

St Augustine as Psychotherapist

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During many years of consideration, I have grown into a firm conviction that two of the greatest masters of the human psyche have been Plato and St Augustine. There is a close connection between them. Both considered philosophy to be a sort of therapeia, both were personally and theoretically concerned with the problem of integration, and both saw clearly that the personal and the social problem are at bottom one and the same. That is why we can take so much of our material from Augustine's *City of God*.

Everybody knows that Plato declares in the *Republic* that the individual is the state writ small. Usually this is taken to be a proposition of political philosophy, and this is true enough if we have a right understanding of what Plato intended by politics. If we read the *Gorgias* we shall find a remarkable sentence in which Socrates says that the science which takes care of the health of the body is medicine, but that that which takes care of the health of the psyche is—politics! The argument with Polus, near the commencement of which this statement stands, concludes by saying that the man who is sick with guilt ought to go to the judge and legislator and beg them for the punishment which will cure him. If we consider how much profit we ourselves could expect for our guilt-ridden souls by approaching Parliament or the minister of justice as the agents for our release, we can imagine the incredulity of Socrates' hearers. But his point is clear: politics should be regarded as psychotherapy. The right environment for integrated personal living is a community under just laws. Any tinkering with the individual, who is the community writ small, which pays no attention to the larger social environment will simply be the endless caulking of a leaky boat. I notice that there is an increasing amount of attention being paid to the psychoanalysis of history and of societies. But there are practical difficulties in the way of getting history, or whole nations, or even cabinets on the couch, and there seem to me to be untold possibilities for the future in a return to the Platonic idea of politics, and a closer union between psychological theory on the one hand, and ethics and politics on the other. On the one side the psychotherapist is overwhelmed by the sheer mass of the flotsam which the tides of a disorganised and unjust society

wash up in his clinics, while the political philosopher and statesman will not properly co-ordinate their work round a sound idea of human happiness unless they have a true and realistic psychology. Socrates' statement about the function of the judge could superficially be written off as paradox or idealism did not the sheer weight of circumstances render it a pressing and practical matter. We cannot separate problems of morals and politics from those of mental health.

These Platonic convictions are fully shared by St Augustine, and worked out at a deeper level. In the *Confessions* we see Roman history and world history writ small in a man who was struggling to achieve his integrity. In the *City of God* we see the plan of the good society which is the reintegrated soul writ large. He cuts deeper because time and therefore the struggle have a deeper meaning for him. In fact, it is this seriousness about time which makes him the great psychologist which he is, and I should like to try to bring out its relevance.

The construction of an inner and an outer cosmos are two movements which proceed with equal pace. There is a correspondence between inner and outer being. Ontology is the science of being, and we have to remember that for Augustine, as for Heidegger, questions about man are primarily ontological questions. His investigations into the *psyche* move on an existential or ontological level. Psychology then becomes a question of the manner of human existence, particularly of man's existence in time, and cannot be separated from the question of the coming into being of the cosmos. Questions about genesis and the character of human existence in time occupy the centre of his thought.

To understand his doctrine of man we have to begin with his doctrine of creation. He takes his stand here on revelation and on the Biblical teaching about creation. Man is a creature of God, and is a being in a created cosmos. To understand his being-in-the-world we have to understand it in this context. The world and man are created by God *ex nihilo*, so that to understand the spirit of man we have to understand something about the being of God.

In approaching this question we have to remember that however much Augustine may owe to Greek, and especially to Platonic, philosophy, he is spiritually a Semite. The God of Augustine is the God of the Old and New Testaments, who is the God of history. The Jews took time seriously which the Greeks never managed to do. What God does in creation is to create time, and God is the Lord of time. Further, we must not think of time in the impersonal manner to which classical physics has accustomed us. There is a sense in which the time of personal

being is primary. Hebrews 1, 2. speaks of the Son through whom God made the ages. Sometimes this is translated as: through whom God made the world. I think that for us the term, world, has a more immediate spatial connotation. In the text it is temporality which comes into focus. In fact the etymology of the word 'world' is relevant here, and appears more clearly in the Afrikaans *wêreld*. *Wêr-* is connected with the Latin word *vir*, a man; and *-eld* is connected with words like *elder* and indicates age. To say that God created the world is to say that He created the time or age of man.

