MILITARY MOTIVATIONS IN THE SEIZURE OF POWER

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I

One of the most characteristic features of political processes in Latin America is the military seizure of power. The phenomenon is extremely complex and a complete understanding of it, if that is ever reached, will have to take into account a variety of causal factors operating over different periods of time, and interacting in various ways. Where a problem is this complex, one is well advised to approach it through a variety of methods,[1] and this has indeed occurred. Some of the standard methods are:

1. To contrast Latin American experience as a whole with that of other areas—the United States, or Western Europe, or Africa—in order to isolate putative causal factors present in Latin American history and tradition but not found elsewhere;
2. To contrast the experience of different Latin American countries, identifying those more prone to military assumptions of power and trying to determine what socioeconomic or other variables correlate with a high propensity to military coups;
3. To examine changes over time in the incidence of coups, in the history of all of the Latin American countries, of a single country, or of a limited group of them, to try to discover the changes in other dimensions associated with changes in the relative frequency of coups;
4. To examine the motives of military officers who stage coups, either as stated by them or as imputed to them by knowledgeable observers.

The writer has presented elsewhere an analysis using the second and third methods.[2] It is with the fourth method, the examination of the motives of military coup-makers, that this article is concerned.

Such an examination must make several key distinctions. In the first place, motives of individual ambition are always present, especially in the smaller and less-developed countries, where institutional strength and professionalization are weaker. In the second place, an armed forces

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accustomed to repeated interventions in a fragmented political situation itself loses coherence and military factions allied with civilian politicians form, owning to various ideological and partisan persuasions, in whose name and not in that of the armed forces they may seize power. In recent years this has been the case especially in Bolivia and to some extent in Argentina. A comprehensive theory of the military seizure of power would have to explore fully these types of motivations, which the present article does not do. It constitutes therefore only a partial theoretical formulation. Its range is nevertheless great, since professionalization and the growth of institutional loyalties have been such that military seizures of power today are typically presented as acts of a unified armed forces. It is these institutional seizures of power which are discussed in the present article.

Such institutional seizures of power have been explained most frequently as serving national or general public interest, the interest of ruling classes, or the collective and institutional interests of members of the armed forces themselves. While representatives of each of these schools of explanation often consider their views to be mutually exclusive and occasionally engage in polemics, I will argue (a) that in fact the three views are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but can in large part be reconciled with each other; however, (b) that the institutional-interest view has more general applicability—that is, that it accounts for many cases left unexplained by the other two hypotheses.

II

The "national-interest" school of thought derives from non-Latin American as well as Latin American experience. It may indeed have more applicability in Africa or the Middle East, but it has made its appearance among commentators on Latin America. In grouping together writers who share this general perspective, I should first make clear that each of them does not necessarily share *in toto* the views of the others.

This position might also be termed "conservative," "idealist," or "neo-Hegelian," because it typically assumes that things are as they are supposed to be and romanticizes the state and its servants, accepting them at their own valuation. In this view, which is close to military officers' own conceptions of their behavior, the military officer, unlike a civilian politican, is free of partisan commitments. By his training and mission he identifies with the national interest, rather than with sectional or regional loyalties. His behavior is thus primarily determined by what is good for the country as a whole, and not for some faction, party, or sect. Expected to lay down his life for his country if necessary, the soldier is above all else a patriot. "After independence the military continued to be a

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nation-building force. In the process of raising and training troops, men were removed from parochial environments . . . they were instructed in citizenship and patriotism."[3]

Military officers are free of sectional loyalties and able to transcend particularistic ties, in this view. Moreover, they are typically more honest than their traditionally corrupt civilian counterparts."In civilian politics, corruption, nepotism and bribery loomed much larger. Within the army, a sense of national mission transcending parochial, regional, or economic interests and kinship ties seemed to be much more clearly defined than anywhere else in society."[4] Furthermore, the argument runs, the military may be particularly well suited to play a modernizing role. They are of necessity a modernized element in traditional societies, having to operate sophisiticated equipment."They have become the major representatives of modernity in technology and administration."[5]

On occasion the argument goes a step further: The authority of a military government may be necessary in order to clear away the barriers to development. Constitutional governments are too weak and ineffective to deal with the formidable problems involved; moreover, parliaments are very often dominated by representatives of groups that have an interest in maintaining the status quo. Because his origins are typically in the lower middle class, on the other hand, the military officer retains a sympathy for the aspirations of those lower in the social scale. "Now that officers are coming increasingly from the lower middle sectors and the working masses, the armed forces may be expected to be more inclined than formerly to gravitate toward positions identified with popular aspirations. . . ."[6] Because of the military's stress on hierarchy and discipline, military governments are effective where constitutional regimes are not, the argument continues. And the increasing emphasis on advanced schooling for military officers, including schooling in social and economic subjects, means that these men may be well qualified to hold government positions.

