

THE EXPANDING INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS: A REVIEW ARTICLE*

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The military follows courses of action adapted to the political conditions of the country in question, and is not by itself primarily responsible for the absence or presence of democracy or democratic institutions. . . . The political role of the military is not a "political disease"; rather it is but a symptom of a condition of political immaturity. (Theodore Wyckoff. "The Military in Latin American Politics." *Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 13, Sept. 1960, p. 761.)

. . . the work and purpose of the armed forces . . . are essentially political in the largest and most pervasive sense of the word. The least of their professional functions is the protection of the homeland from foreign enemies. The largest is the suppression of civil disorder, the control of internal subversion, and the maintenance of the threat of force for use in the political gaming process. (George C. Lodge, *Engines of Change*. N. Y. 1970, p. 177.)

ALTHOUGH WRITTEN A DECADE APART, THESE QUOTATIONS REFLECT RECENT RESEARCH focusing on the inter-relationship, or lack thereof, between the functional and genetic aspects of the Latin American militaries and their roles in the development process. Generally, the literature has attempted to interweave the military with its role as a subsystem in the larger political system, or it has centered upon the socio-political origins or institutional life style of the military establishment. Problematics confronting social scientists have concerned the rationale for military intervention in the political process, the motivational aspects and the divergent variables reflecting the possibilities for the future. The term "military intervention" as used by most social scientists gives a false impression, for it implies that the military operates from outside the political system, when in fact it is recognized as a principal subsystem in most Latin American nations.¹ Throughout this article, therefore, the term 'military intervention' is intended to connote an active involvement in the political process by the military establishment functioning from within the overall political system.

The interested student or scholar who depends upon others' interpretations for his understanding must recognize the limitations imposed upon himself by this reliance. Circumstances have not changed radically since Lyle N. McAlister wrote in 1964 that "the overall effect of soldiers acting as political men or political groups is

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extremely difficult to evaluate. Evidence is fragmentary and contradictory, and the problem is heavily value-laden."² One must, therefore, read through the maze of literature with a highly critical eye.

The social scientist can utilize one of several approaches to the study of military interventions within the political system. The most general approach relies upon an attempted definition of the subject in the simplest and broadest terms followed by deductive testing for the validity of the original assumption. McAlister and José Miguens would suggest as an alternative, however, that

. . . it would be useful for research purposes to regard Latin American armed forces "scientifically," that is, as social phenomena rather than as disasters and their relationships to civil society as a problem properly belonging to history and the social sciences rather than to demonology . . . if "militarism" is to be regarded as a social disease, some knowledge of its pathology is necessary before remedies can be prescribed.³

A more scientific approach, founded upon the structural functional model outlined by Talcott Parsons,⁴ focuses on comparisons of two or more countries, having basic similarities yet with marked variances in the military's role within society. From this approach complete typologies of military intervention, such as the ten-sided model of militarism designed by Gino Germini and Kalman Silvert,⁵ can be developed for the Latin American militaries. Within similar scientific boundaries is the more purely quantifying approach of Robert Putman's recent research.⁶ Inaccuracies identified in studies by those social scientists employing this structural functional approach and relying primarily upon statistical quantification result from the basic categorization of that which is being tested. As in the more impressionistic approach, the researcher's cultural biases unfortunately play a prominent role in the definition and categorization process. This, however, is less visible in pure statistical analysis and therefore more difficult to ascertain than in more traditional and historical investigations. In other words, the analysis may be heavily weighted in favor of the social scientist's biases merely by the categories and the components which he utilizes for his statistically derived conclusions. Thus the apparent objectivity of the statistics is a façade for the subjectivity of the researcher.

The modern social scientist has also resorted to the case study approach as a means of evaluating the military's political role. This approach has been highly satisfactory on occasion, but the reader must be cautious about accepting any generalizations about Latin America as a whole from such a study. A weakness can be its narrowness, but only when generalizations are the ultimate goal. Within this case study mold, Morris Janowitz'⁷ alternative approach invalidates the traditional, historical methods, which focused upon the relationship of the military, i.e., the officer corps, to the state without any real comprehension of the political subsystems involved. Janowitz' technique of group analysis—study of social origins, career motivations, career development, life style, ideology, and self-image—effectively contrasts with

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those earlier impressionistic tendencies. He has deductively utilized simplified assumptions to extend the range of analysis. Yet if applied over a broad, non-homogenous spectrum, such as Latin America, the results can be just as deficient as were the earlier, traditional approaches. The objective for the reader, therefore, is to meld the structural analysis of the more functional and genetic approaches with the more symbolic interpretations so as to formulate a well-balanced mix for deciphering the militaries' role in the development or destruction of their political systems.

Before such a formulation can be attempted, negative as well as positive aspects of recent research must be evaluated. This study begins where Lyle McMaster in his definitive review of the literature ended in 1966.⁸ With no intention of being as exhaustive as McAlister, I have selected for review various Latin American military studies which represent a broad spectrum of the approaches employed by social scientists.

A critical, objective approach to such a review is not easily attainable considering the inherent biases with which the North American analyst must contend. The earlier approaches to the problem appeared more guilty of subjectivism than recent studies, but few, if any, have been able to break the habit completely.⁹ Edwin Lieuwen's model,¹⁰ typical of this earlier, traditional approach, conceived of the politically involved military as a principal barrier to the ultimate achievement of democracy. Lieuwen employed implicitly a democratic and civilian political-system model in which an apolitical military, subject to strict civilian control, was a prerequisite for development. Lieuwen's logical inference was that since Latin America did not illustrate political development in terms of his model, with its origins in evolutionary positivism, and since the military was constantly intervening in the political sphere, the military must be the principal impediment to political development, i.e., western style democracy. Progress and civilian rule became synonymous; any other arrangement was classified as deviant behavior. The major fault of these traditional theoreticians (as well as United States policy and lawmakers) has been their interest in attempting to remold the Latin American militaries in the image of our Western European allies. The attempt has not been to understand but rather to remodel.

In the period since the McAlister study, two Latin American social scientists—José Nun¹¹ and José Miguens¹²—have devised models highly critical of the earlier approaches. In suggesting new schemata for the study of the military's role, they have recognized the dilemma resulting from the early researchers' writings, namely that understanding was not the ultimate product. Nun views the models of Lieuwen and John J. Johnson¹³ as based upon inaccurate, biased conceptions which identify democracy and stability as unquestionably positive phenomena. While Lieuwen's "traditional" analysis opts for civilian democracy based on nineteenth century European anti-militarism, Johnson's "modern" approach relies upon the technocratic militaries identified in the post-colonial African experience where the military acted as an "effective agent of modernization." But the real irritant for Nun concerning Johnson's model is the latter's interpretation of the middle class as a progressive force,

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which in true western style will lead the social, political, and economic *evolutions* in Latin America. "Both perspectives [Lieuwen's and Johnson's] . . . are based on implicit models uncritically transferred to the Latin American context.¹⁴

Nun has identified deep contradictions within the middle class. It is neither a homogeneous classification nor a definite source of democratic development. The middle class is composed of various groups with extremely heterogeneous orientations. Divergent viewpoints concerning the appropriateness of change emerge from the various groupings, depending upon the structural situation of that group in that particular time and place. The middle class groups do not see eye-to-eye on all issues, and the different sections within the larger classification perceive of different foes—sometimes each other. Because of these internal divisions the middle groups fail to organize as the working class has. Even more than fear of the problems confronting developing nation, middle groups fear the solution, which may not be in their class interest. At any rate, some sector or sectors of the middle class will be affected by every political and social change because of the position of the middle groups between the upper class oligarchy and the masses below. As Nun puts it:

. . . the working and upper classes may or may not be affected by the decisions adopted by the government. It depends on whether the solution is an overt labor policy or an oligarchic one. But, owing to their position in the socio-political space, certain sectors of the middle classes will always be affected. . . . The capacity for defense of these sectors is reduced by their lack of such organizations as the unions of the working class, and their lack of traditional representative instruments like the ones efficiently used by the oligarchy.¹⁵

The middle class will support adjustment in the political structure but not change. When such change is threatened, the military (officer corps), according to Nun, acts as the agent for the middle class, and the result is likely to be an attempted military *golpe*. Nun recognizes that this is not because the military has been co-opted by a homogeneous middle class but rather because it, too, is composed of middle class groupings. It, therefore, reflects the identical concerns and frustrations of the various middle class sectors and reacts to similar stimuli.

