

beginning of the war on June 22, 1941, to her departure from the city in February 1942 and her odyssey as a refugee in wartime Soviet Russia until the capture of Piatigorsk, the town in the Caucasus where she eventually took refuge, by the Germans on August 9, 1942.

Essentially it is a diary of hunger and death as they affected a Leningrad family, its friends, and neighbors, and of their personal struggle to survive. The general picture of the city and the actions of its administrators, workers, and defenders have to be deduced by the reader from these accounts of personal experiences. Despite an afterword by the translator, who attempts to place the story in its broader setting of the war, the lack of explanatory footnotes will make it difficult for the American reader to understand the significance of various events mentioned in the book or the social-administrative system within which Mrs. Skrjabina and her family fought their battle for survival.

LEON GOURE
University of Miami

SAKHALIN: A HISTORY. By *John J. Stephan*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. xiv, 240 pp. \$12.00.

John J. Stephan's account of Japanese and Russian involvement in the Sakhalin region reaches us at a most opportune time. For the past quarter of a century, unresolved territorial issues separating Japan and the USSR have prevented the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two former belligerents. However, at this writing, it is reported that the two governments have finally agreed to seek a full normalization of their relations. The southern portion of the island of Sakhalin was once held by the Japanese but was integrated into the USSR after Japan's defeat in World War II. So far, the Japanese government has been reluctant to give legal recognition to this situation. As negotiations for a peace treaty get under way, the boundary question will inevitably form the principal obstacle to their success.

Until the appearance of Stephan's book, studies of Sakhalin tended to be one-sided analyses based on historical facts selected to buttress either the Soviet or the Japanese territorial claims. Such a manifestation of nationalist bias is not surprising considering that Sakhalin has been the object of Russo-Japanese rivalry for three centuries. Moreover, the few Russian or Japanese scholars having a command of both languages were unable to study the wealth of materials available in both countries. Stephan, who knows both Russian and Japanese, was fortunate to be allowed to do his historical research in Soviet as well as Japanese collections. As a result, his is the first comprehensive account of the external and internal development of the strategic and resource-rich island.

This study is an impressive accomplishment of historical scholarship. The author has conscientiously examined the available evidence in the libraries and archival collections of Japan, the USSR, and Western Europe. He has successfully digested these voluminous materials, and presents a concise, coherent, lucid, and impartial account of Russian and Japanese policies and activities in an important part of the Far East. Though Stephan provides a wealth of detail, the reader is never in danger of losing the thread of the interesting story.

The opening chapter introduces us to the geographic setting and early history of the island. The author then discusses the little-known but important role of China

in the area before the coming of the Japanese and the Russians (implicitly suggesting that here, too, China may have some claim to territory now held by the USSR). The following six chapters tell the story of Russo-Japanese rivalry since the seventeenth century, placing emphasis on the events of the last hundred years. A final chapter provides a picture of the contemporary political, social, and economic organization of life on Sakhalin under Soviet rule. This information is particularly valuable, because the island has been virtually closed to foreign visitors (including the author) ever since the Soviet conquest in World War II. Meaty footnotes, primarily of interest to the specialist, testify to the wide range of documentation. Excerpts from key diplomatic documents, a convenient glossary of Russian and Japanese place names, and a rich bibliography (mainly of Russian and Japanese sources) round out this valuable study. No doubt it will remain the standard work on the subject for many years.

PAUL F. LANGER
The Rand Corporation

THE RIVALS: AMERICA AND RUSSIA SINCE WORLD WAR II. By Adam B. Ulam. New York: Viking Press, 1971. vii, 405 pp. \$10.95.

Adam Ulam has become a prolific and important writer on Soviet affairs. In this volume he elaborates an approach voiced earlier in his *Expansion and Coexistence*, with greater stress on the American side. It is a personal, "old-fashioned" narrative—always informed, often clever, sometimes elegant—somewhat condescending, barely tolerant of human foibles. It is much like a series of lectures to Harvard undergraduates (even some of the jokes are repeated). It will provoke both approval and annoyance, which is a good test of a fine book.

Professor Ulam's comments on Soviet policy are generally wise and insightful. Still, one wishes for a more systematic discussion of its underlying dynamics. He finds that "the sheer inertia of the past policies pushes the Soviet Union on the road to expansion [where?], though by now there is neither rhyme nor reason to this expansion" (p. 381). Soviet feelers and offers have often not been mere propaganda, though the United States has frequently failed to test Soviet intentions. The Soviet leaders considered the increase in their strategic capabilities (e.g., in the mid-1950s) as "justified by *defensive* considerations" (p. 214). He astutely remarks: "Can the Soviet system afford . . . free intercourse with the West, real collaboration in world affairs? This question is still being asked in the Kremlin today" (p. 98). But he fails to elaborate the differential impact of various American policies and postures on the several elements in the Soviet elite: "What is then prudent to hope for from the U.S.S.R. in the near future is that her rulers will become more aware of the risks of their policy of *pretending* to try to win the world for Communism, of aggravating international tension in various areas not because it promises to bring them solid benefits but because it causes discomfiture and trouble to the United States" (p. 391).

Ulam is best in laying bare the American misjudgment of Soviet intentions and capabilities. In a nice paradox he argues that possession of the atomic bomb "had in fact a debilitating effect on American foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia" (p. 77); he finds it "astounding" that the United States did not seek to "exploit politically" its monopoly of the atomic bomb (p. 82). America's "preoccupation with communism" led to an insensitivity to other interests, especially with regard to