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crisis mode kept Yugoslavia relevant and so overreacting to events in Indochina, the Horn of Africa, or in the Middle East made sense (as did the idea that the Soviets acted in their own interests). Yet, on the other hand, emphasizing this perspective reduces Yugoslav leaders to simply reading their lines and aping behavior in the most simplistic manner. This reviewer has little doubt that at times Yugoslav foreign policy was reactive but it was also clear that Tito and his top advisors developed an articulate outlook on global conflict and peace. A number of scholars—Zvonimir Stopić and Jovan Čavoški, to name just two—have shown how interactions with other small powers were nuanced and how Yugoslav policy added value to terms such as coexistence. That heavy lifting was done in the 1950s and early 1960s; by 1968, it was certainly clear that the Yugoslavs failed to adapt their approach to global affairs.

Understanding that a lack of innovation after 1968 could have been a fear of what détente might mean for Belgrade—the "new Yalta" as Lazić puts it (xvii)—is valid, but Belgrade's policy could have well been the result of earlier success. In other words, the rhetoric that would influence nonalignment in the early 1960s took shape thanks to the perilous nuclear tensions that shook the world until the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tito made a voice for himself in that environment and partnered with likeminded leaders who saw the language of peace, sovereignty, and nonaggression as key to lessening tensions that would threaten global war. Despite ongoing conflicts around the world in and after 1968, the threat of a nuclear war between the superpowers dramatically lessened. If Tito and the rhetoric of nonalignment had in fact moved the needle and influenced global affairs then détente could have been the result of earlier success. Perhaps the story is how the Yugoslavs failed to understand how to capitalize on their gains.

The book stands on solid archival source materials, is well-written, and is exhaustive in its coverage of key events in the twelve-year period under consideration. The introduction sets an ambitious agenda, talking about the Belgrade-Moscow-Beijing triangle and the Yugoslav-Cuban struggle for the Global South; Lazić delivers on these points but not as exhaustively as the introduction suggests. To that end, the book would have to be much longer and would likely then lose focus. As is, this is a valuable contribution to studies of Yugoslavia but also the Cold War more broadly. It will help scholars immensely as they navigate events of the 1970s, including taking into account the value of small countries.

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To Make a Village Soviet: Jehovah's Witnesses in a Postwar Ukrainian Borderland. By Emily B. Baran. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2022. xx, 234 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Maps. \$37.95, paper. doi: 10.1017/slr.2024.47

Emily Baran begins with the denouement: in June of 1949, the Soviet state arrested seven members of the obscure Jehovah's Witnesses in an equally obscure village of Bila Tserkva on the western borderlands of Soviet Ukraine. After a brief trial, all received sentences of twenty-five years in the gulag. In her engaging study, Baran investigates why this happened, and what it tells us about the Soviet state in the aftermath of World War II.

Baran divides her work into nine chapters and a conclusion. She introduces the reader to Bila Tserkva and its inhabitants in her first chapter. Situated in Transcarpathia,

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and not to be confused with a similarly named village close to Kyiv, Bila Tserkva only entered the Soviet Union after 1945. Part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire before 1914, the newly formed Czechoslovakia claimed it after 1918 even though the region was fiercely contested by the newly formed Hungary and the villagers were ethnically Romanian (the region's Jews had largely been deported during World War II). Borders had shifted by 1945, such that this now Soviet frontier region adjoined Romania, separated only by an easily fordable Tisza River. No wonder Baran (20) cites Paul Magosci's depiction of Transcarpathia as "a borderland par excellence." A significant number of the region's residents converted to Jehovah's Witnesses during the inter-war period, a movement with strong links to the United States.

The core of Baran's work is found in chapters two through seven, titled successively as: The Passport; The Draft; The Ballot Box; The State Bonds; The School; and The Farm. Baran sees these as the components on which the Soviet state sought to establish its edifice in the newly claimed borderlands after World War II. Thus, Moscow refused to issue passports to almost all collective farmers in this period, but those in the borderlands were treated differently. Here, where security concerns dominated, officials began already in 1946 to issue mandatory passports to the entire rural population. Coincidentally, the state imposed universal military service on its newly acquired citizens, and it expected them to participate in Soviet-style elections and to purchase bonds that effectively put their money into state coffers. Officials mandated that parents send their children to Soviet schools where they would learn how to be good citizens, while the adults would actively participate in newly formed collective farms (the region was overwhelmingly rural).

In every instance, Baran demonstrates how the seven accused villagers of Bila Tserkva refused to participate in the workings of the Soviet state lest they betray their faith. For example, the local school principal claimed that Ivan Ona, one of the Witnesses, had refused to purchase bonds with the declaration: "I have money, but I am never giving it to the state because Jehovah God forbids it" (82).

The strength in this study lies in Baran's ability to demonstrate nuance and complexity in situations that could be easily caricatured. For example, she continually points out the challenges faced by both state officials and the seven Witnesses by the inability of the latter to speak either Ukrainian or Russian. They only spoke Romanian, for which only selected state officials had a rudimentary grasp. In addition, the onset of the Cold War meant that the Witnesses of Bila Tserkva were denied access to a lively debate that their religious counterparts had undertaken in the west about the possibilities of engagement with a modernizing state. She suggests that the failure of the collective farms to root themselves in the borderlands had as much to do with a broad lack of support, which local officials could easily blame on a handful of recalcitrant religious sectarians. Baran also reflects on the difficulty of reading the summaries of state interrogations of the seven, or even the trial transcripts.

Baran follows the fate of the convicted seven as they entered and eventually departed from the gulag. In her conclusion, she reflects on how her study points to the Soviet state's inability to impose its will on its newly acquired borderland. Both Witnesses and state officials were in a dance that neither could fully control.

Nuanced, well-researched, and rich in detail, Baran's fascinating study deserves a broad readership. McGill Queen's has published a strong work at the intersection of Soviet, religious, and minority studies.

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