

vacillation (strikingly similar to Hitler's) during the Battle of Kursk could easily have caused a repeat of the disasters of the previous summer.

Despite its weaknesses, which are typical of military autobiographies, the book conveys a feeling of excitement and urgency, and there is little doubt that this view from the top in the greatest struggle of arms in history is worth the attention not only of students of Soviet history but also of the general reader. For those who do not read Russian, a definitive translation by Professor John Erickson is in the works.

There are some factual errors in the narrative. Zhukov lists P. V. Rychagov, commander of the Air Force in the spring of 1941, as an army general (p. 210). This rank, of course, is almost never given to an arms general. All other Soviet sources list the thirty-year-old Rychagov as a lieutenant general of aviation. Also, one of the pictures following page 224, probably taken in the fall of 1940, in the Kiev Military District, shows Zhukov and Timoshenko inspecting the troops of what seems to be none other than that supreme *persona non grata*, A. A. Vlasov.

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DISASTER AT MOSCOW: VON BOCK'S CAMPAIGNS, 1941-1942. By *Alfred W. Turney*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970. xvii, 228 pp. \$6.95.

Lt. Col. Turney traces Field Marshal von Bock's performance as commander of Army Group Center in 1941, in the German advance from the Soviet border to the outskirts of Moscow and, more briefly, in the South in the first half of 1942. Using von Bock's detailed war diary as his major source and guide, he is thus able to reconstruct how German planning, the decisions by Hitler and by fellow commanders, the performance of German and Soviet troops, and the balance of challenges and difficulties looked, both in victory and in retreat, to one of the leading conservative Prussian professionals of the old school.

As in other, more comprehensive studies of the German campaign, what emerges is the lack of contingency planning, the illusions in Hitler's headquarters, the recriminations among military and political figures, the failure to prepare for winter combat, the lack of reserves, and the underestimation of Soviet skill and stamina. Still, the author appears to believe that the invasion was "fundamentally and politically sound"—whatever that means.

Von Bock was dismissed when his armies failed before Moscow, in late 1941, and, after another brief stint as commander of Army Group South, was cashiered in July 1942. He was convinced that he had been made a "monstrous scapegoat" for the miscalculations of his superiors. The author (now a professor of history) does not give his own estimate of von Bock's share of responsibility for failure. Some of the glimpses from the war diary are valuable, but there is little else in the book that provides any novel insight or interpretation. While he makes occasional use of other records, Colonel Turney did not consider it necessary to delve deeply into other sources. He does not systematically compare von Bock's diary with other German, Soviet, or Western accounts and analyses of the campaign. Hence no independent judgment of the relative importance of the many variables in the "disaster at Moscow" is possible.

A perhaps minor source of confusion and annoyance, unfortunately widespread among books based on German sources, is the (easily avoidable) use of German

transliteration for Russian place names (inconsistently, at that), which is indicative of the reliance on a single body of source materials.

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RUSSIA AND NATIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA: THE CASE OF TADZHIKISTAN. By *Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone*. Published in cooperation with the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. xiii, 325 pp. \$10.95.

This is a case study of the Soviet nationalities policy as applied to the Muslim peoples of what is now known as Soviet Central Asia. After a brief chapter giving the historical background of the Tadjhik people from the earliest times up to the Revolution, the author embarks on a detailed examination of the various aspects of the Soviet experiment: the formation of the Tadjhik SSR; the ethnic structure of the republic; the nature and extent of Soviet control; and the reactions of the indigenous elite to Russian, socialist, political, economic, and cultural regimentation. The book ends with an essay defining the ultimate object of the Russian experiment and assessing its achievements. The author has confined her attention to the decade following World War II, with occasional references to later developments.

Dr. Harmstone has chosen Tadjhikistan for her investigation mainly "because certain of its unique geographic, historical and cultural features place the process of social and political transformation in sharper focus" than in the case of the other, predominantly Turkic, republics. She emphasizes, however, that the application of Soviet policy to Tadjhikistan and the nationalist reaction to it are typical of all the republics.

In the absence of facilities for anything other than superficial and fleeting first-hand observation, any study of developments in Soviet Asia must necessarily be based on Soviet source material. The author's use of this material has been at once exhaustive and discriminating. She handles problems relating to Soviet political and administrative control with great confidence and expertise, although she is on less sure ground when dealing with Islamic matters and the connection between Tadjhik and Persian literature. As a whole, her book demonstrates clearly what a wealth of enlightenment is to be gained from the study of Soviet writing, which is now even more informative than it was during the period to which she has directed her attention.

The book provides great insight into Soviet policy and methods and into native reaction to them up to 1956, and it is thus a valuable introduction to the study of subsequent developments. The brief mention of some, not always the most representative, developments of the 1960s might give the impression that the author claims to provide an accurate picture of the situation as it is today. That this is not so Dr. Harmstone would no doubt be the first to admit. Since 1956 the Soviet attitude toward Central Asia has undergone a marked change, partly, if not principally, owing to the Sino-Soviet conflict, of which, incidentally, there is no mention. An up-to-date appreciation of the progress of the Soviet experiment in Central Asia can be arrived at only if current Soviet writing on the subject is kept under constant, cumulative, and expert review.

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