

**Profiles in Belief:  
The Religious Bodies  
of the United States  
and Canada, Vol. I**  
by Arthur Carl Piepkorn  
(Harper & Row; 324 pp.; \$15.95)

This is the first in a seven-volume work that Martin E. Marty, in the introduction, confidently calls "a classic." The confidence is warranted. It is the magnum opus of the late Arthur Carl Piepkorn, a Lutheran theologian who devoted years to the meticulous gathering and checking of information about religious groups in North America. This volume treats Roman Catholic, Old Catholic, and Eastern Orthodox churches—and that, the reader quickly discovers, means literally hundreds of small and large communions ranging from the well-known to the esoteric and bizarre. While the focus is, as the title suggests, on belief, Piepkorn includes relevant information about organization, membership, and history. Succeeding volumes will treat Protestant Denominations, Holiness and Pentecostal Bodies, Fundamental and Independent Bodies, Metaphysical Bodies, Judaism, and Oriental, Humanist, and Unclassified Bodies. *Profiles in Belief* will certainly be a basic reference work in any library of consequence.

### Correspondence (from p. 2)

comparable. Some of us believe that this will continue to bring lively debate and new support to the World Student Christian Federation.

The Rev. Dr. Ted Fritschel  
The Rev. Louis A. Smith  
The Rev. Albert R. Ahlstrom

*The writers are Lutheran Campus Pastors in Honolulu, Hawaii, Eau Claire, Wisconsin, and at Columbia University, New York, respectively.*

Richard John Neuhaus Responds:

First, the article was chiefly about the World Council of Churches (WCC) and only incidentally about the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF). In agreement with Ahlstrom et al., the article made clear that these are two very different creatures, although they are suffering a similar erosion of credibility for largely similar reasons. Second, the article said nothing about a "conspiracy theory" or "conspiracy of silence" with respect to WSCF, although whether such a theory is "new or original" would have nothing to do with whether or not it is true. To be sure, WSCF publishes regularly, but who reads the stuff? As far as I can discover, in North America no more than a few hundred people stay marginally in touch with the WSCF and its materials, and most of them are in official positions of the ecumenical establishment and are thus required to maintain the bureaucratic contact. I don't see that it matters to whom Dr. Carino wrote his letter. It was accurately quoted in the article, and its message is deeply troubling. To say that "Marxist/Socialist analysis informs the thinking of most of the top WSCF leadership" is a delicacy at the edge of deceit—although unintentional on the part of the letter-writers, I am sure. As quoted in my article, Carino puts the question more forthrightly: "Is Marxism-Leninism simply the instrument of political analysis, or has it become...a creed to which everyone is called to adhere, and which is the tacit basis of the work of the Federation?" He leaves little doubt that he has been forced reluctantly to the conclusion that it is, or is fast becoming, the second.

But above all I wish to support wholeheartedly the writers' contention that the chief failure has been with North American church executives. They have not had the interest or the courage to communicate to their constituencies what is happening in the WSCF and other agencies. Especially is this true of the WCC, where North Americans and others who know better "go along" with outrageous posturings in order not to jeopardize their "identification" with the presumed radicalism of the Third World, or simply because they think that what the WCC says and does isn't all that important. As a result, of course, these agencies become less important than they

already are to North American church members.

Church leaders with whom I have spoken agree that probably no more than 10 per cent of the people in member churches here have any more than a vague awareness of the existence of the WCC. Of that more knowledgeable 10 per cent, a majority likely views the WCC negatively. Of the committedly Christian students on North American campuses, it seems certain that only a very small fraction of 1 per cent even knows there is a WSCF. And that is a great shame, for we desperately need agencies that bring Christians together across national and cultural lines to celebrate and advance the mission of the *One Church*. The letter-writers are more confident than other informed observers that the WSCF could once again be that kind of agency. I hope they are right, but the evidence suggests that students who really care about transnational Christian sharing are not and will not be looking to the WSCF.

### "The Same Old Illusions"?

To the Editors: At the end of my article on "Morality, Law, and the New World Order" (*Worldview*, September) I concluded that "the United States is charged by the elementary logic of the present world situation with pursuing in good faith, assiduously and generously, its professed national purpose of contributing toward the construction of a viable internationalism. That way lies international morality." Professor Paul Ramsey, in his Response in the same issue, takes exception, saying that it would be a mistake to take my statement as "a signpost pointing toward an adequate public philosophy for world order in our time." We have in my article, he says, "the same old illusions, the same escalation of political expectations, the same reach beyond grasp that Browning used to justify heaven."

