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A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY
OF THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONS*

I

INTRODUCTION AND DESCRIPTIONS

A. Introduction

The purpose of this article is to make a contribution to the scientific – that is to say, the analytical and explanatory – historiography of workers' trade unions in individual industries. The question to which an answer is sought is, "What factors determine the success of a trade union of the workers in a particular branch of industry?" A trade union of workers is here defined as a sales cartel for labour power. By the success of such a trade union is meant its recognition by the employers concerned as an agent selling the labour power of the workers it represents; the recognition becomes a fact when wages and other conditions of employment are determined in the framework of a national *Collectieve Arbeids-Overeenkomst* (CAO) – a collective labour agreement, in which the trade union is a party in a formal contract.

It is, of course, possible to define success otherwise. If desired one may speak of success when a solid union is created, which may occur long before a national CAO is concluded. If, however, a trade union is defined as above, it is reasonable to identify the recognition acknowledged by its status as a co-signatory of a national CAO as the moment of its success. It must be remarked that not every CAO, as far as its contents are concerned, is equally favourable to the workers involved. The success of a trade union is naturally greater when the CAO obtains clear and considerable improvements in wages and other conditions of employment than when these matters are of small importance. Attention must be paid to this point in the following discussion, in the

* This article is a translation and an adaptation of "Bijdrage tot de wetenschappelijke studie van de vakbondsgeschiedenis", in: *Mededelingenblad*, the organ of the Nederlandse Vereniging tot Beoefening van de Sociale Geschiedenis (Netherlands Society for the Study of Social History), No 46 (1974), pp. 89-108.

sense that the degrees of success must be noted and also explained. Moreover, success in the meaning given above is often attained by stages, for example through local or regional CAO's, or through limited arrangements which do not yet have the character of a full CAO.

The making of a CAO implies that the labour market in the industry concerned becomes more or less regulated in two respects. On the one hand the competition between the workers in the market is limited; on the other hand the competitive conditions of the various enterprises with regard to wages and other terms of employment are more or less standardised. The latter aspect indicates that the regulation of the labour market is linked with the regulation of other market relationships in the industry concerned. The regulation of the labour market must therefore be considered in the context of all other market relationships. In doing so we must observe the following points, which are given in systematic sequence: the power relationships between the home entrepreneurs in the industry concerned on the one hand, and the suppliers of raw materials, subsidiary requirements and machines, and sometimes of land, on the other hand; those between these home entrepreneurs and their creditors; those between the home entrepreneurs mutually; finally, those between these entrepreneurs and their immediate customers. Of course some of these categories may coincide, such as those of the suppliers and the creditors. The above-mentioned market relationships are here considered in their connection with the relationships in the labour market, which we intend to explain.

In order to understand the factors which explain the success of a trade union in the above-defined sense a comparative historical study was made of three industries in the Netherlands – the diamond-cutting industry, the printing industry and the cotton textile industry. The first was centred in Amsterdam and the adjoining municipalities, the second was scattered over the whole of the Netherlands, and the third was found principally in the Eastern parts of the country, particularly in the Twente district in the province of Overijssel near the German border. The intention of the comparative study made it necessary in all cases to consider the period preceding the conclusion of the first national CAO. This means the years prior to 1895 for the diamond industry, the years prior to 1914 for the printing industry, and the years prior to 1940 for the Twente textile industry. The choice of the industries to study was determined by the desirability of comparing a variety of examples. The diamond industry demands highly specialised craftsmanship; it was at that time concentrated in one place occupying to a large extent a monopoly in the world market. The printing industry also uses skilled labour, but was spread over the whole country; it was not particularly subject to competition from foreign

entrepreneurs. Finally the cotton industry was a highly mechanised industry of mass products, which operated with often untrained labour and was open to international competition in both the home and export markets.

By way of introduction we will first give a brief survey of the conditions and developments in each of the three industries during the periods referred to above.

B. The diamond-cutting industry until c. 1895¹

As already stated, Amsterdam was at that time the world centre for diamond cutting. The only other centre of any importance, Antwerp in Belgium, prepared only about a quarter of world production in 1894, and moreover specialised in coarser work, particularly for the Central and East European markets; Amsterdam specialised in very fine work and at that time served almost exclusively the important North American market and also a large part of the West European market.

The organisation of the industry revealed a remarkable mixture of features typical of an artisan, home-industry and large-scale factory industry. The most important operation, polishing, took place in steam mills, often of considerable size; the steam engines delivered the power necessary for the rapidly turning polishing mills. Usually, however, the factories were not the property of the diamond-industry employers, but of separate entrepreneurs who functioned as lessors of the polishing mills and the steam power. Even employers with their own steam factories exploited them as mill-hiring businesses. Those who hired such mills (the hiring periods were reckoned per half day or per multiples thereof) were of various kinds. There were the polishers' foremen, workpeople who accepted stones for working from the merchants, or entrepreneurs, called jewellers. For each lot given for working piece rates were stipulated. The polishers' foreman employed workers (polisher's mates), but only for the period and to the number of men required to carry out the work. There were also the self-employed workers, who bought stones themselves (usually in small quantities), did their own polishing with or without the help of

¹ The background is described in greater detail in Th. van Tijn, "Geschiedenis van de Amsterdamse diamanthandel en -nijverheid, 1845-1897", in: *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, LXXXVII (1974), pp. 16-70 and 160-201, in which will also be found a list of all sources and literature. Cf. also id., "De Algemeene Nederlandsche Diamantbewerkerbond (ANDB): een succes en zijn verklaring", in: *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, LXXXVIII (1973), pp. 403-18.

other workers, and sold the product. Polisher's mates often worked alternately in the service of a polishers' foreman or as self-employed operators. The preparation of the stones for polishing, that is splitting and cutting them, was done by specialist workers either in the jewellers' ateliers or at home; they accepted lots of stones at piece rates.

The Amsterdam diamond industry experienced a period of rapid expansion between 1871, when the newly-discovered mines at Kimberley, Cape Colony, began large-scale production, and the end of 1889, when rough-diamond production was monopolised and its sale put in the hands of a cartel. The annual production of rough diamonds, which came almost exclusively from Brazil before the discovery of the Cape veins, may be estimated as an average of about 200,000 carats before 1870. In that year the newly started Cape production was about 100,000 carats, in 1873 more than 1,000,000 carats, and in 1880 more than 3,000,000 carats. A market continued to exist (since 1874 against generally sharply dropping prices) for these previously unheard of quantities, and consequently there was an increasing demand for diamond workers. The number of diamond workers in Amsterdam and surroundings rose from about 1,400 around 1865 to about 10,000 in 1889. The number of steam mills increased from four in 1870 to 70 in 1889, and the number of polishing mills increased from 858 to about 7,500.

