

used by Christ. This word is *effeta* which mean *Open up!* The Lord gave power of hearing and power of speech to him who was deaf and dumb and who, in the interpretation of the Fathers, represents mankind. We are all a little short of hearing, we are all a little dumb. May the Lord enable us to hear the voices of history, the voices of the spirits, his own voice, the echo of the gospel, still our law and power.

May he give us strength and grace to hear the word of God and the ability to say unanimously, *una voce dicentes: Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus*: Holy God, Holy Christ, Holy Spirit. When that happens we shall have anticipated our paradise on earth.

War, Love and Justice

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Justice and charity often seem to us to be opposites. Charity means generosity without calculation—'Greater love hath no man than this'...; unending patience—'Charity is patient and kind'; the forgiveness of injuries, and the renunciation of self-regarding rights. Justice, on the other hand, seems to make opposite claims. It requires us to regulate our generosity by reasonable calculation; it puts an end to patience when rights are threatened; it balances crime against punishment. Above all, it seems to be concerned with the assertion of rights, which is foreign to the spirit of charity.

The opposition of these two 'public images' has led, among ordinary people with some concern for Christian ideals, to two apparently irreconcilable kinds of moral thinking; and yet it is evident that neither way of thinking is much use without the other. If some money has to be shared, the fact that everybody is extremely generous does not begin to solve the problem of how to share it; it will only lead to the disorder of conflicting generousities—the 'after you',—'no, after *you*' sort of argument, or the kind that results in the last piece of cake being left on the plate. How is the money to be shared then? The answer is simple;

it is to be shared *justly*, for only an order of objective justice can produce agreement; but to establish an order of justice we must calculate and assert rights—and then we seem to have moved over from the image of charity to the image of justice. If the conflict of generousities leads so obviously to the need for justice, it is even more obvious that the conflict of selfishnesses leads in the same direction. Only when selfishness meets generosity does the need for justice seem to be avoided—then one side gives all, and the other takes all. That is not so tricky as when both sides wish to give, or both to take.

Now it is the substance of the communist protest against Christianity that it has by-passed the problem of social justice by opposing uncalculating generosity to uncalculating greed—the poor are taught to renounce what has been taken from them by the rich. We hear a similar story from the American negro, who accuses his old Christian preachers of teaching him to turn the other cheek to the white man, who was in fact quite content to go on slapping both cheeks indefinitely until Federal legislation stepped in. When charity is matched against selfishness, the problem of justice is only avoided by perpetuating a system of injustice against which the human spirit is bound ultimately to rebel.

If charity is incomplete without justice, justice is also incomplete without charity. No system of justice will establish harmony unless a certain spirit of generosity prevails, which transfigures human relationships, and determines in an indefinable way how the system of rights is to be interpreted and applied. Charity is like the oil on the machinery of justice; the engine simply won't work without the oil.

Nowhere is the oil of charity more obviously lacking than in the normal pattern of group relations, which tend to be regulated exclusively according to justice—if indeed they are ever regulated at all; and this brings us directly to the 'just war' tradition in moral thought. For the just war tradition is exclusively concerned with group relations, and with justice; that is to say, it is definitely *not* concerned either with personal relations, or with charity; it has a different origin, and it looks in a different direction.

It was not the early Fathers who started off the just war theory—they would certainly have been surprised to find such a curious offspring fathered so early upon them! The early Christians were more concerned with personal relations than with politics, with charity than with justice, and on the whole they were what we should call 'pacifists'. This pacifism was simply an extension into the public sphere of the

obvious charity of their personal relationships. The Sermon on the Mount commands us to love our enemies; 'and how can he be just', asks Lactantius, 'who injures, hates, despoils and kills?' There is no peculiar *political* problem for these early writers; there is simply the problem of whether you have the courage to follow the teaching and example of Christ; if you have, then war is simply out of the question.

This position was so bluntly asserted by the early Christians, and by the sects which inherited their way of thinking, that when Christian thinkers eventually began to work out some compromise with politics, they tended to do so at the cost of cutting loose altogether from charity, and from the obvious meaning of the New Testament, to build exclusively on the foundation of justice and reason. St Augustine gallantly tried to hold the two sides together; for although he wanted to make it clear that a man can be a soldier *and* please God, he could not without considerable strain cut loose from the early Christian moorings. All the same, the result of his thinking was that a wedge began to be driven into the Christian ethic, separating the morality of the group-act from the morality of the individual, and the morality of charity from that of justice.