In contrast to Nun's contention that the military is the most independent and politically effective exponent of middle class aspirations, Luigi Einaudi, in his studies of the Peruvian military,¹⁶ contends that the military's actions cannot be determined solely on the basis of its middle class values. He writes:

Some [determinants] are related to social position (anger at "plutocrats" and "oligarchs," or paternalism toward Indian recruits). Others derive from the very isolation and institutional autonomy presumed to give the military their capacity for independent action in defense of "class" interests.¹⁷

A persistent problem in attempting to validate Nun's inductive approach to the criteria for military intervention is, as he readily admits, that the middle class groupings are so disunified, are at such various levels of sophistication, and in some

cases completely lack any potential for political action that the middle class cannot be a model for governing.

The most serious criticism of the Nun model, however, is advanced by José Miguens and Carlos Astiz, whose principal arguments suggest that the military officer is motivated by institutional norms and allegiances or situational considerations rather than class interests.¹⁸ At times these institutional reactions have been directed against middle class criticism. In the process of consolidating its position after the 1966 Argentine coup the military entered the state universities to curtail mounting opposition which was principally middle class in origin. Although Carlos Astiz concurs with Nun's thesis as an assessment of the military's political ideology in Argentina, he believes that "neither the facts nor the background of the military officers seem to justify the view that the Argentine military establishment performs as an arm of . . . any other group, except the military establishment itself."¹⁹ Both Miguens and Astiz agree with Nun's neo-Marxist interpretation to the extent of agreeing that the military may reflect societal groupings, though they would suggest that these are not always within the middle classes. They argue, however, that while cleavages within the military will emerge, overall military action will reflect institutional variables.

Miguens recognizes that these institutional variables may involve more than the mere advancement of corporate self-interest. Undoubtedly, he would agree with Richard Clinton's assessment that the 1968 Peruvian military coup was partially motivated by a disillusionment with the ineffective middle class-reformist regime of Fernando Belaúnde Terry and a belief, fostered in the military's Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM), that "Peru's archaic society required fundamental alteration if bloody rebellion and anarchy were to be averted."²⁰ Miguens does not, however, attempt to determine in sufficient depth the reasons behind this change in institutional variables. Rather he focuses on the hypothesis that while functional criteria do initiate reaction from the military, as they would from any structured group, it is the intra-military socialization process which primarily defines the boundaries of military action. Changes in this genetic socialization process are reflected in the new-style military coups which he identifies in the post-1966 period.²¹

As a result of recent professionalization processes within the Latin American military, Miguens implies that a new type of coup and resulting military government structure based on institutional leadership and technocratic administration have emerged in Latin America. When he stresses the militaries' newly derived doctrines of socio-economic development, as refined at senior military academies, he is in effect including the Latin American militaries within the "ideal-typical Weberian bureaucratic" syndrome, prominent in the literature on the African military.²² Thus within this doctrine rationality reigns supreme, and the institutional leadership relies upon a highly ordered technocratic system of elaborate rules which allows for rapid reaction, mobilization, and sensitivity to the logistical situation.

Miguens utilizes an empirical approach to conclude pessimistically that the mil-

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itary will fail in its schema of development because it does not have the ability to accept compromise in a political context. This apolitical *weltanschauung* is based on an ideological rigidity that results in a failure to recognize conflict, and a devotion to efficiency and obedience which may also result in inept handling of popular agitational politics.

As an overview of the changing situation, Miguens' study is highly valuable; however, he makes no attempt to include a substantive review of the motivations for these changes in the institutional variables other than to identify their existence. His step-by-step account merely outlines the differences between the "traditional" and "new" types of military intervention.

This post-1966 "new" coup format does, however, have very definite pre-1966 antecedents. Astiz indicates that a minority faction of the Argentine military was opting for political control in terms of Miguens' schema at the time of Arturo Frondizi's ouster from power in 1962. The Colorado leadership circulated a classified paper, dated 10 April 1962, entitled "Study of the Establishment at the Present Time of a Military Dictatorship in the Argentine Republic."²³ Einaudi, likewise, identifies institutional changes occurring in Latin America as early as 1960, when the Peruvian military recognized national societal crises that threatened the military institution.²⁴ Thus, prior to 1966, the areas of institutional concern were beginning to expand so as to involve most aspects of the public sector. Development programs were seen as becoming an integral part of defense policy. Miguens, therefore, is too arbitrary in his proposed break between the old and the new intervention models.

Furthermore, it is slightly unrealistic to assert that a new day has dawned on the actions of the Latin American militaries in general. Morris Janowitz and Hugh Seton-Watson in the early 1960s divided military interventions into two antithetic categories. Intervention was either "reactive" or "designed" for Janowitz, and the actors were either "order-restorers" or "intelligentsia-in-uniform" for Seton-Watson.²⁵ The connotative similarities are obvious; the "order-restorers" initiate a "reactive" intervention when there is a void in the civilian-oriented political system, either when the pressures of civilians, directly or indirectly, force an issue, or when it is within the realm of the military's corporate self-interest. The "designed" intervention, on the other hand, can only occur in a far more sophisticated atmosphere and is guided by the "intelligentsia-in-uniform," who have definite premeditated goals.

Even though military intervention in the political system has become far more complex than this overview of the Janowitz and Seton-Watson schemata would indicate, the essential ingredients are apparent. It is not clear, however, that Miguens recognizes their applicability to recent attempted coups. The February 1972 Ecuadorian coup bringing General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara to power was motivated by a desire to insure that a potential populist candidate for that summer's presidential election should not win, since the military perceived him as a threat to its corporate self-interest. This example certainly does not fit the schema of Miguens' model. Miguens' hypotheses, however, can be effectively equated with recent coups in Argentina (1966), Brazil (1964), and Peru (1968) all of which, he asserts, resulted

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principally from the increasing professionalization within the military structure in those countries. But they appear to be unique up to the present time. The other militaries do not display the same degree of sophistication, nor have they traditionally played the same roles in the political apparatus.

Miguens' systematic critique of the earlier approaches, like Nun, stresses that the methodology has been inappropriate and has been more detrimental than beneficial, since it tends to obscure valid meanings and characteristics of military intervention. He criticizes his predecessors for being either too evaluative in assigning the military to a good-bad dichotomy or too scientific when in fact scientific data are scarce and unreliable. In terms of the good-bad" dichotomy the earlier attempts at understanding the military have been based upon preconceived notions of the direction in which development *should* lead, while the deterministic theories, appearing over the past decade, have been responses to the more traditional approaches of Lieuwen and Johnson. Based on the Janowitz schema, they, as well as the quantification schemata, have proven deleterious by proposing either that the military's motivations are purely sociologically oriented or that cyclic patterns can be ascribed to the militaries' interventions.

Miguens has suggested an alternative to Nun's approach while concurring with Nun's critique of the prior methodology. The method he recommends for understanding the Latin American military has its foundation in an analysis of the institution, which then can be followed with interactional analysis:

... the military sector is not isolated but is a part of the total system of the society; not only does it have permanent transactions with the other subsystems but any change in one of the subsystems will modify the others and the functioning of the whole society.²⁶

Miguens, therefore, would opt for attacking the problem from precisely the opposite pole from Nun. The social scientist must dissect the military and view it as an actor in a larger system rather than determine the actions of the military based solely upon the activity of the larger political system and its position or positions in reaction to society. Interaction of the two approaches is essential if the functional, genetic, and symbolic importance of military intervention is to be determined, but for these two Latin American social scientists the angles of attack are in direct opposition to each other.

Miguens and Nun are starting points for a consideration of the research into the military's role within the political sphere since McAlister's 1966 review article in LARR. From opposite methodological and ideological poles they have both reviewed unfavorably the literature, mostly North American, on the subject. Their conclusions, true to their Parsonian and neo-Marxist approaches, have not only been in opposition to each other, but have also cast serious doubts upon the validity of the more standard North American viewpoints.

Studies by Martin C. Needler (1966), Robert D. Putnam (1967), and Norman A. Bailey (1971), which are to be reviewed, represent various general approaches (and degrees of sophistication) to the question of military intervention.²⁷ Putnam's

article relies upon a quantification approach for determining the motivational attributes behind military intervention. Needler attempts to draw conclusions from his own statistical research, but both the research and the conclusions are less sophisticated than those of Putnam. Needler's analysis is saved to a degree, however, by his utilization of a genetic approach to interpret the dynamics of a military coup. Bailey's approach is more traditional but less satisfactory. The three articles essentially descend respectively from a high level of statistical analysis to mere conjecture.

