

shifts . . . ” That there have been in history episodes of such religiously inspired violence is unhappily clear enough. That is why in a very positive conclusion McTernan calls for a new emphasis on tolerance – the conviction that, however much we hold to our beliefs, it is not for us to decide how many roads there are to God.

Why the irritation? For three reasons. No secular backdrop is really provided by which to judge religious terror. Terror, historically, has first of all been an act of governments. No mention is made of the epoch-dividing acts of terror of the twentieth century: the destruction of the cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and the deaths of some 200,000 civilians. Starvation blockade in Nigeria/Biafra, bubonic plague in China delivered by Japan, “shock and awe” inflicted on the people of Iraq: the list is a long one. My question is why religious groups so easily come to justify what their governments have done despite the precepts of their own traditions? How have governments managed so successfully to manipulate faith communities and why are those communities so easily manipulated? Perhaps it is because the most powerful religion of the day – by which I mean nationalism – is not recognised as idolatry. For every person who would kill for religion there are ninety-nine others who would kill for country. Lastly I wonder if enough is said about the failure of religious faiths to undertake positive peacemaking. Peace is not just saying no when a war is about to start. Peace is a permanent search for justice, for empathy, for understanding, for forgiveness, and sometimes for challenging the political and economic structures of the day.

McTernan has done us all a favour in facing up to questions that too often are avoided. Only good can come from some fresh air on these issues. His book is a valuable contribution to the UN’s Decade for a Culture of Peace in which we are now living.

BRUCE KENT

NICOLAI MEDENSIS (DURANDELLI) EVIDENTIAE CONTRA DURANDUM edited by Prospero T. Stella [Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi vol. III], *Editiones Francke*, Tübingen & Basel, 2003, 2 vols., Pp. 566 + 1449.

J. Koch placed Durandellus in the “front rank” of Dominican opponents of Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, and called his *Evidentiae* “the fullest and best” Thomist critique of the first version of Durandus’s commentary on the Sentences (*Durandus de S. Porciano OP*, Münster 1927 p. 340); yet, for lack of a printed text, this work has received little attention. The lack has now been magnificently

remedied thanks to Prospero Stella, who has given us a model edition. After a brief discussion of the author's identity (called Nicolaus Medensis in one manuscript) and the date of his work (he suggests 1325–6 on rather flimsy grounds), he gets down to business. There is a meticulous account of each manuscript's contents and quirks, and an exhaustive study of the textual tradition as a whole. Because this is so complex, he has noted all the variants of all 13 manuscripts in his apparatus – which is desirable anyway, since precise investigation of Durandellus's influence requires the fullest possible information about the forms, however degenerate, in which his work was available to readers. Not content with identifying sources, he quotes in full those which are most essential to each section: the appropriate item, if any, from Dominican masters' lists of Durandus's "errors" (which Durandellus certainly used), the main passages of Aquinas to which Durandellus refers, and, most importantly, the relevant texts from Durandus (which Stella takes from the manuscripts since there is no edition of the first version of Durandus's commentary).

Modern printers are no more capable than medieval scribes of producing error-free texts, and there are some misprints, but I have not noticed any which an intelligent reader should not be able to correct.

An edition of Durandellus is obviously of interest chiefly to historians of medieval thought: his scholastic pedantry, though expressed with admirable clarity, is not to the taste of most moderns. All the same, he tackles some issues of continuing importance, such as the question whether grace creates a proportionality between good deeds and heavenly rewards which justifies talk of meriting *de condigno*. Durandellus defends Aquinas's affirmative answer, and he specifically attacks Durandus's contention – a harbinger of the divine arbitrariness favoured by Nominalism – that God could deny glory to someone dying in a state of grace: God is not bound by anything other than himself, but his own self-consistency means that there is a pattern in his acts which we can, to some extent, understand; the link between "final grace" and glory is certain because it rests on his promise – but, of course, he has not promised "final grace" (pp. 618–9).

To take but one other example, an issue which crops up twice in the *Evidentiae* (pp. 32–53, 1402–1414), and also several times in Eckhart (cf *Die deutschen Werke* V, 131–2). Durandus espoused an opinion originally proposed by John of Paris in defence of Aquinas's intellectualist doctrine of beatitude (cf. J.P. Muller in *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer*, Louvain 1947, pp. 493–511): the formal object of beatitude is not God himself, but the mind's awareness of its own vision of God (just as, Durandus explains, it is not the wine which is the object of my enjoyment, but my drinking of wine). Our love of God is a kind of desire, and desire is satisfied by *possession* of the

desired object, not by the object in itself. I side with Durandellus in wanting to say that I enjoy wine: my enjoyment of it may be inseparable from my enjoyment of drinking it, but if I did not enjoy wine I should not enjoy drinking it. Durandellus is also surely right not to allow love of God to be reduced to *amor concupiscentiae*; it is *amor amicitiae* and, as such, it rejoices in God's perfection in himself, not just in its own satisfaction.

SIMON TUGWELL OP

THE JUST WAR REVISITED by Oliver O'Donovan, *Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, Pp. ix + 139, £13.99 pbk.*

Kofi Annan has recognised the woeful shortcomings of international law and the organs of the United Nations in the face of phenomena with which we are increasingly familiar. States are identifying armed threats to their populations and launching pre-emptive military action to disable the potential aggressor. They are also sending armed forces to rescue a population from humanitarian catastrophe generated by its own government's policies or by the disintegration of a failing State.

Can centuries of Christian reflection on the moral legitimacy of armed conflict contribute to the current debate? This collection of lectures and essays by Oliver O'Donovan allows an affirmative answer. They may be regarded as his learned commentary on the Suarez dictum: "It is necessary to preserve in war the same quality as a just judgement". The paradigm for war is an act of judgement made by appropriate public authority with the aim of establishing peace.

This paradigm allows O'Donovan to reject the sceptical assertion that going to war is not justiciable. It is, but the appropriate organ of judgement is the UN Security Council. More conventional judicial organs are appropriate for determining breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL) committed in the course of armed conflict. It is unfortunate that the essay on war crimes appears to have been written before the July 1998 signing of the Rome Treaty establishing the international criminal court. It would be interesting to hear O'Donovan's view of the Treaty's capacitating the Security Council to indefinitely suspend prosecutions for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Surely, a confusion of tribunals? I suspect he would not disapprove. He is surprisingly lukewarm to the idea of ascribing personal criminal responsibility to individuals. Thus, *inter alia*, he considers it may be preferable to impose economic sanctions on a population rather than arrest and prosecute the political leadership. In my opinion we may be grateful that Louise Arbour,