It's hard work beginning a split, but it gets easier further down. Later writers did not experience St Augustine's difficulty. Suarez, the sixteenth century Spaniard whose treatise on war represents the final flowering of the just war tradition, sees the army of darkness drawn up against the army of light, as did the early Christians; but for him, the army of light is the Church with its just war tradition, and the army of darkness is none other than the pacifists themselves, whose error is simply to apply the obvious teaching and example of Christ directly to international relations. Suarez, then, in his concern to wipe this heresy off the map, wipes off at the same time charity and the New Testament. The exhortations to patience, non-violence, love of enemies, he argues, have been grossly misused by the pacifists; he examines in detail the meaning of these texts, and concludes that they are in fact *completely irrelevant* to the problem of war. This simplifies his subject; the treatise can then unfold without further reference to any embarrassing revelation.

Here we have the opposite extreme from that of the early Church. Each side seems to have a coherent theory; but what is heresy for one is sound doctrine for the other, and vice-versa. The opposition revealed here in our Christian tradition continues to divide Christians from each other. The 'well-instructed' Catholic brought up on a sound

just-war diet will be surprised and embarrassed by the suggestion that the Sermon on the Mount may have something to do with the problem of war and, if the issue is pressed, he will begin to sniff heresy in the wind; such a Catholic is a true disciple of Suarez. The Christian pacifist, on the other hand, and for that matter many ordinary folk with an ordinary understanding of scripture, will fail to see how you can be a *real* Christian and still go to war; such thinking is not far from the mind of the early Church.

If it is true that justice and charity often seem to be opposites, it is equally true that if we neglect justice in the interests of charity, or charity in the interests of justice, we are likely to weaken our moral vision. Charity and justice are the left and right eye of the conscience; together they give us a proper grasp of reality, but each one alone can only give us a one-eyed view.

Christian charity has been traditionally associated with the relief of suffering—alms for the poor, homes for the homeless, hospitals for the sick, and so on. These have been traditionally works of charity, and *not* of justice; and partly because of this, charity has often failed to attack in an organised way the causes of the evils which it has sought to alleviate; for it is justice which forms the structure of society, asserts rights and obligations, and founds the laws by which we live. It is for this reason that the most important Christian document of our time concerned with international order, Pope John's *Pacem in Terris*, begins with a detailed assertion of what we have come to regard as the basic human *rights*—rights which can inspire a structure of laws in which humanity can live together. Within the state, we are living in a changing social order, where the traditional works of 'charity' are being taken over more and more by socialised organisations which work in terms of justice rather than charity; outside theological discourse, the very word 'charity' begins to have a musty smell. The same tendency can be seen in inter-racial problems. The coloured peoples are not asking the whites to be kind to them. The question is not one of charity; it is of justice. In other words, we blancoes are being asked, not what we are going to do, but who do we think we are?—a rude question may be, but a serious one.

What has this to do with international affairs? Well, here again we must beware of out-moded ways of thinking. The pacifist who bases his position exclusively on charity must beware that his is not the one-eyed view. We are not in the same position as the early Christians. They were a missionary group within an established order; they accepted

this order without accepting responsibility for it. One of the main reasons for the hatred of the early Christians was their notorious lack of patriotism and public spirit—they were a people ‘silent in public, and garrulous in corners’, as one Caecilius put it. There were reasons for this attitude, of course; but undoubtedly, this *was* the attitude; and it was not without an element of contradiction. For the same people who abstained on principle from public affairs maintained vigorously, with St Paul, that all authority came from God; the same people who rigorously condemned all forms of violence, positively supported judicial punishments of the severest kind.

Such a contradiction could remain peripheral only so long as Christians could regard themselves as a specialist group within a stable order. As Christianity grew, and the Empire became more and more unstable, the doctrinal attitude began to change. Today, after nearly two thousand years of Christianity, we cannot pretend to return to the primitive Christian situation; both the leaven and the loaf have changed their nature after the long period of fermentation. Now problems of international order are the most urgent and central issues facing mankind. Arguments which were expressions of courage for the first Christians could be arguments of cowardice or stupidity for us in the nineteen-sixties.

What of the tradition of justice, then; does this help us any more in the present situation? Unfortunately not, because it has often been just as one-eyed, for one reason or another, as the tradition of charity. A notable omission from the just war tradition is, first of all, this tradition of charity. The basis of the just war is the need for some kind of retributive justice in international affairs; somebody has to keep order, and if sovereign nations don't, who can?—and if they don't do so by war (as a last resort, of course), how are they to do it? The answers seem obvious, and the only problem is to work out details; but there is not going to be much room for charity here. It is of prime importance that war as an instrument of justice should *work*; charity might gum up the works. That is why Suarez insists that a prince's subjects have no real responsibility in *justice* to enquire into the causes of a war proposed by their prince—they should do as they are told; and when he has to deal with problems like whether you can sack a city or not, there is no foreign principle to disturb the even tenor of his argument. You may sack a city, of course, is the inevitable answer, provided this is justified either by the gravity of the offence, or by the need to deter other potential offenders. What is it that worries us about this kind of treat-

ment? What is it that is so conspicuously absent? It is the horror of bloodshed, the yearning for peace and concord, the hatred of hate, which were the hall-marks of the early Church; and is the normal attitude of Christian charity in the face of violence and bloodshed.

