In 2014, the UN Human Rights Committee published its Concluding Observations on the United States’ fourth periodic report on the progress of the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN Doc CCPR/C/SR/3061), in which also the US surveillance practices are criticised. The Committee’s insistence on the right to privacy and its exterritorial effect is an important first step, but it is not comprehensive, as by remaining within the individual rights framework the UN Human Rights Committee fails to sufficiently take into account the systemic challenges in play. Developing a constitution of the Internet would necessitate not only protecting individual fundamental rights against state interference, but protecting communicative spheres by guaranteeing institutional autonomies and subjecting all social spheres to democratic control; this also requires opening up spaces for a critical public, including whistleblowers, and establishing a right to cryptography – a crucial refraction in the polycentric panoptic schema.

In this article, I argue against the claim that the practice of the European Court of Human Rights cannot be reconciled with the democratic-procedural standards by which state parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, decide about the content and scope of human rights norms. First, I suggest drawing the attention to the neglected balancing exercise of the review process, in which the Court has to determine whether a violation is nevertheless ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Second, I shed light on the role that ‘pluralism’ plays in the balancing (with particular emphasis on Articles 8–11). Third, I argue that Thomas Christiano’s egalitarian argument for democracy can best illuminate the Court’s reliance on pluralism.

The explosion in the literature on global constitutionalism in recent times has come at the cost of ever more, and more diverse, definitions of the concept of constitutionalism. The state of the current debate can therefore be characterised, conceptually speaking, as a ‘constitutional cacophony’. This cacophony is the inevitable result of the ‘problems of translation’ in importing the state-based concept of constitutionalism to the global level. This article attempts to counter suprastate constitutional scepticism borne of these problems of translation and resulting cacophony by revisiting the concept of constitutionalism itself through the lens of legitimacy. Arguing that legitimacy provides both a key element of the concept of constitutionalism as well as a common denominator for the application of constitutionalism both at the state and suprastate levels, it develops a conception of ‘constitutionalism as legitimacy’ as a way of vindicating the role of constitutionalism in the context of global governance. It presents constitutionalism as a discursive ‘mixed’ form of legitimacy entailing both factual and normative components involving a blend of liberalism and republicanism. These theories are then reworked into a framework of reasons for the legitimacy of an authority centring around its origins, its aims and its methods. Tracing the relationship between constitutionalism and legitimacy in this way brings harmony to the global constitutional cacophony and allows for a plausible ‘translation’ of the concept of constitutionalism between the state and suprastate levels allowing for an effective ‘mapping’ and ‘shaping’ of legitimacy in global governance which is illustrated by reference to the legitimacy crisis surrounding the United Nations Security Council’s ‘war on terror’.

The article considers implications of contested multilateralism for the processes and normative standards of global constitutionalism. The focus is primarily on aspects of CM regarded as a mode of constitutional change, considering what to make of such a form of ‘extra-constitutional’ procedure. Research challenges for political science, law and normative political theory are identified. Challenges by CM to the stability of international law are argued to be overdrawn. Of greater concern is that CM lends itself to piecemeal adjustments rather than reforms with an eye to the systemic effects. However, these worries must be tempered by the non-ideal nature of the present legal structure which should make us wary of imposing normative standards drawn from settings where institutions are fully just and generally complied with.

The laws of war and international human rights law (IHRL) overlap, often with competing obligations. When two or more areas of the law overlap, political agents attempt to address these areas of ambiguity with interstitial rules. However, a lack of consensus on interstitial rules can destabilise the law, leading to increased contestation of legal norms and principles. Such is the case for international law in counterterrorism. Prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks (9/11), international agreements and US domestic practices placed counterterrorism within the framework of law enforcement. After 9/11, the Bush Administration replaced law enforcement with armed conflict and the laws of war as the dominant paradigm for counterterrorism, but this decision, among other legal justifications in the War on Terror, has been contested by the international legal community. As IHRL still applies in law enforcement operations, international law in counterterrorism now sits within a contested overlap of IHRL and the laws of war. The contestation of US policies in the War on Terror, including the use of drone strikes in particular, is a product of this unresolved overlap and the lack of clear interstitial rules. Lacking these rules, US counterterrorism policies risk undermining the rule of law.

This article argues that a distinction between the public and the private is both desirable and feasible in times of global governance, at least as a regulative idea. The confusion surrounding this distinction originates in different understandings of the relationship between state and society in liberalism and republicanism. Discourse theory with its idea of the co-origin of democracy and human rights reconceptualises the relationship between state and society in a way that does justice to both liberal and republican approaches. Accordingly, the public/private distinction is crucial for the realisation of democracy and freedom. Classifying an act as public or private determines what kind of legitimacy it requires. The article then recalibrates discourse theory to face the challenges of global governance, shifting its focus from hard law to a broader notion of authority, and from the state to a pluralistic, cosmopolitan world order composed of multiple overlapping communities. A community is characterised by communicative action and a common identity. In such a setting, public authority is the authority exercised on behalf of a community in relation to its members. In relation to non-members, the same act may constitute an exercise of private authority. It is a different question whether such authority is legitimate. Some examples illustrate the approach.

The judicial use of foreign law in constitutional cases is often unsatisfactorily explained in terms of persuasive authority, judicial learning or judicial dialogue. In this article, I argue that the central case of the judicial use of foreign law involves judges treating foreign case law as theoretically, rather than practically, authoritative. The justification for this approach lies in how case law emerges from a process that is structured in such a way that its outcomes deserve respect. There is, in contrast, no justification for any attempt on the part of judges to treat constitutional cases as an opportunity for interjurisdictional judicial dialogue.

