

“Theory: 1927–1937” examines the theoretical debates over Douhet’s concepts of strategic bombing. “Reality: 1927–1937” covers the same timeframe and shows the practical limitations that forced Hungary to accept whatever aircraft it could get: primarily older Italian models. A pattern of “late delivery and uncertain quality” (145) became the norm, which led Hungary into a closer relationship with Germany. “Independence: 1938–1940” covers the brief apex of Hungarian military aviation. Unfortunately, “recruitment was still too low, airplanes too few, accident rates too high, and combat readiness too shaky” (233), problems that became serious obstacles to offensive action.

The final chapter, “War: 1941–1945,” details the decline of Hungary’s Air Force that began in 1941. There were a few early successes in the war, such as air operations that assisted in the capture of Nikolayev from the Soviets. As with its army, the Air Force was subsumed under German control and for all intents and purposes operated as an auxiliary to the Luftwaffe. The Hungarian Air Force was a minor player in the immense air war of 1939–45. The improved capabilities of Soviet aviation, increased Allied bombing attacks, and the steep decline in quality and quantity suffered by all Axis forces resulted in a futile fight to the last airfield.

Broken Wings is primarily institutional and political history. Colonel Renner (currently Dean of Students at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University) earned his PhD at Oxford and was an Olmsted Scholar at the Budapest Institute of Graduate Diplomatic and International Studies. Renner has produced the best and only study in English of the Hungarian Air Force in this period. The author provides a great deal of geopolitical context, necessary perhaps for readers who are unfamiliar with the era, though aviation historians may find themselves skimming to get to where the Air Force comes in. The production qualities are excellent, with an attractive cover and dust jacket, clean editing, a good index, and an essential list of abbreviations. The only thing missing is a good map or two.

This book is a notable achievement. Renner brings to light the story of a small but determined military aviation force, operating under extreme limitations, which tried to do its duty in turbulent times. Hungary faced insurmountable obstacles to creating a powerful Air Force. Funds, lack of industrial capacity, reliance on foreign imports, and low levels of realistic training were all examples of how “circumstances constrain action” (303). Renner suggests that Hungary might have done better to focus on a few standardized types of aircraft and a few specific tactical missions, which might have improved maintenance, repair, and pilot performance. Hungary’s aviation ambitions were a case in which its reach greatly exceeded its grasp. The efforts of the Hungarian Air Force to restore Hungary’s national military capabilities and national pride came to naught, but serve as a useful case study of Hungary’s blighted experience.

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Third Europe: Polish Federalist Thought in the United States, 1940–1970s. By Sławomir Łukasiewicz. Reno, NV: Helena History Press LLC, 2016. Trans. Witold Zbirohowski-Kościa. 476 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Glossary. Index. Photographs. Maps. \$50.00, hard bound.

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This engrossing work deals with the organized efforts of a substantial body of political activists and intellectuals who worked together to discuss and promote the idea of a federalist solution to the national security concerns of the states in east central

Europe, many of which gained their independence after World War I. These individuals, many of them Poles, realized that independence alone was no guarantee for their “third Europe” homelands—countries geographically perched between two threatening super powers—Germany and Russia. Nor were alliances with one another, with Britain and France, or their membership in international bodies like the League of Nations enough in themselves. Instead, the push for a “federalist” solution (a concept whose meaning and implications receive considerable discussion from the author) was something these individuals saw as a far better way to provide for both their countries’ individual advancement and their shared national security needs.

In the interwar period, however, the idea of federalism fell like a seed on rocky ground. The focus of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and the Baltic states was on nation building, a focus that too often led to friction and divisions over boundary and ethnic minority issues. World War II in turn brought devastation to the region. What followed was the Soviet takeover of east central Europe, a “solution” to the issues of the region that the federalists, along with a host of other émigrés who found themselves in western Europe and the United States after the War, totally rejected.

Out of this tragedy came a new impetus for the exiles’ patriotic thinking, and their far-sighted but realistic discussions in support of a federalist, post-Soviet, future for east central Europe. Their many activities, often taking place in concert with various American and west European activists who established organizations in the decade after World War II like the National Committee for a Free Europe, and exile groups who became involved in the Assembly of Captive European Nations, are well presented. These involved debates on a number of proposed federalist solutions—some of which focused on bi-lateral relations (most notably between Poland and Czechoslovakia) and others that extended the application of federalism to most, if not all, of the countries in the region.