Until 1873 the industry was controlled by traditional jeweller families belonging to the propertied middle class. Like the men to whom they gave work they were for the most part Jews. After 1873 these jewellers were superseded in a short space of time by a multitude of small jewellers and self-employed operators from the working class. At the end of the 1880's the number of diamond dealers in Amsterdam (jewellers, self-employed workers, commission agents and brokers) was about 1,500. They started work mostly without capital of any significance and without credit. The bigger operators bought their own rough diamonds in London, while many others bought from middlemen in Amsterdam. The self-employed and the small jewellers had to work (or have worked) each lot purchased immediately and offer their products for sale equally quickly, on the spot and for cash, in order to cover costs and be able to live. They were powerless against the international wholesale trade in polished diamonds, which promptly reflected every fall in the price of rough diamonds in London (a frequent occurrence since 1873) in the finished diamond prices, so that the Amsterdam merchants often suffered a loss on their stocks. In the same way every lowering of wages (and this, after an exorbitant rise in wages in the beginning of the 1870's, was continuous, especially in the 1880's and the early 1890's) was reflected in lower prices for

polished stones, so that this development also did not benefit the Amsterdam employers. In bad times the small Amsterdam jewellers and the self-employed operators had to make do with small profits, with no more than an ordinary workman's wage, or even with less than that. In fact most of the Amsterdam small merchants and employers can only be regarded as middlemen who had the responsibility of working the stones, while the real profits from the industry went to the wholesale rough-diamond trade in London and the great international buyers of the finished stones. An important part of the Amsterdam industry occupied itself at the end of the 1880's with commission work for foreign accounts, and had in fact become a wage-earning industry.

The market position of the Amsterdam diamond businessmen was therefore very weak, both in the purchase of the raw materials in London and in the sale of the finished product in Amsterdam. The continuous drop in price of the product, the consequent continuous losses on stocks and lowering of wages could naturally have been slowed down or stopped if the Amsterdam jewellers and the self-employed operators had united to form cartels to buy rough stones and sell the finished product. This solution was prohibited, however, by the large numbers of small merchants and the ease with which a polisher's mate could start his own business – if only temporarily. The social prestige of the majority of Amsterdam diamond merchants and employers was very small: neither their origin, their wealth, their way of life, nor their education was such as to inspire much respect.

Around 1890 the majority of diamond polishers were young, an understandable feature in an industry which had expanded so rapidly and which usually recruited its workers as 12- or 13-year-old apprentices. In 1889 a good 86% of the polishers and adjusters were younger than 35 and almost 57% were between 18 and 35, as against about 65% and 48% respectively in Amsterdam industry as a whole. During the time of a great shortage of labour and very high wages (the first half of the 1870's) the diamond workers – mostly Jews – managed to form a few trade unions, which attempted among other things to limit the number of apprentices. In vain, for the non-Jewish polishers especially accepted many apprentices, and when prices began to fall the high wage scales fixed by the small unions could no longer be maintained. These unions were disbanded, whereupon countless numbers of new diamond workers began to appear, together with an uncontrolled decline in wage levels. There was keen competition among the workers in the labour market. They were helpless against their employers, who in their turn could do nothing against the buyers of the finished diamonds. Many complaints were made about the low

educational standards of the diamond workers and their irregular manner of living. Yet around 1890 there was a nucleus of more civilised workers numbering a few hundred, who attended all kinds of courses. There was also after 1888 a very small socialist trade union; it is true that it had not the slightest influence, but a few of its members studied the principles of Marxism and the theories of class warfare under the guidance of socialist intellectuals. These people were, moreover, some of the better-paid workers – a few cutters and polishers' foremen.

In 1888-89, under the leadership of Cecil Rhodes, a monopoly was created for the mining of rough diamonds; in 1890 the sale of these diamonds to London was put under the control of a cartel. Rhodes's intention was to raise the prices of the raw material and then to stabilise them, first by curtailing production and then to adjust it to demand. The Amsterdam merchants welcomed these developments in principle, for stabilisation of the rough-diamond prices put an end to their perpetual losses on stocks following a drop in prices. However, it did not prevent the finished product from falling in price, for the competition among the Amsterdam merchants and employers continued, often to the detriment of wages. What did follow was an end to the growth of the industry. Like the quantity of imported rough diamonds, the number of mills was also stabilised: at that time there were evidently too many of them. Some grave unemployment crises ensued, during which the ranks of the apprentices thinned and some workers left the trade.

In the summer and autumn of 1894, after years of mainly slack business, the outlook for the Amsterdam diamond industry suddenly became much brighter as a result of the large stocks of finished diamonds bought by American merchants to anticipate an increase in the American import duty. For the first time since 1873 wages rose as the jewellers and the self-employed sought to buy the best workers from their competitors. After a number of small strikes the workers seized their chance in November 1894. A strike started in a factory quickly spread until it became general – the first in this industry. The leaders of the small socialist trade-union movement, five in number, found themselves leading the strike. The chief demand was the introduction of a general minimum-wage scale. At the end of the week's strike nearly all employers had given their written consent to abide by this scale. The strike committee reorganised itself as the temporary chief executive of a new trade union, the *Algemeene Nederlandsche Diamantbewerkerbond* (ANDB, the General Netherlands Diamond Workers' Union), which began its work by collecting members' contributions and by publishing a weekly journal.

An important cause of the sudden and enduring success of this new trade organisation was the moral and practical support which the influential jewellers, who were able to assess the market situation accurately, offered the strike and the union. The mass of small jewellers and self-employed men were so engaged in throat-cutting competition that they were powerless to form a cartel to sell the polished stones on the model of Rhodes's cartel for the raw material. A general minimum-wage scale, applicable to all employers and strictly enforced by a strong workers' union (really a CAO, but the name was not yet in use) was the next best solution. Stable raw-material prices added to stable wages meant automatically stable finished-product prices. A well-organised sales cartel of the labour power had in that respect the same significance as a cartel for the sale of polished stones would have had. There followed much strife, such as general strikes, lock-outs and a number of small conflicts. Much as the Amsterdam merchants approved the stabilisation of raw-material prices, although they often complained that they were too high, they equally favoured the introduction of a general minimum-wage scale, but sometimes bitterly opposed its upper rates and other conditions of employment. For the time being, however, the new trade union exercised supreme power in the industry. Within a few years it succeeded in negotiating considerable wage increases, shortening working hours, putting an end to numerous abuses, introducing the closed shop and enforcing a stop on the taking of new apprentices. Just as about five years previously the raw-material prices had been stabilised at a higher level, so now as a result of all these steps the prices of polished stones and also wages were similarly stabilised.

C. The printing industry until 1914¹

I have already indicated that the printing industry was limited to the national market, but on the other hand was subject to no foreign competition of any importance. Small printing jobs for administrative, trade and family purposes were done by local printers; the market for

¹ The results of the study of the printing and Twente textile industries are given here. They are based on data arranged according to factors in card indexes and given again in partial reports. It is not possible in this short article to refer to these data. I must limit myself to naming the titles of the publications, reports and papers from which they were taken.

