

its coverage of the literature, and so balanced in its assessment of the quantitative data. Nevertheless, a few questions can be raised concerning the treatment of some of the property concepts. Although it seems entirely appropriate for the book to focus on income rights and control rights, what is lacking is sufficient emphasis on the interconnections between these two categories of rights. Presumably, control rights are sought by individuals because such rights can serve to increase both their pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards. Nonpecuniary rewards, however, include certain very elusive "goods," such as power and prestige, as well as more obvious elements of real income. Thus any attempt to determine, for example, the true distribution of real income in a country is subject to very serious measurement difficulties; and, certainly, conventional statistical data can be misleading. Moreover, it seems clear that the success a manager, or bureaucrat, may have in attenuating the ownership rights of other parties will depend, *inter alia*, on his willingness to assume risk and on the costs to the owners of detecting, policing, and enforcing desired patterns of behavior by the manager. In general, then, when analyzing an economic system, a case can be made for the adoption of a more explicitly defined optimization model based on the preferences and available opportunities of the individuals making decisions.

The interrelations between property rights, transactions costs, incentives, and economic behavior require explanation. But if the theory of property must account for the emergence and development of property rights as well as for the impact of rights structures on behavior, the task of model building becomes very difficult indeed. One might ask whether, initially, a less ambitious model concentrating on *impact* phenomena would not be preferable. By opting for a loose and highly general analytical scheme, Pryor is able to explore a wide range of economic situations. Yet the very flexibility of the approach suggests that in some cases the facts adduced by the empirical investigations may be open to different interpretations than those given.

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SOVETSKAIA NAUKA V GODY PERVOI PIATILETKI: OSNOVNYE
NAPRAVLENIIA GOSUDARSTVENNOGO RUKOVODSTVA NAU-
KOI. By *V. D. Esakov*. Moscow: "Nauka," 1971. 271 pp. 1.07 rubles.

In the last ten years, interest among Soviet scholars in the history of scientific institutions has grown rapidly. They have published a series of documentary collections from Soviet archives and also a number of historical discussions of the legal, economic, and political aspects of Soviet research organizations. The "science of science," or *naukovedenie*, originally promoted by American and British scholars such as J. D. Bernal and Derek Price, has now gained greater impetus in the Soviet Union than in any other country. The Institute of the History of Science and Technology in Moscow and its Leningrad branch have created special sections promoting *naukovedenie*. There are also important centers in Kiev and Novosibirsk. At the recent history of science congresses in Moscow and Tokyo, Soviet scholars predominated at the sessions on science policy and the history of scientific institutions. The discussion at Moscow between Derek Price and S. R. Mikulinsky attracted approximately one thousand persons, a staggering statistic in view of the traditional smallness of the history of science profession and its congresses.

V. D. Esakov's story of Soviet science during the First Five-Year Plan is a valuable contribution to this growing literature despite several serious shortcomings. Esakov has concentrated his attention on three aspects of science in the period 1928–32: the organization of research for industries, the reconstruction of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and the establishment and expansion of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences. The discussion of the origins of industrial research is particularly useful, since very little has previously been published on this subject. Esakov has used archival sources in preparing his account, but he does not claim to have presented a definitive treatment.

From the standpoint of offering an enlightened interpretation, Esakov's work unfortunately is a serious step backward from the work in the late fifties and early sixties of Soviet scholars such as G. I. Fedkin, who asserted that in the early industrialization period grave "violations of socialist legality" occurred, including the repression of innocent scholars. Fedkin hoped to achieve a balance between a record of achievement and Stalinist repression; Esakov, on the contrary, portrays the record of governmental and party actions as being uniformly correct, and he alters the facts to meet political requirements. Perhaps the most flagrant example of factual distortion is his description of the elections to the Academy of Sciences in 1928 and 1929. Esakov does not mention the name of Bukharin, even though Bukharin received the largest number of nominations and was elected to full membership on January 12, 1929. Esakov tells us that forty-two candidates were presented for election that day (which is correct) and then lists forty-one names, omitting only Bukharin. All one has to do to see that an error exists is to count the names. And the fact that the mistake is no accident is shown by Esakov's refusal to mention Bukharin in the entire book, even though Bukharin was one of the most important figures in the events he describes.

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BURZHUAZNAIA FILOSOFIIA SShA XX VEKA. By *A. S. Bogomolov*.
Moscow: "Mysl'," 1974. 343 pp. 1.41 rubles.

Unlike many earlier Soviet studies of American thought, this is an informed account of the last hundred years of American philosophy. The author knows the important figures of American philosophy, past and present; he has gone to many of the original works he discusses; he understands what he has read; and he attains a creditable degree of objectivity in detailing the philosophical positions he has chosen to present.

There is, of course, ample opportunity to disagree with many of Bogomolov's interpretations and evaluations, and to chide him for omitting mention of some contemporary philosophers such as Brand Blanshard and Wilfrid Sellars. This work will neither replace nor supplement any of the standard histories of American philosophy, most of which he notes, quotes, and sometimes comments on. Nor will anyone familiar with the positions presented gain new insights into the philosophies summarized and discussed. Nonetheless, by carefully studying one of the thirty-three thousand copies of the book (an unusually large printing for such a work), a Soviet reader can learn something of the theories of knowledge, the logic, and the ontology of Royce, Peirce, James, and Dewey, who are treated and quoted at some length; he can find out who Santayana, Lovejoy, R. W. Sellars, and the