

Where the author and the reviewer disagree is in the former's statement (p. 217) that the National Socialist ideology was "eine Rassenideologie." It is true that much of National Socialism was racist-oriented, particularly with respect to Slavs and Jews; however, one cannot state categorically as Weingartner does that Germany's ethos under the Nazi regime was based solely on racial concepts. Certainly the concepts of class and economic divisions in Germany played an important role within the Nazi hierarchy before and after January 1933. To equate National Socialism solely with racism and to contrast it with the "class" ideology of communism is neither objective nor factual. But the author has made an important contribution to the understanding of the quite complex and often bewildering relationship of the Comintern, the KPD, and the German governments during a turbulent period of contemporary European history.

HENRY S. ROBINSON  
*Morgan State College*

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HITLER'S GERMANY: DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION IN EUROPE, 1933-36. By *Gerhard L. Weinberg*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1970. xi, 397 pp. \$12.75.

This volume and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen's 1968 study of the institutions of Nazi foreign policy have put research on the coming of World War II on a new and higher plane. Few relevant memoirs or monographs in Western languages have escaped the author's attention. Tens of thousands of unpublished documents have been systematically, critically, and perceptively examined, particularly those in American and West German depositories. The manuscript was completed before British archives for the period of study were opened to research. Those of France, Italy, the DDR, the USSR, and the smaller countries of Eastern Europe remain closed, but Weinberg has carefully examined the published documents of these and other countries.

The interpretation embodies both cold-blooded empirical analysis and passionate conviction. Hitler is the interpretive focal point, and Weinberg's Hitler is no domesticated führer à la A. J. P. Taylor but the man we all once knew and hated so well. Weinberg sees the motive force of German policy in Hitler's abiding ambition to use military might to expand Germany, first by gathering ethnic Germans into the Reich and then by conquering space for agricultural settlements in Slavic Europe. His "vision was primarily continental" (p. 20), but he expected to use Germany's enlarged power "to dominate the globe" (p. 358). For him there could be no separation of foreign and domestic policy; in the latter, Hitler sought total power in order to maximize the effectiveness of his manipulation of the national instrument he must use to realize his foreign policy goals. Neither domestic nor foreign policies were basically determined by broad economic forces; rather, they sprang from Hitler's obsession to expand German territory. Opportunistic means were blended with the constant goals in shaping diplomatic relations with specific nations, and Weinberg shows in considerable detail how Hitler first courted Poland to gain freedom for the rearmament that later would enable him to conquer Polish space; how he reluctantly restrained the Austrian Nazis in order to win Mussolini as an ally, never forgetting his intention to annex Austria; how he fostered better relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia to build up pressure on Czechoslovakia; how he accentuated divergencies between the British and the French while encouraging both in their hopes that he wanted peace as much as they did, thus

insuring their passivity when he remilitarized the Rhineland—the precondition for his intended aggressions.

The thesis is persuasively argued and heavily documented, but the study is not flawless. Convoluted sentences make for neither speedy nor joyous reading. Better portrayals of key personalities are needed in a work that assumes history to be made by men rather than by impersonal forces. In a few cases, what appear as factual generalizations might better have been presented as reasonable conjectures (e.g., on pp. 314 and 318, where it is said that Hitler cared nothing about the welfare of the Sudeten Germans; or on pp. 221–23, 311–12, and 360, where we are told that the Soviet Union sought political accommodation with Hitler in the period 1934–36). On a larger matter, the difference in emphasis between title and subtitle, the organization of the material, and the allocation of space seem to reflect a certain ambivalence of purpose. In any case, the interpretive emphasis on Hitler's will is blurred to some extent by the organizational emphasis on other countries, whose diplomatic relations with Germany are treated one by one in an overly mechanical pattern. Granting this pattern, we still need more details on Japan's actions in Asia and on British and French efforts for peaceful collective security—factors independent of Hitler's will that helped make his successes possible. Less might well have been said (though Weinberg says it well) about German relations with the United States and China, which were of minor importance in Hitler's policies.

The fact remains that Weinberg has written the most definitive account of his subject that we have or are likely to have for many years. His second volume will round out a major contribution to historical scholarship.

JOHN L. SNELL

*University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*

AMERICAN IMAGES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: AN INQUIRY INTO RECENT APPRAISALS FROM THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY. By *William Welch*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970. xiii, 316 pp. \$10.00.

SOVIET POWER AND EUROPE, 1945–1970. By *Thomas W. Wolfe*. A RAND Corporation Research Study. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. x, 534 pp. \$15.00, cloth. \$3.95, paper.

THE PRESS AND THE COLD WAR. By *James Aronson*. Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970. 308 pp. \$8.00.

William Welch's first-rate methodological treatise on the study of Soviet foreign policy consists of three parts and an epilogue. In the first he lays the basis for his analysis; in the second he evaluates the state of the discipline; in the third he proposes ways to improve it; and in the epilogue he suggests how conflicting views may be reconciled. Of central importance to Welch's analysis is a proposed scheme for classifying images of Soviet policy according to two variables: constancy (how much does policy change?) and hardness (how hard is it?). The latter is an aggregate variable consisting of nine dimensions: (1) expansionism of ends, (2) expansiveness of means, (3) militancy, (4) militariness, (5) immorality, (6) addiction to the initiative, (7) offensiveness of motive, (8) malignancy of impact, and (9) hardness toward own. With this scheme he classifies twenty-two leading books