

of the different generations to rediscover ways—perhaps many, varied, an overlapping family-pattern of ways—of recalling this wholeness to us?

Objectivity and Human Needs in Marxism

by Adrian Cunningham

'Communism is the solution to the riddle of history, and knows itself to be such'.—Marx, 1844.

Whether marxism poses for itself solutions to the riddles of history, or whether, more narrowly, it is a science of social formations and their transformation, or some combination of the two—these are central issues of contemporary marxist theory. They are focussed in the debate over the work of Althusser, and over the 'neo-hegelianism' of the earlier Lukacs, Goldmann, the Frankfurt School and others (for present purposes I shall collectively describe this latter position as Critical Theory). It is in this context that the old disputes over the relation between the earlier and the later work of Marx remain so important, for they have implications for the orientation, scope and purchase of the tradition as a whole.

Reflexion on these issues is prompted by two recent collections of marxist essays. Whilst Herbert Marcuse's *Studies in Critical Philosophy* (New Left Books, £3.25) provides for the English reader essential material for the assessment of the claims of critical theory, Paul Walton and Andrew Gamble's *From Alienation to Surplus Value* (Sheed & Ward, £5.50) is an attempt to establish the unity of 'the total Marx', *without* falling back on the critical theory tradition. In both texts, however, there are surprisingly similar lacunae and areas of fuzziness, especially over the definition and analysis of human needs. This is a concept basic to the marxist tradition but one which has rarely been satisfactorily investigated, or its crucial and awkward significance grasped (Mascolo, Meszaros, and Kolakowski not withstanding). It is on this question, and the related ones of the objectivity and universality of marxist theory, that I shall concentrate. For it seems to me that, in the final analysis, marxism's claim to objectivity at any significant level is linked to claims about the universality of its

scope, and that both of these can only make sense in terms of a fundamental description and analysis of the nature of human needs. My main point is that an essential component of the problematic of marxism is a response to an historical crisis over the meaning, even the possibility, of objectivity and universality, a crisis registered in the work of Kant and Hegel. And further, that, for all its limitations, critical theory stays close to this essential component and thus poses these difficulties and attempts solutions of them, whilst its contemporary critics—astute and incisive as they frequently are—fail to do so: until this is done, the project of decyphering a ‘total Marx’ cannot succeed.

Critical Theory and the Problem of Objectivity

Critical theory’s reliance upon the hegelian bases (however ‘reinterpreted’) of Marx’s thought, and its consequent preoccupation with the German philosophical tradition, are obvious. The common characteristic of these writers is the inclusion of the universality of range of Hegel’s thought *within* the familiar notion of Marx’s critique of him; they are not necessarily engaged in a simple reading of Marx back into Hegel. This ground has been gone over many times of late, but I want to put it in a particular way to bring out specific themes. That is, to see the connexion between Hegel and Marx as connected with a fundamental revision of epistemology, and thus of the objectivity that can be claimed for thought.

Arising partially, but importantly, from 18th-Century theories of the constitutively social nature of language and of the close relation between language and thinking, there came deep changes in thinking about the self. The self comes to be seen as possible only in relation to other selves, and, for the first time, a wholly intra-human account of the self at its most personal levels becomes possible. This break with religious accounts of the self is of far greater consequence than most of the scientific and materialist critiques of religion frequently adduced. The dialectical nature of the language-thought-reflexion complex, and its inherence in an historical and social context, permits a powerful formulation of the view of human being as *self-making*. But, to insist upon the constitutively active nature of the components of this complex is to raise novel and extreme difficulties about the criteria of objectivity and truth.

The world-constructing nature of human beings gives them a promethean aspect, but insistence upon the historicity of thought threatens to dissolve this into a multitude of fragmentary and incomparable universes of meaning. The implications of this can be seen in at least three respects. First, theories of the intra- and inter-human construction of worlds of meaning remove the traditional locus of objectivity in the absolute archimedean observer envisaged in theistic/

deistic worlds of discourse. Whether or not explicitly believed in, such notions—as part of a cultural framework—did make statements about ultimate objectivity plausible. Secondly, stress upon active construction simultaneously forecloses the possibility of a merely empirical, external neutrality of things and events which might provide an alternative form of objectivity. Nonetheless, it is precisely to this pre-dialectical position that the greater part of the materialist tradition in marxism reverts when it runs into problems over the nature of objectivity. The kind of difficulty here can be seen as early as Marx's attempts to establish a relation between German dialectical concepts and French enlightenment materialism, attempts which he made and re-made in diverse forms throughout his career. Finally, whilst conceptions of human self-making remove fate and providence as constraints upon human development, stress upon the historicity of thought—its very historical and social specificity revealing *discontinuities* between epochs and cultures—tends to deny the possibility of any universal human project which would provide a location for evaluative criteria for historical development overall. It is to this problem that darwinism came as such an acceptable solution, smuggling providence and fate back into social history.

