This is the first of two chapters dealing with public good problems. When markets for state-contingent income are incomplete, a firm's pattern of income across states of the world is a public good from the standpoint of the individual agents holding residual claims on the firm. However, when share markets are competitive in the sense that each firm is small relative to the market for its shares, individual agents unanimously support value maximization by the firm. This condition is likely to be met for capitalist firms because investors are highly mobile. It is less likely to be met for labor-managed firms because workers are less mobile, and therefore LMF share markets are smaller. This difference results from the fact that capital is alienable while labor is not. In a formal model with both capital and labor shares, it is shown that LMFs are generally vulnerable to takeover by profit-maximizing investors, while capitalist firms are less often vulnerable to takeover by workers. These results support the argument that LMFs tend to be rare because workers have more heterogeneous preferences about firm behavior than investors.