There is a second failure of the just war tradition, closely connected with its neglect of charity, which makes it rather one-eyed; and that is its essentially *static* nature. Like a lot of scholastic thinkers, the just war theorists were concerned with defining the essences of things and then making rules about their ideal relationships with each other—with the nature of national sovereignty and war as an instrument of justice, for example. There is always a danger in this kind of thinking that we 'freeze' our picture of the world in such a way that it becomes very difficult to admit any kind of radical *change* in the nature of the things we have defined. There is a danger then that this kind of thinking about justice will connive at a radical injustice, just as much as the one-eyed tradition of charity. Natural law theorists, for instance, looked at the world in the sixteenth century and saw that humanity was divided into two classes, the slaves and the free, and then they made up laws concerning just grounds for enslavement. To-day, natural law theorists look at the world and see that we are all equal. Something must have changed between; but it has not changed as the result of scholastic natural law thinking; it has changed as the result of a much more turbulent process, symbolised by the French Revolution. In much the same way, Suarez sees the international community divided into states which are sovereign, and states which are not sovereign. If you are sovereign, you have a right of war *by definition*; you cannot of course be obliged to go to arbitration, because then you would not be sovereign; but if you are not sovereign, then you have *absolutely no right* of war—and this quite regardless of whether you can obtain justice in any other way. It is a question of definition.

The fact is that this kind of black and white thinking is not very helpful when the vital question is one of growth. Is there an international order to-day, or is there not? If there is, then war is 'out'; if there is not, then war is 'in'—according to the Suarez pattern. But unfortunately it is not so easy to agree about the answer to the first question. There is in fact no yes/no answer to the question whether there is or is not an international order, and this is precisely because it is the *vital* question—the question of growth; and if the growth is to proceed, it must be the result of a more dynamic kind of thinking than that which we have inherited from our scholastic tradition.

Of course, the law must define if it is to work at all—must try to catch the ever-changing human situation in a network of legal precision. To do this effectively, it needs the discipline of a court and the dynamism of an active legislature. It is often said that the great virtue of the English common law is that it was worked out on the basis of real cases in the courts. It is otherwise with the tradition of the just war; and this brings us to our third major criticism of this particular tradition of justice.

It is remarkable that a detailed judicial treatise should ever be elaborated without the slightest notion about how or when its rules are to be applied, and apparently without the slightest concern that they *should* be applied; and yet this seems to be the case with the just war theories. Presumably the rules it evolves are intended for the private guidance of princes—if they are intended seriously at all; but it is a strange kind of justice which is not at all concerned with how it is to be made effective in the world—and which argues without any reference to precedent, or any need to refer to concrete situations. The result of separating judicial theory in this way from cases is much the same as what happens when an individual separates his moral theorising from real moral decisions; the theories tend to go to seed, and it becomes more and more difficult to break through the abstraction and make up your mind.

This happens in two ways in the just war tradition. On the one hand, we have logical distinctions so subtle as to be quite incapable of real application to situations—like the distinction between personal and public self-defence which I shall refer to later in this article. On the other hand, we have the curious ‘sliding-scale’ rules, the rules of ‘proportionality’—like the rule we are left with if we start to think along double-effect lines. Such rules are difficult enough to apply as effective rules of law in any case, but it is ten times more difficult when there is no court, no judge, no case, and no precedent to give us any kind of lead. We are left with an elastic ruler in an Alice-in-Wonderland sort of world—the best we can do is make a personal assertion, and we can never establish our case.

So much then for the traditions of justice and charity which have been handed down to us in the sphere of international relations. On the other hand, we know that justice and charity are both essential to effective moral vision; if justice constitutes the body politic, charity is its very lifeblood. Charity without justice spills out and is lost; but justice without charity constitutes not a living body, but a dry and lifeless corpse.

How are we then to combine the two? Not by adding one to the other, certainly; but rather by reaching out towards an idea which will

transcend the opposition, which will include what is vital in both justice and charity, and at the same time enable us to engage fully and effectively in the turbulent life of our times. This is a tall order, and there is no easy recipe. But perhaps we can make some progress if we think in terms of an *assertion of fellowship* underlying the whole of our moral endeavour in society, and founding both our justice and our charity; for in the idea of fellowship we can find the basis of both.