Putnam's problematic is concerned with isolating factors which are most likely to cause military intervention. He has isolated four broad categories—aspects of socio-economic development, political development, institutional characteristics, and foreign influences—and then subjected an array of propositions, relative to each category, to strict scientific testing. He defines the degree of military intervention over a time period on a scale from 0 to 3. Clearly, Putnam's contention that all Latin American countries are neatly arranged within this scale can be disputed. Fidel Castro's Cuba receives a rating of only 1, "since the available evidence suggests that the military play only a minor role in contemporary Cuban politics,"²⁸ but Putnam fails to take into consideration the role which the rejuvenated military establishment has played since its establishment by Castro. The inter-relationship between Castro's government and Castro's military warrants a higher rating in Putnam's schema. Within the boundaries of his scale, however, he has quantified and then correlated the effects of several variables on each of the predetermined categories before defining the impact of a given category on military intervention. Thus, his study is beneficial in that he has at least attempted to test scientifically the validity of earlier general typologies, the bases of which were impressionistic rather than scientific.

Putnam first tests five variables of social mobilization and finds that, quite expectedly, the higher a country is on his index the lower is its score on military intervention. A similar negative correlation was found for the relationship between economic development and military intervention; but when he controlled for social mobilization, he discovered a positive correlation. The implication apparently is that the mobilization and development indices are not perfectly correlated.

As in the case of most statistical approaches, Putnam has faith in both the reliability and the significance of his indices. There seems to be a grim determination on the part of the quantifier to make his hypotheses work. Quite obviously, Putnam's biases appear, not glaringly in the conclusions, but unconsciously in the very foundations of his analysis—the indices and other bases of measurement.

A further negative aspect affecting the validity of scientific data, particularly related to Latin America, is the analyst's dependence, out of necessity, on unreliable information inputs. As McAlister acknowledged: "problems of data collection are compounded by the nature of the armed institutions in Latin America. Because of their peculiar function, they are in all countries highly sensitive and tend to surround even their most routine activities with security restrictions."²⁹ Astiz has pinpointed a significant consequence of this dilemma which unfortunately the military establishments continually refuse to acknowledge. He suggests that the military's unwilling-

ness to authorize or release the collection of pertinent data has backfired, "since those who have shown an interest in these matters write anyway, and lacking concrete data and direct personal knowledge, make things look worse than they probably are."³⁰

Not only may the necessary information be shrouded in secrecy, but also the information issued by the national governments is more than likely deceptive. Because of a combination of such circumstances, one cannot be sure of the true significance, for example, of the components of Putnam's index of political development, which includes such qualitatively disparate items as percentage of voters, stability of party system, constitutional restrictions on the military, and interest articulation by parties and associations. Because of the limitations of his data, Putnam's statistical analysis results only in a negative correlation between political development and military intervention. Nor does he affirm any of the other principle hypotheses as being statistically viable. Size of the army, percentage of adults in service, as well as amount of foreign training, all have a negative correlation to military intervention. (Furthermore, it is curious and unsatisfactory that in testing for the relationship between foreign military influence and military intervention Putnam focuses solely on the German influence rather than including that of the United States, which had a near monopoly on military influence at the time of his study.³¹) Other than a positive correlation between economic development and military intervention, which is refuted by Needler, Putnam's only significant conclusion is that the *tradition of militarism* plays an important role in accounting for contemporary military intervention.

The value of such statistical analysis rests on the fact that such testing eliminates certain factors as possible hypotheses, but this testing cannot be expected to produce theories from which the hypotheses themselves can be drawn. The danger, as Robert Dowse suggests, is that the quantification approach "may contribute an aura of specious accuracy to hypotheses that are themselves intrinsically vague"³²—an appropriate criticism of Putnam's statistical analysis.

Martin Needler, on the other hand, has employed the "good–bad" dichotomy and the analytical approaches of which Miguens is so critical. He utilizes a less sophisticated data base than Putnam's to make a conclusive theory. He asserts that "the available data are consistent with the hypothesis postulated, that the overthrow of a government is more likely when economic conditions worsen."³³ His data, however, are based on the highly suspect assumption that real per capita income figures are *the* analytically significant index of a country's economic condition. Since there were, according to his statistics, twice as many years of economic improvement as years of deterioration between 1935 and 1964 (the time frame of his research), then his hypothesis would be supported if more than one-third of the coups occurred in years of deterioration. The data reflect that of the fifteen coups for which statistics were available, seven coups occurred during years of economic deterioration; an equal number took place during years of improvement; and one took place when no change was reported.

Even though the data support Needler's hypothesis, it is highly inconclusive because of the limited and conjectural nature of both his test cases, i.e., *successful*

coups where economic data were available, and his index, i.e., a positive correlation between economic conditions and real per capita income. While the latter is obviously a factor of a country's economic condition, there are definitely additional variables for which data must be collected before statistically significant results can be obtained. This type of analysis seems to be but another attempt to utilize statistical data to satisfy the author's own cultural biases.

Needler also proposes four additional hypotheses centering around the status quo orientation of the military, including the suggestion that military interventions are increasingly directed against legally constituted regimes and occur to forestall the election or inauguration of reforming presidents. Needler, however, uses data only from the fifty-six *successful* coup attempts between 1935 and 1964. In order to illustrate his point he catalogues the 1962 Peruvian military coup as an attempt to prevent the inauguration of a "reformist government"—that of Manuel Odría supported by the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA). Yet the Odría and APRA government would presumably have been far more conservative and status quo oriented than the Belaúnde regime which the military finally supported. In this case Needler's status quo argument is not validated.

Stepan also deals with the question of timing, for the specific instances in Brazil since 1945. Of the five coups (1945, 1954, 1955, 1961, 1964), three did occur around election time or a change in government. But two of these (1955, 1961) were unsuccessful; and even though the 1945 intervention was successful, it was initiated at the insistence of the political parties in an attempt to preserve the electoral system.³⁴ This would indicate that Needler has not considered all intricacies of the questions he attempts to answer. His indices are too vague for the conclusion he proposes.

Needler starts from the premise that military intervention is unhealthy and dysfunctional in any developing nation. From this typical "good-bad" approach he orients all his research toward substantiating his hypothesis that the military is an obstacle to development. Needler also attempts to show statistically that dictatorial regimes, which he would define a priori as "bad" and normally military in nature, are cyclical in pattern and that between 1935 and 1964, while Latin America experienced periods of high coup activity resulting in dictatorial governments, the overall trend was downward. Thus he implies that military intervention as a political way of life may be on the wane. His statistics, however, do not reflect the vast numbers of unsuccessful coups. Moreover, the current political map of Latin America does not support his thesis, for there are at least the same number (ten) of dictatorships, using Needler's vague definitions, today as there were in 1956.³⁵

Throughout his statistical approach to the problem Needler attempts to explain coups in terms of factors external to the military rather than to consider the internal characteristics which might play a role in the initiation of a coup. Therefore, he conceives of military intervention as a phenomenon that is functional rather than genetic.

The significance of Needler's article depends less on his analysis of statistical data than on his empirical approach to the study of coup dynamics. In dealing with the dynamics of a coup, he switches to the genetic-oriented approach encouraged by

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Miguens. Needler's most valuable contribution to the literature is his concept of the "swing man." Plot originators provide the necessary groundwork, but not until the "swing man" enters the coup apparatus will a plot grow into a coup. The "swing man" is the last important adherent to join the conspiracy and thus possibly the least committed; his importance is based upon his personal influence, prestige, or critical position in the command structure, all of which become essential elements in the coup's potential for success. Generals Juan Onganía in Argentina in 1966 and Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco in Brazil in 1964 are perfect examples of "swing men." The incongruous result is that these last adherents to the plot, while possibly the least committed to the originators' ideology, are the prime candidates to assume a leadership role in the new government because of their institutional position. Thus Onganía, leader of the Argentine army's soft-line Azul faction, which overthrew Frondizi in March 1962 but immediately returned the government to civilians, accepted the presidency after Arturo Illia's ouster by the hard-line Colorado faction in June 1966. In addition, Needler very persuasively illustrates the reinforcing nature of military hostility toward a particular civilian segment or political party. The military's hatred of APRA in Peru, despite the fact that the military, ideologically at least, has a good deal in common with APRA's tenets, is a case that supports Needler's conclusion. The same hypothesis is applied positively to the Dominican Republic and the military's fear of a return to power by Juan Bosch.

