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Tsarist and Soviet Elite Administrators

During the past ten years Russian area students have directed increasing attention to comparing aspects of their specialty with those of other social systems. That this interest was so late in developing has caused some of them to be defensive, if not apologetic. Often, however, both practitioners and the critics of Russian area studies have failed to realize that from its inception the field has been devoted to an implicit comparison, not between geographically distinct social systems but between successive periods in the region we have commonly designated "Russia." The failure to note, or at least to stress, this comparative aspect of Russian area studies has many causes, but two stand out. For area specialists, the relation between the Soviet and the prerevolutionary periods was so obvious it scarcely needed emphasis. For general empirical theorists, on the other hand, the problem of temporal boundaries of social systems has rarely been salient. The dominant methodologies for studying pluralistic societies, particularly survey research, in-depth interviews, and participant observation, are by their nature not adaptable to extended historical investigations. Yet the question of temporal boundaries is crucial for systems analysts (especially "structural functionalists"), because tests of the adaptability of systems features depend on the ability to specify system failure.

Precisely because his methodological armory has been understocked, the Soviet specialist has not noticed a significant difference between his way of studying the current social system and the ways used by those studying earlier periods of "Russian" society. In general terms this process of chronological comparison has not been neglected to the extent that it has been, until recently, by students of West European or American society. But the Russian area student comparing the Soviet period with preceding periods has been less inclined to question whether he is examining distinct social systems or merely phases of the same system. To some scholars the question may seem unanswerable, to others insignificant. But this is the kind of question that systems analysis must eventually confront on a general theoretical basis.

For indispensable help in gathering and processing the data used in this article, I am grateful to my assistants, James O'Connor, Gregory Tewksbury, Virginia Parkum, and Jerry Jansen, and most particularly to Brian Silver, who accomplished most of the task of programing. All were supported by various University of Wisconsin programs.

The Russian experience, if examined in a conceptually appropriate framework, is extraordinarily well suited to suggest an answer. The territory of the present Soviet Union is of course nearly the same as that of the tsarist empire for the preceding 120 years, or (to put the matter in a way more precisely relevant to the continuity of the social system) about nine-tenths of the present Soviet generation has four generations of ancestors who lived under tsarist rule. On the other hand, in the October Revolution and its aftermath, this society, while essentially continuous in a spatial and biological sense, experienced a cataclysm of unusual magnitude. Whether in terms of ideological cleavage, elite turnover, or institutional reconstruction, it is hard to find another modern society which has experienced such a break. Tentatively, one may consider this experience a limiting case: if there is a Russian social system that has persisted, one will be inclined to assume that other areas with essential continuity of area and population in recent centuries have also constituted single social systems.

Progress in resolving the question of continuity depends on detailed examination of specific aspects of the two societal periods, rather than simple deduction from theoretical principles or comparison of very general statistical indicators. To be sure, there is nothing novel in this view. Over a decade ago Cyril E. Black's *Transformation of Russian Society* presented the monographic comparisons of more than thirty contributors.¹ Other studies of the period, notably Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, demonstrated elements of continuity by using more precise indicators, such as intergenerational continuity in education and social status.² The findings reported in the present article are an effort to extend this comparison to another significant area of societal relationships by establishing similar, relatively precise indicators. Earlier, we referred to wholesale elite turnover as a familiar, gross criterion for suggesting a break between the tsarist and Soviet periods. In terms of individual movement, this turnover is indisputable. But the rise and the removal of individuals are not the only relevant aspects of elite composition. Patterns of recruitment and socialization for elite roles and career patterns related to those roles are equally significant. Even if there is a drastic one-time turnover in occupants of elite roles, such patterns may become re-established. If they do, the similarity of patterns indicates that broader elements of societal continuity are present, though many more indicators from other aspects of societal life would be needed to establish system continuity.

Choice of both the elite groups to be examined and the characteristics of

1. Cyril E. Black, ed., *The Transformation of Russian Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

2. Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959; reprint, New York, 1968), pp. 81 ff.

the groups used as indicators are severely restricted by availability of data. To provide a significant basis for comparison, the groups must occupy equivalent situations in their respective social structures. There is no assurance that elite groups occupying the same formal institutional positions will in fact occupy similar societal situations; in the present comparison the "elite administrators" selected did not in fact occupy formally equivalent positions as administrators. While members of the tsarist group were formally designated as administrators, the most significant Soviet officials are Communist Party officers, who are not administrators according to formal criteria of appointment (nominally all party secretaries are elected) or authority (nominally party officials are "political" rather than administrative, and play coordinating rather than administrative roles). But sufficient previous investigation has been carried out for both groups to determine that in fact their duties are very similar—provision of policy advice to an autocratic ruler or a small ruling council, supervision of central ministries of a general or economic nature, and territorial governance.³ In other words, it is reasonably well established that the roles of the two groups in decision-making and policy implementation are equivalent. This equivalence is most easily demonstrated for the territorial governors, who are part of any large, highly centralized political system. Consequently, although more extended comparisons will be feasible at certain points, the present study will focus on the characteristics of the principal territorial governing officials under tsarist rule and the Soviet regime.

3. The two leading comparisons of tsarist and Soviet administration are Alf Edeen, "The Civil Service: Its Composition and Status," in Black, *Transformation of Russian Society*, pp. 274–91; and Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case," in Joseph La Palombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 233–67. Neither article is much concerned with administrative backgrounds; instead both concentrate on organizational and legal questions and on the role of the mass of lower officials. Sources on the tsarist administrative elite are generally scattered and unsystematic. Notable exceptions are Erik Amburger, *Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Russlands vom Peter dem Grossen bis 1917* (Leiden, 1966); Iurii Got'e, *Istoriia oblastnogo upravleniia v Rossii ot Petra I do Ekateriny II*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1913, 1941); N. F. Demidova, "Biurokratizatsiia gosudarstvennogo absoliutizma v XVII–XVIII vv.," in *Absolutizm v Rossii (XVII–XVIII vv.)* (Moscow, 1964), pp. 206–42; Hans Joachim Torke, "Das russische Beamtentum in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, 13 (1967): 7–345; Walter M. Pintner, "The Social Characteristics of the Early Nineteenth-Century Russian Bureaucracy," *Slavic Review*, 29 (1970): 429–43; and five works by Marc Raeff, "L'État, le gouvernement et la tradition politique en Russie impériale avant 1861," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 9 (1962): 295–307; "Home, School and Service in the Life of the 18th Century Nobleman," *Slavonic Review*, 40 (1962): 295–307; "The Russian Autocracy and Its Officials," *Harvard Slavic Studies*, 4 (1957): 77–91; *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth Century Nobility* (New York, 1966); and *Michael Speransky, Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772–1839* (The Hague, 1957). The most important of the more numerous treatments of the Soviet administrative elite are referred to below.

This article is an examination of backgrounds and career patterns, not a study of the powers of the *gubernatory*. A discussion (comparable to Philip Stewart's and Jerry Hough's treatment of the obkom first secretary)⁴ of the extent to which the tsarist chief territorial officer controlled aspects of governmental and paragonovernmental activity in his territory would have to be very lengthy. As these authors and others have shown, even during the relatively brief period since 1938, the responsibilities and powers of the obkom secretary have varied considerably. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, fluctuations in the powers of the *gubernatory* were even greater. Not only would an effort to delineate these changes greatly transcend the scope of this article, but in view of the scarcity of monographic studies, any discussion of changes in *exercise* of these powers would be inconclusive. The following remarks, therefore, are designed only to show that the roles of *gubernator* and obkom first secretary were, in a very general way, equivalent.

