

to the Scottish Borders. The Mongol hordes and the feudal levies of Edward I are seen concentrating upon the littoral of Syria, Palestine and Egypt. For the first time Dominicans enter upon the scene and it is refreshing, though tantalizing, to learn of the intelligent attitude of a man like William of Tripoli to the possibility of evangelizing the Mongols, perhaps one of the great lost opportunities of the Church. In this the Dominican was supported by the great mind of Roger Bacon.

Mr Runciman has interesting studies of the leading figures of the last Crusading period—Richard Coeur de Lion, the Emperor Frederick II and Louis IX, Saint and King of France. He admires the military ability of Richard, a rare quality among those who strove to preserve or extend the Kingdom of Outremer, which the thirteenth century found confined to a strip along the coast. He appreciates the diplomatic approach and oriental sympathies of Frederick, but rightly deprecates his cynical agnosticism which was no more to the taste of pious Moslems than it was to that of the Popes. He speaks highly of the lofty character of Louis, which did not prevent him, however, from making egregious military blunders in Egypt. Finally, Byzantium having been fatally weakened by the inexcusable brutality of the Latins, and the possible Mongol alliance having been allowed to lapse, the Ottoman Turks sweep the last remnants of the Crusading States away. It is sad to think that there are no more Crusades for Mr Runciman to chronicle in his lucid, alert and expert manner; still sadder to think back on this intolerant, but not ignoble, enterprise which, for a time, restored the Holy Places to Christendom.

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BEING AND BECOMING. By D. J. B. Hawkins. (Sheed and Ward; 10s. 6d.)

Dr Hawkins here presents us with a metaphysical essay in the Aristotelian tradition. He discusses all the themes of the thomist textbook of metaphysics, but in a critical spirit and with an eye to those without the fold. The names of Hume, Kant and Russell leap to the eye from almost every page; if the names of modern thomist thinkers are not mentioned Dr Hawkins is certainly not unaware of them. His book is written in a natural, sinewy English and contains sincere thinking.

Dr Hawkins is not unafraid to break the crust of ancient terminology in an effort to release the truth. He writes of the metaphysical tension between being and quiddity rather than of the distinction between existence and essence, and has much to say on this matter which is most stimulating. His exposition of the unsatisfactoriness of the avicennian notion of existence and essence should do good to many junior thomists who are often unwittingly more avicennians than thomists.

But where he says that in the thomist definition of God as *ipsum esse subsistens* we can no longer translate *esse* as 'existence', I confess I was disconcerted. 'Subsistent existence is a meaningless phrase; existence is always the existence of something' (p. 42). When Avicenna wrote that 'God has no essence', was he completely off the track? Is not what we call God's essence (all the *rationes* intelligible aspects which go to build it up) rather a subjective determining of the transcendent than a concept with an analogical value in an unqualified sense? Our concepts of God are more of course than a mere beating on the void; but surely Kant has this at least to teach us that their value here is analogical only in a most delicate and subtle sense. Where creatures are concerned one agrees with Dr Hawkins that all existence is the existence of an essence. But where God is concerned would Dr Hawkins not be willing to add that all 'essence' is the 'essence' of 'existence'?

One agrees with Dr Hawkins that St Thomas was saying something different from Avicenna. There is no positive essence in creatures awaiting the reception of existence, as substance awaits accident and form awaits form. Existence actuates in a singular way, in a way that form does not. It actuates the real which it simultaneously makes to be real. But the existence is not the realness. But Dr Hawkins appears to withdraw even further from Avicenna. One fears that he tends to confound what it is to be, simply, and to be perfect. '*Being is enlarged and quiddity specified by the various actualizations of the potentialities and powers*' (p. 120). One fears that *being* has become *bonum* and is no longer existence at all. True, the *esse essentiae* is enlarged by these actualizations, the thing grows on the quiddative line, literally *secundum quid*, but the thing *is*, simply, no more when it is at the height of its perfection than at the beginning. Accidents add to the *esse essentiae*, but where existence is concerned they are parasites.

In this connection the *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1, is perhaps the most illuminating of doctrines. We recommend deep and long reflection on it to all Dr Hawkins' readers. To participate 'Being Perfect' is very different from participating 'Existence'. There is a principle of limitation in both of these orders. In the first case the composition of substance and accident is involved, in the other case that of essence and existence.

One would like also to have room to discuss the assertion of Dr Hawkins that 'a real distinction between substance and powers is impossible . . . for the substance becomes featureless' (p. 119). But perhaps we are only groping towards the meaning of any substance in terms of its behaviour. But this critical, thoughtful book is full of good things and will give genuine pleasure to all who try, even in a modest way, to think.

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