

Soviet Union is a binding of the non-Russian Union republics to the RSFSR; the form of the tie is the (centralized) unitary state" (p. 156).

The nonjurist would add that the federation provisions of the Soviet constitution have become an issue with some dissidents. In 1961 the Ukrainian Lukianenko, a graduate of the Moscow University Law School, almost paid with his life for an attempt to test its secession provision (art. 17). That provision is taken seriously in the 1969 Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, in Sakharov's memorandum of March 5, 1971/June 1972, and it underlies Solzhenitsyn's letter of September 5, 1973. If Brezhnev has his way, the "Soviet people" will abolish the Union to create a single Soviet state. If Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov are the ultimate victors, Russia may once again become ethnic Russia minus the empire. For the time being, Arnold's book is a valuable legal guide to a transitory phenomenon that has endured for over fifty years.

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SOTSIAL'NAIA STRUKTURA SEL'SKOGO NASELENIIA SSSR. By
Iu. V. Arutiunian. Moscow: "Mysl'," 1971. 374 pp. 1.39 rubles.

Arutiunian begins his study with a review of attempts in the 1920s to classify the peasantry in terms of social structure, proceeds to a discussion of the necessity for collectivization, and then deals with changes that have occurred since then. Unfortunately, many of his statistical data for the USSR as a whole are based on 1959 census data, but other data, including Arutiunian's own field research (done in 1968–69), indicate that really striking change in the countryside occurred in the 1960s. Collectivization may have allowed improvements in land use and the utilization of labor, as well as increased access to cultural facilities on the part of peasants, but the impression gained from Arutiunian's work is that changes in rural areas were by no means as rapid during the thirty years following collectivization as they had been in the first decade of the Revolution and as they were during the decade of the 1960s. To take only one example: "If we compare the level of education of administrators and specialists in agriculture in the 1930s and beginning of the 1950s (up to 1953), then it is not hard to be convinced that in this respect there were no significant advances, although the general cultural level of the entire rural population increased markedly" (p. 68). From 1950 to 1954, nine million people left the villages for the cities (p. 69), a fact which had adverse effects on the development of a rural intelligentsia (insofar as an intelligentsia with a specifically rural outlook is desirable): 42 percent of the high-level specialists in Kalinin Oblast and 45 percent of those in Krasnodar Krai came from cities and worker settlements; 44 percent of those in Kalinin Oblast and 31 percent of those in Krasnodar Krai were educated primarily in urban schools (p. 279). Although the same may not be true for the Tatar ASSR, Arutiunian indicates that only 20 percent of administrators and specialists began their careers in kolkhozes, whereas more than 80 percent of the unskilled and semiskilled workers started out in kolkhozes (p. 308).

Arutiunian's book has great significance on a number of levels, some of which will be immediately apparent to those working in more than one discipline within Soviet studies. By choosing Kalinin Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Moscow Oblast, and the Tatar ASSR from which to take statistical samples, he has been able to show

the effect of ethnicity on social change. Rural Tatars are disadvantaged compared with urban residents, but in terms of *their own* perception of their status, no more so than rural residents of Kalinin Oblast, which is heavily Great Russian ethnically. One might therefore suppose that ethnic status is not the reason for the disadvantages incurred by rural Tatars, who have, as Arutiunian puts it, “overcome the material lag behind the city but still experience deficiencies in culture and life style” (pp. 278–79). Like his fellow industrial sociologists, Arutiunian demonstrates that for peasants, wages are not as important as the chance for advancement. His data indicate that peasants have, in a material sense, considerable reason for dissatisfaction with their lot, but his division between material and nonmaterial is not always clear. His survey indicates (pp. 237–38) that in Krasnodar Krai and Kalinin Oblast substantially more people aspired to be members of the intelligentsia than in fact were, and many more people were actually unskilled and semiskilled workers than wanted to be. Arutiunian comments: “If we consider that at present in the village about 10 percent are occupied in mental labor and in the city 30 percent of the population, then it is understandable (by extrapolation this can be fixed more exactly) that in the next fifteen to twenty years, this proportion will quite considerably lag behind the expectations even of rural residents” (p. 239). This appears to be as true for the Great Russians as for the Tatars—diagrams 3 and 10 are roughly similar, although diagram 10 seems to indicate rather narrow chances for upward mobility for the Tatar peasant. Diagram 10 does not, however, indicate what the Tatar’s chances are if he or she knows Russian. In fact, they improve noticeably. Once a Tatar acquires fluency in Russian, his whole outlook changes—to a point. Arutiunian’s study of attitudes among the four social groups he identifies (ranging from administrators and specialists to the unskilled and semiskilled) indicates much more prejudice among members of the intelligentsia than among the ordinary peasants. Moreover, these negative views are intensified in ethnically mixed surroundings, where the competition is also likely to be more intense and the chances for advancement in the chosen sphere more limited (pp. 193–200). Arutiunian is even more explicit about the nature of this conflict when he says (p. 297n.) that the artistic intelligentsia feels the limits of mobility more keenly than other groups, because many people have chosen activity in the artistic field, and relatively few, in an era of mass communication, are genuinely talented. Although this problem is by no means limited to the Tatar ASSR, but is also pressing in the Far North, Arutiunian avoids direct consideration of the meaning of his data for Soviet nationality policy. Nationality policy may not even be uppermost in his mind, for all the boldness with which he has investigated ethnic attitudes, and for all the apparent correlation in this book between ethnic and rural status.

