

The military establishment is important in both countries, but Barnet underestimates the power of the Soviet Communist Party and the nonmilitary roots of American policy. He cannot resist even the parallel between the U.S.A. Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Russian Research Centers at Harvard and Columbia Universities. He admits that "there is more independence and diversity at the American institutions," but contends that "they are not immune from political pressures"; for example, he states: "Recently [Pepsi-Cola's] Donald Kendall offered to raise a considerable sum for the Columbia Institute provided Soviet dissidents would not be welcomed there." The story may or may not be true, but, in any event, it damages Barnet's argument, for surely no individual Soviet is in a position to do what Kendall did, namely, pressure a leading institution to oppose established orthodoxy by playing *down* the evils of the other side.

Although Barnet tends to equate the giants (and even argues that such institutions as the KGB and the CIA are undeclared allies in fostering East-West tensions), the United States remains "more equal." "For much of the last generation," writes Barnet, "the United States has had clearer and larger ambitions than did the Soviet Union, a *Pax Americana* backed by a preponderance of military might and economic power." But he admits that lately the Soviets, in part imitating the United States, have become dangerously aggressive. In the future then, if not in the past, "lasting détente" will require changes in *both* superpowers, and the realization by both elites that "the most urgent security threats facing the giants come not from each other but from systemic crises which each faces at home." The moral is: it takes two to make a conflict and two to settle it. In the realm of Cold War revisionism, a revelation like that constitutes a breakthrough.

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RED STAR ON THE NILE: THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE JUNE WAR. By *Alvin Z. Rubinstein*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. xxiv, 383 pp. \$25.00, cloth. \$9.95, paper.

YOM KIPPUR AND AFTER: THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. By *Galia Golan*. Soviet and East European Studies. New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1977. x, 350 pp. \$18.95.

THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT IN SOVIET CARICATURES, 1967-1973. By *Yeshayahu Nir*. A Research Monograph in Visual Communication. Tel Aviv: Tcherikover Publishers, Ltd., 1976. 126 pp. Illus. Paper.

Analysis of the relationship between the Soviet Union and various states in the Arab world, particularly Egypt and Syria, is beset by serious methodological problems. First, is it realistic to deal with the issue on a "one-on-one" basis, that is, is the "single actor model" appropriate for Soviet decision making any more than it is for other regimes? In fact, there are excellent reasons for doubting whether the political process can be brought to an arbitrary halt by fiat or ukase, even in closed societies with authoritarian forms of government, just as Mr. Novotný (to his surprise) could not terminate inflationary trends in Czechoslovakia by "administrative measures." Of course, given the theoretical concept of "democratic centralism," the political process is bound to seek circuitous routes around the artificial obstacles created by ideological imperatives, that is, to take the form of factional struggles that find expression in esoteric symbols and arcane language. This is hardly a startling revelation, and many will object that acceptance of the proposition does not provide the necessary tools for deciphering the "platforms," not to mention identifying the personalities of kaleidoscopically changing factional alignments. The fact remains, however, that it *can* be

done, and has been done (which is evident, even without planting microphones in the Kremlin) on a sufficient number of occasions to warrant the assumption that the attempt should be made. The (qualitative) "content analysts" who have fortified their interpretation of available documentary sources from the USSR with careful reading of the "hard facts on the ground" (that is, Soviet operational measures, either political or military), more often than not have been proven correct by ex post facto revelations concerning defeated factions (irrespective of whether this was demonstrated by "secret" speeches at party congresses and Central Committee sessions or, as in the Chinese case, by "wall posters"). If this is the case, then the "single actor model" may be not only inadequate but actually misleading, since it may attribute to "objective conditions"—on the international scene—Soviet actions that derive, in fact, from essentially "autistic" argumentation within the leadership, in which one group is trying to score "Brownie points" against another. The cautious interpreter will look closely at the international aspects while keeping a wary eye open for possible factional "angles."

Second, the utilization of Middle Eastern sources is beset by pitfalls which this reviewer has attempted elsewhere to describe. It is not, of course, the function of political speeches or statements in any part of the world to reveal the precise facts of history. This is especially true of the Near East, where, for several millennia now, orators and scribes alike have regarded history not as an exact science but, rather, as a treasure chest in which, for every given situation, a fitting parable may be found. Thus, on different occasions, the same historical episode may serve to provide the speaker or chronicler with entirely different analogies to suit the tactical needs of the day. Western analysts, who are not accustomed to think that an event of the past contains various morals for various moments, are usually puzzled to find one person referring to three mutually incompatible details of a particular incident in three consecutive statements. Much confusion might be avoided if it were realized that, in many parts of the planet, historical fact is not viewed as a rigid and unalterable landmark on the vistas of man's past, but as a kind of genie that can be conjured up in any shape useful to the speaker's present needs.

