

revolt of 1956 also receives its own essay, as does Czechoslovakia's "Prague Spring" of 1968.

A fairly common observation about multiauthored volumes is that the contributions are of uneven quality. But what is impressive about this work is the very high level of scholarship that has been virtually uniformly achieved. These essays are not warmed-over rehashes of the basic story of each Communist effort to seize power, nor is the volume to be justified on grounds of convenience alone. Rather, the authors show clearly their intent to go beyond a mere descriptive recounting of familiar events. Their analyses are deeply thoughtful, free of "cold war" passion, and rich in insight and interpretation.

I found especially rewarding Keep's fresh approach to the Petrograd coup of 1917, Shoup's detailed analysis of the Yugoslav revolution, Kousoulas' conclusions drawn from the unsuccessful Greek Communist attempts, Lotarski's elucidation of the takeover in Poland, and Schneider's reappraisal of the aborted Communist effort in Guatemala. But to mention these is to acknowledge only a few of the many stimulating and helpful essays. Certainly Tigrid's reexamination of the Prague coup of 1948 in the light of Czech and Slovak Communist writings also deserves attention. Hammond, in addition to his other contributions and role as chief editor, offers a carefully detailed and provocative presentation of the takeover in Outer Mongolia, "the Comintern's only successful revolution" (p. 107), in which he argues that this experience set precedents for later takeovers at the end of World War II. While Hammond does not assert that Stalin consciously followed a Mongolian model in Eastern Europe, he obviously believes that this experience had considerable influence upon the Soviet leaders, certainly more than has previously been recognized by Western scholars.

To ask for more, when so much has been encompassed in this already large volume, may seem unfair, but an essay on the evolution of Communist theory in respect to the seizure of power surely would have been appropriate and welcome. Studies of the Communist efforts in Laos and Cambodia, as well as a comprehensive treatment of the takeover throughout the old Russian Empire, also would have been desirable.

These essays are abundantly footnoted and a brief bibliography of basic works on international communism is given at the end of the volume. All in all, this is an impressive achievement and the contributors deserve our thanks.

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STALINISM AND AFTER. By *Alec Nove*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975. 205 pp. \$7.50, paper. Distributed in U.S. by Crane, Russak & Company, New York.

Stalinism and After provides an excellent introduction to the political system in the USSR. It portrays the modern political order as an outgrowth of prerevolutionary historical conditions without implying that the Bolshevik seizure of power or the Stalinist revolution from above were the inevitable responses to problems of economic backwardness and the maintenance of national security. Furthermore, Nove's analysis of the origins of Stalinism emphasizes that the economic and political conditions created by the civil war and the early years of NEP seemed to favor the dominance of Stalin and his tough-minded cohorts over the more intellectual segments of the Bolshevik leadership. This survey includes fine sum-

maries of the social and political costs of the Stalinist system, of Stalin's legacy in domestic and foreign affairs, and of the ideological and policy orientations of both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes.

But Nove's efforts to compress a vast amount of interpretation and information into one small volume has produced a number of problems. The study does not include a unified discussion of political institutions. Consequently, the analysis of the relationships between various party and governmental bodies, which is scattered throughout the text, is probably not fully comprehensible to the non-specialist. Furthermore, the treatment of particular periods and problems, such as the debates over economic policy in the 1920s, the intellectual and social developments in the 1945–53 period, and the unfolding of the USSR's foreign policy (in particular the USSR's intervention in Hungary), is probably too compressed for those with little historical knowledge of the USSR.

Some of the author's judgments will be challenged. It is extremely debatable that Stalin's economic policies could be regarded as "rational" in any terms, that the 1961 Berlin crisis was "not in itself very acute or dangerous," or that Kosygin's position as chairman of the Council of Ministers is largely a "formal" check on Brezhnev's power over his colleagues on the Politburo. The text includes some historical inaccuracies: the U-2 incident did not happen in the midst of a summit conference; and the Leningrad poet Brodsky was charged and tried as a "parasite" under the reign of N. S. Khrushchev, not under his successors.

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POLITICAL UNDERCURRENTS IN SOVIET ECONOMIC DEBATES:
FROM BUKHARIN TO THE MODERN REFORMERS. By *Moshe Lewin*.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. xix, 373 pp. \$16.50.

This book is focused on the political aspects and ideas of the Soviet economic debates of the 1920s and of the 1960s. The author attempts to show the similarity (if not the identity) of certain themes developed in the earlier period, notably by Bukharin, with those developed in the later period by the most representative modern Soviet economic reformers. The reformers' vision of socialism is at sharp variance with the coercive, monolithic, "civil-war model" which Stalin used for shaping the Soviet economy and society.

The book falls into three parts. Part 1 presents a cursory discussion of the preindustrialization debates of the 1920s—with special emphasis on the role and contributions of Bukharin—as well as a broadly-sketched analysis of the Soviet historical phases from 1917 to the present, namely, "the First Eight Months," War Communism, NEP, and the Stalin thoroughgoing "planning" era. These phases are viewed as a succession of socioeconomic "models in history."

Part 2 scrutinizes the achievements and failures of the so-called Soviet "command economy" in the 1950s and the 1960s, when various Soviet economists began to voice a number of unusually bold criticisms concerning the established dogmas on value, pricing, planning, and the underlying assumptions of the socioeconomic model as a whole. According to Lewin, these critics pointed out that market categories were not alien, but rather inherent, to socialism. Therefore, new relations had to be found between the central plan and market mechanisms. Some slight corrections were indeed made eventually concerning various aspects of the