There is a sense in which Hebrew thought is always calling time into the presence of man, instead of dissipating man in physical time. In his famous analysis of our experience of time in Confessions XI Augustine relates past and future to the experienced present. Time there is seen as presence to a human being. This is a way of looking at things which is rooted in the Hebrew language itself. As Boman puts it: 'The Hebrews, therefore, have two tenses: complete (perfect, *factum*), and incomplete (imperfect, *fiens*) . . . If we compare the term *complete* with the corresponding term *past*, we find that *complete* defines the action from the viewpoint of an experiencing person, but *past* defines it with reference to an impersonal, objective point on the time-line. *Fiens* defines the action as incomplete in relation to the person speaking; *future* defines it as not carried to its effect in relation to our position . . . Present means exactly what the word says: 'presence', i.e. we are at the place where the action is taking place as spectators and witnesses'.

To say that the God of the Bible is a person is to say that he is the active witness of time calling all things into his present or presence. The word *Jahweh* has to do with the verb *to be*, and indicates he who is. God is someone who is always acting out being. *Aeternitas ipsa Dei substantia est*, the very substance of God is eternity, says Augustine, and by his eternity Augustine means the act by which God is always present to himself and to all history. The *hayah* or being of God, is at the same time the active presence of God to himself, and his omnipresence to the world. If you like, eternity is the time proper to the divine being, a being which comprehends everything in its present.

The eternity or present action of God is regarded by Augustine as the origin of the whole temporal order. In the city of God he gives a profound answer to a silly question: what was God doing before he created the world. He points out that the distinction between before and after holds only within the created order itself, and cannot be extrapolated

¹T. Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek* (S.C.M. Press, 1960).

beyond it. Time, he says, begins with the creature. We cannot separate time from the creature or the creature from time.

The metaphysical consequences of this are endless. If he could say: *aeternitas ipsa Dei substantia est*, he can now say: *tempus ipsa creaturae substantia est*: the temporality of a creature is its very substance. Temporality is a mode of being, and the very substance of a finite thing is time. This does away at one stroke with the notion of time as an empty continuum or framework of reference into which beings are interjected so that their position in time is something extrinsic to what they are, and in that sense fortuitous. Temporality and change not only belong to their being but are at the very centre of it and define what it is. Ontology then becomes primarily an investigation of time, and the kind of being which any creature has must be investigated through the kind of time and of temporal relations embodied in its structure. There are as many kinds of time as there are kinds of creature. In a sense, indeed, there are as many times as there are men, because each man is a unique personality, and has the kind of time which is proper to his being as a person. The investigation of personality becomes primarily an investigation of this proper time, while anthropology, in the philosophical sense of the term, becomes an enquiry into man as time, and having history and being in history. In such sense as it may be true that man is the measure of things, the intelligibility of historical or anthropological time is the source of the intelligibility even of the physical sciences.

Man, then, is a dependence on God in time. But he is also a dependence in love, and the two themes of time and love are connected in the most intimate manner. For Augustine the active eternity of God is substantially identical with the active love of God. The action and omnipresence of God are the same as his love. If we ask why God created the temporal order, the only reason which we can give is absolutely gratuitous love. The explanation of this is that love has to do with being. Our love of ourselves is primarily a concern with our own being, and we can love ourselves because we are the kind of beings that we are. We are a kind of being, intelligent being, which can reflexively grasp itself, and whose love and intelligence is substantially one with its being. The ontology of this is worked out with great genius in books IX and X of Augustine's treatise on the Trinity. To love anybody else is to be concerned with the being of that person. We wish his good and his good is the same as his being. But whether we love ourselves or anybody else, it is a love of a being already given and is in that sense a received love.

Since God is absolute interiority, his love is absolutely identical with his being so that to say that he is and that he loves himself are the same thing. His creative love for the world is not a love of something already there but an act which actually bestows being. Creation is a bestowal of love, a love which is no more extrinsic to the being of a created thing than its time. Just as it *is* its time so it *is* its love. The ladder of being is a ladder of love, each creature occupying a place in it in accordance with the love which it has received. To be a person is to have received being as self-conscious love. It follows that if the knowledge of human personality is a knowledge of its proper being, so it is also a knowledge of its proper love. That is why Augustine says: tell me what a man loves, and I'll tell you what he is. The mode of our temporality is the mode of our love, so that to investigate the temporal structure and reactions of a subject will involve investigating his erotic structure.

Augustine holds, firmly and centrally, that man is made for joy. This joy will be at one and the same time the complete integration of his whole being, the right ordination of his loves, and the insertion of his human time into the eternity of God. Joy is the enjoyment of a presence, of a man to himself, to other men, and to God. Joylessness is at once a failure in love, and a disorientation in time. A failure in love expresses a misuse of creatures, resulting from a mistake about the kind of time which they are.