Two particular features of this work merit a comment here. One involves the author’s extensive and welcome discussion of the thought and scholarship of a number of Poles who settled permanently in the United States after 1940 and went on to establish impressive and influential academic careers in this country. Four of these individuals receive particular attention. The oldest was the historian Oskar Halecki (1891–1973), who had already achieved prominence in Poland and was in the U.S. at the start of World War II. An organizer of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, which was formed in the wake of the ruthless Nazi and Soviet efforts to destroy his country, Halecki found a home at Fordham University and published extensively on Polish history through the rest of his life. A second scholar was the Kraków-born sociologist Feliks Gross (1906–2006), who wrote extensively about federalism and was based at the City University of New York. Marian Kamil Dziewanowski (1913–2005), a Polish army officer during the War who later earned his PhD in History at Harvard University, went on to enjoy a multi-faceted career at Boston University and the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. The fourth member of this distinguished group, Piotr Wandycz (1923–2017), whose work in diplomatic history at Indiana and Yale Universities gained him international recognition and saw him guiding a number of graduate students who continue to publish extensively on Polish, east-central European, and global matters. Moreover, the work of all four continues to be read and cited to this very day.

A last point about this book involves the connections between the ideas of the east-central European federalists and the developments in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This subject, briefly touched upon by the author, merits a mention here. Freedom and independence for the countries of “East-Central Europe” (a term coined by Halecki), has indeed been greatly enhanced by the entry of nearly all of them into the NATO alliance from 1999 and the European Union after

2003. In a real sense these two developments represent the realization of the federalists' dream, and it is to be hoped that the foolish criticisms of these organizations, both from within and from outside them, will not do serious damage to them.

There are also the regional organizations that have arisen in the spirit of the federalists—most notably the Visegrad group that brings Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak republics together—and the recent conversations about a broader “Three Seas Initiative.” These efforts are further testimony to the far-sighted thinking of the east-central European federalists whose aim was always the well-being of the peoples of the “Third Europe.”

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Creating Nationality in Central Europe, 1800–1950: Modernity, Violence, and (Be)longing in Upper Silesia. Ed. James Bjork, Tomasz Kamusella, Tim Wilson, and Anna Novikov. London: Routledge, 2016. xvi, 236 pp. Notes. Index. Figures. \$160 hard bound, \$49.95 paper.

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Most contemporary human beings have adopted as a given Benedict Anderson's lament that “everyone can, should, will ‘have’ a nationality, as he or she ‘has’ a gender” (*Imagined Communities* 1983/1991, 5). As early as 1882, Ernst Renan contested Europe's prevailing nationalist psychosis with his plea: “human history is essentially different from zoology, and race is not everything” (Homi Bhabba, ed., *Nation and Narration* [1990], 15). Individuals were not organically predetermined to adhere to some blood-based national body; the nation was a *national plebiscite*. When in doubt, international policymakers should consult the local population (*ibid.*, 20). Amid post-Versailles border shifts and national upheavals in 1921, this advice was taken literally in a German-Polish borderland called Upper Silesia: continental Europe's second-largest industrial area and home to a multilingual, largely Catholic population whose identity remained stubbornly opposed to national categorization. After extensive international press attention and political disputation during the plebiscite, Upper Silesia's national question became a leading grievance that fueled the outbreak of war in 1939; thereafter, sweeping forces and then economic migrations radically decreased the proportion of those who, either as German or nationally heterogeneous, did not identify as nationally Polish.

Considerable scholarship since 1989 has sought to transcend national partisanship when assessing nationality in Upper Silesia from the 1921 plebiscite through the interwar, Nazi, and Cold War eras. Highlights have included collections edited by Kai Struve and Philipp Ther, *Die Grenzen der Nationen* (2002), and Struve, *Oberschlesien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (2003), as well as research by Polish scholars including Tomasz Kamusella, Bernard Linek, and Grzegorz Strauchold; German scholars including Struve, Ther, Günther Doose, Waldemar Grosch, and Juliane Haubold-Stolle; and English-language scholars including Richard Blanke, James Bjork, Brendan Karch, Anna Novikov, Allison Rodriguez, Hugo Service, Peter Polak-Springer, Terry Hunt Tooley, and Tim Wilson. This edited English-language collection presents a culmination of recent scholarship, wherein the chief protagonists are locals resisting the siren calls of nationalists who, in ever more violent circumstances, sought to claim their economically- and geopolitically-strategic homeland for the homogenizing nation-state.

The theoretical lynchpin of recent research is “national indifference,” defined by Pieter Judson as a multivalent sense of nationality, in which individuals negotiate