As the title of a recent study of the Soviet territorial secretaries suggests, the present system bears close resemblance to the "prefectural" type of territorial control. In this system, which originated in the Roman Empire (there were, of course, forerunners such as the Persian satraps) and is prevalent today in Latin Europe, full powers of coordination and execution are assigned to a single official as long as he enjoys the confidence of the central authorities.⁵ As an émigré informant told Merle Fainsod, paraphrasing a well-known Russian proverb, the obkom first secretary is, on a small scale, "God and Tsar in the oblast."⁶ The real position of the tsarist governor was strikingly similar, despite the wide disparity in formal authority: Iurii Gotie, the foremost student of the eighteenth-century imperial territorial administration, used the words of the same proverb: "God is on high, and it is far to the Tsar, far also to the instrument of the Tsar's power; in the province, in the *guberniia*, in the *uezd*, the administrator, however he was called, felt himself to be Tsar and God. . . ."⁷

Undoubtedly there were periods when central control was less effective under the tsarist regime than Soviet control has been so far.⁸ Usually, however, the top central authority (the personal or collective leadership in the USSR, the tsar and/or his principal advisers) maintained ultimate control

4. Philip D. Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union: A Study of Decision-Making in Stalingrad* (Indianapolis, 1968).

5. An early observer of the similarity of the Russian system and the French prefectural system was Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians*, 3 vols. (New York, 1893-96), 2:89. Recently Jerry Hough discussed the comparison at greater length in *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 3-7.

6. Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 225.

7. Got'e, *Istoriia*, 1:204.

8. Raeff, *Michael Speransky*, p. 283.

over top territorial officials through the power of appointment and removal. Thus under Soviet rule the territorial first secretaries have always been in the *nomenklatura* of the Central Committee. Similarly, the tsars, although formally delegating the power of appointment of lower territorial governing officials to the Senate Heraldmaster, at least nominally retained the power of appointing *gubernatory* personally.⁹

There is no doubt that the multiplicity of central directing agencies complicated the situation in St. Petersburg as in Soviet Moscow.¹⁰ A certain tendency to remove major economic directing agencies from the *gubernator's* control points to a future major restriction on the territorial official's power under the more developed Soviet economy.¹¹ For example, the Urals mining and metallurgical authorities were autonomous of local territorial authorities for a period of decades beginning in the 1730s. A century later central railroad officials were able to push through decisions against the will of territorial officers as high as the governor-general level.¹² Under both Soviet and tsarist rule the political police maintained, of course, independent channels of command which served as an important check on the autonomy of the territorial governing officials.¹³ In some ways the tsarist governor derived greater powers from his role as commander of the provincial military forces, for there has always been a strict separation of the role of party territorial secretary and Soviet military district commander. The important function of military procurement was, however, placed under a separate authority at an early stage (1711) of tsarist administrative evolution, because procurement by local officials was inadequate.¹⁴ Conversely, one must note that the Soviet party official has

9. Demidova, "Biurokratizatsiia," p. 232. Of course, the degree to which the tsar was personally involved in selecting *gubernatory* varied greatly.

10. Got'e, *Istoriia*, 1:385 ff.

11. With certain exceptions the crucial heavy industrial and transportation facilities have not been under the obkom secretary's jurisdiction. See especially Hough, *Soviet Prefects*; Jeremy R. Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966); and John A. Armstrong, "Party Bifurcation and Elite Interests," *Soviet Studies*, 17 (1966): 417–30.

12. Roger Portal, *L'Oural au XVIII^e siècle: Étude d'histoire économique et sociale* (Paris, 1950), pp. 105 ff.; N. A. Kisilnsky, *Nasha zheleznodorozhnaia politika po dokumentam arkhiva komiteta ministrov: Istoricheskii ocherk* (St. Petersburg, 1902), sec. 1, p. 86.

13. Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, chap. 13; Sidney Monas, *The Third Section: Police and Society in Russia Under Nicholas I* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), p. 71.

14. D. A. Skalon, ed., *Stoletie Voennago Ministerstva, 1802–1902: Glavnoe intendantskoe upravlenie* (St. Petersburg, 1903), pp. 5, 11. The relation of the *gubernator* to military activities is one of those highly complicated and variable aspects of his powers which, as indicated earlier, transcend the scope of this article. Although a separate military procurement system existed, the *gubernator* was heavily involved in the equally important task of recruitment. The extent of his troop command functions varied enormously. During the reign of Nicholas I many officials were specifically designated "military governors"; in some instances there was a military governor and a civil

exercised a limited influence over troop formations stationed in his territory. During World War II it was customary for top territorial officials (for example, Khrushchev, Brezhnev) to become political officers at commands operating near their territories. In peacetime the party has insisted (as in dismissing Marshal Zhukov as minister of defense) that close cooperation in troop indoctrination be maintained between local military commands and territorial party organizations.¹⁵

At first glance one might conclude that the far greater number of territorial governing officials in the Soviet Union (on a territory, as noted, roughly equivalent to that of the later tsarist empire) indicates that the relative power of the Soviet officials is diluted. In 1966 there were 153 units in the USSR, whereas the average number of major units in the empire was about forty.¹⁶ Since, as indicated below, this study must use a considerable range of disparate aggregate data, the large Soviet group must be taken as a basis for comparison at many points. It should be noted, however, that the variation in importance of the Soviet units is immense. If one were to exclude autonomous (nationality) region obkom first secretaries and first secretaries of the small obkoms in Union Republics other than the Ukraine and the Russian Republic (RSFSR), one would reduce the units to ninety-one, only a little over twice the tsarist average.¹⁷ Even leaving the basis of comparison as initially indicated,

governor in the same *guberniia* (we have included both in our sample). Usually, however, any governor had at least a local detachment of troops under his direct orders, and governor-generals in frontier areas sometimes commanded entire armies. See especially N. P. Eroshkin, *Ocherki istorii gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii* (Moscow, 1960), p. 222.

15. John A. Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1961), pp. 143, 319.

16. Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union*, p. 141.

17. I describe the construction of my sample of tsarist officials in detail in "Old-Regime Governors: Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Attributes," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 14 (1972): 2-29. The discussion is too lengthy to be repeated here. Among the most relevant points I make are the following ones: (1) The *gubernatory* considered do not include those in outlying, predominantly non-Russian areas; consequently the *gubernator* sample used in this article is less affected by nationality factors than Stewart's and may more closely resemble the Ukrainian-RSFSR obkom secretaries. (2) Both the "obkom first secretary" and the "*gubernator*" categories include territorial officials of equivalent authority but formally different designation (e.g., *kraikom* first secretaries, governor-generals). (3) Stewart considers his total sample of 377 obkom first secretaries to include about 80 percent of the universe (holding office 1950-66), with a slight bias (useful for my purposes) in favor of the larger RSFSR obkoms (p. 141); on the other hand, using various estimates of the universe of *gubernatory*, I estimate my sample (415) to be about two-thirds of saturation. (4) My larger sample of 1,417 tsarist elite administrators (including *gubernatory*) was derived from the same sources and constructed in the same manner as the *gubernatory* sample, except that all persons listed in the sources as having held high civil administrative posts approximately equivalent to those usually held by members of the first four *chin* (ranks) were included—with a man counted as a civilian if he ever held a high civil *chin*, whether or not he had also had a military *chin*. (5) In most cases data on particular subjects, such as age levels,

however, one may well consider that the immense increase in the country's population and economic activity, to say nothing of the expanded authority of the governing official, justifies the conclusion that the range of authority of the Soviet official is roughly equivalent to that of the tsarist official.

As all students of Soviet affairs realize, the available data on officials, even as high as the territorial first secretaries, are severely limited. Biographical data on tsarist officials are frequently somewhat more abundant; nevertheless, the categories for which information is generally available are very restricted. In a comparative study of two groups, however, categories are necessarily limited to the small number for which information is available on *both* groups. In the present case, this factor limits quantitative data to the categories of social origin, age at initial appointment to governing post, type of formal education, career experience in central and territorial posts, length of individual terms of office, and total tenure in governing office. The comparability of categories is also limited (to a minor extent) by the use of aggregate data. For the USSR, apart from a limited range of data on Ukrainian obkom secretaries, reliance has been placed on data reported aggregately in several excellent secondary studies. Most of the tsarist data have been collected by the present writer and his assistants. Since, however, the data were coded and programed for a broader, comparative study of European administrative elites, it was impractical to adjust the subcategories to correspond precisely to those of the aggregate Soviet data. For example, the five-year age intervals (e.g., forty-one to forty-five) selected as most useful for comparison with West European data do not precisely correspond to those (e.g., forty to forty-four) employed by some students of Soviet obkom first secretaries. Since the unavoidable uncertainties concerning data relating to such different groups and historical periods make it essential to attribute significance only to striking similarities or gross differences, such minor disparities in data comparability did not appear sufficient to warrant the inordinate costs involved, at this stage, in recoding and recalculating the tsarist data.

