¹ Of these 572 missiles, 48 are intended to be installed on Belgian territory according to the modalities and to the time table negotiated within NATO. The other missiles are intended for the Federal Republic of Germany (160), the United Kingdom (160), Italy (112) and the Netherlands (48).

² This decision is in line with the policy of “defence and detente” adopted by the NATO Council in 1977, following a report of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Pierre Harmel.

³ See Delmas, C., L'Alliance Atlantique (Paris, Payot, 1962), 186Google Scholar.

⁴ The North Atlantic Treaty was approved by a Belgian law on the 2nd of June 1949.

⁵ Cass. 27th of May 1971. Pas. I. 886 with the conclusions of the Attorney General W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch.

⁶ The Socialist party, in the opposition since December 1981, had been part of the previous government and had therefore participated in assuming responsibility for the adhesion of Belgium to the double decision.

⁷ This last minute scramble which was to give rise to protests was justified by the evident military security considerations which the government took into account.

⁸ The Francophone socialist party, less radical, declared that it would not enter into a new coalition unless the latter decided to take new diplomatic initiatives aimed at influencing the Geneva negotiations so as to reach a dismantling of the missiles, in the East as well as in the West.

⁹ The principal Flemish party (C.V.P.) did ultimately rally to the government decision, but it was done at the price of harsh confrontations between its left wing and its right wing, and in order to allow the continued pursuance of the economic policy of a government whose mandate was about to reach its end at the end of that year.

¹⁰ See in particular, the paper by John Epstein on “Motives and Morality in International Relations” where the author evokes the “Christian pacifism” which he characterises as being “a convinction (Honeste fastidium said Leon XIII) important enough so that its exploitation would become a characteristic of Soviet propaganda” ((1984) 4 NATO Review 15). During the parliamentary debates, only the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to the doctrine of the Catholic Church on the matter, and he, by the way, limited himself to quoting extracts from declarations by Pope John Paul II, curiously coupled with those from Clausewitz. House of Representatives, 19 of March 1985, Report, pp. 833.

¹¹ The House of Representatives Meeting on the 15th of March 1985, Report, pp. 778 and on.

¹² The Constitution, Art. 68: “The King commands the Armed Forces on land and sea …”.

¹³ The Constitution, Art. 64: “No act of the King's is effective unless it is counter-signed by a Minister, who, in doing so, renders himself responsible therefor”.

¹⁴ The expression “pursuant to the law”, as opposed to the expression “by the law” used in many other constitutional articles, means that the legislator under conditions determined by himself, may delegate to the government the power which is vested in him.

¹⁵ See Verhoeven, J., “Le statut des bases militaires étrangères et des quartiers géné raux interalliés implantés en Belgique” (1969) 2 Revue Belge de Droit International 567Google Scholar.

¹⁶ During the debates on the bill in the Senate, the rapporteur, Mr. Moreau de Melen mentioned that the government had taken the initiative of submitting this bill in order “to lift all doubts”. For his part, Senator van Cauwelacrt affirmed strongly that the bill was superfluous whilst Senator Henri Janne supported the opposing view. See Senate, meeting on the 1st of March 1962, Ann. Par., p. 751.

¹⁷ See on this subject: Beirlaen, , Report to the Belgian Association of Democratic Jurists of the 1st and 2nd of October 1983Google Scholar, as well as Van des Wijngaert, , “Het juridisch debat rond de Kernraketten” (1983–1984) Rechtskundig Weekblad 1056Google Scholar ff.

¹⁸ Senate, session 1961–1962, Meeting of the 1st of March 1962, Ann. Parl., p. 749.

¹⁹ ibid.

²⁰ H. Kissinger, lecture given at the Conference on NATO organised by the Georgetown Center for International Studies in Washington, D.C. Brussels, 1–3 Sept. 1979, reproduced in Zorgbibe, , Textes de politique internationale depuis 1945 (Paris, P.U.F., Coll. Que sais-je, 1985)Google Scholar.

²¹ “Until a more complete Code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included by the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience”.

²² Adopted by 55 votes, including that of the Soviet Union, against 20, including that of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and 26 abstentions.

²³ See on this subject Meyrowitz, H., “La Stratégie et le Protocole additionel 1 aux Conventions de Genève de 1949” (1979) Revue Générale de Droit International Public 905 ffGoogle Scholar.

²⁴ Blischenko, J.P., “The Use of Force in International Relations and the Role of Prohibition of Certain Weapons”, in Current Problems of International Law (Milan, Giuffre, 1975) 175Google Scholar.

²⁵ These reports and debates appear in the Annuaire de l'Institute de droit international, 1967, vol. II, pp. 1–271, and 1969, vol. II, pp. 48–126.

²⁶ Bindschedler-Robert, D., Reconsideration of the Law of Armed Conflicts (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1971)Google Scholar.

²⁷ See Meyrowitz, op. cit. supra n. 23.

²⁸ C. Van den Wijngaert, op. cit. supra n. 17 at 1058.