

brief notes, and an excellent "Selected Bibliography." The work of a master, this is a book from which both scholar and beginning student can profit.

There are nonetheless certain problems which should be mentioned. The limitation of the period covered means that the study only partly fills the existing need. Merely to extend the coverage to about 1800, for example, would bring in the problem of decline, on which the author has already written incisively, and take the account to the point at which responsibility for carrying on could be turned over to the modernists. The publisher's restriction of the text to two hundred pages obviously stands in the way of such extension and does a great deal to impoverish the work. Though the division of the text into chronological and topical sections is laudable in a field usually treated solely as *histoire bataille*, the enforced brevity of part 1 makes the account hard to assimilate. The same problem is observable to a degree in the topical sections, where it tends to be compounded by the extremely limited development of scholarship in certain areas, especially intellectual history.

At least as disturbing are lapses by the editors or translators. Such practices as not capitalizing the adjective Near Eastern and italicizing terms that are listed in the glossary only when they first appear in the text are eccentric at best. Errors in grammar and typography are also too frequent. For example, "tasr" appears instead of "tsar" twice on pages 39–40; "where else we go?" ("can" is omitted) on page 91; "he drunk [*sic*] wine" (p. 99); "a sancak bey's annual income was equalled from [*sic*] four to twelve thousand" (p. 115).

This is a book that will become a standard reference wherever Ottoman history is studied or taught. It is to be hoped that it will be expanded and reissued in a more carefully edited and moderately priced paperback edition as soon as possible.

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FROM PARIS TO SÈVRES: THE PARTITION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919–1920. By *Paul C. Helmreich*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974. xiii, 376 pp. \$15.00.

Although aspects of the negotiation of the Treaty of Sèvres have been examined in recent scholarly works, until now there has been no systematic study of the whole. Professor Helmreich has done it, using the voluminous published sources and the recently opened British Foreign Office and Cabinet papers, as well as the private papers of Lloyd George, House, Sonnino, and others. His work is not definitive, since French and Italian archives ought to furnish some significant additions when they are freely available, but from the British side it may be nearly so.

Helmreich covers the whole range of problems included in the treaty with the Ottoman Empire: Syria and Palestine, Mosul, Armenia, Kurdistan, Constantinople and the Straits, the Greek expansion into Thrace and Smyrna, the rump Turkish state, Italian spheres of influence, and oil (of minor importance then). No startling revelations appear, but much new detail is presented, along with a competent analysis of the Anglo-French negotiations that were at the heart of the whole treaty-making process. The roles of the United States and Italy, although important at times, were distinctly secondary.

The principal merit of the book is its emphasis on the Anglo-French negotiation in the fall and winter of 1919 and through the London conference of February

to April 1920. This was when the treaty was really hammered out. More of the book concerns this period than the spring of 1919, dramatic though that was because of Wilson's presence and the arguments among the Big Three or Four. The San Remo conference is correctly described as mostly a rubber stamp.

Helmreich is usually easy to read. It is unfortunate that the opening page gives an outlandish spelling of Kut-al-Amara, and that the neobarbarisms of "mitigate" for "militate" and "flaunt" for "flout" have been allowed to creep into a scholarly work.

Two of the author's judgments may be questioned. He believes that the negotiations occasionally were influenced by a correct assessment of the growing Turkish nationalist movement; the Sèvres terms make this seem debatable. He also believes that Curzon's idea of splitting Constantinople from the rest of Turkey would have saved much later anguish; yet it is hard to conceive of a viable Constantinopolitan state of any sort, or even of a durable consensus among great and small powers on its future. But generally Helmreich is judicious in his observations and conclusions. He shows clearly how great-power and imperialist interests produced an unenforceable peace that disregarded the wishes of the peoples of the area. Balfour's remark in the following colloquy gives the tone of the peacemaking. Montagu: "Let us not, for Heaven's sake, tell the Moslem what he ought to think, let us recognize what they do think." Balfour: "I am quite unable to see why Heaven or any other Power should object to our telling the Moslem what he ought to think." Or—one might add—the Armenian, the Bulgarian, the Maronite, or the Greek Orthodox.

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DIE ANFÄNGE DES GRIECHISCHEN NATIONALSTAATES, 1833–1843.

By *Irmgard Wilharm*. Studien zur Geschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts. Abhandlung der Forschungsabteilung des Historischen Seminars der Universität Köln, no. 5. Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1973. 274 pp. DM 52.

The first modern Greek national government, established in 1833, had certain unique attributes. Even though the Greeks had themselves conducted a bitter revolutionary war against Ottoman rule from 1821, the three great powers—Russia, Britain, and France—were responsible for the establishment of a political system in 1833 in which Greek nationals occupied none of the major governmental positions. Instead the newly independent country was organized as an absolute monarchy, under the rule of the eighteen-year-old Bavarian Prince Othon, with three Bavarian regents holding the real power in the state. The ultimate influence over both the king and regents was exercised by the strong-minded Bavarian monarch, Ludwig I. In addition, the Greek forces were disbanded and the chief military prop of the government was a foreign mercenary army of thirty-five hundred men recruited primarily in the German states. This book concerns the first ten years of Othon's rule and concludes with the revolt of 1843, which resulted in the establishment of constitutional government in Greece and the conclusion of the period of strong Bavarian influence. The period covered thus corresponds with that dealt with in the excellent study by John A. Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833–1843* (Princeton, 1968). The emphasis in the book under review, however, is more on the Bavarian aspects of the problem.