Literature and sources used in the study of the printing industry: G. W. van der Does, *Ontwikkeling van de bedrijfsorganisatie in de typografie* (Amsterdam, 1921); *Vijf-en-twintig jaren boekdrukkersorganisatie in Nederland. Gedenkboek uitgegeven door de Federatie van Werkgeversorganisatiën in het Boekdrukkersbedrijf*, bewerkt door H. J. Belinfante en P. Borst (Amsterdam, 1934); W. J.

these purposes was therefore always limited regionally. Important printing work (books, catalogues, illustrations and newspapers) was much less confined to one place or region: for such work the national market was one unit. Printing firms were scattered over the whole country. Most of them were small or very small and interested only in small printing jobs. Then there were the large concerns, for example those engaged by publishers for book printing. The typographical workers such as setters and printers were nearly always employed on time rates.

Since about the middle of the nineteenth century the industry had undergone a regular and fairly large expansion. In 1850 about 4,700 persons were employed in the Dutch printing industry (including binders but excluding lithographers). In 1860 there were about 6,000, in 1890 about 10,000, in 1900 about 11,200, and in 1910 about 12,700. The numbers of firms increased from about 300 in 1860 to about 550 in 1890, about 730 in 1900 and about 1,250 in 1912. As is apparent from these figures the printing industry included in increasing measure a large number of small employers. It was easy for a worker to start a business doing small printing jobs. In the second half of the 1890's and subsequently suppliers of typographical machines and paper, because of over-production, began a large-scale campaign to encourage workers to start their own businesses by offering them the necessary capital equipment against credit or on hire-purchase. Keen competition existed among the paper and printing-machine manufacturers at home and abroad, as it did among the printers. They asked lower and lower prices for their work in order to avoid halting their machines. For this reason their position in relation to their clients, who ordered

Wieringa, *Ten dienste van bedrijf en gemeenschap. Vijftig jaar boekdrukkersorganisatie*, uitgegeven door de Federatie van Werkgeversorganisatiën in het Boekdrukkersbedrijf (Amsterdam, 1959); [C. M. J. Alevén,] *Gedenkbladen uit de geschiedenis der Rooms-katholieke Vereniging van Nederlandsche Drukkerspatroons*, verzameld in opdracht van het bestuur ter gelegenheid van het 25-jarig bestaan (The Hague, 1940); J. Giele, "Het ontstaan van de typografen-vakorganisatie in Nederland (1837-1869)", in: *Mededelingenblad*, op. cit., No 42 (1972), pp. 2-55; F. van der Wal, *De oudste vakbond van ons land, 1866-1916. Ontstaan en vijftigjarige werkzaamheid van den Algemeenen Nederlandschen Typografenbond* [Nijmegen, 1916]; J. Hofman, *Van zorgen en zegen. De Nederlandsche Christelijke Grafische Bond, zijn ontstaan en geschiedenis naar de voorhanden zijnde officiële bescheiden beschreven* (Amsterdam, 1927); In volharding gezegend. *Gedenkboek bij het vijftig-jarig bestaan van de Nederlandsche Christelijke Grafische Bond. 1902 - 19 Mei - 1952*. In opdracht van het hoofdbestuur samengesteld door J. A. Conjong [Nijkerk, 1952]; B. Leyn, *Van streven en stuwen. Een halve eeuw katholieke arbeidersorganisatie in de grafische bedrijven* (n.p., 1950); *Grafisch Weekblad*, the organ of the ANTB, 1906-15; *Het Tarief*, the organ of the NBvB, 1910-15.

the printing jobs, was very weak. This applied also to the smaller group of large and established firms which handled book production. They competed sharply with each other in their quotations to publishers, who were often lax in settling their accounts, so that these printers often gave credit to their clients.

The numerous small or very small printers had no higher status or social prestige than their trained adult workers. The big book producers, on the other hand, were men of a certain substance, with capital, business know-how, erudition, and as far as social status was concerned they were clearly superior to their employees. The average age of the workers was low. In 1910 more than half belonged to the age group 18 to 35, only a few less than the proportion of diamond workers of this age group in about 1894. The trained adult workers usually attained a relatively high standard of education, as is customary in the printing industry. They were proud of their craft and considered themselves (like most diamond workers) as more or less the aristocrats of the workers, although their wages were low on account of the great increase of firms and employers, and of the employment of boys since the introduction of modern machines.

As a reaction against the introduction of mechanisation and the employment of boys a national trade union of typographers had already been started in 1866; this was the *Algemeene Nederlandsche Typografenbond* (ANTB, the General Netherlands Typographers' Union), which was the first national trade union in the Netherlands. After 1873, however, this trade union was totally powerless and took little active part in affairs. In the following decades, while it continued to exert little practical effort, mechanical presses (the platen machines) were widely introduced, even in the small printing shops. After about 1900 there was also a rapid increase in the use of type-setting machines. From about 1894 activity in the trade union began to revive, and in the following years, until 1914, it functioned vigorously, organising many local strikes under its leadership. More and more local CAO's were concluded, which limited competition among the workers in the local labour markets, so offering fairly effective protection to the workers in small firms. There were, however, wage differences in the various regions, especially in wages paid by the printers of books; here the printing houses in the big cities found themselves challenged by keenly competitive quotations from firms in the smaller towns and villages. This led to constant attempts to depress wage levels, which the union strongly opposed. It strove to realise a nation-wide wage scale, and in 1908 put forward draft proposals to this end. The degree of organisation among the typographers was relatively high. In 1913 more than half of them were organised, four-fifths of them being

members of the ANTB set up in 1866. This union, though neutral, had a certain socialist tendency. Between 1907 and 1913 its membership nearly doubled. Other unions were the *Nederlandsche Christelijke Typografenbond* (NCTB, the Netherlands Christian Typographers' Union), the *Nederlandsche Roomsche-Katholieke Grafische Bond* (RKGB, the Netherlands Roman Catholic Printing Union) and a number of local unions.

The leaders of the ANTB fully understood that the introduction of the national scale of wages would be impossible as long as no national employers' union existed and as long as conditions in the industry, particularly those governing the fierce competition between the growing number of firms, were not changed. The larger houses which printed books for publishers also realised the necessity for such measures. When, after some bad years, at the end of 1909 the industry's prospects improved, some of these bigger firms took the initiative of forming an employers' organisation, the *Nederlandsche Bond van Boekdrukkerijen* (NBvB, the Netherlands Union of Book-printers), its main goal being the framing and general application of minimum-price tariffs for printing. The new employers' union, whose intentions were warmly welcomed by the workers' union, went to work vigorously. In 1910 it appointed a paid propagandist and published its own weekly, *Het Tarief*. The NBvB succeeded in regulating all market transactions in the printing industry, including those in the labour market, between 1911 and 1914. It obliged the suppliers of paper and typographical machines to equip new firms only against cash payments, and at the request of the NBvB to boycott printers who ignored the price tariffs. On the other hand the members of the NBvB bound themselves not to buy from unorganised suppliers. As from 1st January 1912 the union applied a national minimum tariff for the normal kind of printing.

