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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2009
In a recent issue of the Review John Baylis discussed wartime thinking in Great Britain about a post-war European security group. Baylis's contribution is of great importance to the historiography of wartime and post-war British foreign and security policy, filling a void in our knowledge of these crucial years. However, we would like to make some critical comments on his treatment of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff report ‘Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic’, which is such a central feature in his contribution. According to Baylis this particular study by the PHPS (an interdepartmental study group created by the British War Cabinet) laid down ‘a reasonably coherent set of attitudes’ regarding post-war European co-operation. The PHPS, collecting together much of the current thinking in both Foreign Office and military circles, advocated the formation of a Western European-Group as a kind of insurance against a rearmed Germany ors if the world organization failed to materialize, against a potentially hostile USSR. The report marked the formation of a ‘consensus’ among Foreign Office and military officials involved in post-war planning.
1. Baylis, John, ‘British wartime thinking about a post-war European security group’, Review of International Studies, ix, 4 (1983), pp. 265–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2. Ibid., pp. 275–9. See also his ‘Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO’, Journal of Strategic Studies, v (1982), pp. 236–7.
3. ‘Western Europe’, 9 May 1944, CAB21/1614 (this study is probably written by Jebb). File 1614 (entitled ‘United Nations Organisation. Western European Bloc 1944–1945’) of the Registered Files of the Cabinet Office (CAB 21) is an extremely useful file just dealing with the discussions about a Western European Group in 1944/1945.
4. P.H.P. (44) 17 (0). Final. ‘Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic’,20 July 1944, CAB 21/1614.
5. For instance, Orme Sargent (Deputy Under-Secretary of State) only wanted to plan two years ahead. See Graham Ross, ‘Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941–45% Journal of Contemporary History, xvi (1981), pp. 529–30.
6. P.H.P. (44) 17 (0). Final., p. 6, CAB 21/1614 (our emphasis).
7. For a more complete description of this rupture and the disputes preceding it: Ross, op. cit., pp. 528–32. See also: Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941–1947 (London, 1982), pp. 114–23 and Lord Gladwyn, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), pp. 143–5. Significantly, the author of the official history of British foreign policy in the Second World War touches only lightly on the dispute between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff: Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Volume V (London, 1976), pp. 181–210.
8. Eden even contemplated informing Churchill of the dispute but didn't do so eventually. See Ross, op. cit., p. 532.
9. Comment Jebb, 24 October 1944, FO 371/40741B, U 7975/748/70.
10. P.H.P. (44) 27 (0). Final. ‘Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic’, 9 November 1944, CAB 21/1614.
11. Baylis, ‘British wartime thinking’, p. 276.
12. Comment Jebb, 21 November 1944, FO 371/40471B, U 8181/748/70.
13. J. G. Ward of the Economic and Reconstruction Department of the Foreign Office as quoted by Ross, op. cit., p. 531 and Rothwell, op. cit., p. 115.
