

Professor Hosoya Chihiro is quite right when, in the third essay, he points to the differences between German and Japanese expectations about the alliance. Hitler wanted the Japanese to irritate the United States yet avoid an open conflict; the Tokyo government hoped that the Tripartite Pact would deter Washington from interfering with Japanese plans for southeast Asia. Both parties underestimated America's determination that was to wreck the tripartite treaty by December 1941.

ERNST L. PRESSEISEN  
Temple University

THE MARSHALL PLAN SUMMER: AN EYEWITNESS REPORT ON EUROPE AND THE RUSSIANS IN 1947. By *Thomas A. Bailey*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1977. viii, 246 pp. \$10.95.

Thomas A. Bailey, whose *Diplomatic History of the American People* has been a basic college textbook for more than thirty years has added another volume to his twenty-odd books. *The Marshall Plan Summer* is based on the author's diary maintained while he surveyed conditions in war-torn Europe. Bailey traveled under the auspices of the National War College whose staff provided the initial briefings. In Europe most of his information also came from official or semiofficial American sources. In spite of this handicap, Bailey strives to maintain scholarly objectivity, but he succeeds only in part. Although many observations show his percipience, he is not quite able to evade the clichés of a biased environment: thus the Soviet Union "did not want a reunited Germany"; "Stalin connived with Hitler to start the war"; and the Kremlin used the Western currency reform as "a pretext for inaugurating the Berlin blockade." In a similar vein, important details which could provide balance remain unreported. There is no reference to Truman's neglect when he relinquished the German assets in Austria as reparations; nor is the reader informed that a unanimous control council vote in Vienna was actually needed to reverse the decisions of Austria's independent government.

Bailey acknowledges that "the 'party line' at the War College was that the Soviet Union by its aggressive post-war designs and acts had forced the cold war on the Western democracies." And he admits that "I myself came to accept it, especially after numerous and extended talks with American officers in Europe who had experienced close contacts with the Russians."

Despite these limitations, *The Marshall Plan Summer* deserves a wide readership. It is well written, quite entertaining, and clearly reflects the spirit of the late 1940s, which tended to promote the confrontations of the Cold War.

JOHN H. BACKER  
U.S. Senate

SOVIET IMAGES OF AMERICA. By *Stephen P. Gibert*, with contributions by *Arthur A. Zuehkle, Jr.*, *Richard Soll*, and *Michael J. Deane*. Stanford Research Institute, Strategic Studies Center. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977. xiv, 167 pp. \$12.50, cloth. \$5.95, paper.

In his opening sentence, the author declares: "Faulty perceptions of the policies of other nations or of the motives, beliefs and actions of their leaders and people can and do lead to disastrous mistakes." And his initial position, as well as that of his colleagues at the Strategic Studies Center of the Stanford Research Institute which published this volume, seems to be that Soviet perceptions of the United States have indeed been faulty, and dangerously so. Gibert appears to be convinced that Moscow now holds an