The workers' trade unions, which began to co-operate after about 1910, agreed to all this. But there was a difference of opinion about the question as to whether the minimum-wage scales desired by both parties should take precedence over other market regulations such as the price tariff, or whether they should follow them. Here lay the key to supreme power within the industry and the answer to the question whether the workers' or the employers' union would be the stronger when a CAO came to be concluded. For the NBvB the CAO would be the finishing touch to the total market regulation, which would have to come about under its leadership. The workers' unions, however, campaigned for the rapid settling of a national CAO, and agreement was reached on this in principle after a typographers' strike in Amsterdam early in 1913. The dispute with the workers' unions served

as a practical propaganda weapon for the NBvB to influence unorganised firms to join their union.

This last point presented the NBvB with the real difficulty. The union was growing quickly; started by 21 people (all important book printers), at the end of 1910 it had 250 members and early in 1913 about 600, that is about half of all the employers, but with many more than half of all workers in the services. For the organisation of the others it needed not only the help of the suppliers but also that of the workers' unions. The national CAO that operated from 1st January 1914 provided for agreed wage scales and work times according to class of municipality. On the average they were better wages and shorter hours than were current at that time; organised workers should only work for organised firms; organised firms should only employ trade-union members; the workers' unions should – supported by the NBvB – call for boycotts and strikes against unorganised employers, employers who ignored price tariffs and employers who failed to apply wage scales. These decisions were supplemented in 1917 with a regulation governing apprentices' conditions.

The initiative in regulating the market was taken by the employers; it was also the wage scales drawn up by them which became the basis of the CAO, not the proposals of the ANTB. All this contrasted with what had happened nearly twenty years previously in the diamond industry. The improvements in wages obtained then by the diamond workers were also much better than those which the typographers managed to get in their first CAO.

D. The cotton industry in Twente before 1940¹

The manufacture of cotton materials in Holland around 1930 was 90% concentrated in the Twente region in the East of the country. The Twente spinning and weaving mills were designed for the mass

¹ Literature and sources used in the study of the Twente textile industry: A. Blonk, *Fabrieken en mensen* (Enschede, 1929); F. van Heek, *Sociale gevolgen van de economische crisis en depressie in Enschede (1929-1937)*. Openbare les (Amsterdam, 1937); id., *Stijging en daling op de maatschappelijke ladder. Een onderzoek naar verticale mobiliteit* (Leyden, 1945); W. T. Kroese, *Vormen van samenwerking in de Nederlandse katoenindustrie (1929-1939)* (Leyden, 1955). Permission was received to examine reports of the Sociological Enquiry into the Twente-Achterhoek textile industry, conducted under the aegis of the Sociological Institute of Leyden University from 1955 onwards. Especially useful for our purposes were: G. W. Reitsma, "Economische ontwikkeling in de katoenindustrie (van 1918 tot heden)"; C. F. Vervoort, "De betrekkingen tussen de organisaties van werkgevers en werknemers in de Twents-Achterhoekse textielindustrie (1918-1940)"; B. A. Sijes et al., "Overleg en strijd tussen arbeiders, fabrikanten en vakverenigingen in de Twentse

production of large series; the industry attached great importance to exports. Of the total Dutch production in 1928, worth roughly 240 million guilders, about 50% was exported; half of these exports went to the Dutch East Indies. In this market, which was unprotected, the Dutch manufacturer enjoyed a certain preference, thanks to his knowledge of the trade and connections. Even at that time, however, he was threatened by foreign, particularly Japanese, competition. In the other export markets as well as in the unprotected home market the Dutch products had to compete with those of foreign centres.

Since about 1870 the Twente textile industry was entirely mechanised; both spinning (which was relatively infrequent, as much thread was imported) and weaving were done in big mechanised factories. The workers were paid at piece rates. The industry underwent regular expansion, both before the First World War and also in the 1920's until the world crisis. The increase in the number of workers was, however, smaller than that of the numbers of spindles and looms, for the work was becoming much more intensified. The industry was highly sensitive to market conditions, as is shown by the following employment figures.

	1924		1929		1933		1937	
Boys under 18	2,800	10%	3,000	10%	1,300	6.5%	3,000	10.5%
Men	14,700	58%	18,000	58%	12,200	61 %	17,000	59.5%
Girls under 18	2,500	10%	3,500	11%	1,800	9 %	2,500	9 %
Women	5,500	22%	6,400	21%	4,700	23.5%	6,100	21 %
Total	25,500	100%	30,900	100%	20,000	100 %	28,600	100 %

The figures, which are approximate, relate to the total textile industry in Twente and the adjoining area of the Achterhoek. They exclude office personnel. Most of the workers were employed in the Twente cotton industry.

As can be seen, the numbers of women workers varied between 30% and 32.5%; those of the young people between 15.5% and 21%.

The Twente cotton manufacturers enjoyed considerable social prestige in their region. They were referred to as the textile barons. The cotton industry in Enschede, the most important centre, was in the hands of the members of seven traditional manufacturers' families, who were moreover interrelated by marriage. This does not mean that

textielindustrie (1922-1955)". The following appeared in connection with the work of the above-named Sociological Enquiry: Th. J. IJzerman, *Beroepsaanzien en arbeidsvoldoening met betrekking tot de arbeidsvoorziening in de Twents-Achterhoekse textielindustrie* (Leyden, 1959). The following were also read: H. D. Grobden, "Sociale conflicten en sociale organisatie in de Twentse textielindustrie (1860-1912)", in: *Textielhistorische Bijdragen*, XII (1971), pp. 36-78; XIII, pp. 38-75; *De Textielarbeider*, the organ of *De Eendracht*, 1931-41.

before the world crisis they co-operated in any way when buying raw materials, semi-manufactured goods or machines; neither did this apply to the distribution of their products. Competition was absolutely free, while trade secrets as well as business contacts were jealously guarded. In the early years of the world crisis their position was extremely weak in their dealings with their clients at home and abroad, who were able to demand a number of privileges in respect of *prices and delivery conditions by playing off firms, both home and foreign*, against each other. High losses were suffered, but did not lead to bankruptcy as they were made up from family capital. In their turn the Dutch firms bought raw materials and semi-manufactured goods under advantageous terms because the markets for these commodities were also dominated by open competition and overproduction.

Although there was a tendency to employ as many young people as possible, in the 1930's the average age of the workers was high: more than 60% of the male textile workers in Enschede, according to an enquiry in 1941, were 30 or older and 22% were older than 50. (In comparison, of the diamond polishers and adjusters in 1889 fewer than 15% were over 35 and 5% were over 50.) These workers, male and female, were untrained; at best they had had some experience. They were easy to replace locally or by workers attracted from other trades or from areas outside Twente. They were dependent on the industry because of their lack of other openings, although they were not bound to a particular employer. They could be easily dismissed, to be re-engaged in better times, if not always by their former employers. Their social status was exceptionally low, particularly when compared with that of the textile barons. According to an enquiry in 1941 they were considered by the local population, including themselves, as little better than hawkers, village-fair showmen and suchlike people. There was sharp competition in the labour market, partly because relatively large numbers of women and young people worked in the industry, and because of the influx of workers from outside Twente. This continued to be so during the mass unemployment of the 1930's. Until the Second World War wages were among the lowest in Dutch industry.

