

Brote's life and public career. His use of them is judicious and reveals both a deep understanding of the period and a sense of history.

KEITH HITCHINS  
*University of Illinois, Urbana*

SVETOZAR PRIBIĆEVIĆ I SAMOSTALNA DEMOKRATSKA STRANKA DO ŠESTOJANUARSKE DIKTATURE. By *Hrvoje Matković*. Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Institut za Hrvatsku Povijest, 1972. viii, 270 pp.

SVETOZAR PRIBIĆEVIĆ U OPOZICIJI (1928–1936). By *Ljubo Boban*. Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Institut za Hrvatsku Povijest, 1973. viii, 286 pp.

These two books, produced at the Institute of Croatian History in Zagreb, are about a Serbian political leader who played a critical role—some would say a fatal one—in the first decade of the newly created Yugoslav state. Matković's volume begins with Pribićević's activities in the days of the creation of Yugoslavia, concentrating in the main on his career as organizer and leader of the splinter Independent Democratic Party, and ends with the abolition of political parties by the proclamation of King Alexander's dictatorship on January 6, 1929. Boban's volume deals with Pribićević in opposition, in large part from his leaving Yugoslavia in 1931 until his death in Prague in 1936. The appendix of Boban's book contains a number of letters between Pribićević and some of his political allies in Yugoslavia. There is a brief summary in English at the end of each volume.

Svetozar Pribićević had a stormy political career, frequently changing direction. He began as an admirer of monarchy and a champion of centralism, but near the end of his life he expounded republicanism and federalism, sometimes bordering on revolution and anarchy. As a Serb from Croatia he convinced Alexander that the Croats recognized only power and respected the tight fist. As the first minister of the interior in the new state, Pribićević, by his centralist actions, offended proponents of local self-government, not only in Croatia but elsewhere as well. This was two years before he collaborated with Nikola Pašić and the Serbian Radical Party to produce Yugoslavia's first constitution (1921), a unitarist document. By 1927 he had formed an alliance with Stjepan Radić, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, a man whom he had earlier publicly despised.

Although these volumes are written from the Marxist point of view, much can be learned from them not only about Pribićević but also about Yugoslav politics in the period covered. Unfortunately, there is much repetition and a great deal of excess verbiage. And there are the myths that die hard—particularly the alleged "Great Serbianism" and "Serbian hegemony." It is high time that scholars who have accepted these myths do some serious research on them. A good place to begin might be the brief portrait of Svetozar Pribićević in *Ljudi, Ljudi . . .*, by Dragoljub Jovanović (Belgrade, 1973), pp. 396–404. Jovanović was an opponent of King Alexander and a collaborator with Radić and other Croatian leaders.

It seems ironic that while the volumes under review depict Pribićević's stormy political past—so much identified by Yugoslav Communists with what they consider wrong in the first Yugoslavia—the authors in the end also portray Pribićević as something of a hero, reporting that when his remains were cremated in

Belgrade after World War II, there was a wreath from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

ALEX N. DRAGNICH  
Vanderbilt University

GREECE AND THE ENTENTE, AUGUST 1, 1914—SEPTEMBER 25, 1916.

By *Christos Theodoulou*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1971. xxxvii, 379 pp. Paper.

The outbreak of the Great War in 1914 placed the Greek kingdom in a harsh predicament. Allied with Serbia in the Balkan Wars it had fought first the Ottoman Empire and then Bulgaria for what remained of "Turkey-in-Europe." Thus Greece's reaction to the war was intimately tied to what its two neighbors would do. In addition, her strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean could only lead to pressures by the great powers as the war expanded and each camp sought to gain more allies. If ever the small state needed wise and vigorous leadership this was the moment. What befell Greece during the next two years is the subject of *Greece and the Entente*.

The author has written a detailed piece based on diligent archival research documenting Greece's relations with the Allied camp. Its scope is limited to the period from the outbreak of the war to the decision by Eleutherios Venizelos to set up a government in Thessaloniki in opposition to that of King Constantine. The chapters of the book are divided according to the various governments that succeeded one another during the period from August 1914 to September 1916.

Greece's success in the Balkan Wars had brought her a sizable portion of territory and heightened hopes of realizing an irredentist dream called the *Megale Idea* (Great Idea). There were still thousands of conationals in the Ottoman Empire, and the expansion of the kingdom to include these people had figured prominently in Greek foreign policy and nationalist thinking for decades. Prime minister from 1910 until the spring of 1915, Venizelos had pursued a careful and intelligent foreign policy during the Balkan Wars. Yet Greece's very success meant that her neighbor Bulgaria was now a revisionist state waiting for a chance to gain what it felt rightfully belonged to it—namely, a large part of Macedonia that was now in Greek and Serbian hands. In addition, Greek-Turkish relations were still strained when the world war began, and the Greek government was sensitive to the position of the Greek population in Anatolia.

Both king and prime minister were fully aware of their country's Balkan and Mediterranean position in relation to its neighbors and the great powers. But they came to different conclusions concerning what Greece's policy ought to be. Theodoulou brings this out clearly, noting the personal preferences of each man and that they reflected to some extent the thinking of larger segments of society. There were strong merits to both positions—the king arguing that Greece must remain neutral, Venizelos avowing that the nation must come out for the Entente. But once the Ottoman Empire, and in the following year Bulgaria, joined the Central Powers the king's position became more difficult to maintain. Theodoulou painstakingly details the hardening of the positions of the king and Venizelos and the increasing Allied pressure on Greece. The dreary record of Entente relations with the kingdom during this period does show the deleterious effect of great power interference in the nation's affairs. Yet it would be unfair to state, as the author