A more fundamental problem in precise comparison of elite indicators arises from the lack of general criteria for suggesting what differences should, in fact, be considered significant. Is, for example, a difference of one and one-half years in term of office large in relation to the range experience of modern systems? Or is the difference so small that it indicates close similarity in the systems under consideration? Because of the formal and historical similarities, baselines derived from studies of Continental European systems would appear to be more useful for studying periods of Russian society than those derived from studies of English-speaking countries. This is especially true of the

are less available than the overall data, hence N's (as indicated in the tables) are much smaller. Further details on the tsarist data bank are available from the Social Science Data and Program Library Service, University of Wisconsin. After December 31, 1972, the machine-readable data will be available under the usual conditions.

administrative subsystem, since the formal structure of all Russian administrations has owed far more to the Continental models than to the Anglo-Saxon ones. Continental comparisons are particularly useful in considering the territorial governorship, for the prefectural type common to Latin Europe and Russia has no counterpart in the English-speaking world. Unfortunately, no general comparative studies establishing such baselines exist for the indicators considered in the present study. The writer must, therefore, point out that completion of his larger study, which is intended in part to suggest such baselines, may require revision of his present, tentative conclusions concerning the relative similarity and dissimilarity of the Soviet and tsarist administrative elites.

Finally, one must emphasize that the present study is in no way a *genetic* investigation of the evolution of elite administrative patterns. Before we can comprehensively assess the *influence* of tsarist patterns upon Soviet administration, detailed studies of the actual transition, ministry by ministry and province by province, are needed. Surely the lack of such monographs is one of the most serious omissions of Russian area studies.¹⁸ Lacking such a foundation, the present study may suggest possible influences, but it is entirely incapable of tracing them.

In this study, the period of tsarist rule considered (1762–1881) has been chosen largely as a matter of convenience. For the high-level administrators studied (particularly *gubernatory*) the best published biographical reference is the *Russkii Biograficheskii Slovar'*, which does not provide extensive coverage after Alexander II's reign. For the reigns just before Catherine II's, elite biographic data are sparse. Soviet data, on the other hand, which we have drawn from secondary sources, are for the most part confined to the 1950s and 1960s, with a smaller portion relating to the period after 1938. The omission of the last generation (1881–1917) of tsarist administrators has no theoretical justification from the standpoint of the present study. The omission of the first generation (1917–38) of Soviet officials, on the other hand, while also convenient from the point of view of available data, may be justified theoretically on the ground that our concern is with regular and recurrent patterns of elite administrative characteristics. The Old Bolshevik generation was a "revolutionary elite" with a wide range of special characteristics, which makes it more suitable for comparison with revolutionary elites elsewhere than with regular administrative bodies of the prefectural type.¹⁹

An unavoidable difficulty arising from the limitation of the Soviet data to a

18. At least one such study, by Steven Sternheimer, is in progress in the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.

19. See particularly the discussion in Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford, 1952).

single generation of elite administrators is the difficulty in establishing trends of comparable significance. Although there has been a great turnover in obkom first secretaryships and other elite posts, the incumbents have been drawn predominantly from the generation which began official careers in 1938. The problem can be partly resolved by breaking the tsarist data down into four periods, or generations, roughly corresponding to the four major reigns between 1762 and 1881. Whether this solution produces "generations" comparable to the "men of '38" in the recent Soviet system is a question which will be treated in the discussion of tenure and turnover below.

Several studies (taking into account possible exaggeration by biographies) have established that the present Soviet elite administrators are predominantly of peasant or manual-worker parentage, with the former considerably more important.²⁰ In his recent intensive study of groups of central and provincial officials, Walter M. Pintner shows that early in the nineteenth century a large percentage of the top level was composed of sons of noble and officeholding fathers, and that the proportion had grown considerably by mid-century.²¹ At first glance, then, one would assume that recruitment was a more significant factor in shaping the tsarist administrative elite. Frequently such recruitment from a narrow social base serves as a substitute for special socialization for elite roles, since the upper-stratum family can be counted on to perform most of the socializing. Other evidence indicates, however, that familial socialization was rudimentary in eighteenth-century Russia. A major aim of the regime was to remove boys from their "barbarous" family environment during early adolescence in order to socialize them for government service. Socialization was carried on in a variety of institutions, many of which were designed to train boys for specific branches of the civil or military service. More generally, however, as Marc Raeff has pointed out, "school took the place of home" and "fellow students and the more popular teachers became the real family."²² During the nineteenth century the role of higher educational institutions gradually increased, but higher education was a comparatively infrequent experience until mid-century.²³

20. Grey Hodnett, "The Obkom First Secretaries," *Slavic Review*, 24 (1965): 643; John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York, 1959), p. 19.

21. Pintner, "Social Characteristics," p. 437.

22. Raeff, "Home, School and Service," p. 301. I discuss familial socialization at greater length in "Old-Regime Governors."

23. Pintner, "Social Characteristics," table 5, p. 434, shows that by the mid-nineteenth century nearly half of the officials sampled had higher educations, but table 12, p. 440, indicates that the proportion dropped sharply among those who started their careers before 1839. As his table 11, p. 439, indicates, high officials at the center were much likelier to have higher educations than lower officials, but high territorial officials were no

During the formative years of the present Soviet elite, such deliberate efforts to wean boys away from their families were neither feasible nor necessary. In contrast to the narrow tsarist recruitment base, the Soviet recruitment base of workers and peasants constituted the overwhelming majority of the population in the years immediately after the Revolution when most of the present elite were entering adolescence. Evidently only a small minority of boys of this class began the path of upward mobility. For a considerable but decreasing proportion of those who did move upward, no formal socialization process was involved. They pursued manual-labor careers as peasants, workers, or soldiers until chance, outstanding ability, or political agility recommended them to the attention of leaders of the Old Bolshevik generation.²⁴ Only after some years of service in low and middle-level administrative posts (in the party or the state) were they sent to special party schools for intensive training. Although the socialization in these schools was significant, one may assume that basic attitudes toward administrative careers were formed during the earlier period of on-the-job experience.

More recently, Soviet elite administrative career patterns have usually included an extended period of formal higher training before, or soon after, career service entry. Philip D. Stewart's study of obkom secretaries (1950–66) indicates that about half had higher educations, other than party schools and agricultural institutes (which were more frequently a kind of supplementary adult education).²⁵ George Fischer's more diverse sample of "top executives" showed 43 percent with higher education (other than party or agriculture) in 1958, rising to 48 percent in 1962.²⁶ If one assumes that attitudes toward careers were heavily influenced during the years of formal schooling (though probably more by associations in groups like the Komsomols than by formal instruction), the Soviet pattern becomes more similar to the tsarist. It is obvious that only a small proportion of young men who have passed through higher educational institutions in recent decades reach elite administrative

more likely to have higher educations than were central officials in general. The data in my table 4 (below) are too biased in favor of those reporting educational background for published biographies to be of any use in determining average educational attainment.

24. Hough, *Soviet Prefects*, chap. 3; Armstrong, *Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, pp. 31 ff., 48–50; Ellen P. Mickiewicz, *Soviet Political Schools* (New Haven, 1967).

25. Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union*, p. 149. My somewhat arbitrary decision not to classify any training in agricultural institutes as "higher education" is contrary to Stewart's practice, and also to that of other authors such as George Fischer, *The Soviet System and Modern Society* (New York, 1968). I am influenced by the facts that (1) some of the agricultural institutes were (especially in the 1920s and 1930s) very much lower in terms of stringent, modern educational standards than institutions such as engineering schools, and (2) the terms in agricultural institutes were, like party schooling, often intercludes in adult careers.