Here, again, the background of his thought must be looked for in the Old and New Testaments, where the temporal and the erotic are firmly linked. The crusade against idolatry is a recurrent theme in the Old Testament, and we must understand just what is meant by idolatry. Idolatry is an ontological as well as a religious error and consists in a mistake about time. In essence it is the blowing up of a finite and temporal thing to a thing of infinite and eternal importance. It is the deification of a creature. It is a confusion of the transient with the enduring. It is treating a thing or a finite person as though it were God. It is an inordinate love of the finite. That is why the prophets so frequently speak of idolatry as fornication, a fornication with time and with the history of the Jewish people. Fornication is the expense of spirit in idolatry. The feet of the harlot in Proverbs 'are set towards the grave', because death results from a fundamental inversion of the relations of time and eternity. 'They fornicate against you, O God', says Augustine in the Confessions, 'in loving the fleeting temptations of time'. The *taedium saeculi*, a pathological boredom with one's personal history and with history, is at root a sort of erotic displacement. In the New Testa-

ment the idea of Christ as the manifestation of the divine love, and, at the same time, the redeemer of time are quite inseparable from each other. He who redeems man by drawing him upwards through the circles of love at the same moment redeems the sort of time which he is. Hence the redemption of man is the redemption of history and of historical society. It is a setting right of the fall of man, and the fall was the commission of an idolatry. The fall of man was the waste or devastation of his time, and issues in a misuse and distortion (*torquere*: a twisting into circles) of his time.

The notion of a fall is, I need hardly say, of great psychological importance, and is quite central in the psycho-analysis of St Augustine. We have to ask what it consists in, and what its consequences were. Man is made from nothing in the image of God, and we must ask what Augustine meant by this. The God whom man images is the God of the New Testament and this God is a trinity. God is He Who Is. The second person of the Trinity, the Logos or Son, is generated by God as the knowledge of his Being which is consubstantial with it. The third Person, the Holy Spirit, is the love which unites the being and intelligence of God. The three are one because supreme being must be at the same time supreme knowledge and supreme love, and to call God eternal expresses, not any duration, but this absolute union. Since this union expresses what we mean by a person, what we mean by the personality and the eternity of God are the same.

Man as person is man as the image of God. Man, Augustine points out, is, knows, and loves himself, and in his treatise on the Trinity he analyses in the most brilliant manner how these three acts are related to each other. These acts constitute his being. They constitute what human being is, and in their relationship with each other they constitute what we mean by the identity of a person. We can also discern a trinity, he says, in the relation of will, memory, and understanding. In the exercise of will and memory we call the future and the past into the presence of an understanding whose essence it is to grasp unchangeable principles, and which therefore expresses the essence of what man is vis-a-vis eternity. Joy will be a state of affairs where 'our being shall have no end, our knowledge no error, our love no offence' (*de Civitate Dei*, XI, 28). Misery is a derangement of these acts, and the fall of man consists in this derangement brought about from within.

How can this be brought about? Because he is the kind of creature which he is, man has the capacity to know that he is a creature. He is half-way along the scale between nothingness and the total being of God,

and there is an admixture of nothingness in his being. His sanity consists in squaring himself with what he is by the right use of his understanding, and his will or love. He must remember what he is. He must love himself perfectly, and perfectly means in accordance with the kind of being which he is, a thing which he cannot do unless he loves God better than himself, because by so doing he puts himself where he belongs. Thus he writes in the *de Trinitate*:

But as there are two things, the mind and the love of it, when it loves itself; so there are two things, the mind and the knowledge of it, when it knows itself. Therefore the mind itself, and the love of it, and the knowledge of it, are three things, and these three are one; and when they are perfect they are equal. For if one loves himself less than as he is—as for example, suppose that the mind of a man only loves itself as the body of a man ought to be loved, whereas the mind is more than the body—then it is in fault and its love is not perfect. Again, if it loves itself more than as it is—as if, for instance, it loves itself as much as God is to be loved, whereas the mind is incomparably less than God—here also it is exceedingly in fault, and its love of self is not perfect. But it is in fault more perversely and wrongly still, when it loves the body as much as God is to be loved. (IX, c. 4).