If the idealist approach, in its extreme form, takes the military too much at their own estimation and reflects their own conceptions of their behavior, at least those expressed for public consumption, the rival neo-Marxist school[7] tends to ignore subjective perceptions and to focus instead on the objective effects of military action. To the purest neo-Hegelians, the state and its uniformed servants represent the embodiment of the public interest; to the neo-Marxists, they represent the executive apparatus of the ruling class.[8] To John Johnson, the fact that military officers are recruited from the lower middle class means that their sympathies are likely to lie with those lower on the social scale; to José Nun, the same fact means that military officers are in fact a sector of the middle class and thus defend middle class interests, that is, the interests of the capitalist system.[9]

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By its nature, writes Régis Debray, any government originating in a military coup necessarily tends to the right. "Organized violence belongs to the dominant class."[10] The political actions of military officers, in this view, promote not national interests but class interests; they defend not the nation, but the capitalist system and the dominant power in that system, the United States.[11]

I would personally accept the correctness of both neo-Hegelian and neo-Marxist views as applied to specific cases. However, each interpretation applies to a limited range of cases; even taken together they need to be supplemented, complemented—and, on occasion, supplanted—by the third major interpretive approach, which stresses the military's defense not of an abstract public interest or of the interest of a dominant social class, but of the collective and institutional interests of the military itself.[12] It accepts the idealist thesis that military officers are relatively free of commitment to particularistic interests of region, party, and even of class, but argues that they remain committed to the defense of their own interests, not only as individuals but also as members of the military institution.

From the institutional-interest perspective, the fact that military officers are recruited primarily from the lower middle classes does not necessarily mean, as in the idealist view, that they sympathize with nonoligarchic interests; nor, as in the neo-Marxist view, that they form part of the middle class and thus defend the capitalist order. From this third perspective, class origins are not as important as institutional-interest considerations, since through their training and resocialization military officers become declassed and come to identify with the military institution itself rather than with a social class.[13] In the words of C. Wright Mills, "Social origins and early background are less important to the character of the professional military man than to any other high social type."[14]

III

The strength of the institutional-interest explanation of military political behavior lies in the fact that particular conceptions of the national interest (which is never self-evident), or commitments to specific class interests, are less generalized among the key military officers who decide whether or not to stage an institutional seizure of power than loyalty to institutional interests, which form a common denominator among all concerned.

It is difficult, for a variety of reasons, to quantify the evidence on this point. Studies generalizing from a number of cases of coups, however, typically emphasize the role of military self-interest. In an

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examination of three cases of military intervention in 1954, in Brazil, Guatemala, and Paraguay, Ross K. Baker found that institutional self-interest (rather misleadingly labeled "status deprivation," but explained as "the desire for self-preservation, service integrity, autonomy, and corporate privilege") was of critical importance, far more than appeared to outsiders at the time, in precipitating military action.[15] An analysis of seven Latin American coups occurring in the period of 1962–64 convinced Edwin Lieuwen that "behind the ostensible reasons for intervening . . . one finds the real reason is institutional self-interest."[16] In concluding his valuable survey of military intervention in politics, which considered about one hundred cases, S. E. Finer acknowledged the existence of mixed motives, but stressed especially "the corporate self-interest of the military . . . pride, ambition, self-interest and revenge."[17] After study of 274 coups, successful and unsuccessful, occurring from 1946 to 1970, in Africa and the Middle East as well as in Latin America, William R. Thompson concluded that "the military coup predominantly occurs in order to protect or advance the individual/group/corporate positional and resource standing of the coup makers."[18]

IV

Thus if one had to choose among the three types of explanations adumbrated above, the institutional-interest hypothesis would, I would maintain, provide the most comprehensive explanatory thesis. However, for a great many cases it is a question not of choosing among alternative explanations, but of seeing how different orders of motivation interact to bring about the seizure of power.[19]

Pitched as it is at a different level of explanation from the other views examined,[20] the institutional-interest hypothesis need not contradict those of public and class interest. Thus it is perfectly true, as the "idealists" argue, that military officers are patriotically concerned to defend the national interest. But this is the national interest as seen through military eyes; it consists in the first instance of the defense of national security, and thus entails the maintenance of a strong military force. A growing economy, for example, is desirable because it means a growing military budget, a satisfied population that is less likely to engage in insurrections, and prestige in the eyes of rival countries. The national interest is not self-evident, and one's conception of it is influenced by one's self-interested perspective.