26. Fischer, *Soviet System and Modern Society*, p. 103 (data recalculated).

status. As Stewart correctly points out, the chances of even a few “old boys” from any particular institution attaining high posts are slight.²⁷

The chance that a tsarist secondary school graduate would attain a high civil post (by very rough estimate) was forty times greater than for the Soviet graduate of a higher educational institution. From this standpoint, the tsarist institutions—as one might expect from their upper-class nature—were more stringent screening mechanisms. To put the matter another way, by the time that he had been graduated from secondary school, the future high civil servant was already a member of a much more select group, compared with the total population, than is the top Soviet official when he is graduated. Insofar as selectivity in recruitment is a substitute for in-service socialization, one would expect, therefore, that in spite of the low level of familial socialization, the in-service socialization would not need to be as extensive under the tsarist system. That this is in fact true is suggested by two types of evidence: (1) the observations quoted above concerning the lasting impact of tsarist school socialization, and (2) the intense concern of the Soviet regime to provide systematic in-service socialization experiences. But from a broader comparative perspective one may question whether the Soviet and tsarist systems were as remote in that regard as the discussion to this point suggests. If the Soviet pre-entry educational process is grossly unselective, even the tsarist process was very unselective compared with certain West European systems. Although unfortunately we cannot at this time attempt quantitative comparisons, there is abundant general evidence that during some periods certain West European educational institutions (notably public schools like Eton, some Oxbridge colleges, the *Grandes Écoles*) have “assured” their graduates a much greater chance of rising to top civil posts than the tsarist institutions did. In general, in sharp contrast to Soviet procedure and (though to a lesser degree) to the tsarist system, the French and British systems have stressed rigorous admission procedures as a substitute for weeding out candidates for high administrative posts at subsequent stages of their careers.

The results of the different approaches might be expected to show up most clearly in comparing age levels for attaining high posts. All other things being equal, the more rigorous the entrance requirements the earlier the age at which administrators can be entrusted with elite roles, since the socialization process can be abbreviated. Although the groundwork for such a comparison on a cross-cultural basis remains to be done, the comparison within the Russian situation alone is suggestive. As table 1 shows, the average age (on entering office) of top territorial governing officials under both the Soviet and the tsarist regimes is strikingly similar. The similarity is even closer if one considers only tsarist career civil servants attaining such posts; and the average does not vary sig-

27. Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union*, p. 145.

Table 1. *Average Age of Elite Administrators at Initial Entry into Top Position Indicated^a*

Administrators	Date Post Attained	Average Age	N
Soviet obkom first secretaries	—	44.6	155
Soviet obkom first secretaries with "industrial-technical" higher education	—	45.3	51
Tsarist <i>gubernatory</i> , total sample	—	47.3	297
	1762–1800	47.6	88
	1801–1825	45.0	67
	1826–1855	48.3	89
	1856–1881	48.0	53
Tsarist <i>gubernatory</i> with civil <i>chin</i>	—	44.8	111
	1762–1800	46.3	24
	1801–1825	42.3	39
	1826–1855	46.7	33
	1856–1881	44.6	15
Tsarist elite administrators, on attaining fourth <i>chin</i> , total sample	—	42.3	690
	1762–1800	39.4	145
	1801–1825	39.8	122
	1826–1855	44.0	270
	1856–1881	44.1	153
Tsarist elite administrators, on attaining fourth <i>chin</i> , with civil <i>chin</i>	—	44.2	363
	1762–1800	43.4	59
	1801–1825	41.8	69
	1826–1855	44.8	147
	1856–1881	44.7	88

^a Soviet data recalculated from Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union*, p. 156; tsarist data compiled by the present writer.

nificantly throughout the 120 years examined. It is true that an examination of the distribution of ages of those entering these posts (table 2) suggests that the general averages conceal somewhat greater variation, with the tsarist officials tending (though the tendency is largely eliminated by disregarding men of military background) to start their governorships more frequently after the age of fifty.²⁸ When compared with Fischer's sample of top Soviet administrators, the variation is much more marked for all high tsarist officials sampled. Fischer shows an age distribution, on attaining high posts, very similar to that of both obkom secretaries and *gubernatory* of civil background. High tsarist administrators, on the other hand, much more frequently attained high rank (fourth *chin*) before forty. However, high administrators with civil *chin* in the later nineteenth century had age profiles much closer to the Soviet top executives.

28. My data in table 1 may be compared with Pintner's table 6, p. 434. Considering his "top central officials" only (his top territorial sample is too small to be useful), and assuming (somewhat dubiously) that each year-contingent is equal, approximately 24 percent of his sample were forty or under, 36 percent forty-one to fifty, and 41 percent

Table 2. Age Distribution of Elite Administrators at Initial Entry into Top Position Indicated (in percentage)

Administrators	Forty or Younger	Forty-one to Fifty	Fifty-one and Older	N
Soviet officials:				
Top executives ^a	20	66	14	306
Obkom first secretaries, 1950–1966 ^b	26	60	14	171
RSFSR obkom first secretaries, 1955 ^c	49	48	3	35
RSFSR obkom first secretaries, 1961	36	53	11	56
RSFSR obkom first secretaries, 1966	8	65	27	49
Tsarist <i>gubernatory</i> , total sample:				
Total sample	20	49	31	297
1762–1800	23	41	36	88
1801–1825	28	51	21	67
1826–1855	12	55	33	89
1856–1881	17	51	32	53
Tsarist <i>gubernatory</i> with civil <i>chin</i> :				
Total sample	23	59	18	111
1762–1800	21	50	29	24
1801–1825	33	59	8	39
1826–1855	15	61	24	33
1856–1881	20	67	13	15
Tsarist elite administrators, total sample ^d :				
Total sample	41	43	16	743
1762–1800	56	32	12	145
1801–1825	58	30	12	122
1826–1855	32	51	17	270
1856–1881	33	48	19	153
Tsarist elite administrators with civil <i>chin</i> :				
Total sample	33	46	21	386
1762–1800	37	37	26	59
1801–1825	48	36	16	69
1826–1855	27	53	20	147
1856–1881	31	50	19	88

^a Fischer, *Soviet System and Modern Society*, p. 53, recalculated; the age groups for these data are “under 40,” “40–49,” and “50 and older,” which leads to a slight bias in favor of younger groups when compared with the other data used in table 2.

^b Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union*, p. 157, recalculated.

^c Ibid., p. 166. Data are for ages of obkom first secretaries occupying posts in the year indicated in this and the next two listings. Estimates of age at initial occupancy have been made by assuming that on *initial* entry into the post the secretaries had been one age-group lower than Stewart’s data indicate. This assumption of course renders the calculation extremely tentative.

^d The “total sample” for “tsarist elite administrators” and for “tsarist elite administrators with civil *chin*” includes some men who entered high posts before 1762, and is therefore larger than the sum of the N’s for the periods indicated. In both cases (as in table 1) the criterion for elite status for these groups is the attainment of the fourth *chin*.

fifty-one or older. He used all persons with fifth *chin* or above, while I used only those at fourth *chin* or higher; hence his sample should have been younger. On the other hand, apparently the age he gives is the age of the officials at the time the official census was taken. For a large number this would be many years after attainment of the fifth *chin*, whereas the ages in my sample are at attainment of the fourth *chin*.

In view of the frequent observation that the Soviet elite has been growing steadily older since the Great Purges (1938),²⁹ it is, of course, possible that even the relatively slight variations just noted will be leveled out. The problem is part of the broader difficulty mentioned above of comparing several generations of tsarist officials to a single generation (and one that has not yet run its full course, at that) of Soviet administrators. As the distribution of RSFSR obkom first secretaries (table 2) suggests, even between 1955 and 1966 the number of older men attaining office increased drastically to a point equaling the higher levels of older entrants to tsarist high posts, while younger Soviet entrants decreased to a level far lower than that observed at any point in the tsarist period.

