

in this regard and this reviewer knows of none other in polar literature that appears, at first sight, to be quite so hard hearted:

Nilsen was hauled to the grave on a sledge and buried; a heap of rocks was placed on the grave. Not one of us shed a tear over this remote lonely grave; we were all somewhat dulled and hardened. The death of our companion did not affect us much at all, it was as if something quite normal had happened (page 6).

But there is no doubt of Albanov's personal heroism during the journey towards Franz Josef Land but reading between the lines it is clear that leadership was not his strong point. He seems to have failed, if he ever attempted it, to build a coherent team. One gets the feeling that his party consisted of several men each of whom was following his own personal agenda and that there was little overall appreciation of the obvious benefits to be accrued in such circumstances from sticking together.

It is equally obvious, however, that Albanov was a truthful narrator and one who made no effort to embroider or embellish the facts. For example, he is completely honest concerning the breakdown of his relations with Brusilov even though when he wrote his account it seemed obvious that the latter would never reappear from the Arctic ice and he could, if he wished, place the blame wholly on his superior officer. He does not do this but admits that both of them were 'seriously neurotic' (page 35):

No matter how we tried, we were unable to control our sick irritability; we would suddenly suffer from severe shortage of breath, our voices would break, lumps would come to our throats, and each time we would have to discontinue our discussion without having clarified anything (page 36).

This plus the realisation that supplies on board were insufficient for another winter was the main reason for Albanov's desire to

leave the ship and the crew appears to have been motivated by the same problem concerning food.

This edition, translated and edited by Barr, in his usual meticulous style, fills in a major gap in Arctic literature, throwing light as it does on an expedition that seems doomed from the start but from which, unlikely as it seems, two men survived. But not only is Albanov's account printed but the book also includes Brusilov's own account of the ice drift of *Sv. Anna* up to the time of Albanov's departure. Clearly Brusilov, despite his obvious reservations concerning Albanov trusted him with his own journal. The book also includes informative introductions.

Albanov died in the autumn of 1919, having contracted typhus travelling between Omsk and Krasnoyarsk after a period of duty on an icebreaker. The last survivor, Konrad, served on ships of the Soviet merchant fleet and died in St. Petersburg in 1940.

A word about the volume itself. It is published under the auspices of the Russian Geographical Society with the support of the Sovcomflot Library. They are to be warmly congratulated on the venture. It is handsomely and solidly bound, with a critical apparatus, useful maps and interesting illustrations. Unfortunately the print run was very short and this reviewer believes that it is already out of print. But should any reader of *Polar Record* manage to secure a copy, that reader will possess an almost unknown but major work of expedition literature by a man who deserves to be much better appreciated than he is. The icebreaking oil tanker *Shturman Albanov* named after him, was recently put in service. One hopes that there is a copy of the book in the ship's library! (Ian R. Stone, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge, Lensfield Rd, Cambridge CB2 1ER (irs30@cam.ac.uk)).

North Atlantic Euroscepticism: the rejection of EU membership in the Faroe Islands and Greenland.

Christian Rebhan. 2016. Tórshavn: Froðskapur Føro University Press. 230 p, softcover. ISBN 978-99918-65-76-8. £24.

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Faroese and Greenlandic decisions to stay out of – and in the case of Greenland: leave – the EC/EU is better explained by political concerns for sovereignty than by elite economic interests. Thus, the two autonomous territories of the Danish Realm are added to the category entitling the book, *North Atlantic euroscepticism*, including neighboring sovereign states Iceland and Norway, also self-identified fishing nations.

The argument of the book is based on a reading of political debates in parliament and media, supplemented with reports produced by expert committees and other material publicly available at the time of the debates. The book distinguishes seven rounds of debates (three in Greenland, four in the Faroe Islands), and analyzes each to evaluate the core claim of 'liberal intergovernmentalism' (LI), identified as the leading theory when it comes to explaining national participation in European integration: that political preference only counts when economic interests are weak, diffuse or indeterminate. Five of

the seven analyses are found to disprove rather than confirm the expectations received from LI.

The most immediate value of the book lies in the meticulous documentation of more than 50 years of debate in the two polities. Rebhan manages to select, paraphrase, and extract core points in such a way that the reader gets a real feeling for what matters to the politicians debating. Not all readers are likely to be equally interested in all periods of both cases. But the chapters on Greenland 1959–1967 and 1971–1972/1973–1985 effectively convey the massive contrast between colonial accept of Danish maternalism and the anticolonial youth rebellion: In 1972, Knud Hertling of the old generation could still warn against the risk that a separate day of referendum in Greenland would impose 'an insensible burden on the Greenlandic people to decide such an important matter [EC membership] on behalf of Denmark' (page 104). Meanwhile, Jonathan Motzfeldt of the new generation lamented how 'Denmark once again pretended to know what was good for the "poor Greenlander"' (page 110). In parallel, the chapter on the Faroes since 1989 gives an impression of resigned melancholia in the middle of a 'European policy deadlock' (page 137) produced by a micro-nationalism caught in a home rule arrangement in a world of sovereign states: The Faroese prime minister Kaj Leo Johannesen recently summarized the predicament of his own country stuck in the 'worst agreement' of all European countries as that of 'a banana republic' (page 149).

