Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Moral argument and moral theory
- 2 Utilitarianism and contractualism
- 3 Utilitarianism and animal suffering
- 4 Utilitarianism and the harm of killing
- 5 Contractualism and animals
- 6 Animals and rational agency
- 7 Contractualism and character
- 8 Animals and conscious experience
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Index
2 - Utilitarianism and contractualism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Moral argument and moral theory
- 2 Utilitarianism and contractualism
- 3 Utilitarianism and animal suffering
- 4 Utilitarianism and the harm of killing
- 5 Contractualism and animals
- 6 Animals and rational agency
- 7 Contractualism and character
- 8 Animals and conscious experience
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Index
Summary
In this chapter I shall examine two theories (or classes of theory) that stand some chance of proving acceptable, both in respect of the explanations provided by their governing conceptions of the source of moral notions and moral motivation, and in respect of their basic normative output. The theories are utilitarianism and contractualism.
UTILITARIANISM AND ITS GOVERNING CONCEPTION
Although utilitarianism is named after its basic normative principle (the principle of utility), and although not all utilitarian thinkers have felt the need to provide their theory with a governing conception, I shall begin my discussion by outlining what I take that conception to be. The main idea is that morality may be viewed as the set of decisions that would be made by an impartial benevolent observer – an observer who is aware of all the conflicting interests in a given situation, and of the consequences that different policies would have for those interests, and who is equally sympathetic towards all of the parties involved. The governing conception of utilitarianism is thus an imaginary construction (as is the governing conception of contractualism, as we shall see later). The moral point of view is a sort of God's eye view, but independent of any belief in an actual God. It is the point of view that we would take if we could be fully aware of all the consequences of our actions, and could be equally sympathetic towards all those affected.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Animals IssueMoral Theory in Practice, pp. 25 - 49Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1992