With the minor reservations just noted, one may conclude that under both the tsarist and the Soviet systems men under forty do not usually attain high posts. On the other hand, those attaining such posts (for the first time) after fifty are also a minority. Rather more than half of all entrants to such posts are in their forties, with (excluding military men) the average tending to fall very close to forty-five. From the standpoint of socialization, one may therefore conclude that entrants to high office have had a protracted period of in-service socialization, whether or not their preservice socialization was intense. One would further expect, therefore, that experiences during the service career would constitute a substantial part of the total socialization experience, whether (as in the Soviet period) such socialization was carefully structured or not.

It is difficult to proceed from this generalization to a closer comparison of the nature of in-service socialization. Perhaps the single most significant characteristic of the tsarist upper administration was the heavy military influence. As table 3 indicates, most *gubernatory* were military men by service background except for those appointed during the reign of Alexander I. Most high officials in our sample, on the other hand, were civil servants in early career background (as well, of course, as in the high positions occupied, since we examined only careers of persons who attained high civil posts). The nature of the broader sample is too incomplete to permit one to be certain that the trend was also in the direction of a higher proportion of careers limited to civil service, but what evidence we have is not inconsistent with Pintner's

29. For example, T. H. Rigby, "The CPSU Elite: Turnover and Rejuvenation from Lenin to Khrushchev," *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 16 (1969): 22; Hough, *Soviet Prefects*, pp. 76-77; Armstrong, *Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, pp. 21-22. The conclusion is also reached for major plant managers (Hough, p. 62) and central industrial directors (Azrael, *Managerial Power*, pp. 107 and 247, n. 91). I should infer that for both the latter groups the age at initial entry was also similar to obkom first secretaries, although the data presented do not permit one to be certain.

Table 3. *Proportions of Tsarist Elite Administrators with Civil and Military Chin^a*

Date Post Attained	Gubernatory			Elite Administrators with Service in Ministries		
	N	Military (percent)	Civil (percent)	N	Military (percent)	Civil (percent)
1762–1800	98	68	32	53	41	59
1801–1825	69	36	64	59	32	68
1826–1855	88	60	40	158	35	65
1856–1881	55	69	31	109	32	68
TOTAL	310	60	40	379	35	65
All elite administrators	1,336	38	62			

^a For an explanation of the categories see note 17.

data, which indicate that the proportion of men with military backgrounds among the top officials had dropped to under one-fourth by mid-nineteenth century.³⁰ In any case, the influence of the military remained enormous. Until Catherine II's reign, the lower territorial officers (*voevody*) were nearly all superannuated military officers.³¹ In the latter part of the eighteenth century the regime had to take strong measures to make the civil service as attractive to young nobles as the military was.³² Even an institution like the Tsarskoe Selo Lycée, established for civil-service preparation (and actually sending 82 percent of its graduates to civil posts) was organized on the military model from its inception; the military style was strengthened later.³³ Movement from one type of post to another was so frequent, especially in the territorial service, that civil officials had little opportunity to develop an *esprit de corps*.³⁴ As a result, the large military contingent usually set the tone. Naturally, military officers who were transferred to civil posts tended to employ military models of administration (some even ran their personal estates like military units)—that is, in a rigidly hierarchical, formally organized manner.³⁵

It would require an extended discussion to analyze the crucial differences between the Communist Party style of administration and the traditional military model, which undoubtedly accounts for much of the relative vigor and

30. Pintner, "Social Characteristics," p. 431 and table 3, p. 433.

31. Got'e, *Istoriia*, 1:217–19.

32. Demidova, "Biurokratizatsiia," p. 238; Paul Dukes, *Catherine the Great and the Russian Nobility* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 23, 185; Nikolai P. Pavlov-Sil'vansky, *Gosudarevy sluzhilye liudi*, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg, 1909), p. 147.

33. Dmitrii Kobeko, *Imperatorskii tsarskosel'skii litsei: Nastavniki i pitomtsy, 1811–1843* (St. Petersburg, 1911), pp. 105, 477.

34. Raëff, "État," p. 302.

35. Leroy-Beaulieu, *Empire of the Tsars*, 2:189.

efficiency of the former.³⁶ Suffice it to say that professional military officers have virtually never been seconded to high administrative posts, whether party or state, in the USSR. Nevertheless, in two significant ways there is a resemblance between the Soviet and the tsarist systems of early in-service socialization: the relatively low impact of legally trained entrants, and the high significance of technological orientation.

In sharp contrast to Continental West European administrative systems, in both Russian periods legal styles have occupied a minor place. To be sure, the tsarist system was formally modeled on German and French administrative systems, but the immense influence of legal styles in the latter was greatly diluted. Quite apart from the injection of arbitrary decisions by the autocracy, the level of legal competence in the Russian civil administration was inadequate to maintain the emphasis established farther west. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Speransky found it out of the question to require legal qualifications for admission to the civil service, for the training available in Russia was grossly inadequate.³⁷ Legal instruction in chancery training sections and other specialized institutions had been so obviously inadequate that resort was had to relatively elementary courses in elite institutions like the Tsarskoe Selo Lycée. Even after legal instruction became available in the universities, many students dropped out before finishing, for they knew they could get on in government service without law degrees.³⁸ In the period 1860–1900 about six hundred law students were graduated each year, about one-fourth of all completing higher education.³⁹ As table 4 shows, the proportion of identifiable former law students in our small and rather unsatisfactory sample of educational backgrounds of tsarist elite administrators is only 7 percent—lower than categories, such as medicine, which one would ordinarily not associate with high administration at all.

The absolute number of law students in the USSR is much larger (8,800 *graduates* in 1968), but the proportion is much inferior (1.7 percent of the total graduated from higher institutions that year).⁴⁰ What is more

36. See, for example, Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, chap. 14; Armstrong, *Politics of Totalitarianism*, pp. 61, 142, 319; John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command* (London, 1962), pp. 509, 668; Seweryn Bialer, ed., *Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II* (New York, 1969), pp. 34 ff.

37. F. Dimitriev, "Speranskii i ego gosudarstvennaia deiatel'nost'," *Russkii arkhiv*, 1868, no. 10, p. 1639.

38. Kobeko, *Imperatorskii tsarskosel'skii litsei*, pp. 7 ff.; James T. Flynn, "The Universities, the Gentry and the Russian Imperial Service, 1815–1825," *Canadian Slavic Studies*, 2 (1968): 493.

39. V. R. Leikina-Svirskaja, *Intelligentsiia v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 58 ff., 77.

40. Based on Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1968 g.* (Moscow, 1969), p. 689. It is also significant that during the formative period of the Soviet elite administrators we are considering, the

Table 4. Educational Background of Tsarist Elite Administrators^a

Type of Institution	N	Percent
University (general or unspecified)	144	38
Law	26	7
Medicine	38	10
Engineering	37	10
Seminary	10	3
Pedagogical	12	3
Army and navy	85	23
Noble academy	26	7
TOTAL	378	

^a Only biographies reporting specific educational backgrounds are included; hence the sample is biased toward prestigious attainments. Because the relatively large group of available biographies of students of the Tsarskoe Selo Lycée would have distorted the distribution, this institution is not included.

important is the insignificant number of men with legal training in the administrative elite. Stewart found only one of his sample of 181 obkom first secretaries had higher education in law.⁴¹ Other studies of Soviet elite administrators have found even less trace of legal training. In contrast to the official tsarist position, Soviet rejection of the Continental norm of legal qualifications for elite administrative careers is considered and explicit. Jurists are specialists (as, indeed, they are in England) who are not perceived as possessing general competence in administrative matters. Undoubtedly this position derives to a considerable degree from the relatively low place that Marxism-Leninism ascribes to legal norms. As suggested above, the principle of autocracy, in contrast to the *Rechtsstaat* ideal, exerted a somewhat similar influence during the tsarist period. But the Soviet position, until recently, has gone considerably beyond the rejection of specific legal qualifications, as the official reply of the USSR Academy of Sciences to an international inquiry a decade ago indicates:

No special provision is made for the training of professional administrators; a sufficient grounding is acquired, in the relevant subject fields, in general higher educational establishments. The fullest and most specialized teaching of administration sciences is, of course, provided in the Schools of Law and Economy, since there is a fairly large demand for lawyers and economists in the administration of government departments.⁴²

proportion of legal specialists among all specialists with higher education declined drastically, from 5.6 percent (1928) to 2.3 percent (1941) and 2.2 percent (1956). Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1958 g.* (Moscow, 1959), p. 674.

41. Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union*, p. 144.

42. "The Teaching of Administrative Sciences in the Higher Educational Establishments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Report of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 1959, no. 4, p. 452.

More recently, Soviet authorities have become concerned with the specialized educational requirements desirable for modern administration. This development, however, certainly has not yet affected the *backgrounds* of the elite administrators, although it may modify their attitudes.

What, then, has been the dominant educational specialty for the half of the present administrative elite who have a regular higher education? As Fischer puts it, "For Soviet politicians, no other kind of schooling—least of all the study of law, which is of such importance in the United States—matters as much as technical training: engineering and its counterparts in agriculture. . . . Of a total of 191 [top executives] who went through college, about 40% studied engineering; some 30% studied agronomy. The particular emphasis on professional schooling in technology stands out as a special characteristic of Soviet education."⁴³ Stewart found that one-third of his sample of obkom first secretaries (with identifiable educational backgrounds) had engineering-type training; but the proportion is two-thirds of those with higher education, other than in party or agricultural schools.⁴⁴

A glance at table 4 makes it obvious that engineering training enjoyed no such predominance in the tsarist system, though the proportion of engineers among administrators is by no means negligible compared with other identifiable specialties. Probably a considerably greater portion with at least elementary engineering training and acquaintance with technology is concealed among the 23 percent with military training. The heavy military influence in the tsarist administrative elite, though it undoubtedly enhanced tendencies toward rigidity, almost certainly (as is the case today in developing societies) promoted receptivity toward technological advances. Major training centers, particularly the Imperial Institute of Roads and Communications, founded early in the nineteenth century on the model of the *École des Ponts et Chaussées*, were military.⁴⁵ As noted earlier, the tsarist administration, like the Soviet, relied on agencies independent of the territorial administrative structure for economic development purposes, particularly mining and railroad building.⁴⁶ In contrast to the Soviet industrial and transportation ministries, however, the tsarist

43. Fischer, *Soviet System and Modern Society*, p. 93. See note 25 above for my reasons for differentiating sharply between agronomy and other technological education. See also Gerd Hortleder, "Leninismus, Technik und Industrialisierung: Zur Rolle der Technik und des Ingenieurs in der Sowjetunion und der DDR," *Humanismus und Technik*, 22, no. 1 (1968): 11, 18.

44. Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union*, p. 156.

45. Jean Petot, *Histoire de l'administration des ponts et chaussées, 1599–1815* (Paris, 1958), p. 470; Gaston Pinet, *Écrivains et penseurs polytechniciens* (Paris, 1898); pp. 135 ff.; Rondo E. Cameron, *France and the Economic Development of Europe, 1800–1914: Conquests of Peace and Seeds of War* (Princeton, 1961), pp. 56, 276.

46. See also Raeff, "Russian Autocracy," p. 85; and a forthcoming article by Alfred Rieber on tsarist railroad development, which he has kindly let me have in manuscript.

agencies were operated and frequently directed by military officers trained as engineers. Without exaggerating the role of engineers (which deserves fuller exploration) in the tsarist administration, one can tentatively conclude that their notable and increasing importance was a forerunner of the dominance of technological training as a background for elite administrative status in the Soviet system.

To compare the Soviet and the tsarist administrative elites, as in the preceding section, from the standpoint of recruitment and socialization is somewhat one-sided. An indicator such as age at attainment of elite position contributes to the understanding of the socialization process. The age indicator also, however, significantly illuminates the general structure of elite relationships within the administration and in society as a whole. A system which inducts a high proportion of its elite into top offices below the age of forty may be either a revolutionary one (including revolutions from above like Stalin's Great Purges) maximizing elite mobility, or a system embodying such a high degree of ascribed status that even very young men of aristocratic birth are considered qualified for top posts (like eighteenth-century France and England, where aristocrats in their twenties commanded armies and governed provinces). Conversely, a system in which men must be past fifty to gain access to the elite may be the end result of the "iron law of oligarchy" Robert Michels proposed, or (as perhaps in Confucian societies) the gerontocracy may result from extreme traditional respect for ancestors. As noted earlier, there are some significant indications that the present Soviet elite has indeed been influenced by Michels's "law." Taking the period of stabilized Soviet administration as a whole, however, the dominance of men in their forties among elite entrants tends to place the Soviet system outside of any of the categories just described. What is equally striking is that the tsarist system, for all "generations" and groups of elite officials examined, lay equally outside these more extreme age categories. In other words, the Russian systems resemble one another and stand in contrast to a number of other significant systems in setting access to elite posts predominantly for men just approaching middle age.

Additional light can perhaps be thrown on this similarity by examining tenure and turnover statistics. In one respect the Soviet and tsarist systems differed sharply in turnover of top territorial officeholders. Although (as far as the present writer is aware) no complete table of changes in obkom first secretaries has been established even for the post-1938 period, a number of years of extraordinarily high turnover have been identified. Not only was turnover nearly total in 1937-39, but almost all of the new occupants were new to the first secretary role. In the 1940s and 1950s a turnover of about

Table 5. *Total Length of Service of Tsarist Elite Administrators After Attainment of Elite Status (Fourth Chin)*
(percentage by period of attainment of fourth *chin*)

Administrators	Length of Service in Years						N
	One or less	Two to five	Six to ten	Eleven to fifteen	Sixteen to twenty	Twenty-one and over	
Total sample:							
1762-1800	14	27	22	16	9	12	215
1801-1825	16	12	19	18	12	23	130
1826-1855	10	11	20	20	17	23	286
1856-1881	6	8	25	20	20	21	164
Administrators with civil <i>chin</i> only:							
1762-1800	9	20	21	18	13	18	76
1801-1825	8	8	23	20	9	32	75
1826-1855	3	5	17	23	19	34	155
1856-1881	3	5	25	19	21	26	95

one-third every four years (or about 8 percent per year) was "normal," but in years of political upheaval the proportion rose sharply.⁴⁷ Such was apparently the case during the "Leningrad affair" of 1948-49, and more clearly during the 1953-54 period following the death of Stalin and the ouster of Beria. Boris Meissner estimates a nearly two-thirds turnover between April 1953 and April 1954 in the most significant RSFSR obkom first secretaries.⁴⁸

One might expect a parallel "bunching" in the introduction of new members to the gubernatorial corps under the tsarist regime, either during the year immediately after the accession of a new sovereign or as a result of some drastic change of policy. For a sample of 315 *gubernator* initial appointments, no single year has more than nine—that is, four times the average.⁴⁹ However, six three-year clusters appear, although in no case do the appointments in one of these clusters number more than twenty (two and one-half times the average). Clusters occur as follows: 1796-98 and an overlapping cluster 1798-1800, both obviously associated with the bizarre reign of Paul I; 1806-10, apparently related to Alexander I's efforts to reform his government; 1829-30, indicating perhaps a belated reshuffling after Nicholas I's accession; 1855-57, perhaps reflecting the Crimean disaster as much as Alexander II's accession; and 1860-62, in connection with the Emancipation

47. Armstrong, *Politics of Totalitarianism*, p. 271.

48. "Innenpolitik (Neuwahl des Obersten 'Sowjetparlaments' und Parteisäuberungen: Ein Jahr personeller Veränderungen)," *Osteuropa*, 4 (1954): 223.

49. Because of the numerous historical factors potentially involved, no reasonably simple computer program would have identified all potential clusterings of initial appointments. Consequently I plotted the reduced sample indicated by hand, year by year.

