Introduction

At the time of writing of this chapter on July 8, 2022, the ruthless assassination of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō had devasted Japanese society and the outside world. No other leader in Japanese history was as eager to attain rapprochement in relations with Russia as Abe had been. During his second tenure as Prime Minister (2012–2020), Abe was particularly enthusiastic about activating the Japan-Russia dialogue. Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared reciprocally willing to enhance bilateral relations. However, after the change of political leadership in Japan in September 2020 and, most critically, following Russia’s changed international status since February 24, 2022, the importance of Russia to Japan’s foreign policy has significantly declined.

Since the start of Russia’s market reforms in the 1990s, economic ties between the two countries have diverged from the laissez-faire prescriptions, with the state agencies taking the lead instead. This approach can be seen as a pragmatic choice of the Japanese government to protect notoriously risk-averse national businesses amidst the rough beginnings of market transition in Russia. However, an inclination to state channels for the facilitation of economic contacts with Russia can also be viewed in the context of Japan’s diplomatic calculations concerning the Northern Territories, known as seikei fukabun. Seeking progression in the negotiations, the Japanese government has opted for playing a more active role.