The essence of balance and happiness, then, is realistic love, that is love proportioned to the objective status of the thing loved. The source of all derangement is a wrong self-love and that is precisely what the fall of man consists in. The fall of man is an act of idolatry in which the image is substituted for the original. It consists in man's 'liking himself as though he were his own light'. It is the act by which man divinises himself and turns himself into an ontological absolute. He loves himself as though he were an absolute end in himself, the end of all his acts and valuations, and so encloses himself in his own ego. Everything which he loves and experiences is turned into a means to this egoism. This is the fundamental alienation which is the source of all other alienations. It consists in a deep gap or contradiction in his very being. His very being is to know and love his own being, and yet this knowing and this love no longer square with what he is. His will and his knowledge do not agree with what objectively they are, and he has failed in acceptance of himself by projecting himself into a false time which is an ape of eternity. He comes to eternalise or absolutise finite things in a manner which he is bound to find unsatisfying and personally destructive. He may absolutise money, or sexual love, or power, or a human friendship

or relationship, expecting from them a plenitude of satisfaction which in the nature of the case they cannot afford, and in the end deranging the hierarchy of his own drives and faculties. These are the consequences of what Augustine calls the *amor concupiscentiae*. We must be on our guard, however, not to be misled by the ordinary connotation of the word 'concupiscence'. It does not here mean primarily fleshly desire. It means the idolatrous desire of a spiritual being for itself, and in fact serves as a warning against an unduly 'spiritualised' life or religion. Augustine speaks of those who carnally seek the spirit and carnally avoid the flesh. The source of concupiscence is spiritually to absolutise created spirit, and thereby to come to value everything else, including the body, wrongly. We get our hierarchy or values wrong. Augustine's *amor concupiscentiae* is thus in fact a warning against Puritanism, the Puritanism which commences by despising the body, and then necessarily swings over into sensuality. He found out from his experience with the Manichees that both Puritanism and prurience have a common root: an excessive concern with the body.²

The fall represents an invasion of time by nothingness through a voluntary misplacement of love. Nothing, he says, causes the evil will. Man is suspended over nothingness by the creative will of God, and if he loosens the support which he enjoys by loving adhesion to God he discovers the emptiness in himself and in created things which is part of their metaphysical constitution. Both the psychological and ontological problems of man's fascination by the abyss, his gravitation towards annihilation and destruction enjoy Augustine's profoundest attention. There is in him a well-developed ontology of the death urge, the urge to escape from a time which has disappointed our loves. Death is for him a consequence of idolatry, and suicide a failure to accept the message of our creatureliness proclaimed by death, and so to cling to our own being that we fall through the gap which we thus create in it. Suicide thus contains a great paradox: it is a loosening of man's hold on being by an excessive clinging to it. The suicide is endeavouring to proclaim his being by negating it, and the radical cure for it is learning to accept death—and resurrection.

Self-knowledge, therefore, is a primary duty in the sense that it is urged upon us by our very being. He writes in *de Trinitate*, X, c. 5:

Why therefore is it enjoined upon the mind, that it should know itself? I suppose, in order that it may consider itself, and live according to its own nature; that is, seek to be regulated according to its

²Cf. *de Trin.*, XII, c. 9.

own nature, namely, under Him to whom it ought to be subject; and above those things to which it is to be preferred; under Him by whom it ought to be ruled, above those things which it ought to rule. For it does many things through vicious desire, as though in forgetfulness of itself. For it sees some things intrinsically excellent, in that more excellent nature which is God; and whereas it ought to remain steadfast that it may enjoy them, it is turned away from Him, by wishing to appropriate those things to itself, and not to be like to Him by His gift, but to be what He is by its own gift, and it begins to move and slip gradually down into less and less, which it thinks to be more and more. For it is neither sufficient for itself, nor is anything at all sufficient for it, if it withdraw from Him who is alone sufficient. And so through want and distress it becomes too intent upon its own actions and upon the unquiet delights which it obtains from them: and thus by the desire of acquiring knowledge from those things which are outside the nature of which it knows and loves, and which it feels can be lost unless held fast with anxious care, it loses its security and thinks of itself so much the less, in proportion as it feels the more secure that it cannot lose itself.

I quote this as an example of one of Augustine's clinical pictures of the lapse of a man towards nothingness, and his gradual loss of genuine inner security. I said earlier on that for Augustine to be a person is to have received being as self-conscious love. To know oneself is to be able to receive oneself as a gift to oneself. There is a sense, then, in which knowing oneself is a process of loosening a strangulating grip upon oneself. It is the opposite of, and the cure for, a total immersion in and pre-occupation with ourselves. It becomes primarily a praise of God, a recognition of our being as image, and image of the Trinity. Knowing oneself properly and loving oneself properly proceed *pari passu*. They constitute a loosening of false securities.