If this proposition is correct, it behooves the analyst to approach such sources with the greatest care and skepticism, that is, with critical selectivity. In the case of two of the three authors of the works reviewed here, these caveats are appropriate; both Alvin Rubinstein and, particularly, Galia Golan have previously demonstrated their awareness of the "factional" component of Soviet decision making, as well as their ability to cope with this aspect. Yet, in their present books, despite fleeting lip service to the existence of this factor, no serious attempt is made to integrate it into their analyses of Soviet relations with Middle Eastern states. This is regrettable, especially since those members of the international relations "community" who have devoted themselves to the factional aspect in Soviet foreign policy have discovered that it plays a particularly significant role vis-à-vis the Middle East; and their findings have received ample confirmation from indigenous Middle Eastern testimony. This pertains especially to the part played in Soviet relations with Cairo, for example, by Khrushchev and his protégés among the experts in the relevant "institutes," on the one hand, and Molotov and subsequently Suslov and Ponomarev, on the other.

With regard to utilization of Middle Eastern sources, regrettably there are serious lacunae in both books, as well as an insufficiently critical approach, and, in Professor Rubinstein's case, his resort to Arab sources cannot be regarded as "covering the whole waterfront." These caveats apply particularly to the omission in both works of the highly significant revelations by 'Abd al-Satar al-Tawila, in *Rose al-Yusef* of October 7, 1974 and in a subsequent book, concerning the "disinformation" (or strategic deception) aspects of the whole episode of the "pause" between Egypt and the USSR in 1972-73, and the strong indications offered that the unusual mildness of the Soviet response (duly noted by the two authors) appears to have been

due to Soviet collusion in this “disinformation” ploy. Both authors, moreover, appear to suffer from a lack of appropriate information concerning the precise operational utility of the Soviet weapons supplied surreptitiously, but in generous measure, to Egypt and Syria, between February and October 1973. This hardware was precisely suited to the purposes for which it was to be employed in October 1973, and there is no way in which its Soviet designers and developers could have been under any illusions whatsoever in this connection; consequently, the tendency to question whether Moscow *approved* of the October War is incompatible with the specific weapons (and quantities) transferred. Furthermore, there is no reference at all to the launching by the Soviet Union from Plesetsk of *Kosmos 596* and *597*, which indicates early and detailed tactical knowledge of the Egyptian and Syrian operational plans. In any case, why is there this compulsion to seek evidence that Brezhnev had misgivings concerning the military venture, when he was the very man who tried to prod Iraq and Algeria into more active participation in the same war?

This is not to imply that the two books, and particularly Galia Golan’s, cannot be useful and compact reference sources for this period, if employed with due care. It is a pity, however, that they did not make fuller and more appropriate use of the wealth of material that is available.

Dr. Nir’s book, on the other hand, constitutes a valuable visual, as well as documentary, compendium, with very helpful, if brief, commentary. The caricatures speak for themselves and raise another issue to which Dr. Nir alludes, but which he does not discuss in detail: namely, to what extent does this material reflect non-rational, almost obsessive, elements in the approach of the Soviet leadership to the “Zionist” issue, rather than constituting merely an extension of cold-bloodedly manipulative—that is, “rational”—aspects of the linkage between Soviet foreign policy and domestic propaganda (as many observers assume)?

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THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL OIL POLITICS. By *Arthur Jay Klinghoffer*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. xii, 389 pp. \$16.50.

The one firm, though unstated, conclusion to emerge from Arthur Klinghoffer’s book is that “oil politics” play only an occasional, at most modest, role in Soviet foreign policy. This is not much of a return for so much effort (nearly three hundred pages of text and eighty pages of notes). The nuggets of usable facts scattered through the book do not add a great deal to the return because they are so difficult to find. The paucity of results can be traced to flaws of conception, method, and execution.

In tackling a subject as broad and complex as Soviet foreign policy, one needs a conception of the task which breaks the subject down into separate, but related, components—much as a prism breaks a light ray into component colors. Professor Klinghoffer’s “oil politics,” while perhaps lending topicality, makes for a poor prism; the effect is more that of an inverted telescope. In chapters dealing with every region of the world—Europe, Asia, North America, the Middle East, the Third World—he discusses basic issues of Soviet foreign policy solely with reference to trade in oil. The result is to shrink rather than to enlarge our understanding of Moscow’s foreign policy decisions.

By way of analytical method, the first six chapters (one hundred fifteen pages) describe and discuss foreign trade and national power, Soviet uses of foreign trade, energy policies of the USSR, Soviet trade in oil, the “strategy and tactics” of that trade, and the “geopolitics” of Middle East oil. Numerous quarrels with particular details of this material are the least of the book’s problems. More basic is the failure