

significant point, because this valuable book will handsomely service the needs of those who desire a handy, accurate reference work. It is certainly the best documentary compilation available on Soviet-Middle East relations.

The heart of Professor Freedman's study—which gives one a feeling for the range and diversity of Soviet activities—is three chapters dealing primarily with Moscow's policy toward Egypt between 1970 and 1974, but with attention also given to Iraq, Syria, the Sudan, and Jordan. The book also contains a very brief introduction, a chapter on the 1945–70 period, and a concluding chapter. cursory attention to so many issues leads to a number of questionable assumptions, overly dramatic comparisons, and sweeping generalizations. Moreover, I question the validity of certain points: for example, that Nasser gave up "a considerable amount of Egyptian sovereignty in an effort to get revenge for his humiliation" (p. 43); that "the presence at Nasser's funeral of a senior American official, Elliott Richardson [whom the Egyptians actually considered a minor Cabinet official] was a matter of concern for the Soviet leadership" (p. 43); that the murder of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists "set off a chain of events that greatly upset the pattern of Egyptian diplomacy" (p. 89) and helped to bring about an improvement in Soviet-Egyptian relations; and that the Soviets were expelled in 1972 both "from their air and naval bases in Egypt" (p. 172). Soviet naval facilities were curtailed, not terminated.

One final point. On page 1, the author correctly observes that influence is difficult to assess and that the superpowers have learned that aid is no guarantee of influence. Yet, throughout the rest of the book, he bandies the term influence about indiscriminately, making no apparent effort to maintain a distinction between establishing a presence and exercising influence, and with little differentiation between Soviet initiatives and responses.

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THE GREAT DÉTENTE DISASTER: OIL AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By *Edward Friedland, Paul Seabury, and Aaron Wildavsky*. New York: Basic Books, 1975. x, 210 pp. \$7.95.

This is not a scholarly book but a book written (in fact overwritten) by three scholars who are exercised about the position of the United States in the world as a result of U.S.-Soviet détente and the oil crisis of 1973–74, and they speak out with unscholarly passion. This is as it should be. If doomsday is approaching, someone should tell us. Briefly the case is as follows: Oil is power, and that power is being abused by OPEC; the fourfold price increase is a catastrophe for the world, a systemic change in the international system; Western societies are disintegrating, both in economy and in political institutions, under the impact; the Soviet Union, taking advantage of the West's myopia about détente and inability to define and defend its own vital interests, is making uncontested gains; and the choice must now be made between defense and surrender, between order and disorder.

There is much talk of the decline of American will and the inadequacy of American policy generally, but the real burden of the argument has to do with what the United States did, and did not do, in the Middle Eastern crisis of 1973, and what the United States will do there next. The test is Israel. According to the

authors, we should have supported Israel more consistently and used its military success to bargain effectively with the Arabs and the Soviets instead of giving in to them. In the future, the argument continues, Israel is indispensable to us if we want to break the oil price; and if the time comes when we have to use force against the oil producers, the most propitious occasion will be the next Arab-Israeli conflict. The authors have little to say about Soviet policy. Indeed, because the argument against OPEC is so shrill and so absorbs their attention, we never get a clear idea of what the great détente disaster is, except that American illusions and mistakes have turned it into a one-sided bargain in Moscow's favor.

This is a book of debater's points following (and often repeating) each other in rapid succession. Questions and counterarguments will spring to the mind of many readers. Nevertheless, at a time when the United States and its Western partners seem uncertain of what their vital interests are and unwilling to make any sacrifices at all, we need to hear more cries of alarm and pleas for political will, even if we choose not to respond to this particular recipe for action.

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SOVIET-THIRD WORLD RELATIONS, vol. 3: SOVIET-AFRICAN RELATIONS. By *Charles B. McLane*. London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1974. 190 pp. Tables. £5.00. \$15.00. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.

In the third and final volume of *Soviet-Third World Relations*, Professor McLane provides an overview of Soviet relations with Africa and brief sketches of Soviet relations with thirty-six sub-Saharan African states. Each of the sketches is complemented by a chronological listing of the major political, economic, and cultural developments which have influenced these relations. The volume concludes with tables summarizing Soviet political relations with African states, Soviet economic assistance to Africa, and Soviet trade with Africa.

As in the volumes covering Soviet relations with Asia and the Middle East, McLane has produced descriptive summaries rather than detailed analyses of Soviet policy. (The analytic study is to appear as a separate book entitled *Russia and the Third World*.) But in spite of the lack of analysis, *Soviet-African Relations* will be useful to both neophyte and specialist, for it contains, within the covers of a single volume, a wealth of data on Soviet relations with Africa, plus an excellent selected bibliography and numerous additional references in the notes.

Professor McLane deserves gratitude for providing the student of Soviet foreign policy with ready access to so much specific information on Soviet relations with developing countries.

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FINANCIAL CHECKS ON SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. By *Franklyn D. Holzman*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1975. xvi, 103 pp. Tables.

Contemporary interest in arms control devices tends to focus on limitations of specific weapon systems or forces, expressed in physical units. Ever since the