Accordingly, Augustine is one of the great masters of introspection. This is a word which we must use carefully. Augustinian introspection is not an observation of inner phenomena as though they were physical events.³ Such a procedure is doomed to failure from the start. His introspection is an ontological meditation in which the being of the mind and its status in reality come home to it. The mind must regard itself not as thing under observation, but as an act *sui generis*, which marks itself off as something which is not a thing by the very act of so marking itself off. It does something to itself by this very act, and what it must

³Cf. the distinction between the inner and outer man in *de Trin.*, XII, c. 1.

do is to pay attention to the very thing which it is doing by so paying attention. Such introspection is a way and an act of being, a certain committal to one's way of being, a taking of a stand within oneself by which one removes oneself from the attitude and attention which one gives to physical events. We must, he says invent ourselves, go into ourselves by an act which is its own object. That is the essence of Augustinian interiority. His directions on the point are perfectly clear. The difficulty arises from the fact that he is not merely asking us to see something but to do something, since you cannot have the one without the other. 'When, therefore, the mind is bidden to become acquainted with itself, let it not seek itself as though it were withdrawn from itself; but let it withdraw that which it has added to itself. . . . Nor let it take knowledge of itself as if it did not know itself, but let it distinguish itself from that which it knows to be another. For how will it take pains to perform that very precept which is given it, "know thyself" if it does not know either what "know" means or what "thyself" means? . . . Let the mind not then add anything to that which it knows itself to be, when it is bidden to know itself' (*de Trin.* X, c. 8-10).

Further, this withdrawal from external things is a way not only of knowing and loving ourselves properly but of knowing and loving external things which are intelligible only by the light which the mind casts upon itself. It is not bodies which make minds intelligible, but minds which make bodies intelligible, and we must break with the initial self-alienation which puts the cart before the horse. With our knowledge, he says (*de Trin.* X, c. 3), we wish to embrace all things. But we know what knowledge is by knowing our own knowledge, and we will not know our knowledge of other things properly until our knowledge has taken stock of itself. What gives intelligibility to all the sciences is the self-transparency of human being to itself so that self-knowledge becomes the paradigm and the end of all knowledge, and our way of submitting it to the divine light which the self-limiting of our own being by itself entails. To use a simple analogy, the sun enables us to see the objects around us, but we do not require another source of illumination to see the sun. It enables us to see itself. The mind is luminous to itself, and it is by virtue of this luminosity that it casts the light of understanding upon all things. All things become, as it were, self-conscious in man, and in knowing himself he practises self-knowledge for them vicariously. In knowing and loving them he places them in being. It is self-knowledge which makes us at home in a world from which we should otherwise be alienated because we are alienated from ourselves.

That is the full bearing of Augustine's statement that we must call our thoughts home to themselves.

If we remember that for Augustine pride is the act by which we idolise ourselves and our world, and humility the act by which we stand in realistic self-knowledge, we can see that they are for him fundamental concepts both in morals and in psycho-analysis having their common root in the mode of human being. Pridefulness is a mode of self-alienated human existence. It is a self-removal from eternity which at the same time cuts us off from security among the things of time. To be proud is in a very real sense to be out of time, and a denizen of the false infinity of nothingness. It raises us above ourselves and above the world to a high place in which all true contact with ourselves and with things is lost. In the words of the City of God it induces in us a vertigo of height, and produces a fascination towards death and the abyss. We begin to go round in circles. It is interesting to observe how often St Augustine associates immorality and sin with circular movement. Pride produces mental ill-health: a sort of 'loopiness'. He associates the philosophers of the circular movement of history, with the men who go round and round in compulsions, in the phrase 'those circular men'. Evil is for him something twisting, insinuating, far removed from the straight way of time. It creates a detachment from being, so that the lost man always returns in a circle to the point from which he set out, in a nauseating downward spiral. Hence he says that pride is essentially dejection, a down-throwing, a loss of appetite both for the things of time and for those of eternity. It is characterised by boredom, despair, and senseless activity—running round in circles. It is an unadmitted ontical inferiority taking its own revenge.