If the archimedean observer and simple empiricism are definitely excluded, and if there is not to be a lapse into some version of Darwinism, then objectivity linked to the notion of a free and universal human project is the only genuine possibility. It is worth noting the equal stress upon freedom and universality required here, and the questions this poses. If the universality of the project is guaranteed by its relation to a single subject, as in Hegel, then the notion of human freedoms becomes problematic. But Hegel had, at least, registered the difficulty inherent in the very concept of human self-making, namely that whilst 'self' makes sense in terms of individual persons, its application to 'humanity' as a whole is highly problematic; yet without this application, it is hard to posit any notion of a collective human project, a universal goal of history. If on the other hand, the universality of the project is related to needs fundamental to all human beings—then in the analysis of such needs, one would have to pose the question (as Marcuse does) whether freedom is itself a need, let alone a universal need. The problem in the marxist tradition here is that a good deal of its theory (no matter whether it be explicitly pro- or anti-hegelian) too quickly, I think, runs together these different issues in the notion of the revolutionary class as a single subject which inaugurates a free universal project by responding to previously frustrated universal, albeit only vaguely specified, needs.

Lukacs in *History and Class Consciousness* attempts to solve the problem of objectivity and universality by reintroducing into marxism the hegelian notion of totality, while eliminating the conservative world-justifying aspect of that notion. He finds a subject that is

historical and world-constructing, yet critical of the established order, by introducing the proletariat as the locus of objectivity, in two different ways. First, in a society of organised conflict the situation of the proletariat provides the only real vantage point for a total social critique and the possibility of social transformation. Secondly, to provide for the universal and trans-historical aspects of marxism's claim, Lukacs replaces Spirit by 'proletariat'; the proletariat becomes, in technical terms, 'the identical subject-object of history'. This superb exercise may offer to solve all the problems, but it does not, in the particular respect I am concerned with here, lead to more than a juxtaposition, or rhetorical fusion, of different senses of the term 'proletariat'. In solving the question of totality, which furnishes the possibility of objectivity and universal history, it does not, except rhetorically, make this identical with proletarian revolution. Contrariwise, the resolution of the problem of proletarian revolution in the leninism Lukacs subsequently adopted leaves the grounding of the claim to universality in abeyance—until, that is, his attempt to rework both sets of problems on the basis of marxist ontology, a dialectics of labour, which occupied his final years, and which Walton and Gamble rightly make the keynote of their evaluation of contemporary marxist theory.

The Elusive Proletariat

The role of the proletariat in Lukacs' work is not peculiar to him; I think that it highlights problems in Marx himself and in marxist discussions that overtly reject Lukacs' version of the tradition. That is, far beyond Lukacs himself, the term proletariat functions as an answer to the questions of objectivity and universality, both questions tending to be subsumed in a view of proletarian revolution as the solution to the riddles of history. But, in many instances, usage seems to rest upon a confusion of, or lack of distinction between, different possibilities of the term. I am not here so much concerned with the empirical description of what, at different times, comprises a proletariat, but rather, whatever its particular content may be, with examining the role the term plays in marxist discourse.

There are at least four major and distinct possibilities of the term, all of them concerned with the connexion between the emancipation of the proletariat and the emancipation of humanity as a whole. Their combination, however, is in no way automatic. 1. There is a descriptive usage which varies according to whether proletariat is used of certain social groups throughout history, or whether it is historically specific to the modern capitalist West. It is around answers to this question that we can discriminate between rebellions, revolts, and different types of revolution (bourgeois, socialist, etc.) and also decide the relation between revolutionary change in the Western and non-

Western worlds. A frequent assumption here being that real socialism is only possible on the basis of abundance, and thus that the developed West is crucial: abundance meaning either material satisfaction, or the possibility of abundance producing expectations which in turn produce a highly advanced socialist consciousness.

