

This book is to be recommended only to the unusual reader who would like to find out about Denikin's character and biography. Students of the Civil War will find little in it that is new.

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THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH UNDERGROUND, 1917–1970. By William C. Fletcher. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1971. x, 314 pp. \$12.75.

Professor Fletcher draws several conclusions from his study of underground Orthodoxy: it is a response to Soviet persecution; persecution of Orthodoxy does not succeed, for it does not eradicate religion but drives it underground; this underground opposition serves as insurance that organized (presumably legal) religious institutions may continue to exist. The first two conclusions seem so obvious that they need no comment. Evidence for the third, however, is by no means conclusive. Indeed, judging by the final chapter, "The Continuing Crisis," one is left with the impression that the state has succeeded not only in closing more and more churches belonging to the "Patriarchal Church" but also in weakening underground Orthodoxy (*vide* pp. 198 and 262).

The book relies heavily on Soviet sociological research on religion, without which "this study could not have been written." Despite his impressive list of the great flaws in Soviet sociology, the author has decided that "there is a wealth of accurate information in these studies." But he provides no idea how he winnows these books to find the valuable kernels. For example, he describes the Soviet academician Mitrokhin as "careful and dispassionate" in his presentation of data and then quotes Mitrokhin (apparently as accurate) on the True Orthodox Christians: "[They] disseminated their blind and fanatical rumors by every means, 'testifying' to their prophecies. The very character of these rumours makes it possible to make a direct evaluation of the squalid clerical lives of these spiteful people, who were ready by any means to slander socialism. . . . Powerless to find support among Soviet people, [the leaders] linked the realization of their plans with imperialist aggression" (pp. 190–91). Such outbursts leave the reader wondering why Mitrokhin is described as careful and dispassionate and this "evidence" as a wealth of accurate information.

Fletcher's book nevertheless rightly corrects and dismisses the view popularized by Harrison Salisbury and others that the "Church indulges in no undercover activities."

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STALIN UND HITLER: PAKT GEGEN EUROPA. Edited by J. W. Brügel. Vienna: Europaverlag, 1973. 349 pp.

This volume is a collection of documents on German-Soviet relations in the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Included are materials of various European Communist parties and diplomatic documents, mainly from the German foreign ministry. Almost nine-tenths of the documents have been published previously, many in complete texts rather than with omissions as here. Some have either not been published

or can be located only with great difficulty. (Another version of no. 71 appeared as no. 264 in volume 13 of the eighth series of Italian diplomatic documents.)

The collection is a useful introduction to the available material on an important subject; it is especially interesting for its documentation of the extent to which the Soviet Union gave Hitler political and propaganda support. The separation of the titles and sources of the documents from each other and from the texts needlessly complicates using the book. The editing is not always sufficiently careful.

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DELO VSEI ZHIZNI. By *A. M. Vasilevsky*. Moscow: Politizdat, 1974. 539 pp. 1.64 rubles.

GENERAL'NYI SHTAB V GODY VOINY. Vol. 2. By *S. M. Shtemenko*. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973. 1.45 rubles.

Marshal Vasilevsky's memoirs are the last of three remarkable books by men who were present at the highest level of command during the period of the Great Patriotic War. Army General Shtemenko, who served during the war in the General Staff and was head of the operations section during 1944–45, was first with his memoirs in 1968. The memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, who had been the chief of staff in the early months of the war, were published in 1969, and now we have the autobiography of Marshal Vasilevsky who served as chief of staff from May 1942 to February 1945. Unless somewhere there exist unpublished memoirs by the late Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov and Army General A. I. Antonov, the memoirs mentioned should remain for some time to come the most detailed Soviet view of the high command and the purely military conduct of the war.

Parts of Vasilevsky's memoirs, particularly those dealing with the war years, have already been published in various journals and anthologies. Vasilevsky was a junior officer in the tsarist army who went over to the Reds and served in the Civil War. Between 1927 and 1940 he held various staff positions and attended various military schools. Like almost all wartime high-ranking military leaders, his rise was due to the devastation of the high command through purges—many of the victims were colleagues and close friends. The thirties, however, as seen through these memoirs, were merely exciting times of no unusual significance. The memoirs of Vasilevsky are one more clear example of the sad state of historical writings under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime in which the cover-up of heinous crimes has now been combined with "positive" tributes to the late dictators. There is indeed a contrast in this regard between the writings of Vasilevsky and those of colleagues such as L. M. Sandalov, S. S. Biriuzov, and A. T. Stuchenko. In June 1939 Vasilevsky was appointed to the operations section of the General Staff. At the start of the war his superiors, Zhukov, Vatutin, and Malandin, were sent to various fronts to shore up the inexperienced and incompetent commanders. Vasilevsky soon became head of the operations section and on May 8, 1942, replaced the ailing Shaposhnikov as chief of staff, a position he held until February 18, 1945. During the war, Vasilevsky and Zhukov were the most important men in the Red Army. Stalin, who never completely trusted his front commanders, used both men frequently as the representatives of the Supreme Command to the most critical areas of the front, such as Stalingrad and Kursk.