

imposed or home-grown. They add nuance to their argument by also adding individual-level variables that they suggest might either provide resistance against exposure to communism (such as higher levels of education and Catholicism) or intensify the effect of “exposure” (including Communist Party membership, urban residence, and parental socialization). The construction of this dataset was, no doubt, a herculean task, and the authors deserve credit both for the comprehensiveness of their model and how they explain their reasoning. Furthermore, they display a welcome humility, acknowledging shortcomings in the data and where objections can be made.

The dependent variables, support for democracy, markets, social welfare, and gender equality, come primarily from questions asked in various waves of the WVS, supplemented with surveys conducted by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and country-specific surveys in Hungary and Germany, the last of which allows a more focused comparison between West and East Germans. The data is pooled, with one consequence being that most of the discussion focuses on the examination of variables (that is, does a pre-communist democratic past matter, does higher economic growth under communism matter?) as opposed to countries (how do Czechs differ from Ukrainians?).

This book is methodologically sophisticated, and readers averse to statistical analysis may decide it is not for them. That would be a pity. The authors explain and display their data in a very accessible manner, saving the details for a 125 page electronic appendix (currently available at Joshua Tucker’s webpage). They walk readers step by step through competing models, clarifying how each added variable does (or does not) matter. One can get lost in some of the details, but the general conclusion remains clear across the four issue-areas: living through communism (even when controlled for age) does seem to matter in terms of producing legacies in attitudes (weaker on gender equality), even taking into account all these other variables. Furthermore, more purchase can be gained by taking into account some of the resisting/intensifying variables. As for whether this is a permanent or more transitory effect, the authors suggest in Chapter 8 that whereas the “exposure effect” for support for social welfare seems to be more lasting, the effect for support for democracy and markets may be more transitory since over time, as markets and democratic systems have stabilized in many postcommunist states, individual communist era socialization legacies appear to be receding.

There is obviously more going on in this book than can be covered in a short review. Among possible critiques, perhaps the strongest relate to the WVS, which is conducted in a limited set of countries (which changes in each wave) and asks a limited range of questions. These problems, of course, are not the authors’ fault, and one could argue they do a great job working with what is publicly available. This book should be widely read by those interested in post-communist politics and societies, but it should also find a broader audience, as it sets a high standard in how to do research with public opinion datasets and wrestle with questions of the legacy effects of prior political systems.

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***Russia and Courtly Europe: Ritual and the Culture of Diplomacy, 1648–1725.*** By Jan Hennings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. xii, 297 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Illustrations. Plates. Photographs. \$99.95, hard bound. doi: 10.1017/slr.2018.163

This cogent book is about more than diplomacy; it gets to the heart of debates about Russia’s image and place in Europe. Based on broad secondary and archival research,

it demonstrates Russia's active engagement in Europe through the status and respect it received in diplomatic ceremony across the so-called "Petrine divide" (a term Jan Hennings would reject).

Hennings disputes historiographical contentions that Muscovite diplomacy was hyper-focused on minutiae, attributed to its "exotic Orthodox ritualism" (6), and that Peter I transformed Russian diplomacy to the western model. He argues that European states accepted Muscovy in the community of Christian states since at least Westphalia (1648) and that Peter I, in even as radical a step as taking the title of *imperator*, intentionally "put himself in direct continuity with Muscovite tsars," a far more effective strategy in the precedent-driven world of diplomacy than promoting a new ideology (244).

Hennings focuses on the ceremonial because, given the difficulty of measuring real military power in early modern conditions, ritual expressions publically "recognized by others" (4) not merely *reflected* power but *produced* it. Hardly "vain formality," diplomatic ceremonial was "a constitutive component of a state's sovereignty and legitimacy" (2–3, 14–15). The many disputes over ritual that Muscovite diplomats raised were not specific to them; all—Spanish, French, Dutch, and Swedish—were capable of disruptive and even violent quarrels over the proper status and attendant honors for their monarch or republic. Yet, since political hierarchy was constantly in flux, they mediated, compromised and won or lost ground, as Hennings shows in superb case studies of Russian embassies abroad or British ones in Moscow. Russia's deft ability to leverage a scandal in Britain in 1708 (the arrest of diplomat Matveev) to win higher international regard shows how skillful a player it had become (220–37). Furthermore, diplomats made strategic use of incognito status, secret meetings, and court entertainments to escape the crushing weight of symbolic precedent (Chapters 3–5).

