Effective arms control between rival states requires reconciling three autonomous elements simultaneously: a) politics—the substantive agreement about what military items and activities will be restricted or prohibited; b) technology—the means and methods to monitor compliance with those negotiated limitations; and c) law—the rights and obligations that enable effective international use of the designated verification capabilities. Each of these three variables changes over time; the history of arms control reveals the difficulty of keeping them in sync as international conditions evolve. Today, we are in a period of remarkably rapid revolution regarding all three factors—particularly evident in the air and space domains—which will generate exciting new opportunities and require negotiators to be extraordinarily deft and responsive. This essay reviews some illustrative prior state practice in arms control in harmonizing the three variables and speculates about future adaptations.

Weapons inspections in Iraq and Syria have drawn considerable attention from the international community in recent decades. This essay summarizes the key events associated with those inspections and draws upon my personal experience as a UN weapons inspector in both countries to identify lessons learned and future challenges. Those challenges include distrust among non-Western states, the difficulty of detecting much of the illicit activity, disinformation, and deficiencies in inspector training.

Over the past four decades, the most prolific time in recent memory for the negotiation and implementation of arms control treaties, a cadre of expertise was developed that enabled weapons inspections. Yet the pipeline for educating and developing rising generations to perform such inspections is now running dry, particularly outside of the United States and Europe. In this essay, I argue that we must invigorate efforts to develop and maintain that pipeline. I identify historical sources of expertise in the field of arms control and describe the obstacles that we face in maintaining them. I conclude by offering potential solutions to this problem, arguing that it is time to revitalize platforms for supporting cross-domain, cross-regional, and multi-generational nonproliferation experience and learning opportunities.

The intentional spread of disinformation is not a new challenge for the scientific world. We have seen it perpetuate the idea of a flat earth, convince communities that vaccines are more dangerous than helpful, and even suggest a connection between the “5G” communication infrastructure and COVID-19. Nor is disinformation a new phenomenon in the weapons inspection arena. Weapons inspectors themselves are often forced to sift through alternative narratives of events and inconsistent reporting, and they regularly see their credibility and conclusions questioned in the face of government politics or public biases. But certain recent disinformation campaigns have become so overwhelmingly comprehensive and effective that they constitute a new kind of threat. By preventing accountability for clear violations of international law, these campaigns have created a challenge to the survival of arms control treaties themselves. If weapons inspectors cannot regain the trust of the international community in the face of this challenge, it will be increasingly difficult to ensure compliance with arms control and disarmament treaties going forward. In this essay, I will briefly discuss one of the most comprehensive disinformation efforts of the past decade: the disinformation campaign used to prevent accountability for Syria's repeated use of chemical weapons. After this discussion, I will propose one possible approach to help protect the credibility of disarmament experts and weapons inspectors in the face of pervasive disinformation. This approach will require a concerted effort to connect and support compliance experts and to understand and explain their expertise across cultural, political, national, economic, and religious divides.

Two of the most pressing questions concerning international peace and security today are how to avoid an escalation of conflicts in cyberspace and how to ensure responsible behavior and accountability of states in their use of information and communication technologies. With more than thirty states now possessing offensive cyber capabilities and cybersecurity incidents such as Stuxnet, WannaCry, and NotPetya causing significant physical effects or financial damage, there is a clear need to find a better way to manage security risks connected with the use of increasingly sophisticated cyber means by states. At present, this issue is on the agenda of two United Nations groups and is mainly addressed through a “framework for responsible behavior of states” consisting of international law, voluntary and non-binding norms, and confidence-building measures for states’ use of information and communication technologies. What the current discussions do not address, however, is whether the security risks could also be regulated through an arms control and inspection regime for cyber weapons. While such a regime has been proposed by scholars, states remain skeptical or even actively opposed to efforts to impose traditional arms control measures on offensive cyber capabilities. This essay examines why a cyber weapons inspection regime is so difficult to devise. It argues that due to their nature and mode of functioning, cyber weapons significantly differ from traditional nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, such that mechanisms established by traditional arms control treaties either will not work or will not be agreed to by states. Instead, new regulatory approaches are necessary.