Humility on the other hand is the realism given by perfect self-knowledge and love. It arises from taking stock, by a proper introspection of just what and where we are. It enables us to live in the time proper to us, which, for the Christian, is the redeemed time of the Incarnation. It is the cure, then, for the inferiority feeling and dejection which are wrought by pride, and enables us to place and time our actions in an intelligible relation to the rest of the world to which we are held by a proper knowledge and love, and enables us to keep in step with other people in a time-scheme which is correlated with the eternity or personality of God. It requires that we think neither too highly nor too lowly of ourselves, not refusing authority nor responsibility through a false modesty which is only a concealed form of pride, nor, on the other hand, taking upon ourselves what realism would show that we are

unfit for. The essence of sanity is to take things as they are, and work out from there.

We find upon the last analysis that the mysticism and the psychotherapy of Augustine are identical. The mysticism of St Augustine is a mysticism of the intelligence turning inwards upon its own intelligibility in an act which sees the person for what he is by an introspection which cannot stop short of the personality of God. It is in fact a mysticism of presence which overcomes the alienations of pride which separate us both from things, from ourselves and from God. It is a matter of seeing things with the eye of a unified intelligence, and a unified intelligence is a humble intelligence. If we said that it was a mysticism of living in the present we should be right, provided that we understood exactly what we meant. There is a sense in which it is inhuman to live in the present. Man has a memory by which he draws from the past, and he has to orientate his life to the future if he is to be happy. In fact, the quality of his memory will be relative to the sort of projects which he entertains. On the other hand one can alienate oneself both into the past and into the future, in a sort of literal absent-mindedness which may reach pathological proportions, and turn us into a *Luftmensch* wandering about in high places. We must remember here what Augustine says in Confessions XI concerning the present as an act which constitutes both the past and the future, rightly or wrongly according to its integrity. Now by 'present' he does not mean a moving point in physical time, and we must recall here the essentially Hebraic character of his thought. By present he means the presence of the person to himself in the spiritual time which is the mode of his being. Living in the present thus means living in the presence, the presence of the person, who knows himself, to himself; that is, in the presence of God whose eternity is His absolute recollectedness. Knowing oneself and living in the present mean for Augustine the same thing. Living in the present means living in the secure grasp of our being upon itself, and consequently upon the things which our being illuminates. It means living in the security of the time which is proper to us, and not alienating ourselves into the time of the subhuman and the superhuman by a disproportional love. Living in the present and loving oneself perfectly are thus the same thing.

Loving oneself perfectly involves loving other persons perfectly, that is, as Marcel would put it, being a presence to other persons, since the recollected person is essentially out-going, or rather, the movement inwards and the movement outwards are one. It involves participation in

a common human time, and this for Augustine is the time of history. Human time is social time, and the whole structure of the City of God shows his firm grasp upon this insight. The City of God is a calling of human history into the presence of God, an act of recollection in which the human race takes stock of its own situation. In a very precise sense it is a psychoanalysis of history. For Augustine the fall of man is a collective act, and our alienations from time are collectively manifested. It is possible therefore to analyse civilisations under the notions of pride and humility, and to see whole peoples as pathologically divided from themselves. This is what he means when he says that two loves created the two cities: the City of God and the City of Nothingness. It is the community which must come to itself in the light of a love of a viable good. Perfect self-love and perfect other-love being inseparable, responsibility is not only for oneself but for other persons and for history. The notion of vicariousness runs throughout his thought. We cannot separate out an individual and point an accusing finger at him without accusing ourselves. The therapy of the person is always the therapy of the person in a situation which shares his guilt and at the same time provides a framework of loves in which he must find a support. Guilt is a collective matter and recollection must be a collective operation. There is no trace in Augustine of that pernicious atomic moralism which gives rise to a false sense of guilt, and both provides our clinics with their cases, and on the other hand makes it so difficult to assimilate ethics and psychiatry to each other. Once again we arrive at Plato's position that the medicine of the soul is politics.

Augustine would say that it is the politics of the City of God and that the healer is not the philosopher-king but the love of God in Christ. We must remember that for Augustine Christ is the redeemer of time, the source of all science, and the perfect self-knowledge of God, united with Him in the love of the Holy Spirit. Christ as the Logos is the self-knowledge of the Trinity, and as man redeems time by his perfect integrity. In the *de Trinitate* Augustine is investigating the social life of the Three Persons, and in the City of God he is applying his discoveries to the question of how man can live with himself. The happy life is the life of acceptance of the time of the redeemed city. The last and final duty of man is to be happy, and the final comment on us will be a comment on the use or misuse which we have made of the potentiality of joy inscribed in our being by our essence as created time. Augustine's ultimate aim, both as a psychotherapist and a mystic is that we should enjoy the time of our lives.