Hennings contends that to the extent that Russia differed in ceremonial approaches, it was because of its relatively late engagement with European diplomacy, logistical obstacles, and organizational and conceptual differences. Muscovy maintained an antiquated concept of ambassadorial status that caused tensions abroad, and diplomats' flexibility was constrained because Moscow lacked the postal and courier connections that allowed Sigismund von Herberstein, for example, to correspond with Vienna every few days during his many embassies. Thus, tasked with winning reciprocity and respect in every ceremonial encounter, Russian ambassadors were provided rigid instructions from which they were not to deviate. Those instructions were not, however, "irrational" cultural exotica, but were based on decades-long observation of European practices and precedents by experts in the foreign affairs chancery (Chapter 2). Hennings tracks how Peter I's administration improved communications, record-keeping, and concepts to match European practice.

Hennings sets tropes of Russia as despotic or barbaric decisively in their place. He chronicles their prevalence in Europe from the sixteenth century (Chapter 1) but, based on face-to-face diplomatic encounters, argues that they "had little effect on the inclusion of the tsars in the circle of European sovereigns" (68). Diplomats were a pragmatic bunch, inhabiting a world of "universal Baroque . . . not oriented towards confessional allegiance, national borders, or cultural belonging" (248). Hennings treats this discourse as a sort of parallel world of travel accounts, invoked in diplomacy only when it could be wielded to advantage. So, for example, after ambassador Charles Howard Carlisle failed to regain British trade privileges in his 1663/64 embassy to Moscow, the embassy's secretary, Guy Miede, deflected attention by playing up "the pride and the rusticity of the Muscovites" (154), a rare intrusion of cultural tropes into the "supranational lingua franca" (248) of diplomatic reports.

Hennings thus helps us see the discourse of Muscovite barbarism more clearly. It certainly existed, but as an entertaining diversion for the broad European readership

that loved a good story at a time when the travel account was perhaps the most popular form of literature. Precisely in the decades on which Hennings focuses, European publishers doubled down on the theme of the exotic that had been ambient in travel literature since the sixteenth century (see Benjamin Schmidt's *Inventing Exoticism*, 2015). But it did not represent cultural or political reality. Hennings shows that these stereotypes did not reflect the cultural acuity of the Muscovite court nor prevent European peers from accepting early modern Russia into the family of European states.

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***Petr Velikii kak Zakonodatel': Issledovanie zakonodatel'nogo protsessa v Rossii v epokhu reform pervoi chetverti XVIII veka.*** By N. A. Voskresenskii. D. O. Serova, ed. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2017. 637 pp. Notes. Index. RUB 585, hard bound.  
doi: 10.1017/slr.2018.164

Historians of Russia may know of Nikolai Alekseevich Voskresenskii (1889–1948) because of his invaluable collection of Petrine legislative acts. Although only the first volume came out in 1945, it has been recognized as more thorough and reliable than the tsarist-era Complete Collection of Laws that he edited (*Zakonodatel'nye akty Petra I*, Moscow, 1945). Unfortunately, the rest of Voskresenskii's massive scholarly contribution remained unpublished, including a fascinating monograph on the law-making process under Peter the Great that has now been issued with an illuminating introduction by legal historian Dmitrii Olegovich Serov. Unfinished and debatable in some of its conclusions, this study is nonetheless of great interest not only to legal historians, but to all scholars interested in Peter the Great or the development of Russia's government and political culture. Equally fascinating—and particularly resonant today—is Voskresenskii's personal and professional biography, narrated in Serov's introduction.

Popular understanding of Peter's reign leaves little room for legality or legal rights, following influential interpretations of his government as either ad hoc and even chaotic (Vasilii Kliuchevskii and Pavel Miliukov) or proto-totalitarian (Evgenii Anisimov). Yet historians know very well that Peter was a prodigious legislator whose project to rebuild Russia's administrative machinery included a new court structure. Nonetheless, such scholars as Mikhail Bogoslovskii, Iurii Got'e, Claes Peterson, John LeDonne, and more recently Serov argued that Peter's legal reforms were incomplete and perhaps even misconceived, marred by lacunae and backtracking. Nancy Kollmann finds that criminal justice under Peter generally continued Muscovite practices, with some innovations such as public executions, meant to expand and secure Peter's absolutist power. At the same time, archival-based studies by Kollmann, as well as by Aleksandr Kamenskii, Olga Kosheleva, and other historians, reveal a vibrant legal culture in early imperial Russia that directly affected people's daily lives in diverse ways.

Voskresenskii's study contributes to this literature by focusing not on the details of individual legislative acts, but rather on lawmaking as a comprehensive process ranging from Peter's brainstorming and observations recorded in his private notebooks to lengthy drafting, editing, and publication procedures (Chapters I–VIII). The second half of the book (Chapters VIII–XII) consider the intellectual and political underpinnings of Peter's legislation, including his personal views, the influence of foreign models, and the question of whether Peter's lawmaking was spontaneous or