Table 6. Total Length of Service in Top Territorial Posts (percentage of officials in each group)^a

Administrators	Length of Service in Years				Average	N
	Three or under	Four to nine	Ten to fifteen	Sixteen and over		
Ukrainian obkom first secretaries (1938–1955)	68	26	6	not relevant	—	85
Ukrainian obkom first secretaries (1943–1955)	40	45	15	not relevant	5.5	55
Soviet obkom first secretaries (1950–1966)	14	59	23	4	8.0	168
Tsarist <i>gubernatory</i> , total sample	30	39	20	11	7.6	415
Tsarist <i>gubernatory</i> with civil <i>chin</i>	25	44	21	10	7.5	136

^a Data for all listings except the third listing were collected by the present writer. Item three is based on recalculated data from Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union*, p. 168, and therefore includes only secretaries whose age is known. The average total tenure for his entire group is notably lower, 6.3 years (p. 168).

reforms. What stands out in contrast to even the last, relatively “stabilized” Soviet generation of territorial officials is the lack of wholesale turnover in the tsarist territorial administrative elite.

If, as seems to be the case, life expectancies and/or retirement ages are equal, two groups of men who begin elite careers at the same age, as did the tsarist and Soviet administrators, will have the same total tenure in high office. Since the careers of Soviet officials are not yet terminated, no meaningful comparison of total length of careers is possible. It is of some interest, nevertheless, to note (table 5) the very small fluctuation in total service (after attaining fourth *chin*) of “generations” of tsarist officials, including the 1856–81 group, which contains some unfinished careers. More significant is the length of time that elite administrators have held the same type of office. The first three listings in table 6 represent an effort to control for the fact that the present generation of Soviet elite administrators have not yet completed their careers. The data on Ukrainian obkom first secretaries are obviously affected by the exigencies of World War II; short terms are considerably reduced if one examines only the immediate postwar group, even though most of the members were in mid-career at the time the data collection was terminated (1955). When one considers the general obkom first secretary group for a more recent period (1950–66), the total tenure distribution remarkably resembles that of tsarist governors with civil *chin*.⁵⁰ In other

50. Most of the *gubernatory* without civil *chin* had, of course, exclusively military *chin*; but a few (relatives of the imperial family or foreigners) had neither, and for others the relevant *chin* could not be determined. Obviously, *gubernator* service was a more regular, and consequently more protracted, stage in the career of the regular civil servant.

Table 7. *Average Length of Term in Different Top Territorial Posts, by Order of Term^a*

Order of Term Held by Administrator	Soviet Obkom First Secretary		Tsarist <i>Gubernatory</i> Total Sample		Tsarist <i>Gubernatory</i> with Civil <i>Chin</i>	
	Length (years)	N	Length (years)	N	Length (years)	N
First Term	4.5	377	6.0	415	6.4	136
Second Term	3.9	100	5.1	101	3.7	30
Third Term	3.5	33	3.9	30	5.0	9

^a Data on obkom secretaries recalculated from Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union*, pp. 169–71; the data are approximate. Cases of occupancy of a fourth top territorial post in a different locality are too few in all categories to make comparison meaningful.

words, the top territorial administrators in the Soviet and the tsarist systems had similar expectancies for total service as *governing officials*. To that extent, the role of governing official was consequently a very similar career stage, as well as one which men experienced at approximately the same age in both systems.

Attaining the role of top territorial administrator was also a similar experience in both systems, because tenure in *individual governing posts* tended to be equal. As table 7 indicates, tsarist *gubernatory* had, on the average, longer terms in specific localities than Soviet obkom first secretaries, but the difference was not very great. These overall averages do, however, conceal a significant “generational” difference in length of terms, which table 8 clearly brings out. Although the overall first-term average of tsarist *gubernatory* was not much greater than that of obkom first secretaries, the *gubernator’s* average term tended to increase markedly over time. This increase was especially noticeable for *gubernatory* with civil *chin*. Not only did their average first-term tenure nearly double over the 120 years considered (it is notable that under Catherine II their terms were virtually identical in length to those of obkom secretaries), but the portion who had very long first terms (seven or more years) approached a majority by mid-nineteenth century. Apparently the phenomenon is one aspect of the tendency, in socially stratified systems heavily influenced by ascribed status, for officials of all types to acquire a vested or patrimonial interest in their offices. The present writer has discussed this highly interesting tendency at length in a cross-cultural comparison of the dichotomy of bureaucratic and patrimonial attributes of old-regime governors (see note 17). It should be emphasized here, however, that in the eighteenth century the governors’ terms were shorter in tsarist Russia than in some other contemporary administrations.

The limited data we have collected from brief tsarist-era biographies

Table 8. *Length of First Term of Top Territorial Administrators*
(percentage of officials by period of appointment)

Administrators	Length of Term in Years				N
	Three or under	Four to six	Seven or over	Average	
Ukrainian obkom first secretaries (1943–1955) ^a	73	25	2	2.7	41
Soviet obkom first secretaries (1950–1966) ^b	45	37	18	4.5	377
Tsarist <i>gubernatory</i> , total sample:					
Total sample	41	30	29	6.0	371
1762–1800	55	28	18	4.6	108
1801–1825	38	31	30	6.5	89
1826–1855	29	31	40	7.3	107
1856–1881	40	31	28	5.6	67
Tsarist <i>gubernatory</i> with civil <i>chin</i> :					
Total sample	35	31	33	6.5	127
1762–1800	52	32	16	4.4	31
1801–1825	41	30	30	6.2	44
1826–1855	23	31	46	8.0	35
1856–1881	17	35	47	7.8	17

^a In contrast to the first listing in table 6, only first terms completed by 1955 were considered.

^b Recalculated from data in Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union*, pp. 170–71. The average is given on p. 169. Averages for *all* terms of *gubernatory* in each period were also calculated; the results were not substantially different from the first-term lengths shown in table 8. Similarly, a recalculation of Stewart's data to compute distribution of *term lengths* (a somewhat different measure from the one just noted) shows insubstantial variation from the distribution pattern in table 8.

on formal designations of posts held by individuals do not lend themselves to comparison with patterns of positions held in the nominally very different Soviet structure. All we can do is suggest certain parallels in movement between territorial and central posts. Although the total Soviet picture is far from established, several authors have suggested that “line” positions at the territorial level (whether nominally party or state) constitute a separate pool of career assignments from those in the various central agencies.⁵¹ Grey Hodnett's study of obkom first secretaries indicates, for example, that about half had experience in “leading Soviet work” (usually the phrase signifies territorial-level posts), and fewer than one-tenth had industrial administrative

51. Armstrong, *Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, pp. 54–55; T. H. Rigby, “The Selection of Leading Personnel in the Soviet State and Communist Party,” Ph.D. thesis (University of London, 1954), pp. 181 ff. It should be noted, however, that Rigby concludes (though he does not present detailed data on the question) that transfers between certain central positions (particularly in industrial administration) and territorial posts were frequent.

experience (usually directed from central agencies).⁵² Certainly it is well established that industrial ministerial staffs in Moscow rarely interchanged top personnel with either state or party organizations at the oblast level. Even the *sovmarkhoz* episode in administrative reorganization did not overcome this career-line isolation (usually Moscow ministerial officials rather than territorial officials were reassigned as *sovmarkhoz* directors). In this instance, clearly, career isolation was significantly correlated to group hostility.⁵³ Similarly, under Stalin some central party officials (particularly in his personal secretaryship and the Central Committee Cadres Section) constituted a hostile, isolated group in relation to the territorial apparatus.⁵⁴

The tsarist situation was equally complicated, though not entirely along the same lines. As Gotie has pointed out, for the eighteenth-century *gubernatory* their territorial service tended to be an episode in their careers which usually included service at the imperial court as well as in other central offices. This episodic character of the top territorial assignments, as noted earlier, continued to hold for military incumbents; even nineteenth-century civil servants who reached the high post of *gubernator* were not exclusively identified with the territorial service, although table 8 shows that *after* reaching that level they were, during the nineteenth century, increasingly likely to retain their initial post. Table 9 corroborates the inference of a trend toward increasing tenure in high territorial office. Table 9 also indicates that over four-fifths of all high territorial administrators had no top-level ministerial experience, although the proportion with such experience increased significantly during the nineteenth century. Interestingly enough, the same overall proportion of administrators attaining high ministerial posts had some territorial experience; but the trend during the nineteenth century was the reverse—fewer acquired experience in high territorial office after 1826. It is also interesting to note that the median ministerial term of officials who had high-level territorial experience (six to seven years) was just enough short of the overall median (twelve to thirteen years) to allow for a single term (table 7) as *gubernator*.

