In this chapter I shall begin considering what a utilitarian should say about the moral standing of animals. I shall confine my attention to the question of the moral standing of animal experience (particularly pleasure and pain), reserving to Chapter 4 discussion of utilitarian approaches to the value of animal life.

RACISM, SEXISM, AND SPECIESISM

Peter Singer has been prominent in arguing for the moral standing of animals and animal suffering, through such books as Animal Liberation and Practical Ethics. He does not, in fact, explicitly premise his argument on any version of utilitarianism. For he wants that argument to be acceptable to all, whatever their theoretical standpoint. His strategy here is a good one. Any moral argument will be the stronger for being able to survive translation between ethical theories, being equally stateable in a variety of them. I shall show later that Singer's argument is only really acceptable from a utilitarian standpoint, however – in particular, that it has no force against a contractualist. Singer's argument starts from a principle of equal consideration of interests. This holds that in any situation the interests of all those affected should be considered equally, which may sound, on the face of it, like a utilitarian principle. But in fact Singer is correct that, suitably interpreted, it should be equally acceptable to contractualists.