

blows to the Germans that took them to Berlin and ended the war. The main reason for the difference, Dick argues, is that the Soviets had mastered “operational art,” which they were able to do in part because the Red Army had a tradition of intellectual engagement with the concept. To Dick, operational artistry is most apparent in rapidly moving, aggressive battles of encirclement and annihilation, of precisely the sort the Soviets employed to devastating effect against the Germans in 1944 and 1945.

In illustrating the degree to which the Soviets sought to refine and improve their operations, Dick makes a welcome contribution to the central debate over the nature of the Soviet victory: namely, whether the Soviets outfought the Germans or simply outlasted them. However, in keeping with the case-study method he uses, Dick seeks to draw broader lessons and make more incisive judgments. Dick argues that the western allies’ operational shortcomings were rooted in, among other things, their lack of appreciation for operational art, the friction inherent in coalition warfare, and the caution that the British and Americans took with their men’s lives. This last point, however, is one that does not get enough attention from Dick, particularly since it was arguably at the heart of the different ways the Soviets and the democracies fought the war, including their relative aggressiveness at the level of “operational art.” In August 1944, for example, in a series of engagements that ultimately retook Khar’kov from the Germans—a battle that rarely even registers in broad narratives of the war in the east, dwarfed as it is by the titanic struggles of Stalingrad and Kursk—the Soviets incurred a *quarter million* casualties (68–69). Losses on this scale were simply unthinkable to the military and political leaders of the democracies. At one point Dick notes, seemingly with approval because it helped maintain the momentum of their attacks, that in the Red Army in 1944, “the treatment of human casualties followed the same principles that were applied to equipment” (157). In this way, Dick helps to substantiate, albeit despite himself, the argument of historians such as James Sheehan and Max Hastings that Europe’s dictatorships fought wars in ways that democracies could not, and that these differences hinged on their radically disparate views of the relative worth of individual human life, including their own citizens’. The ruthlessness displayed by the Soviets towards their own people during the Second World War, as much as their operational daring (from which it was inseparable), goes a long way towards explaining their victory.

These volumes are most suitable for use as textbooks in armed services’ war colleges, in which operational art is likely to figure as a subject of study. One hopes, however, that the students will be more cautious than Dick in trying to distill timeless, general principles, as well as less exasperated with the fundamental problem facing democratic armies: that they must put their soldiers and sailors in harm’s way without being careless with their lives. Perhaps this makes them less effective at conducting aggressive attacks, but it does, ultimately, give them something much more worth fighting for.

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The Right to be Helped: Deviance, Entitlement, and the Soviet Moral Order. Maria Cristina Galmarini-Kabala. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2016. xiii, 301 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Chronology. Glossary. Index. Figures. Tables. \$35.00, paper.

doi: 10.1017/slr.2018.56

In this thickly-detailed book, Maria Cristina Galmarini-Kabala outlines the Soviet system’s provision of assistance to single mothers, people who were blind or deaf either

congenitally or through injury, and delinquent children. The analysis focuses largely on the 1920s and 1930s, with a chapter on the post-war years and an epilogue for the late Soviet period. The study shows particular attention to the institutional actors—commissariats, educators, medical authorities, psychologists, and theorists—of the Soviet system of welfare.

Galmarini-Kabala divides her analysis into two major sections. The first outlines the intellectual and institutional history of the concept of rights under the new state—the “soviet moral order”—and the organizations and governmental institutions committed to protecting and defending those deviants, invalids, and others while singling out for persecution other groups as undeserving of assistance such as the “former people” of the tsarist state. The second section analyzes these larger, thematic concepts through three major periods, with one chapter each: 1918–27, 1928–40, and 1941–50. The source base is impressive and varied and her analysis is supported by work with case studies of the system as employed in Moscow, Perm’, and Omsk and as recounted in the letters of petitioners throughout the period.

In a state where the relationship to production defined citizenship, the status of the unemployed or those unable to labor was difficult, and Galmarini-Kabala shows the ways in which rights might be established in other areas of production, in past areas of service, or in recognition of previous suffering at the hands of capitalists or in war. Rejecting charity as bourgeois, Vladimir Lenin and his successors instead created a Soviet-style understanding of help, provision, protection, and care, which they held superior to the empty principles of bourgeois societies. As Galmarini-Kabala convincingly shows, this policy was more than simply a means of care and control in some Foucaultian institutional and discursive framework. Instead, this formulation of the Soviet state’s obligation to its least able became a means for defining the superiority of the Soviet moral order over those of contemporary capitalist countries.