Trade unions existed, but they could seldom do anything much. It was typical that the widespread and long-lasting strikes – which the workers lost, as they did those of November 1923 to May 1924 and those of the winter of 1931-32 – always took place in times of depression in resistance to lower wages and longer working hours. The first trade union among the workers came into being in 1889 under socialist influence. Soon after this a Roman Catholic trade union was formed to combat socialism. After a strike at the end of 1890 the

Fabrikanten-Vereeniging ter voorkoming van werkstakingen (Manufacturers' Union to prevent strikes) was started; it continued to exist and combated strikes by enforcing a general lock-out, as it did in 1902. In 1914 there were four workers' trade unions: the *Algemeene Nederlandsche Bond van Textielarbeiders "De Eendracht"* (General Dutch Union of Textile Workers *De Eendracht*), with socialist tendencies; a Roman Catholic union called *St. Lambertus*; a Protestant union called *Unitas*; and a syndicalist union, the *Federatie van Vrije Textielarbeiders* (Federation of Free Textile Workers).

During the boom of the post-1918 years these unions attained some sort of co-operation and the manufacturers concluded some agreements with them (in particular a guide wage scale made in 1919, which determined the wage of an adult, skilled and industrious worker – without, however, indicating how these two latter qualities could be measured). In the following depression these agreements were however unilaterally abandoned by the manufacturers (July 1921), who then played the various unions off against each other, so that the workers profited from the pre-1930 boom as far as work opportunities were concerned but not in the matter of wages and other working conditions. The membership of the unions rose, however, until the great strike of 1931-32: for example, that of *De Eendracht* increased from more than 5,000 in 1924 to more than 10,000 in 1931. The depression of the 1930's hit the Twente textile industry hard, as I have already said. Owing to mass unemployment, and especially after the failed strike of 1931-32, membership of the trade unions declined considerably. *De Eendracht* lost about half its members in Twente from 1931 to 1937; according to figures compiled on the Enschede branch it was mostly the number of women members of this union that declined, namely from about 28.5% of the members of the branch to less than 13%. In 1936 and the following years the outlook for the industry improved when protective governmental measures began to have an effect and the devaluation of the guilder in 1936 improved export opportunities. The number of trade-union members in Twente continued to decline, however, in spite of renewed activity by the unions, who were now again co-operating to bring about a CAO.

The situation in the industry changed during the depression. Export markets were largely lost: in 1935 only about 20% of production was exported, as against about 50% in 1928. Of this greatly reduced export only about a third went in 1933 to the Dutch East Indies, compared with about a half in 1928. The total sale value of exports fell from about 120 million guilders in 1928 to about 17.5 million guilders in 1935, that is by more than 85%. The sale value of home-market production fell also, but far less drastically than that of export

production, namely from about 120 to about 70 million guilders – by nearly 42%. Export had become comparatively unimportant. After 1933 exports to the Dutch East Indies rose again, as did home sales, following protective governmental measures. In 1935 about 50% of exports went again to the Dutch East Indies, and in 1937-38 even about 75%.

The outlet possibilities for the industry were thus largely limited to the home and colonial markets, which were increasingly protected after the summer of 1932 – that is, they were increasingly reserved for the Dutch product. At the same time the manufacturers tried to limit competing among themselves, which the workers' unions had indeed constantly urged, as they had urged protective governmental measures. Since the end of 1933 regulations were made per sector governing allocation among the various businesses according to capacity ratio of production and export quotas, the latter for the Dutch East Indies market. Terms of delivery were also fixed for the home market, and minimum-price regulations for the Dutch East Indies market.

Until about 1938 the textile manufacturers had opposed the making of a CAO. With an eye on international competition, they wished to remain free in determining and changing wages and other labour conditions. The trade-union organisations of the workers began to make stronger and more unanimous demands for a CAO during the recovery of 1936 and the subsequent years. Now that the manufacturers began to co-operate in the matters of delivery terms for the home market and of minimum prices and production quotas for the Dutch East Indies market, while other exports and international competition had become of little significance, they also approved the idea of standardising their mutual competitive conditions in regard to wages. In May 1940 employers and trade-union representatives were to meet to determine the principle of a CAO. This was prevented by the German invasion, but in 1941 agreement was reached on the matter, although nothing could be done because of regulations imposed by the German occupation authorities. The planned CAO provisions involved recognition of the trade unions of the textile workers as contracting parties in the labour market and standardisation of wage regulations in the various factories, but there were hardly material improvements.

II

THE FACTORS

From the three studies of which the results are resumed above, it seems possible to determine the factors controlling the success

of a workers' trade union in the meaning defined earlier, and also partly to put them in order of importance. I distinguish three groups of factors:

- A. Economic factors,
- B. Socio-structural factors,
- C. Socio-psychological factors.

A. The economic factors

To consider the economic factors first, it is possible to distinguish three of them. As the most important factor (not only of the economic factors, but of all factors) emerged from our comparative study of the three industries the following:

A-1) the extent to which the entrepreneurs are exposed to foreign competition. The question is, "How far is the level of costs in the home country decisive for the price of the products in the consumers' market, and how far is the price influenced by the cost levels of foreign producers?" All kinds of variations are possible here. One production centre can determine the price of the product in the world market. The cost of home production can determine the price on the national market only, for example on account of protection. It is also possible that production must be effected near the place of consumption, so that sales are local or regional and no competition from other centres occurs in the market. The opposite extreme is found when a production centre experiences competition both in the home and in the export markets from a number of foreign production centres.

As a second economic factor must be mentioned:

A-2) the price elasticity of demand for the product. Here the question is, "Can a product suffer a rise in price without a noticeable decline in the demand for it?" This appears to be possible under certain circumstances for a luxury product which is only bought by well-to-do people, largely independent of the asking price, and also for the first necessities of life which nobody can do without and which are bought in any case, if need be by economising on other purchases. In both of these opposite cases, the price elasticity of demand is small in the period concerned and in the production market concerned.

As a third and final economic factor must be noted:

A-3) the mutual power relationships between the parties in the markets, exclusive of those in the labour market. The parties in the markets were listed above.

With regard to the economic factors it appears, as might be expected, that they generally and primarily influence the conduct of the

entrepreneur. In so far as they tend to regulate (among other things) the labour market in the industry, the initiative in this respect will therefore usually be taken from the employer's side; the result will in that event be a CAO offering the workers few direct material advantages. Others factors, particularly those named under B, may however upset this pattern.

Factor A-1 is, as stated, of prime importance. When the producers of a country experience competition from foreign centres in the markets which they provide, the opportunity of regulating the market nationally does not arise. Further, national regulation of the labour market, which hinders and delays the adaptation of wages and other labour conditions to developments in the field of competition, is highly undesirable for the employers. They will therefore oppose a CAO to the limit. Such an agreement will not be easily finalised, even though other factors may in themselves be conducive to its conclusion. An example of this occurred in the Twente textile industry before the world crisis of the 1930's had reduced its market mainly to Holland and her colonies and before this market was protected. Only when matters had got so far did this factor lose much of its negative influence and a certain national market regulation, including regulation of the labour market, became possible.

