

children do not talk to him. He conveys effectively, too, the very real difficulties Labrador Inuit face nowadays in achieving economic security. Brice-Bennett points out in her preface that missionary accounts gave emphasis to the poverty and deprivation of Inuit families in the 1930s and 1940s, and notes that although Paulus Maggo confirmed the difficulty of earning an income in those decades, 'his stories do not convey an impression of the hardship.' On the contrary, 'Paulus accentuates how Inuit improvised and managed with their own resources.' While they still made a living from the land, Labrador Inuit were able to help themselves. Today that is not so easy. 'There is very little or no fish to catch, no animals to hunt, seals are not in demand, boats and engines are in need of repair or broken down altogether because of neglect or lack of use... How will someone purchase food when there is not enough fish, and no equipment, so that a person can try to make money if they don't have a place of employment?'

At the end of his long life, Paulus Maggo admits to 'a feeling of hopelessness for the future.' Brice-Bennett is more optimistic. In her long introductory essay, she writes that Nain, where Paulus Maggo lives, is now a 'dynamic centre for both customary harvesting activities and new economic enterprises focusing on the fishery, tourism, and mineral development.' We must hope she is right. (Dorothy Harley Eber, 1115 Sherbrooke Street West, Apt. 1205, Montreal, Quebec H3A 1H3, Canada.)

THE RESCUE OF CAPTAIN SCOTT. Don Aldridge. 1999. East Linton: Tuckwell Press. xxii + 215 p, illustrated, hard cover. ISBN 1-86232-070-5. £20.00.

I hate to say this, but Don Aldridge has produced a simply dreadful book. Sadly, this outcome could have been avoided. Much research went into its preparation. But the work demonstrates that, although the occasional gifted amateur can write good history (Michael Rosove's *Let heroes speak* stands out as a recent excellent example), not every amateur can produce a worthy volume.

Aldridge makes the kinds of mistakes no one who has had a decent undergraduate seminar in history would make. Starting with the basic presumption that Robert Falcon Scott could do no right, Aldridge interprets every incident, every nuance, as proof of his thesis, even when the facts simply do not support his contentions. Aldridge passes up no opportunity to interpret facts or impressions in a way that shows Scott in the most unfavorable light possible.

Frankly, the book is so replete with questionable or inaccurate interpretations that a lengthy review would be inappropriate in this journal. A listing and discussion of the problems with the book would be longer than anyone would likely wish to peruse. The book will be a painful read for anyone who has an understanding either of Scott or of 'Heroic age' exploration, so flawed are the author's interpretations.

Poor Scott — he has been the victim of two unfortunate historiographical trends: for 60-plus years hagiography,

for the past 21 years character assassination. Neither hits the mark.

I wish I could say something positive about Aldridge's book other than to note that the maps are nice and some, new material has come to light, which, with careful filtering of Aldridge's interpretation, might be useful. Pity Scott, a genuine tragic hero; too bad the tragedy of Antarctic historiography continues in the guise of works such as this one. (T.H. Baughman, University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, OK 73034, USA.)

POLITICS AND BUSINESS IN THE BARENTS REGION. Bo Svensson. 1998. Östersund: Swedish Institute for Regional Research. 291 p, illustrated, hard cover. ISBN 91-38-31461-4. SEK 344.

The Barents region has been described variously as a geographic region encompassing the northern reaches of Fennoscandia and northwest Russia, a historical region dating back more than a millennium, and a political region linking the northern provinces of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia in new patterns of political interaction. It also aspires to be an economic region, harking back to centuries of economic ties that linked Russian merchants along the White Sea with Norwegian fishing communities and Finnish and Saami settlements into a trading area far from national capitals and state authority. This so-called Pomor or coastal trade thrived until the Bolshevik Revolution brought it to an abrupt end in 1917. At the inauguration of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (or BEAR) in 1993, the Norwegian foreign minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, evoked images of the Pomor trade to suggest that the Barents Cooperation was a return to political and economic normalcy in the European Arctic, characterising the east-west division of the Soviet era as but a 'seventy-year historical parenthesis.'

In *Politics and business in the Barents region*, Bo Svensson examines the case of the BEAR to determine how this political region-building project contributes to rebuilding transnational economic relations in the European Arctic. The potential for economic development is clear enough: access to capital on the Nordic side; and a rich natural resource base, an inexpensive yet well-educated labour force, an emerging consumer market, and a need for industrial modernisation and infrastructure improvement on the Russian side. The question is to what extent trans-border political relations can facilitate the local businesses in coming together to realise this potential. Svensson further asks whether this type of regionalisation offers Europe's Arctic periphery a way out of political and economic subordination.

Based on Svensson's extensive interviews with business operators, it is apparent that although Nordic firms had no problems in identifying business opportunities in northwest Russia, these opportunities were circumscribed by severe difficulties. In addition to the expected challenges of operating in post-Soviet Russia (an unclear legal and regulatory framework, unpredictable officials, and