Similarly, in defending the institutional interest, the military often finds itself acting objectively in the interest of the ruling class. The maintenance of internal order, one of the armed forces' principal concerns, is often equivalent to supporting an incumbent regime, or the established

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distribution of power and property. Yet it should be noted that this coincidence of institutional and class interests does not constitute a permanent identity of interest: The desire to maintain order can also prompt the removal of a regime and even the transformation of a status quo that seems to be productive of disorder. One scholar, writing of the 1960s and early 1970s, goes so far as to say: "It became axiomatic among the 'new military' that the traditionally prized goals of law, order and stability could only be attained by an acceleration of social and economic change."[21] A striking case in point is that of the Peruvian seizure of power of 1968, which is discussed below.

The defense or promotion of institutional interests can thus not simply be regarded as the mechanism by means of which military actions are automatically synchromeshed with a larger set of dynamics functioning as the level of the total system, since it can have purposes of its own not explainable at the system level. In other words, the three interpretations of military motivation discussed here are in effect explanations operating at different levels of the social system. In the neo-Marxist model the fundamental dynamic process is one in which social classes are the effective units. The military act without autonomy, as a mechanism in the functioning of a process of class conflict. The neo-Hegelian model, although it can be couched in terms of the subjective motivations of the military, is also essentially a macrosystem explanation. Patriotism is after all the mode in which what are taken to be system-level national requirements are converted into individual motivation at the expense of personal interests.

Military intervention may thus serve class interests, or an abstract public interest, but the movement to seize power becomes effective only as it engages the military's concern for the defense of their own interests. There are many ways in which civilian politicians representing a certain conception of the public interest or a specific social class attempt to secure military intervention in politics. The technique typically used, however, is to try to demonstrate how some *military* interest will be served by a military seizure of power.[22]

It is therefore misleading to treat system-level class-interest or national-interest explanations as excluding institutional-interest explanations. System-level dynamics operate through engaging concern for institutional interests. The big gears must mesh with the small gears for the machine to run. However, while system-level dynamics can only take effect in this way, institutional (or personal) interests can lead to seizures of power *in the absence of compelling class or public-regarding motives*. Institutional motivation can thus be autonomous.

Two very important recent cases illustrate how institutional-in-

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terest factors operate in the process that eventuates in a coup d'etat. An example of a case in which institutional interests interact with a more fundamental class-struggle causality is that of the overthrow of Salvador Allende. Arturo Valenzuela's excellent account of the overthrow of Allende finds that the immediate triggers of the coup were institutional. Military leaders feared that their monopoly of force was being threatened by the creation in the "cordones industriales" of a socialist popular army; they resented political interference with the seniority system, in the shape of Allende's attempt to pass over the ranking seven generals in appointing the commander of the Carabineros; and they feared the subversion of discipline in the campaign by the extreme left to prepare enlisted men to disobey any antigovernment orders by their officers. Yet it was of course a class-struggle situation that gave rise to the circumstances in which these threats to institutional military interests were posed. However, a pure institutional-interest model seems a more promising manner of interpreting the emergence of the progressive military government of Velasco Alvarado in Peru, than to try to explain, for example, how the army somehow became the agent not of the actual Peruvian ruling class, but instead of a prospective ruling class as yet only in a formative stage. An alternative Marxist formulation (used by Marx himself to explain Napoleon) that, in a transitional situation where no single class dominates, the army may play an independent role has been advanced to account for the Peruvian case by Manfred Kossok.[23] While perfectly sound, this is, however, unhelpful. Instead of providing an explanation, it only gives a reason for one's inability to explain.[24] The Velasco Alvarado phenomenon can most plausibly be explained, rather, from the perspective of institutional interests, beginning with the observation that the military's experience in combating guerrillas in La Convención suggested to them that the task of maintaining order would be simpler if some of the peasants' real grievances were removed.[25] *"Hemos aplastado los efectos. ¿Que hacemos ahora de las causas?"*[26]

V

This brings us to the question of what specifically are the institutional interests that are alleged to be critical in the decision to overthrow a government. The following listing of the values that military interventions are designed to defend, while not exhaustive, is representative of the military's institutional and collective interests. Institutional-interest interventions are staged to defend, maintain, or promote:

1. The unity of the armed forces. Thus on occasion officers who do not feel strongly against an incumbent government go along with a coup

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planned by more extreme officers because they do not want to oppose them and thus jeopardize the unity of the armed forces. This factor entered into the decision of Colonel Luis Cabrera and Captain Ramón Castro Jijón to join the coup being prepared by Colonel Marcos Gándara against the government of President Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy in Ecuador in 1963;[27]

2. The authority of officers over enlisted men. Several coups have been prompted by attempts to mobilize enlisted men, or noncommissioned officers specifically, behind a left-wing government. This was an important factor in the decision of the Brazilian military to overthrow President João Goulart in 1964;[28]

3. The monopoly of armed force by the traditional military services. Thus for example the unwillingness of the Guatemalan army to defend the government of President Jacobo Arbenz against the invasion of the country from Honduras by forces under Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas was due in large part to the fact that Arbenz was organizing and equipping a partisan militia force;[29]

4. Any special status the armed forces may have vis-à-vis the civilian authorities. The coup by which the Honduran armed forces removed President Ramón Villeda Morales in 1963 was due principally to the fact that the Liberal candidate in the forthcoming elections had criticized the special privileged status of the armed forces,[30] which in Honduras includes authority to draw up and submit their own budget to Congress, bypassing the president completely, and congressional election of the military commander for a fixed term of office;

5. As a minimum, maintenance of the current level of spending on the military. As Víctor Villanueva has pointed out,[31] every government of Peru that has attempted to reduce the military budget has been overthrown;

6. The autonomy of the rank and seniority system from political interference. The overthrow of Arnulfo Arias after eleven days as president of Panama in 1968 was triggered by the president's decision to pass over the two most senior officers in appointing a replacement for the retiring commander of the national guard;[32]

7. Good relations with the civilian population. This leads frequently to the overthrow of governments that have used the military forces to repress political dissent directed only against the office holders personally. The overthrow of Víctor Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia in 1964 was heavily influenced by Paz's use of the military against the mine workers and other opponents of his reelection;[33]

8. The prestige and dignity of the armed forces. The ineffective performance of the ruling military junta in Ecuador in 1966 led many officers to

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believe that it was damaging armed forces prestige and should be removed;[34]

9. Border defense and preparedness. The overthrow of the Bolivian government by returning veterans of the Chaco War was stimulated by the feeling of military officers that the government had unnecessarily precipitated a war for which the country was unprepared because of corruption and inefficiency in the government's system of supplying and equipping the armed forces;[35]

10. Internal order. Governments whose policies, in the military view, impede the maintenance of order or actively promote internal disorder are likely to be overthrown, as in the case of the Colombian President Laureano Gómez, whose extreme partisanship contributed to the escalation of fighting between Liberals and Conservatives.[36]

VI

To recapitulate: The view that defense of institutional interests provides the most useful general explanation of military seizures of power does not exclude the interpretation of specific coups as serving class interests or a general national interest, or indeed other interests, such as those of specific individuals. The structure of causality of a historical event is complex, and a military seizure of power is the result of the interaction of forces both internal and external to the military institution. Military officers are often persuaded of the desirability of a seizure of power by civilians whose ulterior motives they do not share. However, the chances of success of such a process of persuasion are greatest if it can demonstrate that institutional interests of the military are somehow at stake.

The primary formal purposes for which military forces have been assigned a monopoly of violence are national defense and the maintenance of internal order. But these have been supplemented in practice by two additional purposes that have grown out of the character of political processes in Latin America: Intervening in the public interest to remedy a situation for which no constitutional way out is apparent; and maintenance of the socioeconomic status quo on behalf of the ruling group. These purposes are not formally accepted as a necessary part of the military mission, however, unlike the national-defense role. They must therefore be activated for each occasion specifically by being shown, by those, civilian or military, advocating an assumption of power, to be comprehended within the scope of the national-defense or internal order missions, or else to be related to what military men believe to be the necessary prerequisite to the successful execution of those primary missions: The maintenance and strengthening of a unified, disciplined, hierarchic,

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well-equipped armed forces, enjoying the high morale that comes from popular prestige and comfortable material circumstances. But in any case self-interested considerations of this type, related to the performance of the primary missions or not, induce military seizures of power with frequency even in the absence of public-interest or class-interest provocation.

Institutional-interest motives thus appear invariably present in institutional seizures of power. System-level causes, e.g. class struggle, may on occasion be the ultimate prime movers in the process that leads to a coup; but while they have great explanatory power in the history of some coups, they are not of frequent enough applicability to serve as a general explanation of the military seizure of power.