Fellowship immediately suggest a common undertaking, a partnership within a single legal structure. When we talk about an assertion of fellowship, we therefore think of the discovery of a common task within the framework of a common law; and this must be the basis of our justice. Just as the Christian assertion of fellowship can know no boundaries until it includes the whole of mankind, so our concept of justice must be one which concerns the whole human family. But it must not remain a concept; we have to build justice in the world, and the bricks with which justice is built are human laws and human rights defined and asserted by effective institutions—and no one with any sense of historical reality will imagine that rights can be established without being vigorously asserted. But the laws and rights we are concerned with are part of the structure of justice, which is founded on fellowship; and no right or law can be worthy of the name which tends to destroy or to deny the fellowship of mankind.

At the same time, fellowship implies charity; for a fellow is one for whom one has 'fellow-feeling', and this means sympathy and love; not the sympathy of condescension but the sympathy of identification—a love which includes a radical assertion of equality; and it is equality also which is the first premiss of justice. Thus charity and justice are woven together to form the living structure of human fellowship.

The idea is founded on Christian revelation. A favourite theme in the middle ages was the conflict of justice with mercy in God's dealings with fallen man. If justice demanded his eternal exile, mercy pleaded for forgiveness. But God is both justice and mercy, and his response to the dilemma was a creative act which established a new fellowship between God and men, and between man and man; this act was the incarnation. By his life, death, and resurrection, Christ re-formed the human family with himself as its life-principle and its new head. The brotherhood of ourselves and of every man with Christ is an astonishing fact which we cannot ignore; it is on this that we base our justice and our charity, and on this that we base our hope.

We know that our Lord was concerned primarily with the world's

outcasts, with the deprived, the despised, the sinners and the sufferers; and his typical action towards them was the act of fellowship—to eat with them. We think of him, for instance, inviting himself to supper with Zacheus, who had climbed a tree to see him pass. When he is asked by the Pharisee, 'Who is my neighbour?' he answers with the story of the good Samaritan, in which the hero is a member of a despised and heretical sect, near neighbours of the orthodox Jews. The story therefore has a double level of meaning. It teaches us by the actions of the Samaritan that it is for us to assert our fellowship with those in need; and that there are no boundaries to be drawn within the human race; and it also teaches us, by the fact that he is a *Samaritan*, that the members of the sect or the race we condemn may well be worthier than ourselves, and that their worthiness, like ours, will be judged by our ability to take in Jesus's answer to the Pharisee's question—'Who is my neighbour?' The parable thus undermines at several points the walls of hatred and prejudice which divide mankind.

The ministry of healing can partly be understood in the same light. The cripples, and those 'afflicted with demons', led a diminished life, as they still do, on the fringes of a society which had no function for them; the lepers of course were an extreme case. Sickness always separates; and when Jesus laid his hands on the sick he asserted his fellowship with them, and by the same act they were 'given back' to their families and friends, to a full life in the community from which they had been separated by their disease. The healing of the sick was then, like the forgiveness of sins, at once the restoration of a community which had been lost, and the manifestation of the new fellowship founded in Christ.

The last and most important problem is, how does the notion of fellowship affect our attitude to the international situation? Here are one or two suggestions which may at least open up lines of thought.

There are two basic challenges to charity in the international field. One is the condition of the underdeveloped nations in contrast with the prosperous ones, to which we belong; and the other is the fear, hatred, and violence which has been undoubtedly fostered in the West towards the communist states. Now in neither of these cases should we be soft enough to suppose that any effective response can ignore the demands of justice. It is not *just* a question of charity, of being kind to Krushchev, or of looking after African babies. It is a question rather of asserting the fellowship of the whole of mankind, and considering seriously what consequences derive from this, what obligations rest upon us, and

what changes we must make in our own situation. We may be led then to consider that the fruits of the earth and of human endeavour which we enjoy belong by right to the whole human family; and that the terrible lack of distributive justice which we see in the world must be remedied by the means of justice—that is by laws and institutions which gradually modify the very structure of international society. There are real possibilities for political action in this direction. If our deepest concern then is to assert our fellowship with the communist world, this must mean, besides our charity, a serious effort to find and to work together on common tasks; to affirm the justice which they rightly affirm, and to condemn the injustice which they rightly condemn; thus we may begin to build a fellowship in justice. But fellowship with our enemies must also be asserted by making every possible effort to establish a common system of justice. The smallest treaty agreement can be the beginning of such a system; but the only serious direction of progress here would be towards effective arbitration of disputes by an International Court of Justice. There can be no stable fellowship without a system of common law objectively established.