But Needler's reliance on impressionistic analysis and empiricism are just as suspect as Putnam's determined efforts to categorize the causes of military intervention by pure statistical analysis. The ideal must be a combination of the two. However, Needler's derivation of meanings from a more genetic approach in an attempt to understand the motivations of the military, is the strongpoint of his study, contrasted to his inadequate attempts at applying statistical techniques in order to verify his preconceived biases.

The least scholarly of the articles under review is Norman A. Bailey's. He has allowed his North American bias to penetrate nearly every sentence. His very specific conclusions are not substantiated by factual information. By broad-based innuendos, Bailey depicts the past and present economic mistakes and misconceptions of the Latin American military regimes. He equates the Peruvian military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado with the earlier military dictatorships of Juan Perón and Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, whom he classifies as "Democratic Caesars." This comparison, however, is based entirely upon what Bailey considers to have been the similar economic approaches. The omission of any discussion of the vast differences between the personalistic dictatorships of Perón and Rojas Pinilla and the institutionalized leadership in Peru is a serious weakness. Bailey predicts a similar fate for the Peruvian government as befell the Perón and Rojas Pinilla regimes because Peru likewise is following a policy of staunch economic nationalism. Bailey includes within this economic nationalism the "misfortune" of being influenced by Marxist economics, which are being taught to the military leadership by left-wing economists at CAEM.

Bailey's article fits neatly into the Miguens' "good-bad" dichotomy. Military

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regimes, Bailey would argue, are not evil by definition, as Lieuwen has suggested, but they do become "bad" when the regime loses sight of middle class, North American development values. Thus, by professing complete faith in the virtues of the North American private investment model, Bailey preaches the party line: What is good for United States business interests is good for Latin America. Xenophobic nationalism is leading the Peruvian government, as it did Perón and Rojas Pinilla, down the road to disinvestment and rapid loss of foreign credit. The source of this unsatisfactory condition is Marxist economic teaching. Bailey's solution is not the military regimes' overthrow, which he considers impractical, since, if not the military, then some other elitist pressure group would rule. Rather, he recommends the elimination of Marxist teachings and orientation and a welcome to the foreign investor. He writes:

The good thing about foreign investment from the standpoint of a newly developing country is the initial investment of capital and, more importantly, the transfer of technical and managerial skills. . . . Assuming his [the foreign investor's] business decisions are appropriate, *he should have no competitive advantage over local industry and commerce.*

Such an obvious display of North American rhetoric is followed by this ignoble conclusion:

If the laborious gains of decades are not to be destroyed in years, the *well-meaning but misguided* economic policies of socially conscious military officers must be rechanneled into more productive paths.³⁶

The blank spaces in Bailey's assumptions, and his hollow claims, do damage to any validity which the North American investment model might have for Latin America.

To his credit, however, Bailey does identify the military as a political subsystem. He recognizes its existence as a pressure group and in agreement with Nun suggests that it may act as several, even conflicting, pressure groups depending upon the particular issue. But this acceptable beginning is overshadowed by his unfruitful comparison of the present military regimes with Perón and Rojas Pinilla. Furthermore, Bailey fails to recognize the potential which the military has, as a pressure group, to be absolute, including a monopoly which it tends to possess on the tools of violence. He does not make a distinction between the military and other pressure groups in terms of their power capabilities. His schema stops at the recognition of the military as one of several power contenders.³⁷

Other researchers approach the subject of military intervention from a much narrower standpoint. They utilize primarily the case study method to apply criteria and generalizations formulated by other social scientists. It is then entrusted to the reader to draw comparisons by employing similar criteria in the study of other cases. Thus, the case study approach does provide a vehicle for understanding the general Latin American situation as well as the individual country under consideration.

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Carlos Astiz³⁸ in his study of the Argentine military establishment has followed the suggestion of José Miguens by investigating the internal socialization process within the Argentine military in an attempt to identify the motivations behind its political interventions in the 1960s. Although he draws his conclusions primarily from statistical analysis of the Argentine senior officer corps, he does have the objectivity to acknowledge the limitations of his data, while suggesting that the figures are illustrative of the current overall situation.

Astiz concurs with Nun's thesis that the military is not a monolithic organization, but he is critical of Nun's emphasis on middle class attitudes as a rationale for military intervention. Rather, Astiz claims that military attitudes result from the intra-service socialization process. Not only do inter-service rivalries exist, as between tank battalions and air force units, but also intra-service rivalries thrive, as between the Colorado and Azul factions. And the political involvement of these groups do not necessarily conform to similar cleavages in civilian middle class groupings.

From his data Astiz concludes that the military officer corps is not as heavily middle class-oriented as Nun theorizes. In fact, a large minority of the senior officers have traditional, oligarchical, familial backgrounds. But more significantly, the educational process for the officer corps, which usually begins at age fifteen, remodels the aspirant into an institution-oriented individual. A concurrent withdrawal from the civilian community tends to reinforce institutional desires, while at the same time encouraging the individual to lose sight of the needs, wants, and opinions of the non-military community. As a result, "it would appear to be a mistake to associate the political actions and participation of the Argentine armed forces with a certain class or non-military interest group."³⁹ Thus, in contradiction to Nun, Astiz maintains that while different sectors and philosophies are represented in the military, their motivations are based principally upon internal, institutional considerations.

Astiz' emphasis on these internal considerations as the prime motivators for the military's most recent entrance into the Argentine political system is his principal contribution to recent research on the Latin American military. He perceives the military to be an organization in search of a mission worthy of its position within the socio-political system. The problem of "mission" is an added complexity to the Janowitz model of "designed" military intervention. Essentially, Astiz contends that the Argentine military recognizes that its traditional mission of military defense against foreign aggressors has little relevancy in today's nuclear world. Furthermore, participation in the internal security program is visualized as beneath the military's dignity.

Einaudi and Stepan have also contributed significantly to an understanding of this dilemma encountered by military establishments.⁴⁰ They identify the military, specifically in Peru and Brazil, as an institution which has begun to see itself threatened by the lack of development. This threat has directly resulted in a broadening of the military's institutional concerns to include all aspects of the development crisis.

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As the military increases its professionalization and sophistication, the more urgent becomes its requirement for a mission befitting its self-image as a professional institution. The Argentine military, therefore, settled upon the role of interpreter and guardian of the constitution. While this role of "guardian" is not unique to the present generation of Latin American militaries, the Argentine armed forces enlarged this role to include policy formulation in the areas of social, economic, and political development. The result was the military's total involvement as *the* government. As these attributes of institutional philosophy merge, the military approaches the stage of "designed" intervention as defined by Janowitz.

The significance of "mission" can be over-emphasized. At the same time the military institution is developing a mission, there are corporate self-interest peculiarities within the military which keep intervention within the realm of "reactive" militarism. Just as Needler outlines the necessity for a "swing man," a "reactive" swing event may be equally necessary to provide the impetus for a "designed" intervention. Within the realm of "designed" interveners have been the militaries of Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, which have viewed their civilian governments as failures. Instruction at the senior military schools has fostered the desire among military officers to become policy makers rather than mere king makers. But the "designed" interventions in each instance did not achieve fruition until triggered by a "reactive" swing event.

Finally, while concentrating solely upon the Argentine military, Astiz has provided a further perceptive insight into the overall Latin American situation. As a criticism which he could level specifically at Miguens, he forcefully presents the obvious, probably too obvious, concept that the Latin American militaries cannot be considered a single entity. He writes:

A coup . . . carried out by . . . Argentina or the Brazilian armed forces cannot be considered on an equal footing with apparently similar actions taken by the military establishments of countries such as Guatemala or Honduras. The idea that all Latin American armed forces are "free and equal," that they automatically protect the status quo which always favors the interest of the traditional upper class, represents a gross oversimplification. . . .⁴¹

The student of Latin America cannot possess a real understanding of political reality in the region unless he has a firm grasp of the meaning behind this "gross oversimplification." Such an understanding should have allowed Miguens the freedom to present his theory as a measurement for testing future coups rather than implying the conclusive nature of his hypothesis.

