

ABSTRACTS FROM INQUIRY

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THE PARADOXICAL SITUATION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND THE SEARCH FOR CHINESE WISDOM

JOSEPH S. WU

This introductory article begins by presenting the author's impression of contemporary Western philosophy as having become too professionalized to perform the functions of moral guidance and spiritual supervision. Herein lies a reason for the search for Oriental wisdom by some people in the West. The author then points out some fallacies often incurred in the pursuit of Chinese philosophy: the fallacy of 'craving for cash value,' the fallacy of 'the Procrustean bed', and the fallacy of 'the misplaced hamburger'. In the second half of the paper the author attempts a characterization of Chinese philosophy as a whole. As he interprets it, Chinese philosophy as a distinct tradition possesses five characteristics: (1) human centrality, (2) unity of theory and practice, (3) pedagogic universality, (4) methodological simplicity, and (5) dynamic harmony.

THE CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENT OF A NEO-CONFUCIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

SHU-HSIEN LIU

Until recently epistemology in the Western sense was never a central issue in Chinese philosophy. Contemporary Chinese neo-Confucian philosophers, however, realize that in order to reconstruct some of the important traditional philosophical insights and make them meaningful in the present time, certain methodological and epistemological considerations are indispensable. The present paper undertakes to examine some of these efforts. Since most neo-Confucian philosophers today have been influenced by Hsiung Shih-li, in one way or another, his epistemological theory is presented first. Then the further development of a neo-Confucian epistemological system in Mou Tsung-san's thought is discussed. Hsiung Shih-li has made an important distinction between what he calls the *hsing-chih* and the *liang-chih*. The former may be translated as the original wisdom and is what we rely upon to grasp ontological reality; the latter may be translated as the measuring wisdom and includes both our commonsensical and scientific ways of understanding which postulate a real, external world. A dialectical relation holds between the two. Mou Tsung-san further develops a comprehensive epistemological system which confirms the basic insights of Hsiung Shih-li. He has attempted a synthesis of the philosophical insights which he learns from Kant in the West and the Confucian tradition in China.

THE CONCEPT OF PARADIGMATIC INDIVIDUALS IN THE ETHICS OF CONFUCIUS

ANTONIO S. CUA

This essay deals with one basic feature of Confucian ethics as an ethics of flexibility by way of examining Confucius's concept of paradigmatic individuals (*chün-tzu*). Part I attempts a critical reconstruction and assessment of this concept. Part II takes up a feature of the account of *chün-tzu* in terms of the problem of rules and exceptions. It is suggested that the problem is best dealt with by making a distinction between normal and exigent moral situations—a distinction that appears to be implicit in the Confucian doctrine of *ching-ch'üan*. Viewed in this light, the flexible character of Confucian ethics can be seen to have an important bearing on a problem in moral philosophy.

THE SPIRIT AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEO-CONFUCIANISM

TANG CHUN-I

The ideal of human life as a life of sagehood is the core of Confucian thought. In neo-Confucianism the stress is on the self-perfectibility of man, and the central concern of neo-Confucianist thinkers has accordingly been with the question of how man can cultivate his own potentiality to be a sage. The different answers they give are in the form of teachings about the 'way,' these teachings incorporating different philosophical views of mind, human nature, and the universe. The author outlines the views of successive neo-Confucianists and their versions of the 'way,' seeing their teachings as developments towards the doctrine presented by Wang Yang-ming (b. 1472), whose thought can be seen in particular as a synthesis of the views of Chu Tzu and Lu Shiang-shan.

CH'AN BUDDHISM, WESTERN THOUGHT,
AND THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE

PAUL WIENPAHL

The article relates Ch'an Buddhism to Western thought via the philosophy of Spinoza, in particular through the concept of substance. It shows that Spinoza abandoned this concept as a fundamental metaphysical one. The consequent re-use of 'substance' requires a re-examination of the concepts of property and identity. It is seen that Spinoza made this drastic break with Western tradition by experiencing egolessness, the psychological basis for his metaphysical moves. The move is illustrated by the development of quantum physics. Egolessness and a rethinking of identity are basic to a feeling for, if not an understanding of, Ch'an Buddhism.