The purpose of my short article was not quite as comprehensive as suggested; I simply set forth some general arguments regarding the present

state of world affairs, and the relevance of morality thereto, for one thing, and of law, for another. Let's analyze briefly the Ramsey criticism of my piece. He raises as a "chief question" "why the modern liberal mentality continues to condemn candidate Carter to [*sic*] saying, 'our own ideals [will] gradually tend to become a global reality'...." Condemnation? I used that Carter quotation (and others) as basis for developing in following paragraphs the argument that American political ideals do not have universal acceptance and that "the creation of new global structures must come by the gradual development of mutual understanding, the negotiation of formal international agreements governing actions in the political and economic fields, and the welding of such commitments into a system of law and organization accorded general acceptance."

Ramsey says that "understanding in no way removes disagreement." Understanding does not necessarily remove disagreement, but it is surely the usual prerequisite for promoting viable agreements. Take the particular issue of peace. Ramsey infers that I consider that American proposals have not yet carried conviction. His inference is correct: To carry conviction in today's world, peace proposals must convey assurance that projected international arrangements incorporate adequate provisions for the national security of participating powers. Let's run a simple test: If American (or other powers') relevant proposals bore conviction, in all logic we should be at least within sight of a tangible, durable peace. Are we?

And then there is the matter of human rights. Ramsey proceeds from my argument that, for credibility, the U.S. human rights policy would have to be consistent, and says: "That means the U.S. must 'support human rights universally.' That in turn means we must stop supporting 'rightist dictatorships' in the interest of 'stability.'" But this presentation bears a different tone from that of my full text, which reads: "To carry conviction Washington would have to be consistent and support human rights universally. But this points up an inherent vulnerability of the American policy: In the Third World of developing nations the United States is frequently discovered to be lined up in support of right-wing dictatorships—in the interest, it says, of stability."

In short, as shown by my wording, which is supported categorically by the text that follows it, I find it quite unlikely that Washington will follow consistently a global human rights policy. The reason is simplicity itself: Under existing conditions such a foreign policy principle would not often pay dividends. A test for that estimate: Washington may interest itself in the case of Soviet citizen Sakharov but makes no move to secure due legal process for the purged "Gang of Four" in Peking. Why not? Ramsey himself offers something that looks like a key in point three of his penultimate paragraph. "We ought not to pretend...that we are acting *beyond* national self-interest in behalf of the human rights we cherish, and hope for all." Inferentially, given the "hope for all," he too holds that American concern for human rights should be universal in scope; but the national interest is in the equation.

And that's my "chief point." I believe, as indicated in my reference article, that there is a legitimate range of concern for human rights (at home, be it said, as well as abroad). But Professor David Little, in his well-reasoned Response to my article that also appears in the same *Worldview* issue, stresses the complexity of the matter; and he clearly depicts the hesitancy and inconsistency of the Carter administration in applying its doctrine of three classes of human rights in "a world of scarcity and contention." Why the confusion? Because, says Little, the various rights conflict with each other. I would enlarge upon that explanation: It must be granted by the pragmatic statesman (e.g., Secretary of State Vance) that a one-nation crusade in favor of worldwide human rights as defined by American *political* ideals particularly would more often than not be detrimental to the achievement of larger goals.

We come to conclusions—Ramsey and I—touching on those larger human goals. Ramsey says that statesmen shape foreign policy within an area of congruence between their own nation's interests and those of another power or of the global common good. Agreed: I set forth—approvingly—near the end of my piece former Secretary of State Kissinger's perception of an "urgent need for cooperative solutions to the new global problems of the world economy," and his acknowledgment of the relevance "of how nations deal with

each other and of how we can construct an international order that promotes peace." But Ramsey says that "there are no solutions to problems, only proximate solutions to insoluble problems." Not so! Don't such things as the Louisiana Purchase, the Wright brothers' invention of the flying machine and man's recent trip to the Moon, and school taxes constitute solutions? Although some problems stubbornly persist without satisfactory solution, many other problems *are* constantly being solved, whether in science, municipal government, or international relations. So Kissinger was being, not visionary, but realistic when he envisaged *cooperative* solutions to global economic problems and the construction of an international order conducive to peace.

Let me present my basic arguments with respect to this matter in summary, categorical form. I believe that the basic issue is one of national and international priorities in a troubled world. The objective of any nation's foreign policy is indeed, as suggested by Ramsey, to serve the national interest first and foremost—but it has now been discovered that independence is being transformed into interdependence, and that the issues of prime present concern to most other nations embrace such weighty matters as arms control, the maintenance of economic stability at home and the regulation of international commerce, provision of foodstuffs for hungry peoples, and, not least, preservation of the natural environment in habitable state. For the general service of human interdependence we need the further elaboration of international law and expansion of the jurisdiction of the World Court; the curbing of national sovereignties in favor of strengthening the United Nations, especially as regards the maintenance of peace; more controls, and improved international collaboration, for resolution of humanity's pressing economic problems. Is this all an illusory "escalation of political expectations," as Professor Ramsey suggests? If the attainment of such goals will indeed be arduous, we still had best try; the alternatives of international anarchy and chaos threaten major disaster.

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