The case study approach is not the domain of political scientists alone. Although various historians have applied this technique to a historical time frame in Latin America, Robert Potash's⁴² comprehensive study of Argentina's crucial period in history from Hipólito Yrigoyen's second administration to the emergence of Juan Perón begins to bridge the gap between history and political science. He initially

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employs elements of Janowitz's apparatus, familiar to the political scientist, in identifying several significant factors affecting the military's involvement in Argentina's political system. He suggests that the Argentine military may be unique because of the role immigration played in developing Argentina's societal patterns. Thus the proportion of second generation Argentines among high ranking officers was far greater than the national average because a military career more than any other provided these sons of immigrants with "a secure identity as Argentines and elevated them socially above their origins."⁴³ By applying this genetic approach, he also identifies and stresses the significance of the Argentine military's highly structured verticality, which affects its decision making processes up to the present day. Only after Yrigoyen during his second administration began seriously tampering with the military's hierarchical structure did various factions within the military coalesce and begin conspiring against the president. His meddling in the institution's corporate self-interest and his apparent disregard for the chain of command was perceived by the military as disrupting the system and thus prompted intervention by the soldiers.

Rather than his brief application of Janowitz' analytical approach to Argentina's emerging modern military, implicit warnings to social scientists against an overemphasis on institutional patterns constitute Potash's significant contribution to current research on military involvement in Latin American political systems. He continually cautions researchers against developing distortions of political reality by concentrating solely on the military's institutional and socialization process. He decries the abstract depersonalization of the military which can occur primarily from an over-indulgence in statistical analysis of the institution as a whole to the exclusion of recognizing that each part, i.e., each individual, performs a function in determining institutional behavior. His stated goal is to humanize Argentina's military establishment, and from this he has concluded that the military officer is subjected to a variety of norms and loyalties including familial background, professional ambitions, personal friendships and experiences,⁴⁴ as well as the institutional socialization process. Each of these, to varying degrees, serves as a determinant of his institutional as well as personal actions.

Together with his aversion to inadvertent but still misleading attempts at depersonalizing the institution, Potash seems to fear that the trend in current research also beclouds the heterogeneity of the military. He stresses what Astiz touches upon: the military is composed of numerous factions and sub-factions. For Potash, Argentine history during the period from 1928 to 1945 is a composite of various factions momentarily coalescing into a single unit, usually to intervene in the political process, and then renewing their divisions.

The merger of various factions prior to military coups did not signify a temporary suspension of differences but rather a transitory singleness of purpose—elimination of the existing government leaders. At times very little else changed and military factions continued on their way toward the next leadership crisis. In 1943, for example, some military leaders were unwilling to associate themselves in another

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fraudulent election while others wanted to restructure the entire system along lines prescribed by General Francisco Franco in Spain. These incongruous forces united to oust the government of Ramón Castillo but were unable or unwilling to produce a leader capable of refining and developing any unity of purpose within the military or governing institution.

Potash fails to capitalize on this principal discovery of the inner workings of Argentina's military institution. His major strength and weakness are actually one in the same. In his attempt to counter-balance the behaviorists' and quantifiers' concentration on institutional patterns, he has overstressed the role of the individual within the institution to the exclusion of the role the institution itself performs. Furthermore, the individuals encountered throughout his study are leaders; the role of non-leaders is virtually ignored. Had he approached the subject with a still-broader perspective, he could have identified a serious constraint, which has operated since 1930 against the Argentine military's ability to govern effectively—the lack of a moderating force capable of molding the various military divisions into an efficient governing institution, a role Juan Velasco Alvarado has performed to perfection in Peru since 1968.

Richard Clinton and Luigi Einaudi have researched the Peruvian military, particularly in its role as the government since 1968.⁴⁵ Essentially, they have addressed the same question—Is the Peruvian military a revolutionary force?—but from completely different approaches. Clinton has studied the military as it functions in the political system but has made almost no attempt to dissect its motivational factors. Einaudi, on the other hand, has been much more concerned with the social organism itself and the reasons behind its move into the political realm as government policy maker. Their research and analysis is complementary and therefore useful in understanding the Peruvian situation.

In utilizing the functional approach, Clinton strives to refute Nun's interpretation that the military is status quo oriented because of its association with a non-revolutionary middle class. Clinton recognizes the existence of a "new orientation" within the military, as perceptively identified by Liisa North,⁴⁶ but considers historical conditions within the larger political system as being more influential in the developments leading to military intervention. These historical conditions included the long-standing antagonism between APRA and the military stemming from the 1933 massacre in Trujillo, fear of a Cuban-style revolution, and disillusionment with the slow pace of reform under the Belaúnde regime. These situational factors prompted the military to intervene and to implement its economic development doctrine, formulated at the CAEM. Clinton expresses clearly a Samuel Huntington-type bias and, similar to the earlier J. J. Johnson approach, views the military as an effective agent capable of generating development programs.

Important for a complete understanding of military intervention, Clinton notes the existence of certain corporate, self-interest considerations which prompted military intervention in addition to the above-mentioned historical conditions. Clinton

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contends that the 1968 coup may have been further instigated in an attempt to conceal disclosures by a congressional committee investigating a vast smuggling operation in which top-ranking officers from all branches of the military were implicated. Additionally, General Velasco Alvarado was approaching mandatory retirement age, which presumably played a considerable role in his entrance into the coup apparatus. Velasco's role as "swing man" requires further consideration.⁴⁷ These "reactive" swing events were essential in initiating the coup apparatus which was to culminate in Velasco's assumption of power.

Clinton fails, however, to see beyond the emphasis which the military has placed on nationalism. He fears that it has become an obsession and will detour economic development, eventually destroying the revolution. He cites various examples of the government's "economic naivete." Such measures as profit-sharing and joint-ownership are considered socially admirable but economically unfeasible in light of their presumably disastrous effects upon large-scale foreign investment. These criticisms can be condensed into a single contention that the revolution will wander aimlessly until it accepts the standard, United States private investment model of development. Certainly, his approach and his arguments are much more sophisticated than Bailey's, but essentially the same biases prevail.

There is little doubt that Clinton has great admiration for the Peruvian military, which he views as surpassing the Johnson model of an evolutionary modernizing force. On the other hand, he believes it is following the wrong path toward development, one which will ultimately lead to a dead end. This dilemma is reflected throughout his article. In criticizing the military's apparent emphasis on increasing the public sector, he states:

To shift the principal responsibility for investment and for the administration of a vast number of concerns to that sector is to invite delay, duplication of effort, and the use of political rather than economic criteria for decision-making. Which is by no means to say that unbridled private enterprise is the solution to Peru's economic problem. . . . Unquestionably, however, a state directed developmental effort that could incorporate these means along with all others available holds forth greater possibilities for success than one which dogmatically limits itself to certain ideologically acceptable means.⁴⁸

His consternation over Peru's xenophobic nationalism and at the same time his admiration for its revolutionary drive is illustrated by the following quotation:

Just as the founding fathers of Latin American independence erred with tragic consequences in imposing foreign models of government, however inspiring, on countries where conditions did not yet exist for putting them into practice, so Third-World intellectuals today compound the error by borrowing the most advanced social ideals of modern times and attempting to implant them fullblown in the austere environment of developing areas. Yet, and of this we in the so-called developed nations must constantly remind ourselves, how can they do otherwise? In most cases they sincerely believe that their analysis of their predicament is correct and that, if the prescriptions that flow therefrom are followed, they will be able to meet the challenges that confront them.⁴⁹

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While admiring the Peruvian military's revolutionary honesty, Clinton believes that nationalism upon which its ideology is founded has blurred the military's concept of reality.

Clinton also sounds a warning note to the United States, which has been too nearsighted in its policy towards Peru.⁵⁰ As a result of congressional pressure to protect United States economic interests, i.e., fishing rights off the coast of Peru and business pressure to recover losses sustained in the International Petroleum Company dispute, United States priorities have been misguided. The United States government's approach, particularly during the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies, lacked understanding of the Peruvian military's authoritarian model in a country where there is essentially no democratic tradition.

In contrast to Clinton's functional analysis of the military's role in the political spectrum, Luigi Einaudi attempts in his series of articles and his co-authored study with Stepan to determine the revolutionary aspects of the Peruvian military by utilizing an institutional analysis. Einaudi has indicated that his interpretations are based on extensive field research from which he has derived significant statistical verification for his conclusions. Since the appearance of his first summary in 1969, his readers have been anxiously awaiting the publication of his data. They have been forced to review his conclusions without knowing the type of data from which they were derived. But with or without data, this study of the Peruvian military is an extremely important addition to the literature, for his conclusions destroy some of the myths that have surrounded military intervention, and they also identify some of the institutional motivations prompting intervention.