2. There is the point that there can be no fundamental social change which does not involve the proletariat. Obviously there can be no transformation of social relations which does not, in a central way, include the proletariat; but, since there can be various sorts of transformation at the level of scarcity in which the proletariat can be betrayed, tricked, bought off, or its self-liberation excluded, it is worth noting separately.

3. There is the claim that the emancipation of the proletariat will be its own work. Now this emancipation may or may not occur in strict conjunction with abundance: a society could be free and egalitarian even if abundance, as typically understood, were absent. To say this is to raise questions about the role of abundance as a goal in the motivation of marxist commitment, and, more basically, to pose the question of 'real' human needs, and how true and false needs are to be discriminated. The notion of self-emancipation directly, and that of abundance indirectly, focus on human goals and projects involving moral, existential, even ontological, questions about 'humanity', its inherent needs and tendencies, the desirability of its free realisation.

4. There is a usage, finally, which is crucial to Lukacs' position: the claim that it is only from the vantage point of the proletariat that a true description of society can be given. The germ of this point, which would include all the variants I can think of, can be put by saying that, in a capitalist society, the proletariat is the only group that does not constitutively *require* illusions about itself (though it may in fact have them) in order to be itself. That is, without ideological self-deception the bourgeoisie, for example, could not retain its social identity; its having illusions is one of the conditions of its being the class that it is.

This fourth possibility of the term has some specific and important advantages. It provides a locus for objectivity or true consciousness against which false consciousness can be measured. And whilst this locus is definite, it is not absolute or metaphysical; there is some promise of avoiding the pitfalls of relativism, absolutism, or naive empiricism. It also involves some complications. In the light of what, more specifically, is true consciousness true? Two answers may be given here. It is true in the light of the contradictions revealed by it in the self-proposed programme of bourgeois freedom. Thus proletarian emancipation is true by its consistent egalitarianism, breaking through the bourgeois proclamation of a theoretical general freedom, and yet necessarily differential freedoms in any particular case. Note that the criterion of truth here is, in the first instance, negative,

and it revolves around consistency. It is thus truth of a restricted or relative kind, unless there is a prior case to show that bourgeois freedom is itself only the highest-stage-but-one of universal human development. The second answer would be a recognition of this; true consciousness is true because it reveals the possibility of the final flowering of human self-realisation. Both answers may, of course, be combined, as I think they are combined in a 'total' reading of Marx. But, note, that whilst the first answer has the merit of immediacy and offers a fairly straightforward chance of confirmation or disconfirmation, it is only the second which would provide proletarian truth with a global overview of previous cultures and make it the heir of past ages, rather than just of the bourgeois capitalist epoch. Finally, one should note that the characteristic which enables this social epistemological use of the term to get going is a distinction between a probable empirical false consciousness in the proletariat and an imputed or ascribed true consciousness of its real needs. This is a useful counter to any crude view of proletarian spontaneity, and would also lead one to be wary of the frequent rhetorical conflation of the two terms (e.g. that revealing reification 'the masses').

A major difficulty, however, resides here. For, as it stands, the position is, thus far, *only a cognitive one*. It may or may not be associated with actual membership of the proletariat, or the 'proletarian movement' or even a commitment to socialism. I stress this because it is frequently fudged into the different view (akin to certain evangelical views of christian self-understanding) that only participation in the movement will provide the possibility of a correct understanding. As a possible example of this sort of slip, take Walton and Gamble in their discussion of Lukacs, where terms shift from :

'the discovery of the class outlook of the proletariat provided a vantage point from which to survey the whole of society' (Lukacs),

which they repeat but adding, as if it were the same thing, that Lukacs' view is based on

'identification with the class situation of the proletariat . . . the class in society that alone can understand society and transform it. (54)

Vantage point for analysis, identification with a class, and classes that can have outlooks and understand things, are *not* the same thing at all.