Focusing on the expanding realm of international adjudication, this article approaches justice from the domain of the empirical and shows – through a careful, interview-based case study analysis in the WTO context – that justice in the international context is not only a contested concept, but also a multifaceted one, deeply embedded in notions such as the rule of law, fairness, equality, transformation, and cooperation. Whereas in the past, the primary, if not the sole role of international courts was that of settling disputes, in their modern legalised reincarnation these empowered international institutions have come to be seen primarily as enforcement mechanisms. Mechanisms that have been put in place by states in order to give effect to their originally negotiated commitments, and to hold states (or other entities) accountable for the international rules agreed-upon. Within this common enforcement-centred discourse of international courts, in turn, the natural tendency has so far been to think of ‘justice’ mainly through its ‘legal’ or ‘rule of law’ dimension. This article challenges this enforcement-centred discourse. Focusing on the vibrant WTO dispute settlement system (DSS) and its operation throughout the perennial EC–Bananas dispute, the article argues that the current enforcement-oriented debate of international courts, and the WTO DSS in particular, is lacking in several aspects. First, it brushes aside other important roles served by the DSS, and consequently overshadows the manifold social outcomes – beyond rule-compliance – produced by this system. Second, the prevalent rule-enforcement discourse further works in turn as to mask the multiple challenges of justice encapsulated in international disputes reaching the DSS docket, and obstructs the need to explore other conceptions of justice – beyond its legal-procedural meaning – such as global distributive, corrective, or transformative justice, through which the diverse roles and outcomes of the DSS may (and should) be evaluated. Against this backdrop, the article puts forwards a broad multifunctional account of the WTO DSS, which goes beyond the prevalent view of the system as primarily an enforcement mechanism, portraying it instead as a system of multiple, competing, and shifting roles. Among them, providing an orderly mechanism of renegotiation, redistribution, and settlement. Roles that essentially allow WTO Members to readjust their original WTO commitments and reallocate their burdens and benefits of international cooperation, and thereby to arrive at new – at times not fully legally-compliant – but not necessarily ‘unjust’ cooperative and sustainable social outcomes.

This essay analyses the consequences of contested multilateralism (CM) for the level of constitutionalisation of specific multilateral institutions. We argue that CM has implications for institutions’ constitutional quality in particular if it is polity-driven and not (merely) policy-driven, that is, when actors’ employment of alternative institutions stems from their dissatisfaction with the political order of an institution rather than individual policies. Given the co-existence of constitutionalised and non-constitutionalised multilateral institutions in today’s international order, state and non-state actors can use alternative institutions to contest the constraining or discretionary character of an institution’s polity. We hold that CM is likely to have negative consequences for the constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions if it is employed ‘top-down’ by states to enhance their freedom to wield discretionary authority, but that it is likely to have positive consequence if it is employed ‘bottom-up’ by society actors to constrain the exercise of discretionary authority through multilateral institutions. We illustrate the empirical plausibility of our claims in two cases involving top-down contestation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and bottom-up contestation of the World Health Organization (WHO).

This article examines the contemporary debate about the spread of transnational law and its sovereigntist critiques. Sovereigntists argue that the rapid development of international and transnational treaties and the emergence of regional human rights courts such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) undermine sovereignty and thus pose a threat to democratic self-determination. I criticise the new sovereigntism and argue that transnational human rights strengthen rather than weaken democratic sovereignty, and name processes through which rights-norms are contextualised in polities ‘democratic iterations’. I develop the ‘authorship model of democratic legitimacy’ in order to show how constitutional rights and international human rights can be understood to be in harmony and dissonance with one another. The challenge is to think beyond the binarisms of the cosmopolitan versus the civic republican; democratic versus the international and transnational; democratic sovereignty versus human rights law. Distinguishing between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty enables us to do so. By constraining certain sovereign powers of the state, international human rights regimes and courts can enhance popular sovereignty in that they strengthen the rights of the marginalised and the excluded. The article also briefly touches upon the significance of the Alien Tort Statute in US courts from the standpoint of the development of international human rights norms and focuses on Hirst v the United Kingdom, recently adjudicated by the ECtHR, to substantiate the distinction between state and popular sovereignty.

The article has sought to clarify the phenomenon of constitutional transfer through an analysis of the introduction and implementation of the individual complaint procedure in Turkey. Individual access to constitutional courts has recently attained prominence as an effective tool of human rights protection and it is viewed as an example of the broader phenomenon of transfer of constitutional ideas from a point of origin to a new host environment. Critically applying the IKEA theory of constitutional transfer to the Turkish experience of the individual application to the Constitutional Court, we argue that the transfer process involves more than a simple interaction between the promoter and the importer, both of whom have converging as well as diverging expectations. The Turkish experience has proved a useful case to demonstrate the dynamic and multifaceted nature of the process of constitutional transfers. The Venice Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, the Turkish Constitutional Court and the Turkish Government all have important stakes in the success of the transfer to realise their own policy objectives.

The religious freedom clauses of the Indian Constitution attempt to mediate between the competing claims of individuals, religious groups and the state, in a manner that is born out of specific historical circumstances. This article examines the controversial questions of whether, and to what extent, the Constitution grants individuals (specifically, dissenters) rights against the religious communities to which they belong. Taking as its point of departure a landmark Supreme Court judgment that struck down an anti-excommunication law, the article argues that the Indian Constitution is committed to an ‘anti-exclusion principle’: that is, group rights and group integrity are guaranteed to the extent – and only to the extent – that religious groups do not block individuals’ access to the basic public goods required to sustain a dignified life. Moreover – and unlike most other Constitutions – an individual may vindicate this right directly against her community in a court of law, by invoking the Constitution. This remedy is justified both philosophically, and in the specific context of Indian history. In this manner, Indian constitutionalism offers a novel and innovative solution to the perennial problem of balancing individual rights to religious freedom against the claims of community.