His principal breakthrough refutes the concepts of Huntington and Johnson that the military will become increasingly apolitical in direct proportion to its degree of professionalism. Contrary to their model, the new military, as it becomes more professional, focuses on the nexus of internal security and national development, both of which are essentially political problems. The military's areas of institutional concern have therefore broadened to include intensely political aspects of public life. Similar to Astiz' identification in the Argentine situation, the Peruvian military's sense of mission has been expanded to include seemingly non-military concerns. In fact, the "designed" military interveners, motivated by institutional fears, view these concerns in a military context. These Peruvian military institutional fears were greatly expanded by the social crisis in which its society was seen during the early 1960s, and achieved their articulation at the CAEM. The social crisis led to guerrilla activity, which flourished between 1964 and 1966, and underscored the need for social change. Subsequently, when success in the military's counterinsurgency and civic action program had been achieved, the military's self-confidence, which had historically been lacking, became manifest, resulting in the military's desire to implement its economic development program formalized at CAEM.⁵¹ The historical conditions of which Clinton writes are conceptualized by Einaudi as consequences of broadening institutional fears.

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Though expressing a certain amount of agreement with the Nun thesis, Einaudi submits that the military in fact reacts to areas of institutional concern. The military does identify with the middle class, but it does not do its bidding. The Peruvian officer corps feels excluded from the coastal oligarchy because of its generally darker skin color and its lower-middle class origins, which it visualizes as less acceptable to Lima society. Likewise, it cannot identify with the masses because of its level of education and overall socialization process, from which the officer emerges with an aura of superiority. It, therefore, seeks a middle ground apart from other portions of society. Furthermore, as a result of their connections with all areas of the country, caused by the assimilation of the Indian into the enlisted ranks and the military's activities along the frontiers and in the hinterland, the officers believe that the military institution has a special advantage not available to the former ruling oligarchy.⁵² This process, also a function of the military's socialization process, confers upon the military man the right to interpret and implement the proper goals of development.

Another of Einaudi's significant contributions is to identify a changing style in military governments—a confirmation of Miguens' interpretation. Unlike Bailey, Einaudi recognizes the basic variances between the earlier military caudillo and the institutionalized format now employed in Peru. He has emphasized the importance that all aspects of the military education process have played in developing this new style of military government. "Improved military education also broadened officers' concerns and promoted a new interest in governmental affairs and a sense of technical and political leadership."⁵³ A positive correlation exists between military education and political activism. Certainly, this is a blow to the disciples of Huntington. The need for further military coups has been eliminated, since the military government has been institutionalized. The president, therefore, remains in power so long as he reflects the programs and desires of that institution and can effectively perform his role as the institution's moderator. This structure, as Einaudi stresses, assures "continuing vitality and constant renewal" for the military institution.

Both Clinton and Einaudi have found the Peruvian military a revolutionary force, and actually their understanding of the reasons for this military intervention are not out-of-phase with each other. What is incongruous, however, is their methodology and their terminology. As a result of his genetic approach, Einaudi has been able to identify and express the situation much more succinctly: The military has come to identify development as an integral part of its mission to defend the country. Without this combination, the social crisis would pose a serious threat to the military institution. The professionalized military institution is prepared to accept the role of "designed" intervention as prescribed by Janowitz. Thus Clinton and Einaudi have presented variations on one model of the "new" military which they identify as revolutionary.

A second model of the "new" military, relating specifically to the Brazilian situation, has been proposed by Alfred Stepan.⁵⁴ Expanding his methodology beyond that employed by Astiz, who ceases his examination after drawing certain behavioral

inferences from the intra-service socialization process, Stepan concludes that while such socialization factors are relevant they are not determinant. While the motivational aspects of military intervention are directly related to institutional features or situational considerations, the military reacts because of its role as a subsystem within the overall political system. By extending Miguen's suggested approach beyond a study of the armed forces and the actor therein, he has determined that the Nun thesis is not applicable to the present situation in Brazil. Likewise, he concurs with Einaudi that broadened institutional fears initiate a greater political response from the military as it becomes aware of these threats via the educational process. By initially identifying the genetic variables within the military institution, Stepan's observations on the effects that the functional influences have had on the actions or reactions of the military institution are much more revealing than Astiz'.

Stepan has confirmed the importance that increased professionalization has played in politicizing the military officer. In conjunction with the Einaudi study on Peru, this greatly deflates the Huntington myth about the apolitical nature of the professional military, particularly as it has been applied to Latin American developing nations by Johnson and others. Einaudi and Stepan's comparative analysis of Peru and Brazil indicate that the sense of mission, expanded to include development along with security, has followed similar paths in the two countries. The approach has not been the same, however, primarily because of the divergent influences which different power contenders, such as the United States, have had on the military institution. Thus the Peruvian military has gravitated toward the development side of the schema while Brazil's military was more concerned, although not exclusively, during its first years in power with security considerations.⁵⁵ Brazilian military theorists viewed a secure atmosphere as a prerequisite for economic development, while the Peruvians believed that the lack of socio-economic development was the root cause of security problems. If the former could be generated, the latter would automatically be eliminated. Thus the two militaries approached their roles as *the* government from opposite poles.

The influence of the educational process which has broadened the institutional designs of the military establishment has resulted in the termination of the military role as the moderator for feuding civilian political subsystems. The military no longer performs the role of temporary warden of the state; its role now is as the director. In concentrating upon the fundamental threats to the institution prompting this role change, Stepan does not dismiss corporate self-interest factors which motivated the military to intervene in Brazil in 1964. Though more broadly based, they were similar to those described by Clinton in his study of Peru. Although the military and civilian *técnicos* were becoming increasingly disenchanted with the economic failures of the João Goulart regime, economics did not precipitate the actual coup. Rather, the military establishment feared that Goulart's politically-oriented general officer promotions were undermining military hierarchy, and it visualized the growing politicization of the enlisted ranks as a threat to military discipline. When

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Goulart failed to support punishment for enlisted men involved in a naval mutiny during March 1964, this threat to the system of military discipline galvanized the instigators of the coup into action. This specific threat to the military institution served the function of a "reactive" military swing event culminating in a "designed" intervention by the Brazilian military.

In studying the interaction of the military institution with other areas of the political system, Stepan has joined Potash in destroying the myth that the military is an organizational giant because of its homogeneity in comparison with other political subsystems. In fact, the military is as factionalized as any other subsystem. The Brazilian military's overt unity at the time of the 1964 coup is attributed to a momentary, low-level agreement based on anti-communism, anti-corruption, and a desire for a halt to economic decline. Stepan writes:

The momentary unity of the army during their overthrow of President Goulart in 1964 was not a result of permanent ideological unity but rather of their interaction with the political system in a time of crisis.⁵⁶

Stepan has determined that this factionalization can be traced to socialization differences among military officers.⁵⁷ These differences have been most evident between members of the Castelo Branco government and the two subsequent governments of Arturo da Costa e Silva and Emilio Garrastazú Médici, and are specifically related to the career experience of the two sets of officers. The conclusion can be inferred that within any military institution in a developing situation factions based on the backgrounds of the adherents within the institution will evolve in patterns similar to those of any other political subsystem. This political diversity within the Brazilian military forced it in 1969 to choose Médici as a compromise candidate so as to preserve a minimum of unity. In many respects he serves the same role of moderator within the institution as does Velasco in Peru. With no one capable of fulfilling such a function to counteract and control inherent factionalism, the military institution, as in Argentina, is incapable of implementing its development goals or governing effectively.

Stepan concurs with the conclusion of José Nun that the military is not a homogeneous organization but disagrees in much the same manner as Einaudi that such heterogeneity necessarily results in actions reflecting middle class values. In contrast to Nun's contention that the military acts as a *class* elite. Stepan suggests that its actions reflect the military's status as a *situational* elite. He concludes:

The power and prestige of Latin American officers derive from their membership in an institution with power. When such an institutional elite feels that middle- and upper-class life styles and political practices impede development by contributing to internal disruption or guerrilla activity which could threaten military power, it is very likely that in their own self-interest the military could take aggressive action against those aspects of middle- and upper-class life which threatened their institutional position.⁵⁸

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While the Nun thesis has correctly identified the heterogeneity of the military institution, it has misinterpreted the motivational forces which have initiated military intervention.