NOTES

1. See Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Enquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), pp. 24-30 and *passim*.
2. Martin C. Needler, "The Causality of the Latin American Coup d'Etat: Some Numbers, Some Speculations "(Paper presented at the APSA National Meeting in Washington, September 1972, and reprinted in Steffen W. Schmidt and Gerald A. Dorfman, *Soldiers in Politics* [Los Altos: Geron-X, 1974]).
3. Lyle N. McAlister, "The Military," in John J. Johnson, ed., *Continuity and Change in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 137.
4. Manfred Halperin, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class,"in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).
5. Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of States," in Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military*.
6. John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 152.
7. This rivalry is quite conscious. In an interesting and undogmatic statement of the neo-Marxist position, Dale Johnson refers to the idealist view, represented by John J. Johnson's *The Role of the Military* and *The Military and Society*, as "the conventional wisdom on the military." Dale L. Johnson,*The Sociology of Change and Reaction in Latin America* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), p. 45.
8. This view, couched perhaps in other language, need not be confined to Marxists. In an article based on data through 1964, the present author, who does not consider himself a Marxist, wrote that "military intervention increasingly takes the form of an attempt by the possessing classes to maintain the status quo." "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *American Political Science Review*, September 1966, p. 618. (In fact, the statement was time bound and the post-1964 data have not maintained the trend line.) While a class-interest view may at times be acceptable to many liberals, it is of course properly Marxist and not "positivist liberal," as Manfred Kossok says in "Potencialidades y limitaciones del cambio en la función política y social de las FF.AA. de los países en desarrollo: El caso de América Latina," *Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología* 2-3 (1971): 197.
9. José Nun, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," reprinted in Claudio Véliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
10. Régis Debray, "Castroism: The Long March in Latin America," in Robin Blackburn, ed., *Strategy for Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 29.
11. John Saxe-Fernández, "The Central American Defense Council and Pax Americana," in Irving L. Horowitz, Josué de Castro, and John Gerassi, eds., *Latin American Radicalism* (New York: Random House Vintage, 1969), p. 76.

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12. I mean by "institutional interests" the interests given the military by the nature of the functions they have to perform: That is, the maintenance of order, hierarchy, and discipline within the armed forces, the prestige of the armed forces among the civilian population, the security of the national borders, the size of the military budget, and so on; these are elaborated in detail below. By "collective" interests I mean the sum of the individual interests of members of the armed services, as in the general level of salaries and privileges. These collective interests are not those of "the institution" strictly speaking, but are in practice indistinguishable from authentic institutional interests and will be treated below as subsumed in the concept of "institutional interests."
13. This has been the conclusion of most in-depth studies. See e.g., in addition to sources cited previously, the recent article by Alejandro Leloir, "Brasil: Ejército y política," *Estrategia* 22 (May-June 1973): 25. In a new concluding chapter for the second edition of *The Man on Horseback*, to be published in 1975, S. E. Finer has used West European survey data to show that the political attitudes of military officers do not reflect their class origins. For some reason, these data were not included in the version of the chapter appearing in *Armed Forces and Society*, Fall 1974.
14. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p.192. Cited but disagreed with in Johnson, *The Military and Society*, p.105.
15. Ross K. Baker, *A Study of Military Status and Status Deprivation in Three Latin American Armies* (Washington: The American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1967).
16. Edwin Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 107.
17. S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 241–242.
18. William R. Thompson, "Explanations of the Military Coup," (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1972). This is a valuable study, despite the awkwardness of the data base.
19. Cf. Arturo Valenzuela, "The Breakdown of Democracy in Chile," in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *Breakdowns and Crises of Democratic Regimes* (in preparation).
20. See J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 79. This is a cogent and subtle discussion of a difficult and often overlooked problem.
21. Elizabeth H. Hyman, "Military Power and Political Change in Latin America," *Survival*, March-April 1973.
22. Examples of civilian provocation of military seizures of power are not hard to find. See, for example, Juan Bosch, *The Unfinished Experiment: Democracy in the Dominican Republic* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. xi; M. C. Needler, *Anatomy of a Coup d'Etat: Ecuador, 1963* (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1964), p. 15; *A Report to the American Academic Community on the Present Argentine University Situation*, Special Publication of the Latin American Studies Association, Austin, 1967, p. 17.
23. Manfred Kossok, "The Military and Reform Governments in Latin America," Special Issue of the *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, November 1972, p. 386. But then an embarrassingly large number of situations turn out to be "transitional," and one can only tell which are transitional after the fact. Aníbal Quijano takes a similar line, applying it generally to all of Latin America, in *Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru: A Study in Neo-Imperialism*, trans. Helen R. Lane (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), p. 8.
24. This is not a difficulty for the basic Marxian conception of historical causation, so much as it is for attempts to explain all occurrences, no matter how trivial or fortuitous, in Marxist terms. After all, an attempt to construct a general theory of military seizures of power starts with a set of phenomena not all of which are of any particular historical significance. A general theory of history, on the other hand, starts with the important questions and defines problems in terms of them. Of course a case can be made against Marxist theory on many other grounds. But rather than attempt to force a case of the pursuit, let us say, of institutional interests into a class-interest mold, a stronger posi-

