

in England and France. Berzeviczy studied at Göttingen from 1784 to 1786. He was deeply influenced there by August Ludwig von Schlözer, both as an historian of Russia and as a protagonist of the enlightened policies of Frederick II and Joseph II. Berzeviczy displayed an eager interest in economic innovations. During his travels in Saxony and Prussia he observed new agricultural techniques, salt mining operations, glass manufacturing, and the methods of textile production. He conceived his favorite economic plan in the course of his travels—the export of Hungarian wines from northern Hungary through Poland to Saxony. His visits to England and France in 1786–87 were also of great significance for his reform ideas. In France he was struck by the gulf between the privileged classes and the mass of the population, while in England he saw confirmed his faith in the possibility of creating prosperity and social improvement for the impoverished classes.

The author seeks to develop two interpretations that call for special comment. She argues that Berzeviczy was personally and politically related to the Hungarian Jacobin Conspiracy of 1794, the detection of which ended reform attempts in Hungary for a generation. Though it seems clear that Berzeviczy had personal relations with those who were later condemned as “conspirators,” all available evidence fails to demonstrate his participation in the movement. The extent of his political activity seems to have been the initiation of the reading society (*Lese-cabinet*) of Buda in 1792 and his personal interest in a scholarly society devoted to Hungarian historical research (*Societas eruditorum*). The second interpretation concerns the author’s attempt to show that Berzeviczy was not really a Josephinist but a true Hungarian patriot. It will be interesting to see how the author interprets Berzeviczy’s writings after 1795 in her projected second volume. Only with the information relating to that period will it be possible to understand Berzeviczy’s political and social views and the meaning of his patriotic commitments.

Western students of Hungarian history will welcome the rich documentation in the appendix, which occupies over 150 pages. It includes two autobiographical sketches in Latin and German, dating from 1802 and 1816, and an extensive personal correspondence of Berzeviczy. A useful index of names has also been included. It is to be hoped that the concluding volume will be as valuable in content and documentation as the present study.

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AZ 1918-AS MAGYARORSZÁGI POLGÁRI DEMOKRATIKUS FORRADALOM. By *Tibor Hajdu*. Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1968. 472 pp. Ft. 50.

A MAGYARORSZÁGI TANÁCSKÖZTARSASÁG. By *Tibor Hajdu*. Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1969. 462 pp. Ft. 52.

AUSZTRIA ÉS A MAGYARORSZÁGI TANÁCSKÖZTARSASÁG. By *Mrs. Sándor Gábor*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1969. 301 pp. Ft. 60.

Until recently the literature on the historical significance and political meaning of the Hungarian revolutions of 1918–19 has posed more questions than it has provided acceptable answers concerning the background, the social, political, and military record, and the intellectual impact of these upheavals. In fact, it may be argued that no other event in modern Hungarian history has been subjected to more partisan interpretations than Count Mihály Károlyi’s so-called October revolution and the Béla Kun-led Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919.

Gyula Szekfű, the leading historian of the Horthy era, dismissed both revolutions as just punishment of a decadent nation that proved unworthy of fulfilling its destiny of moral leadership and political pre-eminence in the Danube basin. The Stalinist Rákosi's historians, on the other hand, were confronted with the dual task of fabricating a heroic historical record from their leader's meager and ideologically quite ambivalent activities during the Soviet Republic and of erasing the memory of Béla Kun, Rákosi's predecessor in the Hungarian party and a victim of the Great Purges. Besides contributing to Rákosi's own rather grotesquely promoted "cult of personality," this exercise in rewriting history also enabled the party to disown two cardinal mistakes of the Commune, to wit, the Communists' "unprincipled" merger with the Social Democrats upon assuming power and the united party's orthodox Marxist refusal to distribute the land among the peasants. Thus relieved of the burdens of the past, Rákosi was free to purge the surviving "old Bolshevik" veterans of 1919, to silence the remaining members of the Kun faction, and to eliminate all socialists from the party after 1948.

The Kádár regime's commitment to de-Stalinization in politics, science, and literature—as well as its desperate search for ideological legitimacy—finally permitted historians to gain access to previously restricted archives and to publish their findings at a politically opportune moment. Kun's rehabilitation on the eve of the Twentieth CPSU Congress and Kádár's subsequent emphasis on the national traditions of the Communist Party aided materially the efforts of the frustrated historians to clear up the prevailing confusion concerning the party's origins and its performance—especially Béla Kun's role—during the formative years of 1918 and 1919.