THE TERM 'MIND' IN HUANG PO'S TEXT
HUANG PO CH'UAN HSIN FA YAO

WILLIAM L. CHESHIER

For the Western philosopher the most difficult idea to understand is the Zen (Ch'an) notion of 'Mind', which is a key to understanding Zen Buddhism. In order to transmit the idea of 'Mind' Huang Po suggests that the only successful method for understanding it is intuition. Perhaps the difficulty for the Western philosopher arises from his compulsion to analyze and his wholesale rejection of intuition as a valid method of understanding. For the Zen Buddhist, 'Mind' is a sea in which men float expecting to know it as a whole by analyzing every droplet.

CHINESE PHILOSOPHY: A CHARACTERIZATION

CHUNG-YING CHENG

This article offers a synthetic characterization of Chinese philosophy based on an analytical reconstruction of its main traditions and thinking. Three main traditions in Chinese philosophy, Confucianism, Taoism and Chinese Buddhism, are depicted and discussed, together with some comments on Chinese Marxism in the contemporary scene. Four characteristics of Chinese philosophy are presented: intrinsic humanism, concrete rationalism, organic naturalism, and a pragmatism of self-cultivation. It is clear from the discussion that these four characteristics are interrelated and mutually supporting and thus should be better understood in the context of one another. Many open problems of philosophy, such as transcendence, evil, logic, and theoretical knowledge, are raised by an inquiry into Chinese philosophy. If Chinese philosophy serves to make us critically aware of these problems and to provide alternative ways of thinking, we are more than justified in presenting Chinese philosophy as a philosophy of universal concern and universal significance.

DISCUSSIONS

I. THE CONCEPT OF ENERGY IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

JUDITH B. WINTER

Freud's early attempts to account for repression and for the occurrence of neurotic symptoms in terms of detachable and displaceable quantities of affect-charge (cathexis) has continued to be a basic aspect of psychoanalytic theory. This is unfortunate since the account is inadequate and its central concept, that of a quantity of energy, is unsuited to the task at hand. We see that, despite the appropriateness of *describing* neurotic behavior in dynamic/economic terms, the use of energy concepts on the theoretical level is an explanatory dead-end.

II. ABORTION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM INNOCENCE

MARVIN KOHL

There is an argument against abortion that should be rejected. It is the argument that abortion is the killing of an innocent human being, and since the killing of an innocent human being is immoral, abortion is therefore immoral. The major premise should be corrected to read: 'Generally speaking, the killing of innocent human beings is immoral'; for in some situations morality demands the killing of the innocent. Moreover, given the deep structure of English and the differences between unborn and born progeny, the question of whether a human fetus is a human being is best answered in the negative.

REVIEW DISCUSSIONS

I. TRISTRAM SHANDY, PIERRE MENARD, AND ALL THAT

Comments on Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, JOSEPH AGASSI.

II. MIND AND BRAIN

An examination of D. M. Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, JEROME A. SHAFFER.

III. DANTO ON SPACE RESEARCH AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Arthur C. Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge*, AARON SLOMAN.

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WANTS, NEEDS, AND LIBERALISM

ARNOLD S. KAUFMAN

The author's main practical aim is to defend liberal doctrines to which he is committed against certain fashionable criticisms. An elucidation of *human needs* is offered. The key claim is that human needs entail rights. It is argued that the account proposed fits Marx's conception of human needs, and that, therefore, Marx was implicitly committed to a theory of human rights. It is then argued that John Stuart Mill was also, though implicitly, committed to a theory of human needs. These conceptual and moral affinities help to explain why, in recent years, the two political traditions of which Marx and Mill were principal architects, have tended to converge in theory and in practice. The main shift in moral viewpoint has, however, been a movement by Marxists toward the sort of liberalism defended by Mill.