This book is, above all, a study of the effect of policy on the peasantry. Curiously enough, there are very few “ideological” references, perhaps because most previous Soviet attempts to classify the peasantry failed. In the 1920s the necessity for classification arose out of the debate about what to do with and for the peasant, about where his loyalties lay. In recent years Western scholars have discussed the precollectivization debate thoroughly (see M. Lewin, *Russian Peasant and Soviet Power*, London, 1968, and Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938*, New York, 1973, among others). In their eagerness to prove that many good Communists disputed the necessity for collectivization in the form adopted by Stalin and that it was,

politically, a disastrous error, few Westerners have devoted any attention to peasant social structure in cultural perspective. Lewin is even of the opinion that before collectivization no one was leading the peasantry. However, if one accepts the view of some Soviet historians, notably A. I. Klibanov, that among the peasants, political protest was in religious guise, it is nearly impossible to accept Lewin's view. Arutiunian's book is silent on this point, and since he is statistically meticulous in all other matters, one is tempted to take this blank spot as tacit admission that kulaks and religious leaders were not synonymous. But this is not to say that Arutiunian does not consider religion. He does, in an offhand way, correlating it with age, sex, and low-status occupations, as well as with conservative views. He tends to dismiss it as *statistically* relatively unimportant. He is content that he has been able to demonstrate the existence of four distinct strata among peasant populations, in addition to the fact that there are material differences between kolkhozniks and sovkhos workers (the strata persist across this division, and material status varies from region to region, which may be one reason he de-emphasizes the differences). It is not, he says, access to the means of production but access to education and the content of labor which determine social status. What is important for him is that it cannot be demonstrated that anyone but the party is leading the peasants at the present time. Is the party doing it well or poorly? Arutiunian does not look at the problem in that way, although there can be little doubt that he has attempted to amass as much data as possible for the party to answer the question itself. It is not without significance that in discussing the migration of rural residents to the city he says that efforts should be made not so much to stop the flow of young people to the cities as to induce the return of the adult population (those who have finished their studies or have families) (p. 265). On August 22, 1973, *Izvestiia* announced that monetary subsidies, freedom from taxes for eight years, and other financial inducements would be extended to families settling in certain agricultural regions of the USSR, thus indicating that the Council of Ministers of the USSR has decided that rural areas are at least as difficult to live in as regions of the Far North. It was also announced that these families would be provided with adequate housing or building materials, child-care facilities, and hospitals—items concerning which Arutiunian found considerable dissatisfaction. To correct the deficiencies will be a tall order, but not impossible.

One other aspect of Arutiunian's book deserves mention: he has, in effect, extended a controversy of the 1920s to the present day, operating as a principled social scientist. He shows no desire to return to the 1920s, unlike some Soviet cultural dissidents. It is unfortunate that, perhaps for this reason, Soviet social science gets less attention in the West.

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THE SERVICE SECTOR IN SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. By *Gur Ofer*. Harvard Economic Studies, vol. 141. Russian Research Center, no. 71. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973. xi, 202 pp. \$10.00.

In this slim, tightly written volume, Dr. Ofer has set himself the task of explaining why the Soviet Union has reached a relatively advanced stage of economic development but yet retains an industrial structure resembling those of considerably less