It is clear that the four roles the term 'proletariat' may have in theory construction which I have mentioned can be combined in a variety of ways. 4 alone could be purely cognitive; 4 and 1 combined could yield Marcuse's one-dimensional society; all of them together might indicate the theory and practice of a free society—though to be substantial it would require further consideration of

needs, projects and ontology. Certainly, without such considerations such a combination could not possibly indicate solutions to the riddles of history. Anyway, none of the combinations is automatic, and slipshod moves, licensed by the waving of 'praxis' like a magic wand, will not do: any move beyond a very low level reallocation of human resources demands the elucidation of needs as a major focus. It is this which, it seems to me, has got lost sight of in the argument over critical theory which explicitly (if not satisfactorily) made such concerns very much part of its point of departure. In fact, it is only in that tradition that, whether justified or not, a direct relation of the four usages seems to work. What has happened is that the critical theory approach has been rejected, *but* the direct relation retained at a purely rhetorical level. If terms like true consciousness, praxis, need, proletariat, are to be related outside the hegelian line, then it can only be done on the basis of explicit and careful elaboration. This has not been done; hence the curious and possibly sinister juxtaposition of rhetoric and 'scientificity' in many current discussions. The ground which would permit genuine unification is simply not there (or not yet there), and thus, paradoxically, the critics of the hegelian line reproduce in their own work precisely the externality and purely cognitive stance of which they accuse the critical theorists; hence perhaps the need for an even greater rhetorical unification to cover the problem.

Marcuse and Historical Imperatives

It is the genuine intractability of these questions of the relations between human needs, objectivity and universality, as much as actual remoteness from the socialist movement, that illuminates the difficulty subsequent critical theory had in making any serious connexion between the revelation of human teleology and total social critique made possible by the proletarian vantage point, and the existing proletarian movement. One should note how the possibility of *One Dimensional Man* is clearly present in 1932.

The factual situation of capitalism is characterised not merely by economic or political crisis but by a catastrophe affecting the human essence; this insight condemns any mere economic or political *reform* to failure from the outset, and unconditionally requires the cataclysmic transcendence of the actual situation through *total revolution*. *Only after the basis has been established in this way, so firmly that it cannot be shaken by any merely economic or political arguments, does the question of the historical conditions and the bearers of the revolution arise* [my emphasis A.C.]: the question of the theory of class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Any critique which only pays attention to this theory, without coming to grips with its real foundation, *misses the point* (29-30).

In the light of the foregoing argument, a simple rejection of this as undigested hegelianism is simply insufficient. That is, whether 'the bearers' of the revolution and the empirical proletariat are always identical is not just a quirk of the ageing Marcuse turning to the drop-outs; it is a possibility basic to the critical theory position, and, if my account here is correct, basic to those questions of universality and objectivity integral to the major claims of marxism. Clearly the later Marcuse may be wrong or premature in his description of new bearers of 'the real and free task of human praxis', but the possibility opened up here of a divergence between proletarian revolution and the bearers of the solution to the riddle of history would remain. And I can't see more than three choices here: either this last point stands; or the universal claims of marxism have to be dropped; or a wholly new theoretical ground for the unification of these problems has to be found. I am not here suggesting which of these choices is the most reasonable, only, that if the problem is not faced then marxist theory is unlikely to break beyond a merely rhetorical and increasingly self-deceptive stance at a very fundamental level.

Studies in Critical Philosophy, from which the above extract comes, is an indispensable addition to the previously translated collection of early work, *Negations*—which together with *Reason and Revolution* represents, to my mind, Marcuse's most enduring work. The earliest essay here, 'The Foundations of Historical Materialism', 1932, is a pioneering study of the, then recently published, Paris Manuscripts of Marx, which raises in brief compass the major problems that are the theme of this paper.

In commenting on Marx's 'The real, active orientation of man to himself as a species being is . . . to begin with, only possible in the form of estrangement', Marcuse notes:

We fail to find an explanation here as to why this is (so); and it is strictly speaking, impossible to give one, for we are confronted with a state of affairs that has its roots in man—as an 'objective' being—and which can only be revealed as such'. (37)

And, elsewhere, on Marx's, 'The rich man is simultaneously the man in need of a totality of human manifestations of life—the man in whom his own realisation exists as an inner necessity, as *need*', he writes, 'Distress and neediness here do not describe modes of man's behaviour at all; they are features of his whole *existence*. They are ontological categories.' (21)

It is the awareness of the fundamental character of need and of the limited utility of the marxist tradition on this that makes Marcuse's later attempt at combining Marx and Freud in *Eros and Civilisation*, not a perversion of his marxism so much as an—albeit rather desperate—attempt to maintain it, rooting human need (and thus the object-

ivity and universality of marxism) at the level of basic instinctive drives.

