

in the Soviet and East European area because of some of his earlier writings, especially his study, *The End of Inequality?* (Penguin Books, 1971), which deals with stratification problems of Communist societies. Although the present work bears the subtitle, "Towards a Political Sociology of State Socialism," the reader can find much useful information and many insightful comments on many more specific subjects. The book is subdivided into three parts and addresses four important topics of the sociology of communism: the political system and political culture; the elites of industrial Communist societies; the Soviet model and other models or, rather, "countermodels"; and the social structure. The author, respectful of the "classical" definition of political sociology, has set out to identify the social bases of Communist politics.

In Lane's analysis, as the reader might expect, a perennial difficulty comes to the fore. This is the problem connected with the notion of communism as a generalized model of a socioeconomic system: strictly speaking, there is no one model, but rather a multitude of models. The writer is aware of this, and he clearly demonstrates that the political sociology of Communist nations is a complex matter. The new term which he has coined, "state socialism," is not meant to remove the difficulty but to supply a more suitable common denominator for observed phenomena.

After perusing the book, the reader will better understand why variants of "state socialism" exhibit different political cultures. It would be misleading, however, to view this relationship as unidirectional. In the vast sociological laboratory (or laboratories?) of the Communist world, political models shape compatible management and planning systems as often as they themselves are shaped by these systems. This is especially true as a negative proposition: no type of economic organization of a Communist state is conceivable, in the long run, which would challenge or run counter to the fundamental political formula, such as the principle of the power monopoly of the party. Czechoslovakia of 1968 is a case in point.

The volume is well documented and well annotated. Perhaps the only criticism one can make is that the book is not exhaustive as far as all "social bases of communism" are concerned: a discussion of factors such as family, work experience, and effects of complex organizations would have been worthwhile, although hardly possible in some two hundred pages. But this is a minor point. The talent and expertise of the author promise that this expectation may well be met in his future scholarly exploits.

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POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL REVOLUTION IN THE USSR. By *T. H. Rigby* and *R. F. Miller*. Department of Political Science, Research School of the Social Sciences, Australian National University, Occasional Paper no. 11. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976. iv, 115 pp. \$4.95, paper.

The continuing development of science and technology in any society contributes to social and economic changes which can have far-reaching implications for the nature and stability of political systems. The Soviet Union is no exception. The Soviet leadership has recognized the significance of what it calls the "scientific-technical revolution," and it has taken steps to control, or at least to manipulate, that process as much as possible. This is not always successful, as Rigby and Miller aptly demonstrate. Their papers document a situation of tension and accommodation between the CPSU and the complexities of technological development.

Rigby calls our attention to the changing roles of the party in industrial administration. Unfortunately, he does not relate his analysis specifically to the scientific-

technical revolution. Instead, after a discussion of economic reforms, he concentrates on (1) the patterns of recruitment and retraining of party members, and (2) the changing relationships between party and government elites. Much of his data supports Fleron's model of an adaptive-monocratic system, in which the party increases its technical expertise in order to retain control over the economy.

Miller argues, however, that the party fears its own obsolescence as well as the ultimate threat of confrontation between technocrats and politicians. According to Miller, another danger is the obsolescence of a "mechanistic" bureaucratic system that is too rigid to allow for technological innovation. He stresses the development of an alternative form of administration, the "organic" model, which provides an organizational base that is more flexible, self-regulating, and horizontally integrated. Both papers would have been strengthened by an elaboration of these models, especially their relationships to theories of social behavior and political change.

Throughout the book, the authors refer to external factors (*détente*, American computer technology, and the Czechoslovakian Spring of 1968) which may have influenced the domestic role of the CPSU and its responses to technological change. Such references help to place the Soviet experience in better perspective. The organic mode of administration is related, for example, to Western theories of systems management, particularly in its focus on the dynamic interaction of goal-oriented structures.

The adaptation of systems analysis to Soviet conditions supports the all-encompassing goal of a highly coordinated and integrated society. Ironically, the organic model, thus conceived, may further stifle individuality while ostensibly promoting innovation. In this sense, the impact of the scientific-technical revolution on Soviet politics can be viewed less as a process of erosion in party authority by technical experts and more as an enhancement of that authority by sophisticated methods of social control.

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THE INNOVATION DECISION IN SOVIET INDUSTRY. By *Joseph S. Berliner*. Cambridge, Mass. and London: The MIT Press, 1976. xii, 561 pp. \$35.00. £23.80.

Aware that his research has been a milestone in the study of central planning, Professor Berliner at an early stage disarms "the analyst who insists on quantitative microeconomic research," for he "must ply his trade somewhere other than on the study of the Soviet economy." Citing with approval the pathbreaking surveys (by Mansfield and by Carter and Williams) of United States and United Kingdom factories in order to identify the springs of invention, Berliner readily concedes that the criteria he applies "fall short of those one would employ in studying the economy of a more open society" (p. 22). Because he does not expect to pass through field investigation, Berliner adopts the other extreme, of which the most sophisticated exemplar is that of NASA in its search for life on Mars: his methodology subjects virtually every Soviet newspaper article, journal paper, civil-service manual, technical monograph, and scholarly book published in the decade after 1965 to the closest scientific scrutiny for evidence, specific or generalized, on what hinders or promotes change of process or of technique. At this end of the spectrum there is no corresponding apologia to the Slavist who—all the more reasonably in an era of intergovernmental *détente*—might have anticipated some informal inquiry on a Muscovite shop-floor or office carpet; neither the preface nor the thousand footnotes tell of any dis-