

*jest mi tam* allegedly meaning 'when do we laugh?', and that the adjective *jenský* means 'pertinent to Jena (University)'; the phrase *jenské sklo* is the name of a heat-resistant glass (originally manufactured in Jena).

The level of grammatical information (or rather the sheer lack thereof) is pathetic. The terms perfective/imperfective are unknown. Instead, imperfective verbs are called "progressive." Gender is not given even in those cases where it is not possible to guess it—for example, *úroveň* (f) 'level,' *obyčej* (f) 'custom.' And there is no way for the reader to discover that *miezd* is the Gpl of *mzda* 'wage, pay,' *hier* the Gpl of *hra* 'play, game,' *tehál* the Gpl of *tehla* 'brick,' or that *odtne* is a form of the verb *odt'at'* 'to chop off.' These forms are given, but under the corresponding nominatives and infinitives.

The dictionary contains numerous personal and place names. Some Slovak villages are cited (e.g., *Slažany*), other, more important ones are omitted (*Abelová*, *Istebník*, *Brodzany*). Incidentally, *Roháče* is not a 'village' but a mountain chain.

It does not pay to continue. The Slovak Catholic Sokol would have better served its members and the general public in this country by having financed a smaller dictionary, but one that would have been reliable, professional, and up to date. The price of the book is a ridiculous one to pay for 1,664 pages of printed paper.

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TRIESTE, 1941–1954: THE ETHNIC, POLITICAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE. By *Bogdan C. Novak*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1970. xx, 526 pp. \$16.50.

This review is of a particular kind. Its author in fact wrote, several years before Professor Novak, a book treating exactly the same subject (J. B. Duroselle, *Le conflit de Trieste, 1943–1954*, Brussels, Institut de Sociologie, Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie, 1966, 647 pp.). The two authors ignored each other, Novak using my book only for the last chapter (pp. xviii and 418–71). With the exception of the theoretical essay I included, we followed the same path, and I am happy to report that our conclusions are very similar.

The Trieste dispute involved—between the destruction of Austria-Hungary in 1918 and the Italian peace treaty in 1947—the entire region which the Italians call Venezia Giulia and the Yugoslavs the Julian March. From 1947 to 1954 the dispute was confined to the zone of the Free Territory of Trieste, which was created by the treaty but could not be put into operation, for the Allied powers could not agree on the choice of a governor. Zone A, administered by the British and Americans, could never be unified with Zone B, administered by the Yugoslavs. Despite the tripartite French–British–American declaration of March 20, 1948 (which, without consulting the USSR, for reasons connected with the forthcoming elections promised the entire Free Territory to Italy), Tito held firm. His rupture with Stalin helped him to improve his standing in Washington's eyes. Every device was suggested: mediation, condominium, partitions of different kinds. And finally the most logical solution was reached. In October 1954 Yugoslavia received Zone B, with minor changes; Italy, Zone A.

The big dispute (1918–47) and the little one (1947–54) were passionate because they involved nationalism. Peasant peoples, the Slovenes and the Croats considered that the cities—oases of Italian population in a Yugoslav hinterland—ought

to be ceded to them, especially Trieste, which a "natural process" would render Slovene. Urban people, the Italians demanded the sparsely populated peasant hinterland (Novak's map, p. 5, appears to exaggerate the Italian penetration in the Istrian interior).

Novak is of Slovenian origin and lived at the heart of the problem from 1947 to 1951. I had a male Slovenian assistant and a female Triestine assistant, but my contact with the problem was less direct. This explains the fact that on the Yugoslav resistance, the war, and the role of the London government, his book is more precise and detailed than mine. On the other hand, I had access to the Italian, Yugoslav, and—I can say it now—French archives, which enabled me to set forth with more precision the Italian viewpoints, the disagreements among Italians, and the hesitant attitude of the Allies. I suggest also that Novak's book should be consulted on the diverse local political factions, and mine particularly for a criticism of the census figures. In sum—and I hope Novak will share my view—two historians by profession, if they are sincere and try to consult all the accessible sources, are apt to arrive at the same interpretations and end by concluding that unbridled nationalism is the source of a large share of human suffering.

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THE BATTLE STALIN LOST: MEMOIRS OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1948–1953.

By *Vladimir Dedijer*. New York: Viking Press, 1971. x, 341 pp. \$8.50.

Ironically, the first fissure in the Soviet bloc monolith after World War II occurred in Yugoslavia, where Partisan zealots had died with Stalin's name on their lips. In exploiting the revolutionary idealism of "honest fools," as he termed his Yugoslav followers, Stalin provoked the most calamitous and consequential schism in the Communist world since Trotsky. However, even after being cast out of the pale by the June 28, 1948, Cominform Resolution and subjected to Moscow's campaign of slanderous vilification and threats, the Yugoslav Communists had enough residual idolatry of the Soviet Union to feel an involuntary revulsion at the thought of fighting an invading Red Army.

Vladimir Dedijer, journalist, biographer of Tito, and erstwhile high Communist functionary, presents us with his lucid recollections of those dramatic days after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the bloc, when many expected the Tito regime to fold under Stalin's relentless pressure (State Department specialist Charles Bohlen predicted it would last three weeks). In the manner of outraged innocents, the Yugoslavs refused to take the advice of Italian Communists "to be flexible, go to Moscow, daub a little ash on our foreheads, then go home and do as we pleased" (p. 179). After Molotov's 1949 ultimatum the pressure was applied in earnest. Dedijer says little about Stalin's intensive preparations to invade Yugoslavia (former Hungarian Army Chief Béla Király's letter of December 11, 1970, to the *New York Times* revealed that plans were laid in 1949 and that Soviet advisers, technicians, men, and equipment were poised in readiness in Hungary in 1950–51). As Edvard Kardelj had correctly guessed, the Russians would threaten to use force but would refrain for reasons of foreign policy. Uncertain whether the war could be localized or might escalate into a world-wide conflict, Stalin relented and took Bulganin's purported advice "not to strike at a hornets' nest."