COMMENT ON KAUFMAN

RICHARD B. BRANDT

FOUNDATIONS OF THE LIBERAL MAKE-BELIEVE

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY VERSUS FREEDOM THEORY

CHRISTIAN BAY

Among three possible avenues toward a good society—revolutionary Marxism, liberal-democratic reform, and radical citizenship education—this paper examines and advocates the third. Societies are held to be ‘good’ so long as the Most Basic Rights are in fact enjoyed by all (i.e. the right (1) to stay alive, (2) to remain unmolested, and (3) to be free to develop one’s potentialities). Some key propositions in ‘contract theory’ as represented by such diverse theorists as Socrates, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Tussman and Meiklejohn are discussed, and an alternative tradition, ‘freedom theory,’ is sketched, with contributions from Socrates, Godwin, Thoreau, and Camus. An argument is then developed to the effect that the contract theorists have all contributed to the basis on which the contemporary ‘liberal make-believe’ rests. This term refers to the myth that our society is democratic, i.e. that working (only) within the system of our constitutional procedures will or can lead toward a just society. Finally, it is argued that the highest priority in citizenship education is to destroy this liberal make-believe, and that freedom theory provides a better foundation than contract theory in the struggle for human rights, and for mankind’s survival.

COMMENT ON BAY

WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY

MILITARY SERVICE AND MORAL OBLIGATION

HUGO ADAM BEDAU

The author investigates the view that there is a moral obligation to serve in the armed forces of the nation State which one is a citizen resident (with special reference to young American men at the present time). It is conceded that under current law in this country there may be such a legal obligation, that many men may be obliged to render such service, and that under certain circumstances even a moral obligation to serve may also exist. What is denied is that any of the familiar theories of moral obligation is adequate in existing circumstances to establish this thesis in general. The result is either that a new theory of moral obligation must be developed to fit the current facts, or the present assessment of those facts must be fundamentally revised, or we must concede that draftees and men generally have no such moral obligation of service at all.

COMMENT ON BEDAU

S. R. DOSS

ON THE CHOICE BETWEEN REFORM AND REVOLUTION

KAI NIELSEN

The concepts of social transformation, reform, and revolution are characterized. A typology of revolutions is given and revolutions of the appropriate type are compared with reforms. It is argued that reform and revolution are on a continuum and that there are social transformations that with equal propriety could be called ‘a cluster of radical reforms’ or ‘a revolution’. What is

sensibly at issue concerning the choice between reform or revolution is whether in bourgeois democracies it is more reasonable to adopt the piecemeal reformist tactics of liberal reformers or whether a commitment to a revolutionary overthrow of the established order is justified. Arguments for both positions are examined and it is concluded that *no general* noncontextual answer can be given.

COMMENT ON NIELSEN

ROBERT V. HANNAFORD

REFORM, VIOLENCE, AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY

A COMMENTARY ON THE SAYING THAT YOU OUGHT TO FIGHT FOR
WHAT YOU BELIEVE RIGHT

GERALD C. MACCALLUM, JR.

The popular slogan that one ought to fight for what he believes right appears to point a way for persons to witness the moral seriousness of their interest in reform. But exactly what way does it point, and, in particular, does it enjoin resort to violence for the sake of what one believes right? Pursuit of this question exposes some roots of our indecisive and often confused views about the acceptable means of revolution and reform and the eventual rôle of violence therein. Common understandings of 'violence' and 'fight for' do not carry us far. Further, there are doubtless differences in how the slogan's enjoinder of 'fighting' (and thus, if at all, of violence) is understood to be limited. These differences and the issues underlying them are exposed when we ask whether the slogan is to be understood to enjoin fighting or manners of fighting that might be called premature, gratuitous, or wasteful, and when we ask whether the 'ought' in the slogan is to be understood as, at best, a *prima facie* ought.