The combined study by Einaudi and Stepan of the Peruvian and Brazilian military institutions focuses on the deviations in the motivations of the two institutions. By utilizing similar formats Einaudi and Stepan have identified the vast similarities between the two—similarities which Miguens cites in his study. Yet at the same time the reasons for the divergent paths followed by each military become clearly related to the situational factors affecting the institutions. This approach has placed these two researchers beyond the boundary confining the other social scientists under review here. From their comparative approach the insight proposed by Astiz concerning the “gross oversimplification” of the Latin American militaries as a single entity is verified by Einaudi and Stepan. The military institutions of Brazil and Peru, while both following the path of “designed” intervention, cannot be placed within the same model. Even though there are great similarities, the emphases of the two military governments are upon different aspects of and approaches to the development problem.

It is not the concern of this review essay to evaluate morally the effects of “designed” military intervention on the development models of Latin America; that has occurred too often in the past. It is sufficient to submit that a significant minority of Latin American militaries has begun to experiment with development schemata which they are now implementing. The “designed” militarists have not forgotten their own corporate self-interest desires (but what political interest group has?), nor are they following the traditional democratic models, but the more authoritarian approaches to which they ascribe may be viable alternatives for their countries in the 1970s. In any event it would be prudent for the North American social scientist, as well as United States policy and lawmakers, to at least acknowledge these possibilities. As Clinton hopefully concludes about Peru,

. . . the Peruvian military have established their right to be looked at apart from their former image and that of the Latin American military in general. Indeed, they are a military organization, with all the limitations that entails. Indeed, they will take care of their own needs in more than ample measure. And, indeed, they may commit injustices as stark as those they seek to abolish. But, withal, they have struck out in a new direction, the trajectory of which holds forth more promise for the Peruvian masses than has that of any former government of that ancient land, at least since the time of the Incas.⁵⁹

These military institutions within the “designed” militarism model have lost confidence in the civilian political subsystems’ abilities to manage development. Because of the professionalization process they have acquired the self-confidence they once lacked and now desire the same opportunity to make mistakes which their civilian counterparts have enjoyed in the past.

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In this review of the literature on the military's role in the political system, the social scientists have mainly approached the problem from two polar positions. The military has been investigated from either the standpoint of its functional position within the political system or from the genetic approach which identifies the intra-institutional socialization process as the prime motivator for the political actions of the institution. The Einaudi and Stepan studies, however, attempt successfully to combine these two approaches and therefore have recognized the enlargement of the military's institutional aspirations to encompass development goals. Miguens has also acknowledged this consequence but failed because of his reliance on the socialization process to identify the reasons behind this changing situation. It remains for the reader to synthesize the varying results into an overall conclusion utilizing the significant data of the functional analysis as well as the motivational factors derived from the genetic approach.

This author stresses on the basis of this review the requirement that the North American social scientist should escape from his more traditional biases. Understanding must be reached that Latin America should be allowed to follow its own path to, and models of, development, even if those models do not result in a western-style democracy. Our prejudices in the past have clouded our thinking and have fostered a dysfunctional approach to the study of the military's role in the political system. Distinctive developmental characteristics have been too frequently obscured by our own societal predilections.

Astiz' country study effectively focuses on the generalizations that need to be identified. The social scientist is inviting inaccuracy if he attempts to consider Latin America as a single entity. A similar problem arises if he views the military as a monolithic structure. In fact, the Latin American countries and the military apparatus within each state are at different relative stages in time and space. While some militaries are approaching a sophisticated degree of professionalism, the majority remain "reactive." When this concept is not clearly understood, broad generalizations about socio-economic development, for example, and its correlation to military intervention can be postulated with no apparent acknowledgment of the vast variations in the meanings of development and military intervention to Brazil, for example, as compared to Guatemala.

Greater comprehension of the military's role in the political spectrum may be gained if Miguens' approach is taken as a starting point. The military can be more accurately understood if it is initially viewed in isolation so as to discover its institutional motivations as well as the effects of the intra-institutional socialization process upon its role as a political subsystem. It is not enough, however, to terminate the study at that point, for then the researcher must place the military back into the overall political structure, as has been accomplished by Stepan's study of the Brazilian military, in order to determine the significance of the institutional actions upon society and the role of society in motivating the institution to act. Only then should the social scientist be satisfied with his research.

NOTES

1. See Charles W. Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America*, Ch. 4 (Princeton, 1967), for a model of political stability and the military's role from within the political system. Also, Elizabeth H. Hyman, "Soldiers in Politics: New Insights on Latin American Armed Forces," *Political Science Quarterly*, 87:3 (1972), questions the use of the term and suggests that the military is one of several "non-party" forces operating from within the system.
2. Lyle N. McAlister, "The Military," In: *Continuity and Change in Latin America*, J. J. Johnson, ed., 155 (Stanford, 1964).
3. Lyle N. McAlister, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America," *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, 13:3:348 (1960). José E. Miguens, "The New Latin American Military Coup," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 6:1:4-5 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1970-71), paraphrases McAlister's comments in his critique of the evaluative approach to the study of military intervention.
4. Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, (Glencoe, Ill., 1951).
5. Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America," *European Journal of Sociology*, 2 (1961).
6. Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," *World Politics*, 19 (1967). This article will be reviewed later in the present essay.
7. Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago, 1964). Janowitz did not include Latin American militaries in his original analysis because he did not believe they were concerned with political development and system change as were the African militaries. In light of present developments, specifically in Brazil, his feelings have changed. See Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred C. Stepan, III, *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil*, 125f (The RAND Corporation, R-586-DOS, Santa Monica, Calif., 1971).
8. Lyle N. McAlister, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review*, 2:1 (Fall, 1966).
9. Charles D. Corbett, *The Latin American Military as a Socio-Political Force: Case Studies of Bolivia and Argentina*, Part 1 (Miami, 1972), stresses the distortions which have been caused by the value judgments and inherent biases of various authors.
10. Edwin Liewuven's model can be found in several of his studies: *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (N.Y., 1960, rev. ed. 1961); *Generals vs. Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America* (N.Y., 1964); while a more recent restatement of his thesis appears in *The Latin American Military* (A study for the Sub-committee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., 1967).
11. José Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle-Class Military Coup," In: *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?*, James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds. (Greenwich, Conn., 1968). This article first appeared in 1965 and was discussed in McAlister's LARR article (1966: 15-16), but it is the most perceptive neo-Marxist interpretation in addition to being my model of the functional approach. Therefore, it is included in this study of the current literature. In addition, Nun has subsequently written *Latin America: The Hegemonic Crisis and the Military Coup* (Berkeley, 1969), which also summarizes the North American models of Latin American military interventions.
12. Miguens (1970-71).
13. John J. Johnson's model of the modern military in Latin America is defined in *The Military and Society* (Stanford, 1964).

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14. Nun (1968), 153.
15. Nun (1968), 176.
16. Luigi R. Einaudi has written three articles for the RAND Corporation on the post-1968 Peruvian military: "The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis," RM-6048-RC (Santa Monica, 1969); "Revolution From Within? Military Rule in Peru Since 1968," P-4676 (Santa Monica, 1971); and in co-authorship with Alfred C. Stepan, III, *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil*, R-586-DOS (Santa Monica, 1971).
17. Einaudi and Stepan (1971), 47.
18. Miguens (1970–71); Carlos A. Astiz, "The Argentine Armed Forces: Their Role and Political Involvement," *Western Political Quarterly*, 22:4 (1969). Corbett (1972, Part 1), also proposes that young officers' frequent isolated tours, where the only society is totally dependent upon the military, as well as the years of intense study in the progression of military schools, account for the officers' adherence to institutional considerations and allegiances.
19. Astiz (1969), 873.
20. Richard L. Clinton, "The Modernizing Military: The Case of Peru," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 24:4:51 (1971).
21. Miguens (1970–71), 4, 8–11.
22. Robert E. Dowse, "The Military and Political Development," In: *Politics and Change in Developing Countries*, Colin Leys, ed, 227–232 (Cambridge, Eng., 1969).
23. Astiz (1969), 865.
24. Einaudi (1969), 11–14.
25. Janowitz (1964). For a brief discussion of Seton-Watson's schema see John H. Kautsky, "The Military in Underdeveloped Countries," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 12:4 (1964).
26. Miguens (1970–71), 12.
27. These articles are: Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (1966); Putnam (1967) (see note 6); and Norman A. Bailey, "The Role of Military Forces in Latin America," *Military Review*, 51:2 (1971). I include Bailey's article, even though it is not well known, primarily because of its approach, which I believe too many scholars have adopted, and because of the audience for which he is writing.
28. Putnam (1967), 90.
29. McAlister (1966), 31.
30. Astiz (1969), 866.
31. For a similar situation, see Robert A. Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928–1945*, 3–5, 51–52, 96, 117–25, 170–74, 284 (Stanford, 1969). Potash discusses at length the influence of the German military mission on Argentina's military institution. But he questions its impact on and correlation to the military's political concepts, since in comparison to the Chilean military, on which "German military influence was much stronger than in Argentina" (284), political involvement by the Argentine military was much greater than that demonstrated by the Chilean military. Furthermore, that involvement lasted long after the German military influence ceased. Numerous other social scientists, such as Hyman (1972), discuss the effects of other foreign militaries' influence. She casts doubt, for example, on French military influence when looking at the differing political