Ten years, thousands of articles, and scores of documentary collections and memoirs later, Tibor Hajdu, a senior research associate of the Institute for Party History at the Hungarian party's Central Committee, has produced a two-volume, nearly definitive study on the two revolutions. Hajdu's well-written and lucidly argued work proceeds from the sound proposition that despite their failures these revolutions represent a crucial turning point in modern Hungarian political, social, and intellectual history and that, after being cleansed of Stalinist distortions and Rákosi's falsifications, they should become a part of the young postwar generation's political awareness and historical consciousness.

Hajdu is a Marxist and an able historian. This is to suggest that while one often disagrees with his xenophobic interpretation of Hungary's role in the tumultuous European scene of 1918–19 and with his superficial analysis of the contemporary Russian scene—especially the Bolsheviks' factional disputes over matters of revolutionary strategy abroad—Hajdu's narrative on Hungary draws on an astonishing range of published and unpublished sources and omits nothing that has the slightest bearing on his subject. His prodigious research in Soviet, Rumanian, Czechoslovak, and Austrian archives and his meticulous sifting of evidence emanating from Hungarian ministerial, provincial, and factory archives, combined with his remarkably objective reading of the Western literature (he makes extensive use of works by Wandycz, Low, and Spector) have resulted in a factually unimpeachable study that, as long as Western researchers are barred from post-1918 Hungarian archives, will remain the best summary of the events of 1918–19.

Hajdu's new findings consist of a reinterpretation of known events and the offering of new evidence on several points. Unlike earlier works dealing with the leaders and the social forces of the "bourgeois-democratic" revolution of 1918, Hajdu draws a critical, yet in many ways generous, picture of Károlyi, Oszkár

Jászi, Zsigmond Kunfi and their profound dilemmas in attempting to construct a democratic society from the ruins of the militarily defeated and morally bankrupt Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy. Hajdu's research has also unearthed a body of systematically presented economic and social data that go a long way toward explaining the reasons for the rapid radicalization of the masses and the erosion of the Károlyi government's tenuous hold on the war-weary people and intellectuals of the country.

Concerning the origins of the Soviet Republic, Hajdu presents an interesting and, to this reader, entirely convincing case for dismissing the myth of the notorious *Vix aide-mémoire*—an Allied ultimatum that brought down the tottering Károlyi regime. According to Hajdu the essential contents of this document had been known to the Hungarian government at least three weeks before the bloodless Socialist-Communist coup of March 21, 1919. He also tends to be critical of Kun's intransigence in his dealings with the Smuts mission and of his inability to make better use of diplomatic opportunities to ensure the survival of the Commune.

Hajdu's most interesting chapters deal with the cultural-educational dimensions of the two revolutions. Beyond tracing the intellectual transformation of György Lukács, Jenő Varga, and Karl Polányi from middle-class radicalism to revolutionary Marxism, Hajdu is quite persuasive in suggesting that a similar trend was also observable in the works of many previously unrecognized creative intellectuals, scientists, and scholars, such as Béla Bartók, Zoltán Kodály, Karl Mannheim, Sándor Ferenczi, Theodor Kármán, Alexander Korda, Ruzstem Vámbéry, and many others who occupied leading academic or administrative positions during the Commune.

Mrs. Sándor Gábor's monograph (she is also with the Institute for Party History) on the relationship of Austria and Soviet Hungary is a pioneer effort in three respects: (1) it is the first scholarly study of the foreign policies of the Kun regime on the state *and* party level; (2) it is the first in-depth inquiry into the post-World War I dynamics of the Austrian left—Socialist and Communist—by an East European party historian; and (3) it is the first study that offers a convincing explanation of two events that have puzzled historians of the period for some time. We finally have the complete story on the Ernst Bettelheim-led attempted Communist coup of June 15, 1919, in Vienna, which Radek later offered as an object lesson of how *not* to make revolution; we also learn many new details on the circumstances surrounding the escape of Béla Kun and his selected colleagues into Austria after the fall of the Communist experiment in Hungary.

The appearance of these books and several other recently published studies on hitherto sensitive subjects seems to indicate a remarkable revival of the traditionally rather backward and excessively polemical historical scholarship in Hungary. Although one still encounters in these works a fair amount of ideological nonsense and dutifully cited non sequiturs from Marxist classics, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that new methodologies (borrowed from sociology, economics, and even psychology) and the younger historians' growing demands for intellectual honesty and objectivity in historical research may, perhaps in the near future, lead to the publication of a methodologically sound, well-documented body of historical literature that could serve as much needed research and teaching aids for Western students of East European history and politics.

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