

in (for example) Russian periodicals like *Selskaia zhizn'* fully support Ukrainian evidence. Perhaps I might add that my own analyses and descriptions of the terror-famine first appeared in the USSR in Moscow in *Russian* journals such as *Voprosy istorii* and *Novyi mir*, and that the long chapter printed in the latter was specifically about the famine in Ukraine and hence relied importantly on Ukrainian sources.

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Professor Tauger Replies:

I would like to express my appreciation for Mr. Conquest's informative response to my article. His comment, however, does not address the article's main arguments.

Those arguments were as follows. First, the 1932 Soviet grain harvest was much smaller than official figures indicated. Second, the famine's severity and geographical extent suggest that the harvest must have been small enough to cause a famine on its own, regardless of the geographical emphasis of the procurement campaign. Finally, even taking grain exports into account, the harvest faced the Soviet regime with a dilemma: it had to feed either the towns or the villages because it did not have enough grain to support both.

Mr. Conquest does not deal with these arguments. He most nearly approaches them in his assertion that in Ukraine and certain other areas "the entire crop was removed." Since the regime procured 4.7 million tons of grain from Ukraine in 1932, much less than in any previous or subsequent year in the 1930s, this would imply that the harvest in Ukraine was only on that order of magnitude or even less than my low estimate! Obviously this could not have been the case or the death toll in Ukraine would have been not four million or five million but more than twenty million because the entire rural population would have been left without grain. Even the highest famine mortality estimates for Ukraine, ten million, imply that a significant portion of the crop remained in the villages. Mr. Conquest's procurement estimates are much lower, so he must acknowledge that much more of the crop must have remained at the peasants' disposal. In this context I do not understand his contributory point regarding wastage of procured grain: the issue is not what happened to that grain but how much was harvested and how much the peasants retained.

The question of the famine's death toll, to which Mr. Conquest devotes most of his response, has no bearing on the argument insofar as it shows greater mortality in Ukraine, the North Caucasus and the Lower Volga. I acknowledged this and even provided part of the explanation for it: data showing that the 1932 harvests in those regions were much smaller than even the low average for the country as a whole. To the extent that new data show higher mortality, however (and this is a gruesome point I regret having to make), they support my argument. Since procurements were much less in 1932 than in other years, the larger mortality after them indicates that peasants had less grain left, in other words that the harvest was smaller.

I have yet to see any actual central directive ordering a blockade of Ukraine or the confiscation of food at the border. The sources available are still too incomplete to reach any conclusion about this. If large numbers of peasants starved to death in Siberia and the Middle Volga in 1931–1933, were similar restrictions, of which as yet we have no record, imposed there as well? I would not be surprised if the militia in fact confiscated food for themselves and their families and justified the confiscation by reference to a "decree"; even soldiers were short of food.

We still have very little data on food reserves and the aid that was provided during the famine, but Mr. Conquest does not use even the data available. The 25 February 1933 decree, to which he refers, was ostensibly limited to seed grain. But that does not mean that all aid, of which seed grain was only a part, was limited in the same way. As S. V. Kulchyts'kyi, whom Mr. Conquest cites, noted in his article, this 25 February decree, published later than the telegraphed order of which it was a record, included food aid. Moreover, all of this aid was in fact released at the height of the famine (see fn. 53 in my article).

My criticism of Mr. Conquest's sources was not that they were Ukrainian—I also used Ukrainian sources. I had two main points. First, since Ukrainian memoir sources claim erroneously that the 1932 harvest was a good one, they cannot serve as a basis for determining the causes of the famine. Second, the memoirs available are disproportionately from Ukraine and hence give a biased impression of the geography of the famine. My article provides substantial evidence that famine pervaded the Soviet Union in 1931–1933.

The main issue here, however, seems to be one of inference: the intent of Stalin and Soviet leadership, which we cannot know until we have complete access to Party Archives. Mr. Conquest infers from greater mortality in certain regions and from almost exclusively Ukrainian memoir accounts that the leaders had a particular animus against Ukrainians. Yet the Stalinist regime seems to have acted with violence against every Soviet nationality.

While cognizant of mortality figures and memoirs of Ukraine, I also take into account food production and supply data for the entire country, which I think must have been the leadership's overriding concern. This broader array of sources provides the basis for a more complete understanding of the famine. This is not to dismiss nationality as an issue: if the harvest forced the regime to choose whom to supply, their decisions are an important aspect of the famine. They were *not*, however, its fundamental cause. The causes of the small 1932 harvest, in turn, have to be sought in the process of collectivization and the character of peasant farming in the *kolkhozy* in these years.

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