

the views of Karl Heim and D. M. MacKay. Heim leaves the crucial notion of 'spaces' too unclear to function effectively as an argument for the claim that science is irrelevant to theology. MacKay uses the logical relation of complementarity, defined as existing between two statements only if they are made from mutually exclusive standpoints. This could occur if religion and science are regarded as belonging to different 'language games', or if religious statements are made from a standpoint of personal commitment whereas scientific statements require a posture of detachment and objectivity. Austin argues that these differences in standpoint are not sufficient to support the claim that scientific statements are irrelevant to theology.

Austin believes, but does not prove, that these arguments for the irrelevance of science to theology represent all the main types, and since none of them can be sustained he concludes that science does in principle bear on theology and so cannot be ignored by theologians. A more positive

approach would be to consider in detail the examples he gives to illustrate the types of relevance, but he does not do this.

The theological doctrine most likely to be affected by science is that of divine providence, and in his final chapter Austin considers how a theologian could take account of scientific results when formulating this doctrine in a contemporary way. He does so with explicit reference to each of the major arguments of the preceding chapters, thus showing how they can be applied in particular instances.

This is an important contribution to a field requiring more systematic treatment. A major defect is the lack of ontological reference: Austin does not say what he believes about scientific and religious truth and its relation to reality. Thus an essentially metaphysical problem is treated in terms of logical analysis; but both natural science and theology are irrelevant if their relevance to being and existence are made irrelevant.

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PROSPECTS FOR THE SOUL, SOUNDINGS IN JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION, by Vera von der Heydt. Darton, Longman & Todd. London, 1976 £2

It has always seemed odd that the Church should try to swallow such camels as Freud and Marx, yet strain at the Jungian gnat. To Freud, after all, as Baroness von der Heydt points out:

"religion was an illusion, the religious man a neurotic; to him the 'Father in Heaven' was nothing but a projected image of the personal parental figures of a psyche which had remained infantile. The aim of his therapy is to release man from this bondage. . . thereby freeing him also from the delusion of a transpersonal, transcendent being."

Jung, on the other hand, was a profoundly religious man who did much to make Christianity accessible and meaningful to "modern man in search of a soul." With a few exceptions, theologians have, however, ignored Jung's insights or rebuffed them with a firm "non tali auxilio."

One difficulty was that Jung seemed to value precisely those elements in the Catholic tradition which the Church itself was on the point of discarding. He stressed the importance of the Church's role as the guardian of myth and ritual, in the full spring tide of reductive demythologiza-

tion. The new consensus that was arising, collectivist, materialist and utopian, had little sympathy with any approach that might be deemed mystical or individualistic. His enthusiastic acceptance of the dogma of the Assumption as proof of the Church's openness to archetypal developments can, for instance, have won him few friends in progressive seminaries over the past quarter of a century.

Yet it seemed at one time that a bridge might be built between Rome and Zurich, and its chief architect was Fr. Victor White O.P., supported by a small group of colleagues in the English Dominican Province. His work is continued—from both sides—in "Prospects for the Soul" by one who practises both as a Catholic and an analyst and knew Victor White and his circle, as well as Jung, during the time of their friendship and collaboration. She attributes her success in conjoining what to many people are irreconcilable opposites to the fact that in Jungian terms she is not a thinking type. This does not prevent her work from being a small triumph of lucidity and simplicity, both as an exposition of Analytical Psychology and, as a

very senior religious wrote to me, "a butress of the Faith,"

Her chapter on alchemy is the clearest and most convincing brief account, in the literature, of the relevance of this arcane and ancient art to the practice of modern depth psychology. She has valuable new insights to offer on the subject of the parent archetype and on that important but little understood concept, the animus. She draws widely from her own experience and does not hesitate to disagree with Jung when this tells her he is wrong, as in the treatment of Catholic patients.

In her practical assertion of the supremacy of individual experience over orthodoxy, Vera von der Heydt is thoroughly Jungian, but is this attitude equally Catholic? To ignore this question is to ignore an important difference of emphasis between Jung's psychology and the traditional teachings of the Church. There are other differences. Jung's insistence on the reality of evil and the necessity of integrating the personal shadow has proved hard to reconcile with the doctrine of *privatio boni* and the quest for perfection. Is the wet, winding, circumambulatory way of individuation with its aim of completeness through the experience of all sides of oneself compatible with the

straight and narrow path? Does Jung's interior ethic, informed by a close attention to the movements of the unconscious, especially as revealed in dreams, tally with conventional Christian morality?

There are, of course, no answers to such questions outside the lives of those individuals who experience them as a reality, but I think they account for some of the reserve and suspicion with which the Church has approached Jung's psychology. It is as though Jung touches the collective psyche of Catholicism on an old complex, dating back to the trauma of its struggle with Gnosticism, and exacerbated by the splitting-off of Protestantism. But complexes are not healed through repression, and it may be that in trying to understand and come to terms with Jung the Church could redeem and integrate precious values that were lost in the old battle for survival, in which both parties fell into one-sidedness. For Jung is no gnostic guru or systematizer, but one who always sought to hold the tension between the opposites. It is one of the chief virtues of "Prospects for the Soul" that it shows how this can be possible.

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THE SEEING EYE, THE SEEING I, by Renee Haynes, Hutchinson & Co. London, 1976. 224 pp.

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The tension implicit in the visual dissection of the title pun (a characteristic of our literate, analytic culture) adequately conveys the effort in Miss Haynes' book to narrow the gap between the transcendental ego and the empirical 'subject', between experience and experiment. Far more than an essay in "Perception, Sensory and Extra-Sensory", *The Seeing Eye/I* is a philosophical investigation of the range of human perception, containing incisive criticisms of both technical and amateur approaches to experience, particularly in the area of para-psychology. This the author is well qualified to do, as the secretary of the Society for Psychical Research and author of previous studies in the same area. While largely based on anecdotal material, Miss Haynes' account draws heavily—and critically—from the wells of laboratory investigation, the literature of which she is thoroughly acquainted with. The anecdotal

material is well authenticated in most instances.

Philosophically in the van of William James, Miss Haynes attempts (and, in my opinion, successfully) to illuminate the meaning of human experience by a descriptive analysis of both ordinary and extraordinary events which reveal the abilities and power of the psyche. Rather than turning either to a minute analysis of the meaning of sentences or to the equally minute dissection of specimens of laboratory behaviour, Miss Haynes, like James and Husserl, prefers to explore the larger structures of 'lived experience'. Hence, in the realm of parapsychology, Miss Haynes must be ranked among the younger, more 'radical' generation of investigators who, dissatisfied with forty years of wearisome laboratory exercises in card-guessing and dice-tossing, have returned to the methods of earlier researchers, armed, however,