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- courses of Brazil and Peru (407f). The argument is not one-sided, however, for the United States is convinced that by spending several million dollars of military assistance funds each year to bring Latin American military officers to the United States, they will return to their countries imbued with the concepts of democracy.
32. Dowse (1969), 221.
 33. Needler (1966), 618. Needler has written a more recent article on the subject of military intervention, entitled "The Latin American Military: Predatory Reactionaries or Modernizing Patriots?", *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, 11:2 (1969). The article, however, is merely a re-statement of his previous position that "military intervention contributes to the retardation of the processes of political development," which he insists upon defining in terms of mass participation.
 34. Stepan (1971), 92–102.
 35. The ten "dictatorships" include: Chile; Cuba; Haiti; Nicaragua, where the Somoza family dominates; Panama; Ecuador; Peru; Brazil; Bolivia (President Hugo Banzer has announced that Bolivia will hold a presidential election in 1974; however, it has already been postponed once); Paraguay. This listing is somewhat arbitrary, needless to say, but I suspect that Needler might concur with it. I am being kind to many of the other Central American and Caribbean states where a strong-man or group dominates the political system, and Uruguay, where the military continues to expand its new identity as the dominant political force.
 36. These two quotes form the conclusion of Bailey's (1971), 72 analysis. Underline is mine.
 37. See Anderson (1967), Ch. 4, for his model of political stability which is defined in terms of relationships between power contenders and their power capabilities. Hyman (1972), 410–11, discusses in some detail the military's role as a pressure group in a political system. She is critical of the term "pressure group" because it fails to convey the true power of the military institution, which she considers to be concerned with the centers of power. It therefore is more of an arbiter over the government—an attribute civilian pressure groups cannot hope to achieve. Brady Tyson, in a recent addition to the literature, "The Emerging Role of the Military as National Modernizers and Managers in Latin America: The Case of Brazil and Peru," In: *Latin American Prospects for the 1970s: What Kinds of Revolutions?*, David H. Pollock and Arch R. M. Ritter, eds., 125–6 (N. Y., 1973), identifies the military's ability to dominate and its monopoly on the tools of violence.
 38. Astiz (1969). In addition, he has recently published a study of the Peruvian military, "The Military Establishment as a Political Elite: The Peruvian Case," Pollock and Ritter, eds. (1973).
 39. Astiz (1969), 872.
 40. Einaudi and Stepan (1971), 68–70. They acknowledge that in Peru and Brazil the military perceives of "Defense and Development" as components of national security. The difference between Peru and Brazil lies in where the emphasis has been placed.
 41. Astiz (1969), 862.
 42. Potash (1969). Other efforts utilizing a similar approach to define military involvement in political processes during a previous era include: José Ferrer, "The Armed Forces in Argentine Politics to 1930" (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1966); June E. Hahner, "Brazilian Civil-Military Relations, 1889–1898" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1966); R. L. Millett, "The History of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 1925–1965" (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1966); and Winfield J. Burggraaff, *The Venezuelan Armed Forces: 1935–1959* (Columbia, Mo., 1972).

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43. Potash (1969), 22.
44. Potash (1969), 200, 279, 281–82, hypothesizes that the course of history might have been significantly altered in October 1945, if General Eduardo Avalos, Acting Interior and War Minister, had ordered troops into Buenos Aires to quell pro-Perón labor unrest and demonstrations which ultimately propelled Perón to the Casa Rosada, but Avalos never issued the order. He was determined to avoid a confrontation and violence. He may have been motivated by a deep sense of guilt stemming from the 1943 golpe when his decision to enter the grounds of the neutral Naval Mechanics' School resulted in an altercation and the only loss of life (70 killed) in the entire affair.
45. Clinton (1971). For a listing of Einaudi's article under review see note 16. To get an insider's viewpoint I recommend Victor Villanueva, *El CAEM: La revolución de la Fuerza Armada* (Lima, 1972), and *Nueva mentalid militar en el Perú?* (Lima, 1969). Although he is a retired army officer, not a trained social scientist, Villanueva's books provide a good insight into the Peruvian military's role-expansion during the last ten years.
46. Liisa North, *Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile and Peru*, (Berkeley, 1966). This brief, but excellent, study was one of the early attempts to identify institutional motivators, including the important role played by CAEM in Peru.
47. For an interesting insight into the role of Velasco in the 1968 coup, see Richard N. Goodwin, "Letter From Peru," *The New Yorker*, 45:13 (1969). This perceptive article also suggests that the IPC controversy was utilized by the military as a rationale for intervening.
48. Clinton (1971), 58.
49. Clinton (1971), 62.
50. Potash (1969), 169–73 and 220–23, addresses the same dilemma. He discusses United States policy toward Argentina during World War II when Washington refused to sell arms to that nation, hoping to force the Argentines to accept the United States position and join the war against Germany. Recognition of his policy's complete failure was lost on our policy makers and lawmakers in the 1960s. They enacted numerous pieces of paternalistic legislation such as the Conte-Long Amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act, to force the Latin American nations "to do what is best for themselves." These misguided North American perceptions and consequent interventions have had in nearly every case a disruptive influence on bilateral and regional relations. The most recent instance in which United States policy backfired was Peru's purchase of Soviet armor in 1973.
51. Astiz (1973) disagrees with the thrust of Einaudi's conclusion and suggests that the Peruvian military came to power for traditional reasons and only now after being in power for five years may their primary concern be with development.
52. Goodwin (1969), 68–72, deals extensively with the military's perception of its right to speak for the nation as a whole.
53. Einaudi and Stepan (1971), 59; Charles D. Corbett, "Politics and Professionalism: The South American Military," *Orbis*, 16:4:932–6 (1973), traces the educational progression of the Latin American military officer and its effects on his institutional pattern in this companion article to his 1972 book (see note 9).
54. Stepan (1971).
55. Thomas G. Sanders, "Development and Security are Linked by a Relationship of Mutual Causality," American Universities Field Staff, *East Coast South America Series*, 15 (1971), draws a similar conclusion: If change is recognized as a fundamental ingredient, development tends to absorb security, but if the process of change is neglected, then security may be overemphasized (3). Brazil has not disregarded *economic* development—quite the contrary, its economic growth rate is unmatched over the past few years—but it has not recog-

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nized the need for change, i.e., *socio-economic* development, which is a principal tenet of Peru's revolution. Thus Brazilian theorists apparently believe that improvement in the quality of life will be a natural fallout from economic development. But without a change in direction toward improving all Brazilians' living conditions, concurrent with economic improvement, security must be continually emphasized in order to preserve the military's approach toward development.

56. Stepan (1971), 45.

57. Corbett (1973), 939–41, identifies two different schools of thought: the "liberal-internationalist" is committed to democratic forms but views mobilization politics as detrimental; it does not object to aspects of statism but believes that ultimately private enterprise and foreign investment remain the driving force of the economy. On the other hand, the "authoritarian nationalists" believe that sweeping structural revisions of socio-economic patterns are required. The enemy is not internal subversion as is the case with the "liberal-internationalist" but rather economic imperialism. Corbett's models of the new military are too encompassing. His lumping of various attributes under one category may be too arbitrary. In actuality, different factions within the institution may be oriented around only a portion of one of his models or could cross the line between the two models.

58. Stepan (1971), 269.

59. Clinton (1971), 66.