

ILO

International Organization

Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes
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James D. Morrow
Arms Versus Allies

David Strang and Patricia Mei Yin Chang
The ILO and the Welfare State

Etel Solingen
Industrial Policy in Brazil and Argentina

Peter F. Cowhey
Domestic Institutions and International Commitments

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Abstracts

On compliance

by Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes

A new dialogue is beginning between students of international law and international relations scholars concerning compliance with international agreements. This article advances some basic propositions to frame that dialogue. First, it proposes that the level of compliance with international agreements in general is inherently unverifiable by empirical procedures. That nations generally comply with their international agreements, on the one hand, or that they violate them whenever it is in their interest to do so, on the other, are not statements of fact or even hypotheses to be tested. Instead, they are competing heuristic assumptions. Some reasons why the background assumption of a propensity to comply is plausible and useful are given. Second, compliance problems very often do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking on the basis of a calculation of advantage. The article proposes a variety of other reasons why states may deviate from treaty obligations and why in many circumstances those reasons are properly accepted by others as justifying apparent departures from treaty norms. Third, the treaty regime as a whole need not and should not be held to a standard of strict compliance but to a level of overall compliance that is “acceptable” in the light of the interests and concerns the treaty is designed to safeguard. How the acceptable level is determined and adjusted is considered.

Arms versus allies: trade-offs in the search for security

by James D. Morrow

Nations have two methods of increasing their security: building arms and forming alliances. Both methods present different political costs that must be incurred to raise security. Building arms requires shifting economic resources to the military. Forming alliances requires abandoning interests that conflict with those of the ally. Each of these strategies produces domestic opposition. A nation’s response to a threat to its security must weigh the relative attractiveness of arms versus allies, both in terms of their effects on internal politics and on their external benefits. Three cases are examined in the light of this argument. The response of Austria and France to the unification of Germany in the 1860s is the central case. Theories of alliance formation based on neorealism and the offense–defense balance predict that Austria and France should have allied against the mutual threat of Prussia. This article argues that they did not form an alliance because

arming separately presented lower political costs. World Wars I and II likewise are analyzed from the perspective of the argument above.

The International Labor Organization and the welfare state: institutional effects on national welfare spending, 1960–80

by David Strang and Patricia Mei Yin Chang

National welfare programs are importantly affected by models of welfare activity institutionalized at the global level. This article examines the impact of the welfare regime advocated by and within the International Labor Organization (ILO). Countries that have recently ratified ILO conventions related to welfare show increased growth in spending, net of national characteristics. Subanalyses show that the effects of ILO ratification are strong in the industrialized capitalist democracies, particularly where prior welfare spending is low and the working class has a weakly institutionalized role in policymaking. ILO ratification seems disconnected from spending in the less developed countries. Legislative case studies point to similar patterns. These findings suggest that international norms contribute to policy where they offer compelling models that powerful actors can use to legitimate policy innovation.

Macropolitical consensus and lateral autonomy in industrial policy: the nuclear sector in Brazil and Argentina

by Etel Solingen

Levels of macropolitical consensus and sectoral institutional autonomy both influence industrial policy. Different combinations of high or low consensus and autonomy help anticipate the respective explanatory relevance of generic industrial models, sectoral agencies' trajectories, and bureaucratic politics. Industrial policy choices thus are not always determined by international market opportunities, relevant domestic endowments, or the political strength of industrial entrepreneurs. The nuclear sectors in Brazil and Argentina are examined in light of this argument. A relatively strong consensus over the generic industrial model and a centralized decision-making process explain state entrepreneurship and foreign technology in Brazil. In contrast, Argentina's emphasis on domestic private entrepreneurial and technical resources can be traced to an absence of macropolitical consensus and to sectoral institutional autonomy. These differences had implications for the process of bargaining with foreign technology suppliers. Levels of consensus and autonomy influence the process of bargaining with foreign technology suppliers through their impact on the size of domestic win-sets, on risks of involuntary defection, on credibility of commitments, and on reduction of uncertainties.

Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitments: Japan and the United States

by Peter F. Cowhey

The domestic politics of great powers significantly influence the fate of such multilateral regimes at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Unless great powers can make credible commitments to support those regimes, few countries will offer more than token support. Domestic political constraints may bind national leaders to good faith adherence to multilateral regimes even if international circumstances do not compel adherence. Domestic politics also

influence the ability of other countries to monitor national adherence to agreements. Case studies of U.S. and Japanese responses to multilateral regimes show how the nature of the national electoral system, the division of powers in the government, and the transparency of the national political system influence credibility and lead to special features of multilateral economic and security regimes.