The printing industry operated from production centres scattered throughout the whole country, but the national market was practically free from international competition, while there was hardly any question of exports. The small printing firms could rely on their local or regional market (there was thus little interlocal or interregional competition), and this applied also to the newspaper printers. As for big printing jobs such as books, illustrated work and catalogues, the national market was a great deal more unified. Regulating the markets (also the labour market) was therefore possible on a national level, while for small jobs and newspaper printing this was also possible on local or regional levels. In the printing industry the national CAO was therefore preceded by local and regional ones. Finally, the Amsterdam diamond industry of about 1894 provides the extreme example of a local production centre of which cost levels, at any rate for top-quality ornamental diamonds produced there, fixed international prices. Market regulation, in so far as it depended on the operation of this prime factor, was possible in that industry then.

With regard to the second economic factor, A-2, the diamond industry was equally an extreme case: such a luxury product as the ornamental diamond can easily bear a rise in price, so that as far as this aspect is concerned a rise in cost level caused by a rise in wages did not need to involve the employers in any difficulty. As for the

printing industry, big printing jobs at least could more or less be considered as luxury products able to stand a price rise. Of the mass products of the textile industry it may be remarked that, while most of the population can economise on them, there is always a minimum amount which will have to be bought, even if prices do rise.

Factor A-3 must, as became clear, be divided into various parts. Ground lessors and creditors do not need to be considered separately in the examples studied by us. As the most important of the three remaining parts, we must mention the mutual relationships between the home employers in the consumers' market (factor A-3-a). Both in the diamond industry of about 1894 and in the printing industry before the First World War there was a morbid growth of small employers, many of them from the workers' group, who seriously disturbed the consumers' markets, in other words they greatly lowered market prices and so profits. Mutual agreements on minimum prices and/or other delivery conditions were therefore desirable in both cases for the entrepreneurs. Because of the large numbers of small employers (in fact, therefore, because of factor B-1, see below), the diamond merchants were not able to do this on their own account. The initiative to regularise this market could in this case only come from the workers and had to be reached deviously by a CAO, as customers for ornamental diamond naturally had no interest in opposing deteriorating prices. The workers were also capable of such an initiative in the second half of 1894 owing to the factors B-2 and C (see below), which operated in their favour. This initiative also favoured the entrepreneurs in view of the positive operation of the factors A-1 and A-2.

After 1909 the printing employers were ready for mutual tariff agreements in view of the favourable (for them) operation of factor B-1, but to conclude them they had to compel or enlist the help of their suppliers on the one hand and the workers' trade unions on the other. The Twente textile manufacturers, as stated above, were only able to effect a certain measure of market regulation when factor A-1 had largely lost its negative operation in the world crisis of the 1930's and as a result of the protective measures in the Dutch and Dutch East Indies markets. Aided by a socio-structural factor (B-1), they were then able to bring that about without outside help.

In the foregoing I have also discussed the relationship between the home employers and their immediate customers (factor A-3-b). In all three industries in the beginning of the periods under consideration the home employers occupied a weak position when dealing with their customers because of sharp mutual competition, and in the textile industry also because of much competition from abroad. In general the consumers, as I have said, naturally had no interest in market regula-

tions that would result in price rises. In the printing industry there was, however, a mixture of functions in some firms. Some of the large publishers of books and newspapers exploited printing presses on which outside orders were often carried out. Such publishers, in their capacity as producers of printing jobs, might feel inclined to support market regulation.

Let us now consider the last element in this factor – the markets for raw materials, subsidiary requirements and machines (factor A-3-c). Regulating the market can be desirable for suppliers when their mutual competition leads to a deteriorating market and so to lower profits. Such was the situation for a long time for rough diamonds, for which, however, one production centre, Kimberley in Cape Colony, fixed international prices, while the raw material could easily bear price rises in view of the nature of the end product. The creation of a monopoly in this product and a cartel for the sale of rough diamonds was therefore quite possible, and as it was also desirable because of the deteriorating market it was carried out in 1888-89. This meant that the setting up of a buyers' cartel to counterbalance this sellers' cartel became desirable for the Amsterdam diamond merchants, but they were powerless to effect this because of a socio-structural factor which I shall discuss presently (see under B-1). The result was that they could have no objection to market regulation if others initiated it. That could only be done by the workers, for reasons given under A-3-a above.

Since the 1890's there was a structural over-capacity in the production of printing machines, as was made clear by the installation of printing firms aided by suppliers' credit, a frequent development at this time. The home market for these machines was open to imports from various countries; regulation of this market was in itself desirable for the suppliers, but in view of international competition they were unable to attain it on their own initiative. In this they were dependent on an initiative from the other side. Once again the socio-structural factor to be discussed below (see under B-1), together with the operation of factor A-3-a, resulted in this initiative being taken by the printing-press owners, supported by the workers' trade unions, who were already in a strong position because of the socio-psychological factors (see under C), which were mostly favourable to them.

The Dutch market in raw cotton and thread could be freely supplied from various foreign production centres, like that of textile machines. Its regulation by the suppliers was therefore impossible and was not desirable to Dutch employers and their workers.

B. The socio-structural factors

The importance of the socio-structural factors has become apparent above. When the economic factors promote market regulation, including that of the labour market, these factors are all-important in determining from which side the initiative in making a CAO shall be taken and which party shall be the strongest. The factors concern the social status on the one hand of the group of employers (or a group representing them) (factor B-1) and on the other hand of the workers' group (or a group representing them) (factor B-2), and they do this in mutual comparison. If workers with limited capital can become employers without much difficulty, the result is a large number of more or less poor little businesses. The social status of the owners of such businesses is not much higher than that of their workers. This can occur in industries which are entirely or largely conducted on an artisan basis, and in which not much investment is needed to start as an entrepreneur.

This was the case in the diamond industry around 1894 and in the printing industry before 1914. The Twente textile employers, however, enjoyed high social prestige in their region, while that of their workers was negligible; it was also an industry for which the production processes required large investments. Nevertheless the social status of the workers was raised somewhat through the existence of relatively strong trade unions and the prestige of their leaders.

Among the printing-press employers there was, however, a group of important owners who were held in high esteem socially, in contrast to the majority of their colleagues. This group was able to take the initiative in regulating the markets (through the foundation of the NBvB in 1910). With the help of the suppliers and workers' unions they succeeded in persuading the smaller firms to co-operate. Among the diamond merchants no such group of sufficient strength existed in 1894. The social status of the diamond workers was generally low, although it was not lower than that of most diamond merchants, but there was a small elite qualified and ready to lead the whole group. As the economic factors were extremely favourable a CAO (not so called at that time) was drawn up on the initiative of the workers, so that the contract was materially much to their advantage. This result of the combined operation of economic and socio-structural factors was exceptional, as favourable economic factors usually lead to the employers taking the initiative in calling for a CAO.

