

WLASSOW: VERRÄTER ODER PATRIOT? By *Sven Steenberg*. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1968. 256 pp. DM 18.

VLASOV. By *Sven Steenberg*. Translated from the German by *Abe Farbstein*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970. ix, 241 pp. \$7.50.

Many essays and books have been published—those by Jürgen Thorwald and Alexander Dallin, to mention only two—dealing with the events in the Second World War still connected with the name of Vlasov. This is the first biography of the general. We are indebted to Steenberg for having collected information over a number of years that would raise Vlasov's image and correct the distortions to which it has been subjected since the war. As this effort necessitated placing the main emphasis on his personality, his surroundings have been pushed further into the background than would have been the case in a more balanced account. The author describes, however, how Stalin's favorite and one of the saviors of Moscow became a staunch opponent of the Soviet regime, and what trials of strength Vlasov was exposed to in the tussle between the various forces that streamed around him and within him. His tragedy was a psychological and political drama from which conclusions can be drawn that would relate to future developments.

Vlasov's story will lose none of its importance so long as there is a necessity to determine the role played by the internal opposition in the Soviet Union. Since the subject of Vlasov is often raised in Russia, it apparently belongs to a past which has not yet been finally mastered. Hitler failed to recognize anti-Stalinism, and in 1945 the Western powers overlooked this political potential.

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SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS, 1917–1921. By *Piotr S. Wandycz*. Russian Research Center Studies, 59. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. ix, 403 pp. \$10.00.

Professor Wandycz has at last put the controversial subject of the Polish-Soviet War of 1920, its antecedents and effects, into the proper perspective. It was neither a war of "Polish imperialism" nor an issue of Russian self-determination but a struggle between Warsaw and Moscow over territory of crucial importance to both—that is, the borderlands of Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. To Piłsudski, as to Lenin, the borderlands were the key to the future power status of the country he led. If Russia failed to control these territories, her influence and intervention in Poland and the Baltic States would be blocked and, with it, the highroad to Germany. If Piłsudski succeeded in gaining his objective of linking the borderlands with Poland by way of alliance with an independent Ukraine and federation with Lithuania and Belorussia, he would lay the foundations for the most powerful state in Eastern Europe. As it turned out, Russia suffered only a temporary setback, since Poland lacked the strength and the will to follow where Piłsudski wished her to tread.

Basing his work on much hitherto unpublished archival material, Polish, Russian, and to some extent British, as well as extensive published sources, Professor Wandycz has produced the most significant study of his subject to date. He demonstrates, with chapter and verse, that the Soviet version of self-determination was a farce—in reality an attempt at the federation and then unification with Soviet Russia of all her borderlands, including Poland. The Communist parties in the