Our data do not relate to interchange of territorial and central experience at ranks lower than the fourth *chin*. Fortunately, Pintner's sample permits one to draw inferences concerning this level of experience. For the early nineteenth century, his sample (central officials of all levels) began their careers about

52. Hodnett, "Obkom First Secretaries," tables 6 and 8, pp. 646, 648 (data for 1962–64).

53. Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.* (New York, 1967), pp. 304 ff.; Armstrong, *Politics of Totalitarianism*, pp. 309 ff.; and "Party Bifurcation and Elite Interests."

54. Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1959), pp. 393–95; Armstrong, *Politics of Totalitarianism*, pp. 268 ff.

Table 9. *Tsarist Administrators' Territorial^a and Ministerial-Level^b Experience (After Attaining Fourth Chin)*

Administrators	Total	Period of Attainment of Fourth <i>Chin</i>			
		1762–1800	1801–1825	1826–1855	1856–1881
All administrators with territorial experience, length of service in territories:					
Average (years)	8.0	6.5	7.6	10.1	8.3
Median (years)	6–7	4–5	6–7	8–9	8–9
N	344	139	56	100	49
All administrators with ministerial experience, length of service in ministries:					
Average (years)	14.7	11.1	16.0	15.5	14.6
Median (years)	12–13	8–9	14–15	12–13	14–15
N	379	53	59	158	109
Administrators with <i>both</i> territorial experience and ministerial experience:					
As proportion of all with territorial experience	18%	12%	21%	20%	27%
As proportion of all with ministerial experience	17%	31%	20%	13%	12%
Length of service in ministries:					
Median (years) ^c	6–7	4–5	6–7	6–7	6–7
N	62	17	12	20	13

^a This category differs somewhat from the *gubernator* category, because a few high territorial posts other than gubernatorial ones were included, and (more important) the dates of attainment of fourth *chin* were not known for many *gubernatory*, who therefore had to be excluded here. A comparison with table 6 indicates, however, that the overall average tenure is close for both groups.

^b Determination of “ministerial-level” posts over such a long period is necessarily somewhat approximate. In general, Amburger was used as a guide to selection.

^c The small N’s make median distribution by periods more significant than averages.

one-fifth as often in territorial as in central assignments, with the proportion rising to about one-fourth by mid-century.⁵⁵ These figures might be taken to suggest that a combination of territorial and central experience was more common at higher than at lower central official levels early in the century (since our table 9 indicates that nearly one-third of the *high* ministerial officials of that period also had high territorial experience), but that the reverse was true later in the nineteenth century. It seems more probable, however, that even early in the century men who eventually attained high central office tended to start in territorial posts somewhat more often than the average central official did. By mid-nineteenth century 12.8 percent of Pintner’s sample of *top* central officials had started (obviously several decades earlier)

55. Pintner, “Social Characteristics,” tables 1 and 2, pp. 431–32.

in provincial posts, compared with 54 percent starting in central posts⁵⁶—a ratio of 1:4 as compared with the ratio of 1:7 for the comparable interchange of central and territorial experience indicated by our data for 1826–55.

Regardless of these relatively small variations, one can safely conclude that for all periods it was the exception rather than the rule for a high administrator to have *both* central and territorial experience either very early in his career or while holding top posts. Although we cannot be certain that the majority did not acquire such varied experience at intermediate levels of their careers, the inference is strong that the tsarist elite administrator group, like their Soviet counterpart, was fairly sharply divided between men with predominantly territorial career patterns and those with predominantly central career patterns.

Though the examination of elite administrators indicates major differences between the tsarist and the Soviet groups, the similarities are more striking. As noted early in this article, the presence of basic institutional similarities facilitates comparison. The persisting prefectural type of territorial administration means that the roles of top governing officials are equivalent, despite the great nominal difference between *gubernator* and obkom first secretary. The relation between center and periphery, too, has much in common in systems subject to close control by small groups in the capitals. Although the number of major territorial units is much larger in the USSR, the scope of the top territorial official's office seems roughly equivalent.

At first sight, patterns of recruitment appear very different, for the Soviet elite administration (like most contemporary elites) recruits from an enormously broader social base. This tendency toward universality in the present system is reflected in greater access of all groups of the population to higher education as compared to the tsarist system. The fact that the relatively few tsarist graduates (even if one considers secondary school graduates as the appropriate comparison group) had much better chances of becoming elite administrators reflects more stringent early screening for high status. Both the tsarist and the Soviet systems, however, have relied on in-service socialization, since (in contrast to some Western systems) neither of the Russian systems has employed graduation as the main screening device for elite administrative careers. One result of the use of an extensive process of in-service socialization (and screening out) for advancement in the administration is that men attained high posts at relatively advanced ages—close to forty-five on the average, although the tsarist distribution shows greater proportions of both younger and older groups.

The most striking difference between Soviet and tsarist elite administrator

56. *Ibid.*, table 3, p. 433.

corps is the latter's large military contingent—an influence which may have accounted for much of its rigidity. But socialization in both of the Russian systems has shown a marked rejection of legal training, in contrast to Continental Western systems, or even to the United States. Conversely, both Russian systems have stressed technological backgrounds for high administrators, although the trend under tsarism was incipient rather than dominant. There is little doubt that both the rejection of law and the emphasis on technology reflect broad, underlying value assumptions in the two systems, although it would require a complicated and profound investigation to relate these factors precisely.

Although the increasing tenure of tsarist *gubernatory* in specific posts probably reflects in part the patrimonial tendencies of an old-regime society emphasizing ascribed status, one should note that in some other respects (notably the low level of familial socialization for *elite roles* as contrasted to family influence in acquiring *elite status*) the tsarist system was less particularistic than its contemporaries in Western Europe. More important, perhaps, was an insistent pressure to lengthen gubernatorial terms in the interest of efficient administration. The apparent incipient Soviet trend toward longer terms may be due to similar causes. Although the physical facilities for an obkom first secretary to become familiar with his territory certainly exceed the *gubernator's*, still the secretary's were, until recently, inadequate. Poor roads, faulty telephone systems, and inadequate clerical support may have made it almost as difficult for the obkom secretary, in relation to his greatly enhanced sphere of activity, to become thoroughly *au courant* with his territory in two or three years as it was for the early *gubernator*.

Finally, though the antipathies between central and territorial officials under the tsars cannot be established (at least by the present writer) as readily as for the Soviet *apparatchiki*, there does appear to be a close parallel between the career-pattern isolation of the two groups under both regimes.

Obviously, the similarities presented above go only a short way toward suggesting systemic continuity between the tsarist and the Soviet periods. To the present writer, the least weighty objection is to the evidence presented. Though precision is unattainable, the use of quantitative indicators does ensure a measure of objectivity, since most of the dimensions of comparison were determined (either theoretically or by the limitation of data available) in advance of his knowing whether the data would indicate similarity or contrast. Moreover, converging evidence from a number of other studies tends (for most factors examined) to point in the same direction. At the same time, it should be emphasized that neither assurance of reliability nor reasonable interpretation of quantitative data would be feasible without the availability of numerous careful studies already completed by Russian area specialists.

One of the most important reasons for treating the evidence for systemic continuity with great reserve is, of course, the very narrow range of societal phenomena which it covers. Elite administrators constitute a convenient group for comparative study because of their relation to formal institutional structures and the attention they commonly receive in publications. While recognizing their real importance, however, one must admit that few theorists would ordinarily ascribe to elite administrators (or even to high administration) the dominant role in shaping the course of society as a whole. A less obvious but perhaps more significant (because more susceptible of treatment) limitation of the conclusions presented above is the lack of systematic baselines for determining whether, indeed, the similarities noted between the tsarist and the Soviet systems are not, to a considerable degree, reflections of similarities among all large-scale, modernizing social systems.