In the printing industry in the early twentieth century the employers, as I have said, could take the initiative through a small elite, but they were obliged, among other things, to call in the help of the workers'

trade unions, which were prepared to co-operate in their own interests and, in view of the socio-structural and socio-psychological factors, were also in a position to do so. The CAO here concluded was of limited advantage to the workers. As far as the Twente textile industry is concerned the employers could practically dictate the terms of the proposed CAO, because of the operation of the socio-structural factors, when the economic factors finally rendered the time ripe for market regulations. (The German invasion of 1940 prevented the CAO from moving beyond the proposal stage.)

C. The socio-psychological factors

The socio-psychological factors now to be reviewed apply exclusively to the workers, except those that concern the psychological effect of an upheaval in market conditions (factor C-6). They have less influence on the success of a trade union, as explained above, than the foregoing factors. They do determine whether a trade union exists among the workers concerned and how strong it will be. They therefore influence the degree of organisation among the workers and their fighting spirit. The success of being a party to a CAO is only achieved in a favourable combination of the foregoing factors, but the union's record before the CAO, during the period when the CAO could not yet be realised, is certainly determined by the socio-psychological factors which are now to be discussed. Naturally account must also be taken of them after the conclusion of a CAO. I am talking here of socio-psychological factors, although some of them appear to be rather of a technical, industrial-organisational or economic nature. We are here concerned, however, with their psychological effect on the workers, that is with their consequences for the workers' mentality. From the study of the three industries it was not possible to arrange these factors in order of importance. Before this can be done further comparative examination of other industries will be necessary.

Mention must be made of the psychological consequences to the workers of the nature and organisation of the work process (factor C-1). Here various elements may be distinguished. First, the question of vocational schooling (factor C-1-a). Trained workers have more self-confidence than untrained workers. Most diamond workers and typographers enjoy this advantage of training, but the Twente textile workers could at best be called experienced. Further, whether or not the system of contract work obtains in the industry is of importance (factor C-1-b). If so, then the workers, or some of them, individually or collectively, are often difficult to tell apart from small employers, which is good for their self-confidence. In the industries studied this

system occurred only among many of the diamond workers; the printers worked mostly on time rates and the textile workers on piece rates. As the final element in this factor mention must be made of the question whether the workers are concentrated in big factories or scattered over a number of small work-places (factor C-1-c). The concentration of large numbers of workers in factories furthers their cohesion and ability to undertake united action, so giving them a sense of power. This was noted among the diamond polishers and the textile workers, but hardly at all among the typographers during the period we studied. Factor C-1 was therefore favourable to many diamond workers in each of its three elements, but was not so in the other industries.

A factor in this category concerns the standard of living (factor C-2). The question is here, "Do the workers find the standard to be typically proletarian?" Two aspects of the question must be observed. First (factor C-2-a), "Was their standard of living such that in their own eyes and in the opinion of their neighbours it was proletarian?" And second (factor C-2-b), "Did the workers concerned remember a higher standard of living?" The combination of both aspects will increase fighting spirit providing there is a recovery in market conditions (factor C-6). As for the diamond workers of 1894, both questions must be answered in the affirmative. The same applied between about 1910-14 to the printing workers, although in a less extreme form. The Twente textile workers traditionally had an obviously proletarian standard of living, in their own view and in that of their neighbours; moreover, in the first half of the 1930's it had declined still further. In all three industries this factor thus operated to increase fighting spirit, but only when the operation of another factor (see C-6) roused real hope of improvement.

Next, the age levels of the workers' groups concerned (factor C-3) must be considered. It is assumed that men of about 20 to 35 are best in a condition to undertake meaningful, responsible and if need be bold collective action. Among the diamond workers in 1894 and the printers in 1909 and the following years the age groups were exceptionally favourable, but this could not be said of the male Twente textile workers in the 1930's.

Of importance in this connection is the sex ratio among the workers (factor C-4). It is assumed that men, who are most frequently the breadwinners and tied to the industry, have a greater preference for organisation than women. This ratio was favourable for the workers' organisations in the diamond and printing industries, but much less so in the Twente textile industry.

A socio-psychological factor is naturally the amount of class consciousness among the workers (factor C-5-a) and among their leaders (factor C-5-b). This follows to a large extent from the above-named socio-psychological factors, but not entirely, as will presently be seen. The question is, "Is the mutual solidarity of the workers (at least within the industry, as far as wages and other conditions of employment are concerned) of more weight than other socio-cultural bonds?" The other bonds may tie the workers to the employer or the enterprise, the state or the nation, church or religious beliefs. In the three industries studied and in the periods concerned the personal relationships between the employers and their workers, interpreted in a more or less paternalistic sense, had become very much weaker; this was the result of a more businesslike relationship due to constantly intensifying competition. The question of a national bond did not arise in the Netherlands in the relevant periods at industry level, unless this could be included in religious or church bonds. In connection with the last point it must be remarked that where the employers themselves had broken or weakened the bonds and exchanged them for liberal ideas, the workers too often had an opportunity to escape from the social control of the church, for it was no longer supported by the employers, so that they became more exposed to other influences, for example socialist ideas. This was largely the case in the diamond industry in 1894, and equally so in the Twente textile industry. It also occurred in the most important centres of the scattered printing industry, in which the ANTB, the largest of the unions, was clearly motivated by class considerations, while both of the confessional unions, regional in importance, gave priority in 1909-10 to the solidarity of the workers at industry level, meaning in the struggle for improved labour conditions, and ranged themselves to form one front with the ANTB. In the textile industry in Twente the most important unions were clearly class-conscious; the confessional unions were more or less so at industry level when their efforts for a CAO began to promise some success, namely after 1938, through the development of economic factors.

As I have already indicated, special attention must be paid to the class consciousness of the workers' leaders. Of significance here is that the general milieu of the town, the region or the country in which the work is done offers the leaders an opportunity to make contact with progressive, preferably socialist, intellectuals or with already established organisations of a more or less socialist nature. This is of the greatest importance, especially when the first trade organisation is started in an industry in which the class consciousness of the majority of the workers cannot yet be strongly developed. This was plainly so among the diamond workers in 1894, whose class consciousness was hardly

existent when the struggle began; its lack was compensated for by the small elite of leaders who in the last years before 1894 had been influenced by socialist intellectuals. The success of the struggle itself and the influence of the leaders ensured thereafter a rapid development of the class consciousness of most diamond workers. The ANTB, nearly half a century old when the first printers' CAO was concluded, counted numerous social democrats among its groups. In 1940 the modern textile workers' union, *De Eendracht*, had fully half a century's trade-union experience and socialist influence behind it.

Finally, there is the element of the psychological influence of a change in market conditions on workers and employers (factor C-6). It influences primarily the timing of the workers' actions. A sudden improvement in market conditions in the summer and autumn of 1894 after years of malaise doubtless determined the time of the decisive action of the diamond workers. Conditions in the printing industry changed less suddenly, but it is clear that the unions' actions became more fierce and extensive after market conditions improved around 1910. In the Twente textile industry there was also a marked improvement in market conditions after 1936 combined with increased pressure from the trade-union organisations on the textile employers. Naturally in all three industries when market conditions improved the employers felt more lenient towards the demands of the workers.