In the second half of the monograph, the articulation of these ideas against the major economic policy shifts of the 1920s, 1930s, and post-war world display the push and pull between policy, people, and events. Especially in these chapters, the fascinating case histories of different applicants for state intervention, such as pensioners or single mothers, provide a welcome view from the supplicants to balance the rosier image coming from bureaucrats, medical professionals, and social theorists as well as revealing the manipulations of gender, social, and revolutionary language and expectations by petition writers. Interestingly, in this regard, Galmarini-Kabala found no major difference between the implementation of these ideas in the peripheries versus the center.

The categories of disability and deviance were slippery in the periods described and are necessarily loose and responsive to social and historical context in the investigation. The analysis would have benefitted, however, from a more thorough engagement with other recent works that have investigated the place and definition of the deviant within Soviet society. These include Dan Healey’s *Bolshevik Sexual Forensics* and *Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent*, Sharon A. Kowalsky’s *Deviant Women: Female Crime and Criminology in Revolutionary Russia, 1880–1930*, and Kenneth Pinnow’s *Lost to the Collective: Suicide and the Promise of Soviet Socialism, 1921–1929*.

Galmarini-Kabala provides a deeply-researched investigation of the Soviet system of social welfare and places this within a global discourse regarding the responsibility of states to their citizens. For researchers of Soviet health, psychiatry, and social welfare, and for those working on expertise among psychologists, educators, or sociologists, the thorough explanations of the institutional movement of these issues over the course of the Soviet decades covered will prove valuable. This book

would be an interesting addition to courses on human rights, Soviet history, or public health, and would work well with undergraduate and graduate classes.

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Illness and Inhumanity in Stalin's Gulag. By Golfo Alexopoulos. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. xi, 308 pp. Notes. Index. Maps. \$65.00, hard bound. doi: 10.1017/slr.2018.57

Illness and Inhumanity is the latest in a growing number of studies on the Soviet Gulag. It focuses on the exploitation and suffering of inmates, primarily in terms of nutrition, labor, and illness, with evidence drawn from both memoirs and archival sources. The book is organized primarily by topic, with the nine body chapters centered on such themes as “food,” “health,” and “invalids.” Most chapters begin in the early 1930s and end in the early 1950s, thus providing a sense of chronology for each topic.

Much of *Illness and Inhumanity* will be familiar to those who have read a few memoirs or scholarly works on the Stalinist Gulag. Alexopoulos chronicles in painstaking detail how production concerns were paramount and how Gulag personnel dehumanized prisoners by referring to them as “labor power” rather than people. She demonstrates how rations were often insufficient and tied to labor productivity, and how inmates were sorted and sent to different camps or colonies based on their health and work capability. She also details gross deficiencies in the medical system, with Gulag medical staff in short supply, poorly trained, and compliant with the production concerns of their superiors. The result of these conditions was a massive number of sick and starving inmates, many of whom died in the camps or shortly after release.

In a few areas Alexopoulos significantly extends our understanding of how the Gulag worked. One discovery is the extent to which some territorial penal apparatuses, as opposed to the large and better-known corrective-labor camps, served as dumping grounds for sick and emaciated inmates. Another contribution is demonstrating precisely how Gulag officials manipulated illness statistics to conceal the true numbers of starving inmates. A third key insight is that hard-working inmates who received the highest levels of rations often still perished from malnutrition because the extra exertion was not compensated by the relatively small increase in caloric intake. Like all richly-researched books, a few mistakes have crept in. Alexopoulos seems unaware that the colony system existed under republican NKVD structures until 1934 (190). The term *aktivovanie* is defined variously—does it mean discharge or just being taken off the working rolls? (169, 216) Ivan Serov in 1956 was head of the KGB, not the MVD (237). These inaccuracies do not significantly detract from the wealth of information provided, however.

The most provocative part of *Illness and Inhumanity* is Alexopoulos's three framing arguments. First, she contends that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was correct: the Stalinist Gulag was “destructive by design” (7). Second, Alexopoulos argues that at least six million people died in the Stalinist Gulag, or shortly after their release, out of the roughly eighteen million who entered the system. This is much higher than the figure of around 1.6 million provided in archival documents (although researchers have long assumed the actual number to be somewhat greater). Finally, she concludes that the deadliest period of the Gulag was not World War II, as other scholars have concluded, but the final years of Stalin's life.

These assertions will certainly spark renewed debate among Gulag scholars, but in *Illness and Inhumanity* they are supported primarily by indirect or misinterpreted