

before and after 1917, such as encounters and conversations, references to Bulgaria and the Balkans in Lenin's writings, their translation into Bulgarian, and the like. Shnitman's labors over the works of Lenin and leading Bulgarian Marxists, Russian and Bulgarian archives, the contemporary press, and the publications of Soviet and Bulgarian researchers have resulted in an interesting monograph which brings together much useful information. It is, however, written in the spirit of the intense cult of Lenin and tends to becloud rather than clarify the main outlines of Lenin's relationship to the kindred Marxists of Bulgaria.

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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE GREAT POWERS: THE GREEK-BULGARIAN INCIDENT, 1925. By *James Barros*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. xiv, 143 pp. \$6.50.

James Barros has established himself as an authority on the League of Nations. Within the span of a few years he produced three case studies—on the Corfu incident of 1923, on the Åland Islands question, and on the role of Joseph Avenol, the League's secretary-general—all of which received scholarly recognition.

His newest effort is no less convincing. Barros has researched with painstaking detail the available primary sources, mostly archival. (The French and Bulgarian archives were not accessible to him.) The result is a concise (perhaps too short) study of the day-by-day sequence of events which unfolded as a consequence of a seemingly harmless shooting incident at the Bulgarian-Greek border on October 19, 1925, and which culminated in the rapid involvement of the great powers and the successful settlement of the dispute by the League of Nations.

The book portrays the workings of interwar diplomacy (with its formalism but also its behind-the-scenes manipulations) and evokes many leading actors of a past era, especially Aristide Briand, Austen Chamberlain, and Sir Eric Drummond, who dealt firmly and successfully with the explosive situation. No less engaging are the minor actors and particularly the Greek officials, from the prime minister, General Theodoros Pangalos, down to the Greek diplomats in Paris and London, all of whom tried to justify the Greek invasion of Bulgaria and avoid the League's sanctions, with the usual pretense of Balkan immaculateness, yet this time without success.

Barros's main purpose in analyzing the League's "greatest political success during the interwar years" (preface) is to prove that it "had been due to a unique combination of factors which would never occur again in the years that were to follow" (p. 115), to wit, a conflict involving only marginal powers, and a unanimity of great-power interests to resolve the incident as soon and as effectively as possible. While these findings are hardly novel, the author generalizes in his conclusions that international organizations such as the League of Nations or the United Nations would do better to limit their scope to social and economic matters or at least to eschew coercive political responsibilities, thus enhancing rather than eroding their usefulness.

Although generalizations are usually debatable, one can find little fault with the core of this instructive, albeit atypical, case study. Perhaps more background on the international as well as Balkan climate would have placed the course of events in a better perspective (the few sporadic references are mostly relegated to

the footnotes). Perhaps greater attention should have been paid to secondary sources wherever primary sources were unavailable (such as many pertinent publications of the Bulgarian Academy's Institute of History). And some names are misspelled (Pancho Hadjimisheff, not Pontcho Hadji Misheff). Yet, there should be no doubt at all about the author's scholarship and contribution.

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MAGYAR-CSEHSZLOVÁK KAPCSOLATOK 1918-1921-BEN. By *Ferenc Boros*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1970. 330 pp. 47 Ft.

Ferenc Boros is a brave man who has undertaken to investigate a delicate topic. Today the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic not only consider one another fellow socialist countries, but are on the best of terms. In the period examined by Boros relations between the two countries were at their worst. Czechoslovakia had just arisen from the ruins of the Monarchy and included, with the sanction of the Entente, areas inhabited solely by Magyars. The peace treaty of Trianon, writes Boros, was an integral part of the "imperialist system at Versailles" (p. 183) and it "legalized new injustices and set the smoldering fires of new conflicts" (p. 184). It may be noted that the treaties signed in Paris after the Second World War did not redress these injustices, if injustices they were; the border between Czechoslovakia and Hungary remained unchanged, except for a few additional square miles awarded Czechoslovakia near Bratislava. Is then Boros himself fanning the flames of one of those smoldering fires? Not exactly; for the conflict he discusses was between bourgeois Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and the Hungarian Republic of Councils and the counterrevolutionary Horthy regime on the other.

Diplomatic relations are not the main topic of the book; in fact, the word used in the title is "contacts" rather than "relations." The author is primarily interested in the contacts between the workers' movements in the two countries, the subject of his doctoral dissertation at the University of Budapest in 1962. Considerable space is devoted to discussions of articles appearing in the left-wing press (as far as Hungarian papers are concerned, published mostly in Vienna) and to the conflicts between the various factions of the Left among the Czechs and among the Slovaks, as well as among the Hungarian exiles who found refuge in Czechoslovakia or in Austria after the fall of the Republic of Councils. There is little concern with the reality of power, or with the attitude of the average workingman (whether in Hungary, Slovakia, or Czechoslovakia) who fell prey to nationalist sentiments, however bourgeois those may have been. Although the doctoral dissertation has been considerably reduced (I am told), I still found the book unnecessarily long.

Nevertheless, the work is not only a brave one, but also an important one. It uses hitherto unused sources, particularly the Czech press and the Czech archives of the period. It is a work highly critical of both Hungarian and Czech (he writes "Czechoslovak") nationalism, of Czech imperialism, and of the "machinations" of the Entente powers (p. 8). Even if the contacts between the working class of the two nation-states were not close or particularly significant, Boros provides evidence to show that it is not true that Czechs and Hungarians "were created by God, or moulded by history, to hate one another," as Paul Iqnotus wrote ("Czechs, Magyars,