The last paper in the present collection, 'Historical Imperatives', 1969, taken in the light of the earliest, brings out the remarkable degree of consistency in Marcuse's thought (to his critics this would be a remarkable degree of obtuse idealist fixity). The old problems are not resolved but they are set out in a lucid and precise way :

'To justify the concept of objective historical imperatives, we have to recognise only one fact (or "value") as historical datum, namely, that the dynamic of human existence is self-preservation *and* growth, i.e. not only satisfaction of biological needs but also development of the needs themselves in accordance with the possibilities which emerge in the constant struggle with nature (and with man). . . . If this is the case we can meaningfully speak of growth (in the sense indicated) as a force in history without any teleological and moral connotations, and regardless whether this kind of progress is good or bad, and whether it implies progress in freedom'. (212)

From which it follows, correctly I think, that

'In this conception, freedom does not appear as an historical imperative, in the sense that the prevailing conditions 'prescribe' it as the necessary next (or higher) stage of the development. The prevailing conditions are objectively *ambivalent*. . . .' (214)

Thus the continuing problem of critical theory is put afresh :

'Unless and until it becomes a vital need, restructuring the thought and action, the rationality and sensibility of the individuals, the chains of exploitation will not have been broken—no matter how 'satisfying' life may be. There is no historical 'law of progress' which could enforce such a break : it remains the ultimate imperative of theoretical and practical reason, of man as his own lawgiver'. (223) '(The revolutionary imperative) is indeed not only a political but also (and perhaps even primarily) an intellectual and moral imperative. . . .' (216)

As in *Eros and Civilisation*, as in the 1932 paper, the most consistently marxist of the critical theorists represents a heroic and still incomplete attempt to be attentive to the problematic existential and ontological questions which undergird the tradition as a whole, and the necessity of which most marxists would deny. To underscore the seriousness of the issue raised here is not of course to validate Marcuse's vague political proposals, anymore than agreement with his political critics would mean acquiescence in their 'moral' vacuity.

A Marxist Ontology?

It is this lack of a sufficiently articulated ontology in marxism that Walton and Gamble attempt to rectify. I don't think that their book really has the unity that is implied; it is a set of fascinating papers which illuminatingly rework current issues like Engel's contribution to marxism, the role of Marcuse, Althusser, and Habermas, at an astute and readable level.

Even if rather uneven in quality, the book is possibly the best critical survey of contemporary marxist theory available in a single volume. The section on Althusser is particularly good, taking in writings of his collaborators and followers, it meets his points at a requisitely sympathetic level which Kolakowski's spirited attack a couple of years ago, in my opinion, missed. Again, for the purposes of a thematic review I shall concentrate on a paper which, whilst it is not the strongest, is crucial to the authors' general conception, that is the one on ontology. The very use of the term is, given the prevailing climate, commendable, as is the disciplined élan with which they focus upon it, a focus which however gets fuzzy at significant points. They take from Lukacs' ontology the insistence upon the basically teleological nature of human beings and thus of human science: man is the *only* location of teleology that we know, thus the attempt to make this a universal process is as mistaken in Engels as it is in Aquinas or Hegel. The stress here is, I think, decisive, as is their case (sketched rather than properly elaborated) that it is in this that the unity of Marx's *oeuvre* resides. Lukacs attempts to resolve the basic and genuine problems of hegelian marxism by situating the problem of dialectical epistemology in *History and Class Consciousness* within a dialectics of labour seen as the continuing locus of human self-genesis, self-maintenance, and self-transformation. If sustained this would very much qualify the persistence of the problems in marxist theory I have outlined. And it does not seem to me sufficiently sustained. Their treatment is far too cursory for the importance they rightly claim for the dialectics of labour. The manifold difficulties of any notion of self-genesis, for example, are not even adverted to.