An effective response to the problems of charity then leads us straight into the territory of justice; not the static justice of the old tradition, but the justice which is struggling to come to birth in the world, to measure up to the radically new situation and to the emerging self-awareness of the human family. In the meantime, the static and outdated formulae of an old tradition continue to be repeated; how are they to be judged in the light of the principle of fellowship on which our justice is to be based?

There is one difficulty in the just war tradition which the principle of fellowship throws into clear relief. The innocent, it is claimed, always have the right of self-defence; and if the only means of self-defence against a nuclear attack is a nuclear counter-attack, then such a counter-attack could be justified by the right of self-defence, although it would 'accidentally' (that is, in terms of the double-effect principle) kill many innocent people in the enemy state. But if our unqualified right of self-defence is a true assertion of justice it must be a right which we should assert with equal vigour for all innocent people, of whatever nationality. Consequently, we must be equally enthusiastic in asserting the right of the innocent on the enemy side to adequate self-defence—however 'accidentally' they were being killed. But since the only adequate means of defence against nuclear attack is, according to our own argument, nuclear counter-attack, this means that we must

eagerly support, on the grounds of justice, a nuclear counter-attack by the enemy which will result in the slaughter of our innocents—whom, incidentally, we still have an obligation to defend! But the just war tradition itself will not admit of a war just on both sides; consequently, this so-called argument of justice leads straight to a contradiction in the very tradition which it claims to represent. It has always been difficult to fit the killing of the innocent into any pattern of justice, because murder is the most fundamental denial of fellowship which we can imagine; but in the present context, the difficulty is multiplied a hundredfold. Any so-called rule of justice which can justify a radical dissolution of human fellowship can hardly be anything but a diabolical parody of that justice which as Christians we are bound to build.

We must then echo the words of Pope John in his great peace encyclical: it is hardly possible to conceive that in the atomic era war could ever be an instrument of justice; right reason and justice therefore demand that nuclear weapons should be banned, and that there should be general agreement on progressive disarmament. This is the negative aspect of our endeavour; the positive aspect is to build the world fellowship. This is only a direction; it is not yet a plan of action, and everyone must form that for himself. In the public sphere, there is no short cut; no way round the complexity of disarmament talks, the complexity of international politics, the cumbersome machinery of newly emerging international institutions. We can only start from where we are, and that is in all the immediate world situation.

What hope does this situation offer? It is everyone's task to read the signs of the times; but in our anxiety about the mushroom cloud we must not forget the sign of Skopje. A few months ago, this Yugoslav city was almost unknown; only the state which contained it was known as a communist dictatorship not very popular on either side of the iron curtain. An earthquake shattered the city and brought cruel losses to the ordinary folk who lived there. To-day, the place is like one vast building-site. Convoys of Red Army lorries carry away rubble, British soldiers erect Nissen huts, American troops carry out relief-work. There are long-term plans afoot for the construction of satellite-towns around the old city, and for a redevelopment of the centre; Japanese earthquake experts are there, and French architects, manufacturers of prefabricated houses, and people attracted by curiosity or sympathy from all parts of the world. Skopje could not have happened at any other period of history. It is because of modern communications that we know about it, and it is because of modern transport that

people could get there; but more than this; it is because modern technology is practically universal, that Japanese earthquake experts and French architects and manufacturers of prefabricated houses from goodness knows where *can* meet in a Yugoslav city without making it into another Tower of Babel. Can we hope too that the spirit in which work of this kind is done is just as much a sign of the times as is the technology which makes it possible? If so, there is ground for hope here that no political cynicism should be allowed to extinguish.

Perhaps the human family is really struggling through the smoke and dust of two world wars and the cold war to a new degree of self-awareness. Christians at least must work as hard as they can for this end, without ceasing to pray:

‘Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven’.

Religious Instruction: An Experiment

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The purpose of this article is to describe a course of religious instruction I have been trying out with boys from seven to twelve years old who attend non-catholic schools, and who visit me once a week. It seemed worth while to make it more widely known in this way, in case others might like to make use of it in some way, or at least to suggest ways of improving it.

One cannot teach many things in a mere thirty three-quarter-hour classes; what is taught one week is often forgotten the next. So the purpose of this course is to try to give some idea of what it means to be a Christian. To make it as vivid and concrete as possible I dramatise it, placing it in a setting in which the Christian faith appears as something new and wonderful. The setting is as imaginary one, but contains elements of the early Church in the Roman persecutions, the contemporary Church in some pagan parts of the world, with reference to the