Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Note on Transliteration
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Patronal Politics and the Great Power of Expectations
- 3 Eurasian History as Patronal Politics
- 4 Constitutions, Elections, and Regime Dynamics
- 5 The Emergence of Networks and Constitutions
- 6 The Building of Eurasia’s Great Power Pyramids
- 7 Revolutions and Other Presidential Ousters
- 8 Nonrevolution in Post-Soviet Presidential Systems
- 9 After Revolution
- 10 Patronal Parliamentarism
- 11 Explaining Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
- 12 Patronal Politics in Global Comparative Perspective
- References
- Index
- References
4 - Constitutions, Elections, and Regime Dynamics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2014
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Note on Transliteration
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Patronal Politics and the Great Power of Expectations
- 3 Eurasian History as Patronal Politics
- 4 Constitutions, Elections, and Regime Dynamics
- 5 The Emergence of Networks and Constitutions
- 6 The Building of Eurasia’s Great Power Pyramids
- 7 Revolutions and Other Presidential Ousters
- 8 Nonrevolution in Post-Soviet Presidential Systems
- 9 After Revolution
- 10 Patronal Parliamentarism
- 11 Explaining Post-Soviet Regime Dynamics
- 12 Patronal Politics in Global Comparative Perspective
- References
- Index
- References
Summary
As Chapter 2 argued and Chapter 3 illustrated, patronalism is a social equilibrium whereby individuals organize their political and economic pursuits more around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments than around abstract, impersonal principles such as ideological belief or categorizations that include many people one has not actually met in person. It can be conceived of as a kind of collective action problem, a vicious cycle whereby individuals understand politics as an arena of personal wealth redistribution and targeted coercion and therefore reproduce these very practices themselves for fear of being the “sucker,”the feckless soul who acts on principle but only succeeds in impoverishing one’s family, marginalizing oneself, and accomplishing nothing. For individuals in highly patronalistic societies, what matters most for one’s material welfare is belonging to a coalition that has access to – and hence can pay out – resources. But which coalitions are capable of this depends on who else joins. There is thus a very important process of coordination at the core of political competition in patronalistic societies, as discussed in the previous chapter: The strength of networks depends on the support of individuals, but which side individuals support depends very strongly on which side these individuals expect other individuals to support – or, more precisely, on which side they do not expect to wind up losing access to resources for patronage and coercion as a result of a lack of support. Power, then, becomes a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy whereby those who are expected to become powerful (for whatever reason) can become powerful by virtue of these expectations. And they can lose power just as easily for the opposite reason. This is the great power of expectations in highly patronalistic societies.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Patronal PoliticsEurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective, pp. 61 - 94Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014
References
, , , and , The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003)
, Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment (New York: Random House, 2009)
, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union,” Journal of Cold War Studies, v. 5, no. 4, 2003, pp. 178–256Google Scholar
, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)
, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
and , Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
and , “Constitutions and Commitment,” Journal of Economic History, v. 49, no. 4, December 1989, pp. 803–32Google Scholar
, “Repudiations and Confiscations by the Medieval State,” Journal of Economic History, v. 46, no. 1, March 1986, pp. 31–6Google Scholar
, “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” American Political Science Review, v. 91, no. 2, June 1997, pp. 245–63Google Scholar
, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
, “A Politics of Institutional Choice – Post-Communist Presidencies,” Comparative Political Studies, v. 30, October 1997, pp. 523–52Google Scholar
, “The Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in a ‘Least Likely’ Case: Peru,” Comparative Politics, v. 21, no. 2, January 1989, pp. 127–148Google Scholar
, Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
, “Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics, v. 2, April 1970, pp. 337–63Google Scholar
, “Pluralism by Default in Moldova,” Journal of Democracy, v. 13, no. 4, October 2002, pp. 127–41Google Scholar
, The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011)
, “Parliamentarization of Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758–1834,” Theory and Society, v. 26, 1997, pp. 245–73Google Scholar
, Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008)
and , “Elections under Authoritarianism,” Annual Review of Political Science, v. 12, 2009, pp. 403–22Google Scholar
, “Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan,” Democratization, v. 13, no. 3, 2006, pp. 456–71Google Scholar
, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
, , and , “Three Dilemmas of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia from Putin to Putin,” Post-Soviet Affairs, September 2013Google Scholar
, “Dictatorship and Democracy through the Prism of Arab Elections,” in , ed., Dynamics of Democratization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), pp. 48–51
, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
, Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
, “The Impulse to Reform in Africa,” in , ed., Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 13–28
, “International Dimensions of Elections,” in , ed., Dynamics of Democratization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), pp. 266–82
, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
, “Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS,” World Politics, v. 49, no. 2, January 1997, pp. 184–211Google Scholar
, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002)
, Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001)
, , and , “Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative and Historical Perspective,” Texas Law Review, v. 89, no. 7, 2011, pp. 1707–39Google Scholar
, The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 54
, , and , The Endurance of National Constitutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
, “Hybrid Regimes: When Democracy and Autocracy Mix,” in , ed., Dynamics of Democratization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), pp. 23–45
, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science Review, v. 66, no. 1, March 1972Google Scholar
, “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and the ‘2nd Wave’ of Post-Communist Democratic Revolutions,” Perspectives on Politics, v. 53, no. 5, 2007, pp. 537–53Google Scholar
, Voting for Russia’s Governors (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005)
, Democracy and Elections in Africa (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006)
and , “The Putin Vote: Presidential Electorates in a Hybrid Regime,” Slavic Review, v. 68, no. 3, Fall 2009, pp. 473–503Google Scholar
, Television, Power, and the Public in Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008)
and , “The Dynamics of Presidential Popularity in Post-Communist Russia: Cultural Imperative versus Neo-Institutional Choice,” Journal of Politics, v. 65, no. 1, February 2003, pp. 111–41Google Scholar
, “Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin,” American Journal of Political Science, v. 55, no. 3, July 2011, pp. 590–609Google Scholar
, “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa,” in and , eds., Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) pp. 50–67
, “The Power of the Powerless,” in , ed., Open Letters: Selected Writings, 1965–1990 (New York: Vintage, 1992)
, “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science,” American Political Science Review, v. 96, no. 4, December 2002, pp. 713–28Google Scholar
, “Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, v. 39, 2006, pp. 331–50Google Scholar
, “Managing Society: Protest, Civil Society and Regime in Putin’s Russia,” Slavic Review, v. 68, no. 3, Fall 2009, pp. 528–47Google Scholar
and , The New American Voter (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1996)
and , eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996)
, “Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, v. 17, no. 1, January 2006, pp. 5–20Google Scholar
and , Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
, Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005)
, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
and , eds., Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008)
, “Political Competition as an Obstacle to Judicial Independence: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine,” Comparative Political Studies, v. 43, no. 10, 2010, pp. 1202–29Google Scholar
, Judging Russia: Constitutional Court in Russian Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008)
, “A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government,” European Journal of Political Research, v. 8, no. 2, June 1980, pp. 165–87Google Scholar
, “Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes,” Comparative Politics, v. 34, no. 3, April 2002, pp. 253–72Google Scholar
, Semi-Presidentialism: Subtypes and Democratic Performance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)
, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” Journal of Democracy, v. 1, no. 1, Winter 1990, pp. 51–69Google Scholar
, , and , Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), pp. 20
, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1960)
, “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution,” Politics & Society, v. 36, no. 1, March 2008, pp. 35–60Google Scholar
, Political Consequences of Crony Capitalism inside Russia (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2010)
, Klientelizm i Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennost’ (Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1997)
, European Revolutions, 1492–1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993)
, “Resolving the Problem of Pre-Election Coordination: The 1999 Parliamentary Election as Elite Presidential ‘Primary,’” in and , eds., Elections, Parties and the Future of Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
, , and , Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
, Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
and , eds., Prometokrati: Mellan Diktatur och Demokrati (Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur, 2010)
and , Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
, Democracy, Dictatorship, and Term Limits (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014)
, , and , “On the Evasion of Executive Term Limits,” William and Mary Law Review, v. 52, no. 6, 2011, pp. 1807–73Google Scholar
, The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev (New York: Free Press, 2011)
and , Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011)
, “Peru’s Fujimori: A Caudillo Derails Democracy,” Current History, v. 92, no. 572, March 1993, pp. 112–20Google Scholar