

Colour-touch-taste-smell-sound, why are they together? They are together in one thing. . . . That is the way the apple is; that is the way God made it.' It is at this point that the Berkeleian philosophy, though not paradoxical, though not even incorrect as far as it goes, seems rather too simple. For in talking about 'the apple', 'the thing', 'one', Professor Luce has ceased to talk the language of sense-data; he has begun to use the language of substance and accident, to talk analogically. This chapter on 'Perception of the thing' is an excellent, though unintended, demonstration of the necessity of different language-levels; 'matter' is a contradictory and useless concept precisely because it is thought of at the level of the sensible and yet can never be sensed.

The weakest part of this philosophy is its treatment of causality. 'Matter', it may be agreed, could play no part in energizing the objects of sense; but there is no need to think of causality in nature as merely apparent. It is true that if only mind or spirit is able to inaugurate change, the passivity of nature is immediate evidence for the existence of God; but here if anywhere is a paradox, from the point of view of common sense. An argument from the reality of secondary causality (closely bound up as it is with the notion of substance) is more difficult, but perhaps in the end more plausible.

LAURENCE BRIGHT, O.P.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE. By Jeremiah Newman. (Cork University Press and Mercier Press; 12s. 6d.)

Since the publication of the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* there has been a spate of literature dealing with social justice. Not all writers on the subject are of one mind as to what social justice is and Fr Newman sets himself the task of defining the meaning, scope and foundations of this concept. His thesis is that social justice is identical with the thomistic concept of legal or general justice, the virtue which directs the acts of all the other virtues to the common good. Not every thomist will feel confident that Fr Newman understands the subordination of virtues nor that his exposition of the meaning of legal or general justice is entirely St Thomas. Nevertheless it is a thoughtful, if somewhat uneven, book which will well repay the study of any serious moralist or sociologist.

The whole thesis hangs on the relationship between law, justice and the common good. When the common good is defined as the ultimate end of all social life, which is the beatific vision, and law as the divine order of things towards their ultimate end, it is not difficult to conclude that social justice is that virtue which directs all human things to the common good, in the ruler by making and applying law, which is a reflection of the divine order, and in the subject by obeying. All this is

admirable as a statement of what ought to be the case, but it is perhaps a little remote from reality as it is, or as it ever has been or is ever to be in this world. Who will say that the laws of even the most perfect of human rulers are in every particular a reflection of the divine order? If they are not, are they then not laws? It seems to expect a continuous divine inspiration not only for rulers but for the invisible men who make regulations, to make the most all-pervading of moral virtues consist in obedience to law. St Thomas was a little more subtle when he said that legal justice was the virtue which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good and also said that legal justice was exercised in obedience to law, but he did not say that they both meant the same thing.

It is Fr Newman's view that the concept of legal justice built up by St Thomas was misunderstood by his successors and commentators and finally abandoned by the sixteenth-century writers in face of the all-powerful national state. As to the abandonment by the sixteenth-century controversialists there can be no doubt, but a more complete reading of the texts of the later medieval theologians might lead him to revise his view of their teaching.

URBAN FLANAGAN, O.P.

HERDER ART SERIES: Vol. I, *THE ICON*. Edited by H. Lützel, translated by S. Hackel. Introduction by A. A. Hackel. Vol. II, *MOSAICS*. Edited by H. Lützel, translated by R. M. Bethel. Introduction by J. Kollwitz.

Both these volumes possess similar defects as well as great merits. In both cases the titles chosen are too wide. The *Icon* deals with Russian icons only and the plates reproduce panels from the late fourteenth to the late sixteenth century. The true title of *Mosaics* should be 'Mosaics in Italy from the fourth to the eighth century'. None of the colour plates have been made direct from the paintings or mosaics they illustrate or even checked against them. Fifteen of the sixteen colour reproductions in *Icon* are taken from *The Russian Icon* by Professor Kondakov. All sixteen illustrations in *Mosaics* are reproduced from Dr Wilpert's *Die Romischen Mosaiken und Malereien*. Had they been checked against the originals it would have been noticed that the tints in the Old Testament Trinity in *Icons* represent the panel as it was before its cleaning in Moscow over twenty years ago and that the Old Testament Trinity in *Mosaics* gives a quite misleading impression of the scene in S. Maria Maggiore.

Yet the selections from both volumes are admirable and contain not only some of the most beautiful but also the least known masterpieces of Christian art like the Virgin *Ecclesia* from S. Pudenziana and the icon