However, to conduct his argument vis-à-vis LI, Rebhan devices an analytical strategy which is not totally convincing in its own terms. Formally, the seven debate rounds are approached; first, with a view to determining the aggregate economic versus political interests of the elite; and second, by ‘process-tracing’ in order to ‘assess whether economic interests were *causally* linked’ to policy choices (page 47). Nevertheless, the core of the empirical material engaged in both readings remains the same: public statements accessed via parliamentary records and newspapers – neither interviews nor closed archives are employed to document underlying interests or trace hidden processes. Fortunately, the author is generally so apt when it comes to ‘show, don’t tell’-style textual analysis, that the reader tolerates the formalities made necessary by arguing on the epistemological home turf of LI.

On the one hand, specific formulations twist the message of the book in a way which seem to open up towards a revised version of LI. The book concludes that ‘as long as fisheries remain the economic backbone of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, it will remain essential for the ... Home Rule governments to remain in control of their fisheries resources.’ (page 211; cf. page 196). In Rebhan’s rendition, the prevalent version of LI claims that *short term* economic interests will be decisive; his conclusion could be read to suggest that *long term* economic interests are decisive – and sovereignty, then, is merely a means to secure that aim rather than an inalienable value according to national identity discourse (as in Bergmann’s analysis of the Icelandic case which Rebhan cites as inspiration).

On the other hand, the overall thrust of the argument contributes to an alternative tradition in the International Relations discipline explaining integration decisions with identity concerns rather than economic rationality (Hansen and Wæver 2002, Rumelili 2007, Gad and Adler-Nissen 2014). Particularly, Rebhan is explicitly inspired by Bergmann’s work on Iceland in this tradition (2009 and in Gad & Adler-Nissen 2014) when he singles out the current version of EU’s *Common Fisheries Policies* (CFP) as prohibitive for integration of the North Atlantic fisheries nations. Moreover, the book convincingly identifies sovereignty as doubly problematic for the home ruled territories (page 159–62, 190, 197): EU-accession would under the current constitutional arrangement happen via Danish membership. This would involve not only passing sovereignty taken home from Copenhagen on to Brussels, but also *not* having

a separate seat at the table when negotiating the vital issues surrendered.

The book closes by considering a few ‘factors for change’ – re-nationalisation or regionalisation of the CFP; diversification of the Faroe and Greenlandic economies; possible independence – none of which appear immediate. The reader is left with an image of the future consisting primarily of an erosion of the home rule arrangements by EU integration eating up competences kept in Copenhagen – primarily EU coordination of foreign policy aspects of issues substantially devolved like hunting, whaling, and fishing (page 201ff). Here, the book comes across as a bit conservative when it comes to the willingness of Denmark to play games with its formal sovereignty. Rebhan seems to accept the official 2005 interpretation of Danish constitutional law, that Danish sovereignty cannot be divided (page 153, 203ff). However, as Rebhan handed in his book as a PhD thesis, the Danish government actually *did* agree to launch a case at the WTO against the EU on behalf of the Faroes – literally placing Denmark on both sides of the table (pp. 205f; cf. Gad 2016).

The strength of the volume lies not in creative policy advice but in solid academic craftsmanship: Rebhan has made a lasting contribution in providing both a historical overview and forthcoming introductions to key debates and documents; domestic position papers and reports as well as shifting bilateral agreements with the EU. (Ulrik Pram Gad, Department of Culture and Global Studies, Aalborg University, Kroghstræde 3, DK-9200 Aalborg, Denmark (gad@cgs.aau.dk)).

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South Pole. Nature and culture. Elizabeth Leane. 2016. London: Reaktion Books. 232 p, illustrated, softcover. ISBN 9781780235967. £14.95.
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Richard Byrd wrote ‘The Pole lay in the center of a limitless plain. [...] And that, in brief, is all there is to tell about the South Pole’. Elizabeth Leane, Associate Professor of English at the University of Tasmania, thinks differently. And she is right because there is plenty of interest. It is a strange place because, with the North Pole, it is the only place on Earth that did not have to be ‘discovered’: it is where the lines of longitude meet at 90° latitude, so it could be pinpointed on the globe without anyone going near it.

Leane sets the scene with detailed retelling of the stories of Amundsen and Scott. Shackleton gets short shrift because he does not reach the Pole although arguably his was the most important journey because he demonstrated the nature of the south polar region. Travelling the last 100 miles did not advance human knowledge significantly. There is also the problem of where exactly is the South Pole; Amundsen went to great lengths to ensure that his party did reach the Pole. The Ceremonial Pole with its familiar ring of flags is a few hundred metres from the real Pole whose marker is shifted every year in a New Year’s Day ceremony to correct for the movement of the ice. There is also a correction needed for changes in the Earth’s axis of rotation. Then we should not forget that there are Geographic, Magnetic, Geomagnetic and Celestial South Poles, and the South Pole of Inaccessibility. It is all rather complicated.