D. Governmental measures

In certain circumstances the factor of governmental measures must be considered as a separate group from the economic, socio-structural and socio-psychological factors. They may be divided into four categories, of which the first two may however be included among groups already named. The following must be noted:

D-1) measures of a trade and political kind, for example protectionist. These have an effect on factor A-1 and may in our opinion properly be included under that factor. This was already done in the foregoing, in connection with the protection of the textile industry.

D-2) measures of a social kind. In our example the protection of women and young people in factories and workshops was of some importance. This exercised an influence however on the factors C-4 and C-3, and therefore did not have to be included as a separate factor.

D-3) measures concerning the legal position of workers, such as the regulation of the right of dismissal, the right to strike, union rights, and the employment contract. These matters did not play a very important part, even though they were not entirely absent, in the industries discussed, so that it was unnecessary to list them separately.

It is known that after 1940, during the German occupation and after, they were of paramount importance.

D-4) measures for the prevention of meetings, demonstrations and strikes, imposed by the government or local authorities and motivated by the argument that order must be maintained. Although this element was not entirely absent it was of limited importance in the industries studied. At other times and in other places, however, this element must be included as a separate factor.

III

CONCLUSION

The historiography of trade unions in various industries (to be distinguished from that of trade-union federations) has, as far as I know, never been scientifically planned. In my opinion what I have written above offers an adequate framework for such a scientific approach, even though it has not yet been possible to group the factors according to their importance under each main heading. But this has been done for those regarded as most important, while the interaction and connection of the factors could often be indicated. As an appendix an outline, with explanation, of the three industries examined is given below. I hope this will provide a convenient additional survey of the situation.

An analytical and explanatory history of the trade unions written according to my ideas makes great demands on the historian, if only because it will be more comprehensive than traditional accounts, such as those found in the annals of unions. For example, studies conducted in the way I have indicated must concentrate not only on the workers' position and their organisations: the employers and their associations must also be studied. That the employers' side of the story must be equally thoroughly examined as that of the workers if a serious history of the trade unions is to be written is in itself obvious: the battle of Waterloo too could not be analysed, and the course of the actions on the battlefield could not be explained, only by studying the movements of the French troops! But this requirement naturally brings consequences with it: among others the obligation to study the industry's economy. This implies that one of the tasks to be undertaken will be the examination of records, papers and if possible of the files of employers and employers' organisations. For the study of the printing industry many publications issued by the employers were available and appeared to provide a rich source of information about, among other things, the history of the printing workers' unions since 1910.

I hope that what I have written here may be used as a basis for future scientific studies of the history of trade unions. Such historiography appears to me to be of importance in itself, and will at the same time offer an opportunity to define more closely what I have put forward here, to supplement it, and if necessary to correct it.

APPENDIX

Names of factors

Group A. Economic factors

A-1: the extent to which home entrepreneurs are exposed to foreign competition.

A-2: the price elasticity of demand for the product.

A-3-a: the relationships between the home employers in the product market.

A-3-b: the power relationships in the product market between the home employers and their immediate customers.

A-3-c: the power relationships in the market for raw materials, accessories and machines between the suppliers of these items and the home employers.

A-3-d: the power relationships between the home employers and their creditors in the money and capital market.

Group B. Socio-structural factors

B-1: the social prestige of the employers or of a group leading them in comparison with:

B-2: the social prestige of the workers or of a group leading them in comparison with B-1.

Group C. Socio-psychological factors

C-1-a: degree of training of the workers.

C-1-b: work done or not done according to the system of contract work.

C-1-c: whether or not workers are concentrated in large factories.

C-2-a: the presence or not of a proletarian standard of living of the workers in their own opinion and in that of their neighbours.

C-2-b: the presence or not of the memory of a higher standard of living among the workers concerned.

C-3: the age groups of the workers.

C-4: the sex ratio of the workers' group.

C-5-a: the degree of class consciousness, at least at industry level, of the workers.

C-5-b: the degree of class consciousness, at least at industry level, of the workers' leaders.

C-6: the psychological effect of changes in market conditions on the workers and the employers.

Group D. Governmental measures affecting the legal position of the workers and their organisations; repression of workers and their organisations by the government or local authorities, the motive put forward being the maintenance of law and order.

Factor	Diamond industry c. 1894		Printing industry c. 1909-14		Twente textile industry c. 1930-40	
	Employers	Workers	Employers	Workers	Employers	Workers
A-1	A-1 + B-1 = -1	A-1 + B-2 + C = +2	+4		First -, but during depression and after protection ±4	
A-2	A-2 + B-1 = -1	A-2 + B-2 + C = +2	+4		A-2 + A-1 = -, but during depression and after protection ±4,5	
A-3-a	A-3-a + B-1 = -1	A-3-a + B-2 + C = +2	+4		A-3-a + A-1 = -, but during depression and after protection ±4,5	
A-3-b	A-3-b + B-1 = -1	A-3-b + B-2 + C = +2	+4		A-3-b + A-1 = -, but during depression and after protection ±4,5	
A-3-c	A-3-c + B-1 = -1	A-3-c + B-2 + C = +2	+4		-4	
A-3-d		<i>Pro memoria</i>	<i>Pro memoria</i>		<i>Pro memoria</i>	
B-1	-		+3		+	
B-2		+3		+		±6
C-1-a		+		+		-
C-1-b		+		-		-
C-1-c		+		-		+
C-2-a and b		+		+		+
C-3 and 4		+		+		-
C-5-a		-		+		First ±;
C-5-b		+		+		{ since 1938 +
C-6		+ (second half 1894)		+ (since 1910)		+ (after 1936)
D		<i>Pro memoria</i>		<i>Pro memoria</i>		<i>Pro memoria</i>

+ or - indicates that the named factor or combination of factors has a positive or negative influence on the attempt to regulate the market by the employers and/or by the workers; ± means that the factor or combination of factors concerned was moderately favourable to the attempt to regulate the market.

- ¹ The economic factors A-1 to and including A-3-c are in this case positive in themselves, but ineffective in their operation because factor B-1 is here negative.
- ² The economic factors A-1 to and including A-3-c were positive in themselves, but generally influenced in the first instance the behaviour of the employers; in this case its effect on the employers was obstructed because factor B-1 was negative; and under these circumstances the initiative of the workers to regulate the market (*via* a CAO) could have success, as the operation of factor B-2 and the factors under C were positive for the workers.
- ³ For the majority of the diamond workers and the printing employers a --- should be printed here, but in both cases the greater social status of a group of leaders turned the scale in a positive sense.
- ⁴ The economic factors influence in the first place the behaviour of the employers, who may undertake action to regulate the markets (including the labour market), if the factors are positive and if factor B-1 is also favourable. These factors operate in the same way for the workers as for the employers, but only indirectly, namely in so far as they make the employers susceptible to pressure from the workers' organisations to conclude a CAO.
- ⁵ The factors A-2 to and including A-3-b are in this case positive in themselves, but are obstructed in their operation as long as factor A-1 is negative.
- ⁶ The social prestige of the textile workers was very low in comparison with that of the manufacturers; it was raised, however, by the existence of relatively strong workers' trade unions and by the prestige of their leaders.