COMMENT ON MACCALLUM

RICHARD B. BRANDT

REVIEW DISCUSSIONS

I. THE THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF HUSSERL'S
LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

(Trans. J. N. Findlay), ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI

II. JUSTIFYING PUNISHMENT

Ted Honderich, *Punishment—the Supposed Justifications*, JONATHAN GLOVER.

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TOWARD A THEORY OF MORAL DEBT

PROLEGOMENA TO CHREOLOGY

MORRIS B. STORER

Part One. In our strife to express the meanings of moral terms, we have neglected the one transparently built-in meaning: 'A man ought to keep his promises' could mean 'A man *owes*

it to other men to keep his promises. Such is his *debt* and *duty*—just what is *due* or *owed*'. This proposal is supported by the evidence of major languages of the world, ancient and modern, in all of which identical or closely related words serve to express both the idea of material debt and that of moral obligation. But on study the revealing model and analogue of 'moral debt' is found, not in *debts of exchange*, the simplest and most obvious class of debts, but in *debts of shared responsibility*. Working from such models we conclude that '*A* ought to do *X*' means '*X* is part of *A*'s share in the cost of the good community, the common cause and stake of all mankind'.

IS 'HUMAN ACTION' A CATEGORY?

ARTHUR B. CODY

It seems to have been taken for granted that we all know what a human action is. However in attempting to draw from what philosophers have said about actions the necessary clues as to their distinguishing features, one finds little to discourage the idea that there is no way of distinguishing one category of occurrences, human actions, from the complex of different sorts of things which happen. From this I am tempted to conclude that there is no category of human action. But before drawing such a conclusion an ancient but terrible question must be faced: What sorts of things happen in the world? This ancient question is faced but not answered. It is brought up because the failure to find a satisfactory answer to the question, Is human action a category? is a failure even to find a satisfactory assumption about what kind of reference the term 'human action' is supposed to have.

MARX AND THE ORIGIN OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

STANLEY MOORE

Dialectical materialism was born in 1857, when Marx returned to studying Hegel. In opposition to Hegel, Marx adopted a realist epistemology. Abandoning the pragmatist ambiguities of his *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts*, he became a materialist in the traditional sense of that word. Influenced by Hegel, Marx simultaneously attempted a dialectical proof for the labor theory of value. Abandoning his positivist critique in *The Holy Family*, he started using dialectic to discover beneath appearances an otherwise inaccessible reality. But his dialectic was incompatible with his materialism. The identification of reality with *Praxis*, rejected at the level of philosophical statement, was retained at the level of economic argument. Turning Hegel upside down proved harder than Marx thought.

THE DIALECTICS OF METAPHOR

DAVID BLOOR

Two points of contact are explored between contemporary philosophy of science and Dialectical Materialism. The first point deals with the interaction view of metaphor as an exemplification of the law of the unity of opposites. The contradiction is then noted between the strategy and tactics of much analytical philosophy and the lesson to be learnt from this account of metaphor. The concern to change category habits into category disciplines rules out the process of conceptual change of the interaction view. G. A. Paul's dismissal of Lenin's theory of reflection is then criticized in the light of the interaction view.

COVERING LAWS IN HISTORICAL PRACTICE

STEN SPARRE NILSON

Carl G. Hempel has expressed the view that explanation in history is of a kind with explanation in any other branch of empirical science. Historians, according to him, aim at showing that the

events they describe are not matters of chance. In the author's opinion there is no necessary connection between these two statements. Historians often aim at showing that the events they describe *are* matters of chance. But this does *not* make explanation in history different from explanation in other branches of empirical science.

REVIEW DISCUSSION

GLOVER ON RESPONSIBILITY

Jonathan Glover, *Responsibility*, T. L. S. SPRIGGE.

SYNTHESE

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