

greatest myths of all time. Conscientious historians should not whitewash him without sufficient proof.

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TO THE EDITOR:

1. It is at least gratifying to learn that the affair of "Lise" is not a dead issue, as I had feared it might be. It is also gratifying to think that I am considered partial to Lenin rather than the reverse, which seems to be a more likely pitfall for American scholars. On the other hand, not everyone will assume as quickly as Professor Dovring that the alleged affair blackens Lenin's character. If true, would it not be a sign of the *prostor* that he so painfully lacks in most of his life?

2. *Fjords and rowboats*: While several reference works confirm my belief that the word "fjord" is not used to describe the low-relief inlets around Stockholm, I concede that Alexinsky's usage was derived from the similar Swedish term. Although I have done some rowing near Stockholm in late June and checked my impressions of the seasonal practices of boat hiring there with a person who has lived in the area, I now repent raising this matter because it is inconclusive, not that this in itself strengthens the case for "Lise."

3. *Letters*: There are striking dissimilarities between Lenin's authenticated hand and the published excerpts from his alleged letters to "Lise." One of the most obvious is the formation of the Russian *v* as a preposition. Judging by Bertram Wolfe's comment, to which I alluded, the Columbia University library, which presumably had a better look at the evidence than Professor Dovring did, was unconvinced that the letters were Lenin's. I do not, however, find this question crucial to my case. The published excerpts of letters could have been forged and "Lise" still could have existed, or they might have been by Lenin and written to someone else.

4. *Alexinsky*: What is crucial is Alexinsky's reliability, for one must depend wholly on him as the link to "Lise" and her story. Professor Dovring has not disposed of the contradictions that I noted in Alexinsky, undermining his credibility. While there is no need to repeat these contradictions, I do wish to point out that in one connection Professor Dovring might have spared himself some trouble if he had checked the Russian version of the story. In it Hanecki supposedly tells "Lise" in Paris during the World War, "On [Lenin] *v* Tsiurikhe." There is no basis for stating that this is merely a "mailing address."

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TO THE EDITOR:

Alvin Rubinstein's review of my book *Soviet-East European Dialogue: International Relations of a New Type?* (December 1969) has little relevance to its major ideas. His use of descriptive terms such as "turgid," "opaque," and "jaded" is unsupported by any telling example; and what is more, quoted passages are divorced from the very adjacent ideas he cites as shortcomings of the book, to wit:

1. The book actually refers to compelling Communist reappraisals and states, "Similarly, the West has revised its views: while some observers continue to affirm that the USSR is conspiratorially and routinely fulfilling every prophecy of Marx and Lenin, the overwhelming majority of Western specialists in international relations sees as the most extraordinary impact of contemporary Communist politics its very failure to achieve doctrinaire objectives" (p. 12). In short, Rubinstein erects his own straw man if he believes that the failure to achieve doctrinaire objectives is on the same plane with political-strategic aims.

2. Again on page 12, instead of striking a mere glancing blow, it would have been more enlightening to quote the whole idea, that is, "The intention is to concentrate not so much on past or potential Soviet military aggression in Eastern Europe, as upon the more intellectually demanding questions of why the USSR has insisted upon influencing the politics of its East European neighbors, and what kind of policies it is presently pursuing in this sensitive area of traditional national interest."

Rubinstein attributes to me the view that the only vision that constitutes the underpinnings of an operational East European Communist subsystem is Marxism-Leninism. Nothing of the kind. The book states: "Unmistakably, the trend has been toward reciprocal accommodation without destroying the privileged position of the USSR. . . . Joined together by conventions, treaties, and sundry agreements of a military, political, economic and cultural character, the system . . . has shown a marked urge toward increased organization and institutionalized cooperation, bearing multiple options, exchanges, compromises, and mutual benefits for member states—in short, a highly complex pattern of international behavior" (p. 118).

Nowhere in the book is there any intended optimism about the capacity of doctrine to cement political differences. Quite the opposite. The failure of Marxism-Leninism to do this has generated "a trend whereby intrasystem party unity is increasingly compromised on behalf of regional integration based on a community of East European national interests rather than on dogmatic rectitude" (p. 119). More than this, "The important truth for both Communist ideologists and the world is that the Soviet Union's hegemonistic posture in Eastern Europe confirmed not the predictions of Marx and Lenin, but rather the ability of the Red Army to push its way into a vast power vacuum caused by the War's devastation and the attendant collapse of Europe's Great Powers" (p. 29).

Concerning events since 1968, the Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia demonstrated that Dubček's liberalization had endangered Soviet territorial and regime security. Proximate East European states may not ease out of the international Communist system without Soviet retaliation. One need not accept Rubinstein's thesis about the specter of Soviet tanks to understand that the book is really somewhat (although unintentionally) prophetic: "Once the USSR laced its satellites together in a military alliance, proved its reliability in exercising overwhelming punitive force during the Hungarian Rebellion in 1956, and, beginning in 1958, rejuvenated the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation, the die was cast. In the Soviet purview, the territory of Eastern Europe had assumed a security priority comparable to that of the USSR itself" (p. 30).

Fine scholar that he is, Rubinstein cannot afford a careless review of ideas with which he may quite properly disagree, but which he nevertheless has the responsibility to present fairly. At a minimum, a few of the book's important themes should have been presented.

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