

where. Several strawmen are toppled to demonstrate that the relation between socioeconomic and political development is historically contingent. But the analysis underlying this self-evident conclusion incorporates systematic comparison of discrete elements of economic reform and accompanying political developments in the three countries. Students of East European affairs will find this systematic comparison useful.

Quantitative analysis is used in part 3 to examine the rank-order correlation between indices of East European international relations and socioeconomic development, on the one hand, and an index of conformity to Soviet policy, on the other. Some generally accepted hypotheses (the greater the East European trade dependence on the USSR, the greater the conformity to Soviet policy) are confirmed; others (the greater the cultural interaction with the West, the greater the deviation from conformity to Soviet policy) are not. The data base of most of the indices appears sufficient to make the conclusions of interest to students of politics as well as methodologists; the authors have usefully applied quantitative analysis to the data-poor East European political systems. But there are some problems. Indicators of East European declaratory policy cannot, for example, adequately be derived solely from the magazine *East Europe*.

Part 4, "The Lessons of Czechoslovakia for Europe's Security," is (for the nonlayman) the least satisfactory part of the book. A twenty-three-page outline of the Czechoslovak crisis, though competent, can serve the specialist only as an introduction. The final chapter on European security indicates some of the exogenous factors affecting the East European countries (as of mid-1970) but neglects their own perceptions of, and attempts to influence, European security (although the latter was discussed by Klaiber in his 1970 *Problems of Communism* article). The questions about the policy of "bridge-building" posed in the final pages deserve fuller consideration than they receive.

This book is more a collection of studies than an integrated volume. With judicious selection, each of the intended audiences will find it useful. That is both its strength and its weakness.

A. ROSS JOHNSON
The RAND Corporation

THE ROSA LUXEMBURG CONTRACEPTIVES COOPERATIVE: A PRIMER ON COMMUNIST CIVILIZATION. By *Leopold Tyrmand*. New York: Macmillan, 1972. 287 pp. \$5.95.

COMMUNISM: A NARRATIVE HISTORY. By *Robert Goldston*. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1972. 304 pp. \$.95, paper.

Tyrmand begins by writing that "this book does not have any scholarly, publicistic, or journalistic pretensions." He is more than right: the book lacks any scholarly, publicistic, or journalistic merit. What it does contain is old stories, dating from the Stalinist period, arranged to display the trials and tribulations of a Polish intellectual from his birth to his death. Although the old stories are sometimes interesting, on the whole they suffer from overkill. In fact, the author boasts of his "hyperbole of an existing reality" and of his hatred of communism; indeed, this reader gets the feeling that his style of writing flourishes in bloc accounts of life in the West. Why, then, was the book written? The answer is, in part, to alert the

“naïve,” ignorant folk of the West: we need to know the enemy. But surely this sort of writing is obsolete by two decades—despite Tyrmand’s possible experiences in New York intellectual circles! After all, Nixon has gone to Moscow, and few Western rebels look to Soviet society any more for a model of the future.

Three more comments are necessary. First, Tyrmand justifies his book by asserting that he was *there*. But, who hasn’t been there? For decades émigrés from there have come here, and in recent years American graduate students have routinely gone there. Second, Tyrmand denies the uses of objectivity in studying communism, yet the lessons contained in his stories can be found in any textbook on totalitarianism. Third, in his opening sentences Tyrmand confesses to error, then he commits error. But does confession excuse bad work? His book is unnecessary.

In the same measure as Tyrmand’s book is unnecessary, Goldston’s book is needed. His work can be simply described in one word: *rich*. Writing of the Enlightenment or modern pessimism, utopian socialism or Marxism, Russian revolutionaries or the Soviet system, Goldston presents the issues and offers his conclusions. He has written a book which, at 95 cents, should be considered for adoption in undergraduate classes. In commenting on such a rich book, each reader will have different reactions. This reader, of course, would like to offer his own lines of praise. For instance, Goldston summarizes well the failure of Marx’s economic predictions and presents a good running commentary on various intellectual perceptions of “man.” He calls Marxism “a theory of capitalism” and describes its use in industrializing feudal societies by means of what he calls “state capitalism.” He points out that a study of communism becomes a study of Soviet history, and wonders if the Soviet state has become a new possessing class. He also presents his explanation of Stalin’s diplomatic moves before the Second World War and comments on the nature of Castro’s communism. Moreover, an interesting running commentary is provided on the place of the peasantry in various revolutionary calculations.

Naturally, any reviewer will also have his own objections. Did top German capitalists *really* finance Hitler’s struggle for power? Were the purges of the 1930s tied in with Stalin’s switch to a united front policy in 1935? Did the Berlin Wall or the Soviet presence in the Arab world contribute to Khrushchev’s downfall? Does the continual use of the phrase “ruling classes” provide clarity or hide complexities? In any event, Goldston’s book is to be recommended. I only regret that I did not write it.

HARRY KENNETH ROSENTHAL
California State University, Los Angeles

BONN’S EASTERN POLICY, 1964–1971: EVOLUTION AND LIMITATIONS. By *Lászlo Görgey*. Foreword by *Richard L. Walter*. International Relations Series, no. 3. Published on behalf of the Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books (Shoe String Press), 1972. xvi, 191 pp. \$8.50.

Professor Görgey (University of South Carolina) has written a solid, well-balanced study of one aspect of Europe’s most difficult postwar problem, the German question. Personal experience—the author is a Hungarian refugee—and study have caused Görgey to distrust Soviet policy, which he believes is bent upon “political and military hegemony over the entire European continent” (p. 172),