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tion would be to argue, "We explain the tides, and some of the waves; we don't bother with every ripple on the surface."

25. Most observers explain the complexities of the Peruvian case in institutional terms; e.g. the persistence of the military's hostility to the APRA after the party had become acceptable to the oligarchy can only be explained institutionally. In fact, the APRA's rapprochement with the oligarchy made the military more antioligarchy, and not less anti-APRA, as a class analysis would suggest. See Alain Rouquié, "Military Revolutions and National Independence in Latin America: 1968-1971," in Philippe Schmitter, ed., *Military Rule in Latin America: Functions, Consequences and Prospects* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), pp. 15-25; Julio Cotler, *El populismo militar como modelo de desarrollo nacional: El caso peruano* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, October 1969); Carlos Astiz and José Z. García Jr. "El ejército peruano en el poder," *Aportes*, October 1972; Luis Valdez Pallete, "Antecedentes de la nueva orientación de las fuerzas armadas en el Perú," *Aportes*, January 1971; Luigi Einaudi, "Revolution from Within? Military Rule in Peru since 1968," (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, July 1971 [also reprinted in Dorfman and Schmidt, *Soldiers in Politics*]); and José Z. García Jr., "The 1968 Velasco Coup in Peru: Causes and Policy Consequences" (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1974).
26. The words of a Peruvian major describing the attitude of the army, quoted by José Luis Rubio in an excellent short account of the Peruvian phenomenon, *Aproximación a la Revolución Peruana* (Barcelona: Ediciones Acervo, 1974), p. 21. He goes on to cite General Leonidas Rodríguez, head of SINAMOS: *"Por otra parte, también la subversión provocó en el Ejército la necesidad de estudiar lo que realmente pasaba en el país, pues teníamos que intervenir contra ella. Las guerrillas nos hicieron pensar, pues evidentemente eran producto de una situación socio-económica determinada".* Ibid., p. 23.
27. Needler, *Anatomy of a Coup d'Etat*, p. 26.
28. Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 296-97; Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971 [paperback edition, 1974]), pp. 160-65.
29. Edwin C. Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America*, rev. ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 93; and E. C. Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 41.
30. Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents*, pp. 65-66.
31. *¿Nueva mentalidad militar en el Perú?* (Lima: Editorial Juan Mejía Baca, 1969), p. 194.
32. Daniel Goldrich, "Panama," in Martin C. Needler, ed., *Political Systems of Latin America*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970), p. 158.
33. William H. Brill, *Military Intervention in Bolivia: The Overthrow of Paz Estenssoro and the MNR* (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1967), p. 41.
34. See the careful analysis of John S. Fitch III, "Toward a Model of the Coup d'Etat as a Political Process in Latin America: Ecuador 1948-1966" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1973), especially p. 230.
35. Robert J. Alexander, "Bolivia: The National Revolution", in Needler, ed., *Political Systems of Latin America*, pp. 361-62.
36. Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics*, p. 88.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note: *This bibliography includes both works specifically concerned with military seizures of power and those that deal with coups as part of more general treatments of the military. No attempt is made is to include works on unrelated military questions, such as combat training and equipment, nor general works on politics which may devote a few pages to the military seizure of power.*

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JOURNALS

Two journals devoted to military questions are of special interest. *Estrategia* is published in Buenos Aires and edited by General Juan Gugliamelli. Its orientation is nationalist and developmentalist. *Armed Forces and Society*, which began publication in Chicago in November 1974, is edited by Ivan Dee and a board consisting of Raymond Aron, S. E. Finer, Morris Janowitz, and Jacques Van Doorn for the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Other journals most often containing articles of relevance are *Aportes* (now discontinued) and the *Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología.*

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