

eventually to achieve a position of strategic economic dominance over the Middle East" and a "level of political authority as predominant power" in the region. This, in turn, would enable the Kremlin "to exert pressures upon capitalist states by threatening their strategic interests, which include the unhampered flow of petroleum from the Middle East." Ideologically speaking, "the U.S.S.R. would be working toward a world energy delivery system within a world socialist planned economy" (p. 121).

Thus the major intrinsic inadequacy of Landis's book, given his own framework, is the failure to appraise the chances for Moscow's likely success or failure in the light of the objective obstacles to Soviet expansion. As a result, his work is based on a number of questionable assumptions concerning Russia's ultimate intentions in the Middle East which have not been tested against the realities of regional politics and economics or against Washington's obvious determination not to abandon the area to the mercy of the USSR.

O. M. SMOLANSKY
Lehigh University

PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION: FROM HEGEL TO SARTRE, AND FROM MARX TO MAO. By *Raya Dunayevskaya*. New York: Delacorte Press, 1973. xix, 372 pp. \$8.95, cloth. \$2.95, paper.

If one seeks the central idea of Ms. Dunayevskaya's work, it may be found to be that of *praxis*—but the idea used as backdrop rather than analyzed in depth. I have in mind not what Marxists have said about it and made of it in translating it as "practice" but what Karl Marx himself understood by the term: "ce tout de l'activité réelle de l'homme, cette activité ouvrière, que Marx oppose à l'idéalisme comme au matérialisme," as the French philosopher Jean Lacroix put it twenty-five years ago, or, in Dunayevskaya's phrase, "an activity both mental and manual, [a] 'critical-practical activity,' which Marx never separated from its revolutionary character" (p. 265). But from the moment when Marx's thought became transformed into an ideology, that is to say into a doctrine whose practical purpose is *political*, supported by a conception of the world and an ethic which claim to conform to a *scientifically* established order, and when this ideology became the doctrine of an agency in power (party or state), there was substituted for the *praxis* of Marx a voluntarism more or less uprooted from the analysis of the reality and the movement of a society.

It is around this issue that Dunayevskaya organizes her analysis of the relations between philosophy and revolution. In the first part of the work she places on the same footing Hegel, Marx, and Lenin, considered as philosophers in search of the concrete universal. In the second and third parts, she shows why recent Marxists and philosophers (Trotsky, Mao Tse-tung, and Sartre) have been unable to fill the theoretical void of the Marxist movement and how examination of the different liberation movements of the last two decades in Africa, Europe, the United States, and elsewhere suggests that "the filling of the theoretic void since Lenin's death remains the task to be done" (p. 266). That is to say how necessary it is both to the theoreticians and the revolutionary movements of our time to return to Marxian *praxis*: "It has always been my belief that in our age theory can develop fully only when grounded in what the masses themselves are doing and thinking" (p. xviii).

In the latter half of our century revolutionary groups, wherever they begin,

whenever they are free from partisan conformism, are realizing that they can do nothing durable without a theory, as they can accomplish nothing without acting themselves. In Dunayevskaya's view, of particular importance are the different resistance movements which from 1956 to 1970—in Warsaw and Budapest and Prague, Gdansk and Szczecin—have united workers and youth from various countries of Eastern and Danubian Europe in revolt against the inhuman oppression of local Marxist-Leninist regimes. They have embarked upon a movement for the liberation of all men: “All sorts of nonstatist forms of social relations emerged in every field, from newspapers and parties . . . to underlying philosophies of freedom and totally new human relationships” (p. 252). She asks, “Is it not time for intellectuals to begin, with where the workers are and what they think, to fill the theoretic void in the Marxist movement?” (p. 266).

From Dunayevskaya's vantage point the question is urgent, for neither Mao, nor the post-Stalinists, nor the Trotskyists, nor the disciples of Sartre can fill the void: “Rather, the void existed because, from Leon Trotsky down, the disputants failed to face up to the movement from below” (p. 125).

The fundamental question is nevertheless not that but a different one. It lies in the philosophical equating of Hegel, Marx, and Lenin, from the viewpoint of the dialectic of negation. There is no need to dispute the characterization of philosopher given Marx by the author, following Karl Löwith and many others. Marx is really a great philosopher, one of the most penetrating critics of Hegel. The chapter devoted to the manuscripts of 1844 and to the *Grundrisse* is among the most interesting in the book. Proper treatment is given to the fallacious “epistemological cut-off” which Louis Althusser located first in 1845, then recently transferred to the 1870s. This “cut-off” is doubtless only the rendering into philosophical form, for the benefit of Western readers, of the conclusions of the Soviet philosophers who, during the 1950s, studied the formation of Marx's ideas. Marxism-Leninism is, however, unaffected, as one sees in the *Réponse à John Lewis* (Paris, 1973).

In returning to Hegel when he read the *Science of Logic* in 1914–15, Lenin seemed to overturn the ideas which he had expounded a decade earlier in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. Dunayevskaya is doubtless right to challenge the “reductionism” of B. M. Kedrov, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Nevertheless a more detailed study of the written work and later actions of Lenin would be required in order to conclude that these new ideas of his, which he recorded only elliptically, governed his work in 1917–24. One must reserve judgment, for several of the decisions taken by Lenin during this period—especially as concerns the role of the opposition in the party and that of terror as instrument of class justice—would find their logical consequences in the day-to-day Marxism-Leninism of Stalin.

No more than Marx's dialectic of negation can that of Lenin be equated with that of Hegel. In Lenin as in Marx other philosophical elements are also present which radically alter the configuration of the whole and no more arrive at a concrete universal that does Hegel's dialectic. It is probably only in exploring other paths, which Hegel called “the seriousness, the suffering, the patience and the labor of negativity,” that it will be possible to arrive at the *real* liberty of all men. Dunayevskaya's book may aid in this discovery as a result of the questions it raises.

HENRI CHAMBRE
Paris/Vanves