They very clearly distinguish their usage of teleology and totality from the notion of Spirit or expressive totality, but I don't find that they adequately substitute anything for the advantages of the latter in terms of elucidating objectivity and universality, or suggest why a substitute is not required. Here they seem somewhat irresolute, torn between maintaining the importance of scientific (=non-critical theory) procedures and a 'total Marx' (=non-althusserian) ontology. Thus their telling critique of Marcuse does not finally advance beyond the replication of the basic problem of historical imperatives and the contingent, but humanly central, question of freedom that he has outlined. For example, they make a good case for objecting to an element of fixity in Marcuse's view of human needs—and thus his

choice of Freud's economy of the instincts to solve marxist problems—and they counterpose to this Marx's 'open-ended model' (an open-endedness that I don't find readily compatible with the marxian metaphor of 'man's slumbering powers' also quoted which seems rather to betoken an expressive model). As they put the case, I don't see how they avoid reproducing a relativism at the level of human needs which they must, quite rightly, deny at the level of marxist sociology. And if human needs are, without further specification, left 'open-ended' and if the sense of a satisfactory human life lies in the degree of adjustment between expectation and fulfilment then, on a hypothetical if pessimistic view, the ratio could at diverse historical points be the same. In which case, revolutionary effort would be an adjustment of the ratio between expectation and fulfilment; a wholly demanding necessity of existence but not the end of a pre-history as envisaged in that view of the human condition which provides one of the single most important, if often silent, components in the whole commitment to revolutionary socialism.

To illustrate the problem Walton and Gamble are dealing with, consider the following. In their search for the requisite 'clear non-relativistic premises' (83) which are to be found in a dialectics of labour, they object to Marcuse's 'almost metaphysical conception of man's essence as having more potential than society allows him to fulfill' (85). Their counter to this reveals the gap between the situating of a marxist ontology and the claims of marxism as science: 'The forced division between mental and manual labour . . . stands condemned by Marx not because it thwarts the essence of man but rather as one of the miserable yardsticks by which we can demonstrate that capitalism is maintained on a permanent contradiction between the forces of production and the oppressive social relations of production'. (86-7)

This meagre yardstick of 'miserable yardsticks' empties the dialectics of labour as a clue to the whole Marx, and to a marxist ontology, of any relevantly assessable content. In terms of what for example, are the relations oppressive? for, to put it crudely, in a purely developmental scheme there is no clear reason why oppression should be wrong. In a book of such valuable range it may seem unfair to pick up phrases on a few pages—but I think these are representative both of the authors' astuteness in raising major questions, and their restricted success in resolving them.

To emphasise what seem to me major unresolved problems at the heart of marxism is not to suggest that there are any ready-made solutions to hand. It should, anyway, be stressed that the marxist tradition is internal to the formulation of these problems. The difficulties here, then, are not something that can be counterposed to marxism in a simple way as a critique of it. There are, indeed, analogous difficulties in other approaches to the problem of objectivity and

universality in a thoroughly historicised world. But it is in the marxist tradition that historicity in relation to need and to praxis, thus focusing the most insistent and abiding of human problems at the level of science, presents itself most forcibly. These issues may, almost certainly will, finally run beyond the competence of any thinking that could directly be called marxist, but, for the present, it is with reference to this area that they must be pursued. And it is the burden of these reflexions that the pursuit of a marxist framework in which there could be relevant and substantial discussion of human needs, objectivity and universality, is not an eccentric luxury vis à vis politics. Without it, there is no alternative to a continuance of purely rhetorical assemblages of universal claims, scientific method, and basic politics.

A Redeeming Occasion

by Hamish F. G. Swanston

Going to a performance of any opera anywhere—well, almost any opera and almost anywhere, not *Lucia di Lammermoor*, not Glyndebourne—is for me an entrance upon an occasion. An entrance I may make at each performance. An occasion not to be experienced by those who sit amidst contraptions which without a by-your-leave or a letter of introduction thrust the entire chorus and orchestra of La Scala into one's withdrawing room, and which are yet quite unable to bring Parsifal's heavenly voices descending from the ceiling.

This sense of occasion belongs not nearly so much as is popularly believed—by those, for example, who covered the great concrete staircase of the Metropolitan at Lincoln Center with rich red cloth—with chandeliers and plush of a vanishing past, but rather is to be discerned in a common expectation of audience and players and singers. 'It does me good to come here', said my mother during the interval of a recent Covent Garden performance, 'I don't often see so many people looking cheerful. It is not what television suggests to me that the world is like these days'.

Not that opera is to be thought escapist. Contrariwise. The 19th Century convention, for example, of a plot moving along by quick melodramatic incident, like falling in love or shooting a man down, with, before and after the incident, extended arias of comment and interpretation, seems to me not a whit artificial but exactly like the